APPENDIX AGENCY AND OTHER COMMENTS REQUESTED J. ERVIN, Jr., Comments on S. 40 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, New Senate Office g, Washington, D.C. . CHAIRMAN: This responds to your invitation to comment on S. 40, improve and implement procedures for fiscal controls in the United ernment and for other purposes." roposes to establish the Joint Committee on Budget which will prepare ive budget, to require the President's budget to include five-year at a very detailed level, to limit authorizations of major expenditure ▷ three years, to require pilot testing of new major expenditure prore implementation, and to provide all appropriations, with minor on an annual basis. support the general objectives of S. 40, we do have some reservaggestions concerning certain provisions of the bill. concerning the provision which requires the heads of departments and ncluding the Office of Management and Budget, to furnish such à and data requested by the Joint Committee, we will be glad to a requested information as could be assembled on the contents of nt's budget recommendations or on the facts with regard to actual I the past years. This would, of course, not include working papers mal nature, showing advice to the President that may or may not eflected in his budget recommendations. Under existing policies, after has been transmitted to the Congress, the Administration's witnesses, eads of agencies, will continue to provide information concerning their missions when requested by members of the Congress in connection consideration of the budget. We do suggest that "to the extent posded to this provision, to reflect the practical limitations that at times ability of the executive branch to respond to these requests. some redundancy in the detailed requirements of the "legislative e requirements in subparagraphs (1) and (2) are repeated in sub(3). Also, while there is a provision for the Joint Commission to make tions when the total estimated receipts exceed the proposed expendiis no provision for situations when the total estimated receipts are e proposed expenditures. ificantly, the "legislative budget" is due not later than May 31. This pinion, too late. Since it would be out of order in either House to y bill or joint resolution making appropriations or authorizing apuntil the legislative budget has been formulated, only one month in to consider all necessary authorization and appropriation bills eginning of the next fiscal year. This could rule out the timely enappropriations bills and compound the attendant problems. n, in reporting out a bill, the requirement for explaining the excess appropriations or authorizations over the legislative budget does sufficient "teeth' to enforce the budget ceiling. For the ceiling to be ere should be a requirement for a vote larger than a simple majority se before passing a bill with amounts exceeding those in the legislaAt the same time, consideration should be given to providing for nother programs when ceilings are exceeded. (407) Title II. An amendment is proposed to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1 to require the President's Budget to provide for estimated expenditures a proposed appropriations "for the ensuing fiscal year and the fiscal years mediately following." We believe that a five-year projection at some aggreg level is necessary and desirable. In fact, we have been working toward this g and have attempted each year to provide more and more long-range informati in the budget. We will continue to work on this. We are, however, extrem concerned with the amount of detail involved in producing the five-year proj tions by each appropriation account as required by the bill. If the informati is produced too fast within the time constraints of the Presidential budget pro ess, it would not be too realistic because of insufficient consideration and d liberation. Also, we question whether projections would really be helpful at th level of detail. It is most unreasonable and impractical to require the President to submit, addition to the regular budget, alternative budgets taking into account co tingency plans in the event of either major disasters or economic or strategic di locations. There are just too many variables in the types of disasters and disloc tions, severity and extent, geographic involvement, etc. This requirement wi delay the submission of the budget to the Congress and, consequently, i deliberation. Title III. A provision in this Title limits the period of authorizations to thre years for any major expenditure program except for those funded in whole o major part by user taxes. We believe that the authorizations, especially thos for major procurement, construction, and research programs, should be for th entire project regardless of the period required for completion. It takes mor than three years from a decision on space exploration to its fruition or from a decision to action on a new weapons system. Accordingly, by viewing a projec as a total entity, authorizations can be made with better visibility, the "foot-inthe-door" approach can be avoided, and management in the executive branch can be enhanced. The Congress will not sacrifice its right to review, expand or contract the programs. Another provision of this Title states that the period in which "comprehensive reviews" are to be made of the major programs is the last whole fiscal year for which appropriations are authorized. Since such reviews must precede future authorizations, and authorizations in turn must precede the appropriation process, the passage of appropriations bills could be delayed until deep in the fiscal year to which they apply if reviews are performed late. We, therefore, believe that such reviews should be completed not later than the end of the fiscal year before the final authorized year. This would facilitate the renewal of authorization before it expires. We do not object to a three-year limitation of authorizations for on-going operations provided that they are presented on a timely basis and that appropriations become law after a specified date, even though the authorizations are not enacted. This might remove the impediment to timely appropriations now caused by unenacted authorizations. Title V. The requirement that all appropriations (with two stated exceptions) be annual appropriations is not practical or desirable. Although most appropriations for current operations are now made available for obligation for a year, some are made for a specified number of years. Others, including many of those for construction, research, and nearly all trust fund appropriations are made available until the purpose is accomplished, and, therefore, remain available for obligations until the objectives have been achieved. Complete conversion of all appropriations to annual appropriations in some of these cases would remove some desirable flexibility and make the management of the government more difficult. Further, budget authority for some of the Federal funds and most of trust funds becomes available from time to time without further action by the Congress. We agree that periodic review of these provisions would be in the public interest, but annual appropriations seem unduly restrictive and unnecessary. One way for the Congress to better control multiyear appropriations is to require both the authorizing bill and the appropriation bill to provide for them specifically. Under this procedure, neither the authorizing law or the appropriation act could authorize a multiyear appropriation by itself. the provision which limits expenditures in any fiscal year only to is enacted for that fiscal year does not recognize the fact that a ortion of outlays results from obligations incurred in prior fiscal reasons, we recommend against enactment of this bill. ely, ERVIN, Jr., WILFRED H. ROMMEL, Assistant Director for Legislative Reference. Comments on S. 565 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ommittee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, New Senate ilding, Washington, D.C. CHAIRMAN: This responds to your invitation to comment on S. 565, a re the Congress to prescribe a ceiling on expenditures for each fiscal stablish procedures to effectuate such ceilings." ovides for the Congress to prescribe by law a limit on the total itlays to be made in a fiscal year by the Federal Government. The 1 be required to keep outlays within the limit, by reserving amounts ly from spending for each functional category in the budget (extrollables). we endorse the concept of limiting outlays, the bill does not go far bill contemplates that the Congress will continue the practice uthority to spend in amounts it considers appropriate for each inram but with no mechanism to keep them from aggregating to too This, we believe, avoids facing the basic issue. We believe the Conset the outlay ceiling early in each session and establish a rigorous o take account of the ceiling in its authorizing and appropriating ould deliberately reflect the ceilings in the new obligation authority egislative process. It should also review the unspent authority enr years for termination or reductions if deemed necessary to stay tlay ceiling. the proportionate reduction approach does not provide for the exexpenditures as to the individual merits of each program, as well onship of each to the overall budget. For example, a 10 percent rea appropriation for a building or for an aircraft runway would e this year's contract by 10 percent. It could thus delay completion t for a short time, probably into the next fiscal year. Further, its ays for this year might be as little as one percent because of the lag ents behind the contracting process itself. On the other hand, a 10 ction in the appropriation for Federal law enforcement, prison orts, regulatory functions, and other labor intensive activities would beration of these activities disproportionately and would generally perations earlier and more harshly than other kinds of activities. easons, we recommend against enactment of this bill. -ly, mmittee on Government Operations, ew Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. HAIRMAN: This responds to your invitation to comment on S. 703, trol Federal spending by requiring an annual ceiling on expendiobligational authority." The bill provides for the Congress to prescribe by law (1) a limit on the amount of expenditures and (2) a limit on the total amount of new obligati authority to be made available during a fiscal year. The President will b quired to keep outlays and the use of new obligation authorities within limits, by reserving amounts proportionally from spending and obligating each program and activity of the government (excluding specified un trollables). Amounts reserved for new obligational authority will expire at end of the fiscal year and will be reported to the Congress 90 days after close of the year. The bill contemplates that the Congress will continue the practice of enac authority to spend in amounts which it considers appropriate for each i vidual program without regard to the overall ceiling. We believe the Cong should set the ceiling early in the session and establish a rigorous mechan to take account of the ceilings in its authorizing and appropriating proc It should deliberately reflect the ceilings in the new obligation authority thro the legislative process. It should also review the unspent authority enacted prior years for termination or reduction if deemed necessary to stay within outlay ceiling. Also, the proportionate reduction approach does not provide for the exami tion of expenditures as to the individual merits of each program, as well as relationship of each to the overall budget. For example a 10 percent reduct in an appropriatoin for a building or for an aircraft runway would meely ed this year's contract by 10 percent. It could thus delay completion of the proj for a short time, probably into the next fiscal year. Further, its effect on outla for this year might be as little as 1 percent because of the lag of disburseme behind the contracting process itself. On the other hand, a 10 percent reducti in the appropriation for Federal law enforcement, prison guards, passpor regulatory functions, and other labor intensive activities would curtail t operation of these activities disproportionately and would generally affect the operations earlier and more harshly than other kinds of activities. For these reasons, we recommend against enactment of this bill. Sincerely, WILFRED H. ROMMEL, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to your requests for the views o this Department on S. 565, “Expenditure Control Act of 1973", and S. 70 "Fiscal Responsibility Act." The bills would provide that after the submission of the budget by the Pres dent for each fiscal year (beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974 the Congress would prescribe a limit on the total amount of outlays (includin net lending) to be made by the United States Government during that fiscal year To enforce this limitation the President would proportionately reduce spend ing in amounts necessary to keep outlays within the limit prescribed. The bill would make an exception to this proportional reduction for outlays which ar not controllable and emergencies. The proposed proportional reduction would be contrary to the principles o efficient program administration and would limit flexibility to establish prior ities in the allocation of scarce budgetary resources in response to rapidly chang ing domestic and national security needs. In view of the foregoing, the Department would be opposed to the bills. The Department has been advised by the Office of Management and Budge that there is no objection from the standpoint of the Administration's program to the submission of this report to your Committee. Sincerely yours, SAMUEL R. PIERCE, Jr., ERVIN, Jr., Comments on S. 758 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, mmittee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, New Senate ding, Washington, D.C. HAIRMAN: This responds to your invitation to comment on S. 758, rove and strengthen the role of Congress with respect to budget ersight matters." poses to change the current fiscal year to a calendar year basis, ceiling for new obligation authority in the Congress' appropriand to improve Congressional oversight, in part, by obtaining addition from the Executive Branch. ides for changing the fiscal year to the calendar year basis. Our proposal has led us to conclude that a change in the fiscal year the heart of the problem addressed by the bill. At best it will of temporary confusion and lack of control during the transition. , a change in the fiscal year would make fundamental changes in the budget which is, at present, an all-encompassing program plan. The changes would necessitate that the President submit proposals well in advance of his budget to enable the Congress w authorizing legislation when the session begins in January. such legislation, the Congress would be handicapped without nship of the legislative program to the budget totals which would at a later date. Further, legislative proposals submitted too early lete assessment of the corresponding fiscal policy might well be a sion during the review of the budget. ng law, the President is required to submit the budget within 15 Congress convenes its annual session in January-about six and a fter the close of the prior fiscal year. This period is used to ailed actual data for the prior fiscal year and to firm up Presiendations on funding requests and programs for the upcoming on the calendar year basis, provides for transmittal of the get on or before April 15, which would be only three and a half the close of the prior fiscal year. This schedule shortens the g the accounts and assembling data from all over the world, ens the President's decisionmaking time by three months. This increase the difficulties of preparing the budget, a task which sent time limitations grows more difficult each year because of ral expansion. ndar year basis, the Congress would have eight and a half sideration of the budget compared to the current five and a half ncrease in time is deceptive. During this time, the Congress for summer recesses, and for biennial and general election • the transition period, a provision is made to provide budget -ing the period July 1-December 31, 1974. This amount is to be 0 percent of the amount appropriated for fiscal 1974, which ance for changes in programs or program levels following the he 1974 appropriations. Nor does it allow for the fact that some such as certain public works, are one-time matters for which iation in the following six months would be unnecessary. The only ve would be for the Congress to go through two complete budget 12-month period when the transition is to take place. One of the as not addressed in this legislation is the change in relatione and local governments, most of which now have the same » Federal Government. btedly know, the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, ber 5, 1971 report, concluded that a change in the fiscal year marginally at best, to the time actually available for authorizaons action prior to the beginning of each new fiscal year. =s, in spite of all these difficulties, concludes that a change in fiscal e, we would appreciate the opportunity to work with you for - procedures and mechanisms for the transition period and for ess in the years following. -pt. 1-27 |