rather than any requirement that there be a finding in order to make the legislation operative.

Mr. SLAYMAN. Well, suppose this proposition is squarely before the Senate of the United States in the debate on this or any other legislation, and it is deleted or voted down, do you think that will change the law in any respect?

Senator JAVITS. I do not. I think the only reason I made the point was that when you compare the administration bill to Senator Johnson's bill, you find it in one and not the other. The issue being raised as between the bills is which bill do you prefer, and I evidenced my preference for the bill which would make this recital of the fact. But I do not believe it essential to the legislation. If it doesn't appear, it just doesn't appear. I don't think that changes the law or anything else.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Javits, we are very much indebted to you for your testimony and your very excellent response to questions. We appreciate your appearance here this morning.

Senator JAVITS. Senator O'Mahoney, may I apologize to my colleague, Senator Thurmond. I hope I didn't make my answers too long.

Senator ERVIN. On that point, I would like to make this comment. I was very much surprised to read a statement in the public press some months ago where the Department of Justice said that it had received fewer complaints of the deprivation of voting rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 than it had hoped to receive. One other observation. The Douglas bill starts something new in undertaking to have Congress approve Supreme Court decisions. If it can approve such decisions, Congress can also disapprove them. It certainly ought to disapprove the Stephen Girard case where the Supreme Court wrote a post mortem codicil to the last will and testament of a man who had been slumbering in the tongueless silence of the dreamless dust for 126 years, and who had evidently entertained the belief while he walked the earth's surface that making a will disposing of property was the function of the owners of the property rather than that of judges sitting on the bench 126 years after the will became effective. With that innovation I would like to offer an amendment to the bill to disapprove that decision.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

(The complete text of Senator Javits' statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAVITS

Enactment by the Congress of meaningful civil rights legislation at this session is even more crucial an issue than it was 2 years ago-serious as it was then when the first major civil rights bill in more than 80 years was passed. We have reached this critical crossroads primarily because much of the progress promised by many who led the drive to modify, weaken, and water down the original civil rights bill as finally approved by the Senate has not yet been realized.

The harsh lesson pressed home most often since 1957 is the grave omission made by the Senate in not retaining the original part III in the civil rights bill passed by the House of Representatives. I have introduced a bill, S. 456, cosponsored by Senators Keating, Case of New Jersey, Cooper, Scott, and Allott to amend the existing part III in the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to give the Attorney General the authority to bring civil suits seeking to obtain desegregation of the

public schools in accordance with the Supreme Court's historic 1954 decision. It would apply similarly to the protection of other constitutionally guaranteed rights, including the right without restriction to ride on public transportation and utilize public facilities.

This bill is both reasonable and moderate civil, not criminal proceedings are involved seeking compliance with the law. It is indispensable if we are to sustain the hand of southern moderates who, though they may not agree with the specific desegregation decision, recognize it as the supreme law of the land and seek in an orderly transition to a society where equal opportunity is the rule as well as the law for all. Therefore, should civil rights legislation reported out fail to contain such a provision, it is my intention to offer my bill restoring the original part III as an amendment to any civil rights bill which is considered by the Senate this year.

This legislation is similar to a provision in Senator Douglas' omnibus civil rights bill which I have cosponored. His bill represents a broad-scale attempt to provide Federal leadership in school desegregation by making available at the local level technical and financial assistance, and ultimately provides a means for implementing school desegregation plans. In addition, it is equally important that Congress act on the administration proposals, of which I am a cosponsor, to assist school districts wishing to desegregate, to extend the life of the Civil Rights Commission for another 2 years (also covered in a separate bill, S. 435, which I previously cosponsored), to assure education to military dependents in areas where local public schools are closed to avoid desegregating and to give the Attorney General subpena power in voting rights cases.

However, the key civil rights measure before the committee is the bill to restore the original part III. It would empower the Attorney General, upon written complaint, to begin civil injunctive proceedings against local officials or those conspiring with such officials to deprive a citizen of his constitutional civil rights under the 14th amendment.

Under present law, an individual may bring suit for civil injunction to protect his civil rights, but in many cases such a person may not be financially able to begin proceedings and the antibarratry statutes now on the books in six Southern States make it increasingly difficult for those deprived of their rights to seek the help of others to get judicial redress. The Attorney General must have power to act upon a showing that the person about to be deprived is himself financially unable to prosecute a civil proceeding on his own behalf.

I am well aware that it is now the position of the Justice Department that we should delay in considering this provision which it strongly supported 2 years ago. I cannot agree with this position. By postponing action in this area we are not increasing the likelihood of new gains a few years hence. Instead, we are inviting the hard core opponents of civil rights to toughen their resistance through additional laws, and other techniques which will discourage the members of any minority group from safeguarding or securing their rights.

It has been 5 years since the Supreme Court decision ordering public schools to desegregate. In the 2 school years starting in the fall of 1954 and ending in the summer of 1956, 450 school districts achieved an integrated situation in which Negro students had the opportunity of attending a nonsegregated school. In 1956-57, 270 districts desegregated, and last year, 60 others followed suit. However, only 18 new school districts have desegregated so far in 1958-59, with three-quarters of the school year already over. For 2,600,000 Negro public school pupils living in 18 States the door to equality of opportunity in education remains closed; even "token" desegregation does not exist in their school districts. If it is to be opened in the foreseeable future, then the restoration of the original part III is essential.

I believe it is clear that the threat of filibuster was a major consideration in the elimination of this section in the original 1957 bill. We have the view of the Senate majority leader, Senator Lyndon Johnson, that even the slight modification of Senate rule 22 adopted at the beginning of this session now will help to protect against the threat of filibuster. I earnestly hope he is right. A final vote on my proposed amendment would furnish real evidence that the filibuster, or the threat of its use, have become ineffective weapons in the civil rights fight in the Senate.

Senator Johnson's bill could represent a significant step in the field of civil rights, but it poses a serious problem in that area. It is a laudable event when a bill dealing with this subject is proposed by the majority leader of the Senate who comes from a State which was once considered to be part of the South. As

a matter of fact, the last three provisions of Senator Johnson's bill are also to be found in the administration program, and in other bills which I myself have introduced or cosponsored earlier in the session.

I have serious reservations, however, about the first part of the Johnson bill, title I, which establishes a community relations service. This provision seeks to establish a conciliation service-but how can there be conciliation of a flat refusal to obey the law? How can a citizen's insistence upon exercising his constitutional rights be conciliated or compromised? This is not a question of a difference of opinion on practice or timing-in which case conciliation would be useful-this is simply a question of obeying or disobeying the law and the courts.

Certainly conciliation is attractive, but we must be careful that in seeking to compromise an issue we do not seek to compromise our form of government. Certainly, without some accompanying provision for enforcement, conciliation presents this danger in the present frame of reference.

There are two substantial changes which are certainly essential to Senator Johnson's bill. The first is the addition of civil enforcement provisions, such as those in my bill and that of Senator Douglas, but presently not contained in Senator Johnson's legislation. The absence of authority of the Attorney General to enforce constitutional rights is, of course, the most serious gap in Senator Johnson's proposals. The second change needed is in his statement of purposes so that it clearly recognizes that the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is the supreme law of the land, and that there is an irrevo cable obligation to obey that law and to desegregate. This recognition is set forth in one of the administration proposals. The time has come for the Congress to stand firmly behind the courts in this area-to indicate that it stands for law and order and obedience to the Constitution.

A repetition of last year's inaction by the Congress on civil rights measures in the weeks and months ahead may make us unwilling witnesses to a series of new crises and mounting tensions which may erupt in communities throughout the South. We have a duty to take timely action by enacting needed measures into law.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Senator Thurmond.

STATEMENT OF HON. STROM THURMOND, U.S. SENATOR FROM

SOUTH CAROLINA

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, before making my statement, I would like to say that the distinguished Governor of South Caro lina, Ernest F. Hollings, desires to testify before this committee, and in letters to my colleague Senator Johnston and to me he has suggested the date of April 8, if that date is suitable. If that date is not suitable, then I presume another date will be fixed for him to testify.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Has he written to the committee, Senator? Senator THURMOND. He would like for the date to be fixed as early as possible.

Senator O'MAHONEY. You are delivering the message on his behalf?

Senator THURMOND. I have talked to him yesterday, and he would like for the date to be fixed as early as possible because he has a number of other engagements and he is hesitating to make any further engagements until this date has been fixed.

Senator O'MAHONEY. The committee will look over the schedule of witnesses and advise you and the Governor when he can conveniently appear.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

I wish to comment in detail on the lack of merit of each of the socalled civil rights proposals under consideration by your committee.

I shall address myself to the detailed provisions, subject by subject. First, however, I would like to comment briefly on the philosophy which apparently breeds such proposals.

The philosophy of which I shall speak is responsible for all of the bills on this subject, directly or indirectly, but is most evident in the provisions of S. 810. This proposal is extreme. It is punitive. It is flagrantly abusive. It is palpably and viciously antisouthern. It would, in effect, treat the South as a conquered province, to be ruled over, insofar as race relations are concerned, by a czar in the person of the Attorney General of the United States. It is, in every respect, a conquered-province bill.

That the bill has this sweeping purpose is not surprising to me, in view of the curious attitude exhibited toward the South by those who adhere to the philosophy which bred it. On occasions, I have heard those enslaved to this philosophy, when speaking with regard to the South's effort to turn aside, or at least to soften, some of the more extreme legislative blows aimed at it, remark, somewhat ruefully, that they sometimes wonder just which side did win the Civil War. Such a remark, spoken in a serious manner, reflects, I repeat, a curious attitude an attitude which seems to be that the North, having been victorious in war, should by right, or might, have a free hand to work its will on the South; and that there is something altogether unreasonable, almost outrageous, or shocking-about the South actively offering any objections. There would seem to be almost a sort of resentment that the South should offer any resistance at all to northern efforts to remake the South or to write new laws for it. This strange attitude toward the South-which has become increasingly noticeable on the part, not only of certain political figures, but of various editors, authors, professors, and national labor leaders-is reminiscent of the attitude which prevailed in the North after the War Between the States and even long after Reconstruction.

This attitude on the part of the North was very ably described by a southern scholar, Frank Lawrence Owsley, who wrote on the subject nearly three decades ago. Mr. Owsley wrote, and I quote:

After the South had been conquered by war and *** impoverished by peace, there still appeared to remain something which made the South different-some thing intangible, incomprehensible, in the realm of the spirit. That too must be invaded and destroyed; so there commenced a second war of conquest, the conquest of the southern mind, calculated to remake every southern opinion, to impose the northern way of life and thought upon the South, write "error" across the pages of southern history which were out of keeping with the northern legend, and set the rising and unborn generations upon stools of everlasting repentance. Francis Wayland, former president of Brown University, regarded the South as "the new missionary ground for the national schoolteacher," and President Hill, of Harvard, looked forward to the task of the North "of spreading knowledge and culture over the regions that sat in darkness."

Wayland and Hill, of course, dealt with what might be called the educational and cultural front. Their counterparts on the political and governmental front were Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania and Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts; and the theoretical rationalization of the line of thinking-or of malice-on which Stevens and Sumner operated, in dealing with the South, is known as the conquered-province theory. In essence, this theory held that the South, having been defeated in war, was a conquered province, to be dealt with by the victorious North as the North saw fit.

The whole curious attitude toward the South reflects, it seems to me, something of this same attitude of treating the South as a conquered province. Certainly this bill, emphasizing as it does the forcible integration of southern schools, proceeds upon that theory. Certainly, beyond any possible dispute, this bill makes a mockery of the fundamental and once cherished principle, apparently now discarded from our governmental system of "government by the consent of the governed."

Speaking of this idea of "consent of the governed," I sometimes wonder if it has ever occurred to those Senators and others who are constantly proposing new methods of integrating southern schools that the people of each and every one of the Southern States could, at any time they should so wish, either through their legislatures or through amendment of their State constitutions, abolish segregation of the races in any sphere of activity controlled by their State? I further wonder if it occurs to the Senators that the reason why these States have not taken this action is that the overwhelming majority of the people of these States do not wish to take such action? I further wonder if it occurs to the Senators that, whatever may be the opinion of the majority of the people of the North as to integration, to force the integration of southern schools in the face of the obvious and manifest opposition of the overwhelming majority of the southern people is the very negation of the principle of "government by consent of the governed"?

The philosophy, which breeds a conquered province bill, is a disgrace to our country's heritage. No such attitude has reared its ugly head after any other war in which we have engaged. Our attitude toward the Axis' powers following World War II was magnanimous. Yet, the conquered-province bill is the offspring of the same philosophy which prompts Russia's treatment of its East European conquests and which we heartily-and correctly-do condemn and deplore. Is the outgrowth of this philosophy any less despicable when evidenced in our own land? It would not be remiss to apply the words of the third verse of the seventh chapter of St. Matthew, "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considereth not the beam that is in thine own eye?" I sincerely hope that objectivity and reason will triumph over the philosophy which bred this conquered-province bill, for only this mother philosophy can nurture the offspring, and without this philosophy the bill will die as it justly deserves.

I turn now to the lack of merit of the various proposals. Two of the proposals pending before the committee, specifically title I of S. 810, and S. 958, provide in varying degree for the endorsement by Congress of the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions.

I will not discuss the demerits of those decisions beyond saying that they ignore the existence of the 10th amendment to the Constitution, the doctrine of stare decisis, and the wisdom of all previous courts; they are based solely on erroneous sociological theories rather than law, and they are a living exemplification of the lack of judicial restraint which has characterized the present Court. I would address myself, rather, to the foreseeable effects of a congressional endorsement of those decisions.

The endorsement by Congress of a Court decision would, in the first place, constitute an invasion by the legislative branch of the