st establish a ceiling each year but that it must take the basic espect to spending priorities. These, in turn, require a much greater 1 the Congress to evaluate programs from the point of view of including effects on the economy of the nation. More often than not, enacted without sufficient analysis of costs and benefits both 1 long term. ted, the Joint Economic Committee, on which I have the honor Vice Chairman at the present time, has been very much concerned tion of public spending priorities. We consider this a central issue omic policy. In July of 1971, I testified that Congressional failure job of assessing spending priorities was tragic. Within our limited Joint Economic Committee has made a significant effort to study of spending priorities and the related subject of cost-benefit economic evaluation of public spending. We have had a number of ssued numerous studies and reports. of 1970 entitled, “Economic Analysis and Efficiency of Government", › recommended that Congress develop a capbility to provide objeclysis and program evaluation on a continuing basis for the use of That report recommended that an Office of Economic Evaluation be established as a separate staff unit within the Joint Economic th the understanding that the proposed office be responsible to all offices and assist them in obtaining analytical studies, data, and 1 policy and program alternatives. ́as considered in connection with a bill which my colleague, Senantroduced in the 92nd Congress, entitled the "Full Opportunity and s and Priorities Act." One section of that bill would have estabof goals and priorities to perform in general the same functions as ormed under the proposal outlined in our earlier report. In the bill's passage in the Senate (it was not taken up in the House) at a majority of Senators were of the opinion that the office should y thereby guaranteeing its availability to all of the Senate. While vith this alternative because of the overriding importance of proual competence in analysis to the Senate, I do have fears about e effectiveness of such an office by making it completely independervisory direction. I think it is most important to locate such an major committee so as to give it the strength and direction needed functions. I do not intend to urge upon your committee that the ly be associated with the Joint Economic Committee but I do urge it be given appropriate committee control and direction. Moreover, o take this opportunity to urge upon you the vital importance of analytical competence to the Congress in the performance of its b) of the bill provides that the Joint Economic Committee hold y after Congressional receipt of the U.S. budget and make a report s shortly thereafter, setting forth an estimate of revenues to be g the coming fiscal year along with a recommendation of the , by which outlays should exceed revenues or revenues exceed r to promote the general welfare and otprovide maximum employon, and purchasing power. In its annual report to the Congress required by the Employment Act, the Joint Economic Committee n effect. This year our report was filed somewhat later than usual elays attendant upon the inauguration. I add the specific requirement that the Joint Economic Committee mit on the total amount of aggregate new obligational authority the amounts of new obligational authority for each functional should be enacted during the fiscal year, along with a limit on the 2 outlays both in the aggregate and for each functional category ng the fiscal year. Upon receipt of this report, the Appropriations ld be required to report to their respective Houses a bill estab1 outlays to be made during the fiscal year. Under the provisions pt action would be required so that the aforementioned ceilings shed early in the legislative year. . I think these steps are all positive and highly desirable. I suptives wholeheartedly. At the same time. I do not feel that it is me to comment on the specific details of this bill now, either in orementioned issues or in respect to additional provisions relating to the departmental budget process, legislative oversight, and veto of fun poundment, limitations on authorization and the taxpayer information provi As a member of the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control which, as know, is now studying the question of a Congressional spending ceiling related matters, I am sure that our findings will have direct bearing on the i raised in S. 1030. As a member of that Committee, I feel it most appropriat me to reserve judgment on the many specific issues involved in legislation as the bill now before you. At the same time, I want to stress that the objec of S. 1030 in respect to increasing the competence of the Congress to deal with spending issue are most desirable. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on these highly important issues. Comments on S. 1030 Vice Chairma Hon. SAM J. ERVINS, Jr., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, New Senate O Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This responds to your invitation to comment on S. 10 This bill, among other things, proposes to establish a Congressional Office Budget Analysis and Program Evaluation; to provide participation by State a local officials and the general public in the budget process; to provide investi tion by the Comptroller General of impoundment reports: and to provide le lation oversight and veto of impoundments. This bill contains interesting ideas, many of which are not germane to solv the fundamental problem of restoring congressional control over the budg In fact, some of the provisions would add greatly to the existing burden with commensurate benefit accruing to the Congress, the President or the public. C comments and suggestions are provided in the following paragraphs. Title I. We have strong objections to two of the provisions in this title; th they are concerned with (1) the addition of detailed information to be submitt in the budget and (2) the submission of so-called budget information to the Co gress before the President has had the opportunity to reconcile competing a conflicting objectives and to prepare his budget. First, there is a requirement to include in the budget, a detailed evaluati of functions, activities, and authorities for which appropriations are pr posed; a detailed explanation for increases and decreases in appropriations expenditure for functions, activities, or authorities; and a detailed explanatio for each function, activity, or authority of the reasons for proposing appr priations in amounts less than the amounts authorized. A large portion of the have little or nothing to do with the major decisions of the budget. In fact, to much detail can and does obscure an understanding of the major issues. Th President's Budget Message and the program statements in the Budget Appendi already provide the kind of evaluations and explanations that are feasible i documents of this type: executive branch witnesses can give other detail i their testimony before the appropriate congressional committees. Specific re quests for data by the Congress should certainly be honored if such data ar obtainable, and will be, but the attempt to require additional across-the-boar requirements for the whole Government to be published in the President's budge would undoubtedly delay the submission of the budget to the Congress, which would, in turn, shorten the time available for the Congress in its deliberations. The second concern we have is the wide-open requirement for agencies and the Office of Management and Budget to submit any and all information re quested by the Congress. We will be glad to furnish such program and fiscal data as we have for the coming year. This would, of course, not include working papers of an internal nature, showing advice to the President that may or may not have been reflected in his budget recommendations. Also, under existing policies, after the President's budget has been submitted to the Congress, the Administration's witnesses, including heads of agencies, will continue to provide information concerning their budget submissions when requested by Members of the Congress in connection with their consideration of the budget. he requirements to allow State and local officials to participate in the ss and the proposal that the Executive Branch hold public hearings quests will further burden the already overburdened budget process uire the consumption of more time and effort. These activities will various avenues the State and local officials and the general public e their desires known to the agencies, to the President, and to the e firmly believe that the goals should be the simplification of the he reduction of processing time now required. Since the President's sents a proposal to the Congress, and not a final document in and nal participation by other elements of the public and private sector Executive Branch would be inappropriate and duplicate the funcongress in large measure. also covers the submission of certain budgetary information to the r views on this subject have already been presented in our comle I. and IV. The provisions in these titles designate the Comptroller nvestigate impoundments and make reports on "violations," and t such impoundments shall cease to be effective unless the Congress em within 30 days by a concurrent resolution. isions would alter the long-established relationships between the nd Executive Branches of the Government, and would constitute a ngement upon the President's authority and responsibility to "exvs enacted by the Congress. The establishment of reserves within an 1, and their release, is an action of an administrative nature, fully th the President's constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be cuted." ional disapproval of certain reserves could create a real problem g must be restricted to comply with other statutes, such as the statuthe national debt. So long as the Congress continues to avoid limitamount of all appropriations and other budget authority for any o that spending thereunder is within available receipts and borthe applicable statutory debt limit, it is illogical and impractical ess to attempt to restrict the President's ability to control spending. uld hamper the President in the exercise of needed flexibility to deal g economic conditions and would reduce his ability to respond conomic necessities. provision in this title limits the period of authorizations to three major expenditure program except for these funded in whole or y user taxes. We believe that the authorizations, especially those for ement, constructions, and research programs, should be for the enegardless of the period required for completion. It takes more than om a decision on space exploration to its fruition or from a decision new weapons system. Accordingly, by viewing a project as a total rizations can be made with better visibility, the "foot-in-the-door" be avoided, and management of the Govergnment can be enhanced. I will not sacrifice its right to review, expand or contract the vision of this title states that the period in which "comprehensive to be made of the major programs is the last whole fiscal year for riations are authorized. Since such reviews must precede authorauthorizations in turn must precede the appropriation process, of appropriations bills could be delayed until deep in the fiscal they apply if reviews are performed late. We, therefore, believe that should be completed not later than the end of the fiscal year before orized year. This would facilitate the renewal of authorization benment programs, including a large part of the work of the Departerce, for example, are not currently subject to authorizations which Hollar terms or which frequently expire. The fundamental concept rams is one of leaving to the appropriations process the making al decisions on the need for the program and its size from year to insufficient evidence at hand to persuade us that this traditional y effective approach should be abandoned, as this bill would ap re. We do not object to a three-year limitation of present dollar authoriz for on-going operations, provided that they are presented on a timely basi that appropriations become law after a specified date, even though acti enactment of the authorizations has been delayed. This might remove th pediment to timely appropriations now caused by unenacted authorizations Title VI. This title provides that the Secretary of the Treasury or his nated representative shall furnish each individual taxpayer upon receipt income tax return a statement of how his taxes were used proportionatel a number of specified purposes. While specific comments on this section are more properly the purview o Treasury Department, we see little real merit to the proposal, certainly n the extent that it would warrant an extensive expenditure of resources. the President's budget and Treasury's annual publication, "Your Federal In Tax," now show expenditure breakdowns on how each dollar was spent. Sincerely, (Signed) Wilfred H. Rommel WILFRED H. ROMMEL, Assistant Director for Legislative Referen Comments on S. 905 and S. 1030 CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your request for my comments on S. 1030 and S. are appreciated. Both of these bills deal with a subject of overriding importance. It is obvi that Congress must reassert its constitutional powers to control public spendi This is one facet of the much broader question of relationships between the Leg lative and Executive Branches. Your leadership in exposing the dimensions Executive usurpation of power are an inspiration to us all and I want you know that you have my wholehearted support in your endeavors. Both of these bills would establish procedures whereby the Congress wou establish limitations on aggregate spending and both would provide for Congre sional establishment of limitations on programs and sub-categories of the budge The bills would require that the Joint Economic Committee recommend to t Appropriations Committees the appropriate levels of revenues and expenditu for maintaining suitable growth and stability of the economy of the Unite States. It is most obvious that the fiscal policies of the Government have a very larg effect on the economic welfare of the country, not only because of the large aggr gate of Federal spending but also because of the extensive effects of Federa programs on the entire economy. For this reason, it is most appropriate for th Joint Economic Committee to make a contribution to the process of setting ceiling on spending in the Congress and on the equally important question o setting spending priorities. As a matter of fact, the Joint Economic Committee, for many years, has mad recommendations on the appropriate fiscal mix and on the need for a surplus of deficit, as the case may be, each year in connection with its annual report to the Congress. The Employment Act of 1946 requires that the Joint Economic Com mittee, "as a guide to the several Committees of the Congress. . . not later than March 1 of each year, file a report with the Senate and House of Representatives containing its findings and recommendations with respect to each of the main recommendations made by the President in the Economic Report, and, from time to time, to make such other reports and recommendations to the Senate and House of Representatives as it deems advisable." As I see it, the bills before your Committee would make somewhat more specific the existing requirements on the Joint Economic Committee and would relate them specifically to the proposed procedures for setting Congressional limitations on spending. The proposed procedures are highly commendable, in my opinion, and I hasten to assure you that the Joint Economic Committee would, if given these new responsibilities, do its utmost to provide the advice and counsel called for. me assure you of my continuing support in your admirable efforts to althier balance as between the Congress and the Executive Branch. rely, s. Mr. President, on March 15, 1973, I offered testimony before the essional Study Committee on Budget Control. At that time I stated xploring ways in which to make vital budget information available through a restructuring of the way the Office of Management and nts the budget to Congress. introducing the Congressional Budget Control Act of 1973. Through 1 legislation, I hope to offer a framework to help the Congress regain does not now have over the budget. that the most effective way to get that control over programs is to arly steps which actually determine the level of spending that Cons concerned about later-when it is too late to do anything about it. at Congress ought to be setting the priorities within a budget target herefore, have the visibility within individual programs to effect the dollars that these programs eventually command. I believe that st have a clear picture of what separate public needs the Federal is trying to satisfy; and I believe Congress must have the capability nd collect in sensible groupings all the programs and activities we get. Congressional Study Committee on Budget Control has cited the rmation which will show the effect on expenditures resulting from proposed legislation. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Manageadget, in cooperation with the Comptroller General, to develop a information and data processing system for budgetary and fiscal develop also a standard set of classification of programs, receipts, ures to be used in the budget system. The Comptroller General has at n contemplated by the executive branch will not fulfill the informathe Congress." pe that through the implementation of my bill, these congressional eeds might be met. ink anyone here needs to be convinced that Congress lacks visibility get as a whole and particularly the early phases of new programs. words like "fragmentation," "automization," and lack of "coordiwe are really saying is that we in Congress have the responsibility of a budget over which it is virtually impossible to stay on top of it. gress which ought to be setting the priorities within a budget target. 3 which should understand and confirm the missions or functions of ncies; and, most important, it is Congress which should have the in individual programs to effect control over the dollars that these ntually command. As I will explain in more detail later, it is at ng stages of any program, at the research and development level, I ought to be directing most of its energies, because that 5 percent develops into 95 percent over the years, through small increases O budget. ent obviously recognizes the control problem as evidenced by his up a "super cabinet" to oversee the programs of groups of agencies. lo that? How can we perform our responsibilities of oversight, convision over such a complex operation? that question we first must answer why Congress does not have nts of budget and program control right now. The basic answer is a ization of budget and program-related information; the way it is s, the information we have to work with; and the way we handle on. |