relieved from liability for its defectively insulated wire."

It seems to me that this is not true, because this statement is opposed to all theory, for example, in the Turntable Cases, where fairly there could be no question about an injured person being a trespasser. And it has been held that if one maintains on his premises an attractive nuisance he will be responsible for injury to a child of immature mind for injury therefrom. Cousol E. L. & P. Co. v. Healy, 65 Kan. 798, 70 Pac. 884, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 71.

In Lewis v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N. E. 23, it was declared broadly that a child of tender years is not a trespasser when he is injured by resorting to an attractive nuisance. It is said: "What an express invitation would be to an adult, the temptation of an attractive nuisance is to a child of tender years."

In Houston & C. R. Co. v. Simpson, 60 Tex. 103, the Court held it was not error to refuse an instruction in a turntable case, that plaintiff could not recover while injured in trespassing, saying: "It is the duty of every person to use due care to prevent injury to such persons, even from dangerous machinery upon the premises of the owner, if its character be such as to attract children to it for amusement."

In Lynchburg Teleph. Co. v. Booker, 103 Va. 594, 50 S. C. 148, where injury to a child grasping a live wire on private premises, the Court said that "In legal contemplation, it might be that any unauthorized entry upon the premises of another *** by putting one's hand through or over a boundary fence, was a trespass. But it would certainly seem that the trespass had reached its vanishing point, when it was committed by a child eight years of age. The owner of the premises would find it difficult to maintain such a defense if he had knowingly permitted so grievous a danger to exist within reach of a public street, and thereby caused an injury to one incapable of contributory negligence."

The theory of liability despite the commission of trespass all refers back to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. In annotation in 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 80, to the case of Walker v. Potomac & C. R. Co., 105 Va. 226, 53 S. E. 113, 115 Am. St. Rep. 871, a turntable case, this maxim was held in many cases to apply when the effect of dangerous nuisances on one's own land has a probable or to be anticipated effect over and beyond its boundaries. So far as children are attracted from the outside there seems to be considered to exist a sort of constructive invitation. The annotator speaks of the hopeless conflict in authority on this subject, and he suggests that "The question must necessarily resolve itself into one of expediency-whether the good to the community to be derived from the protection of its youthful members from the results of their own irresponsibility, by requiring landowners to safeguard dangerous attractions placed by them on their own premises, is sufficient to overbalance the inconvenience and expense which must result to the landowner from the partial restriction of his dominion over his own property." This seems to me a very practical observation. Any place is in its nature a public place, or may be, in some situations.

C.

A Congressman tells this story about a politician running for a minor office, who was accused of using the old-time method of some politicians in the days before the country became a Sahara:

"Johnson was before the judge charged with having bribed or attempted to bribe a colored voter to cast his ballot for him.

"You gave this man a drink of liquor, didn't you?" the accused was asked.

"I certainly did, your honor. He is an old friend of mine, has worked for me and for my father, and he needed a drink, as he had a bad cold.

"He voted for you, didn't he?"

"Why, yes, I understand he did. I don't know positively that he did. But, look here. judge, you don't think I tried to buy that negro with a drink, do you? him with a smell."

Why, I could have got

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of Important Opinions of the State Courts of Last Resort and of the Federal Courts.

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.

Alabama

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Connecticut

Florida

Idaho
Indiana.

Kansas
Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland Massachusetts

Michigan...

Minnesota.

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana.

New York.

North Carolina.

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania..

Texas..

V. S. C. C. App... United States D. C... Wisconsin...

1.

81

48 66, S4

31 18, 82 32, 65 85

.15, 30, 31, 36, 67, 72, 78

6

39, 49

2

58

37 55

.34, 41, 62, 63 .5, 23, 35, 44, 70

4 38

.9, 16, 33 11, 13, 57, 80 17, 47, 69, 73, 83 40 19, 26 14, 20, 21, 25, 27, 29, 42, 46, 53, 54, 56, 59, 75, 86, 87 .3, 8, 43, 50, 71, 74, 77, 79 ..7, 12, 24, 61. 64, 73 .60

.1, 10, 22, 28, 45, 52, 68

Adverse Possession-Calls of Deed.-The use by adjoining landowners of the land on their respective sides of the fence up to the fence for more than 20 years established title in and to the farms on each side of the fence, whether such possession or occupancy by either party went beyond the calls of their respective deeds or not.-Wilson v. Stork, Wis., 177 N. W. 879.

2. Color of Title.-A person who possesses a part of a tract of land under a title for the whole tract is presumed to possess the entire tract as defined in his title deed for the purpose of acquiring title by prescription of 10 years, notwithstanding Civ. Code, art. 3503, providing that possession extends only to that which is actually possessed; such statute having no application to the prescription of 10 years.-Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor, La., 84 So.

648.

3.

Assault and Battery-Previous Threats.That man assaulted was a dangerous man, who had made previous threats, and who had reputation of carrying out threats, may be used in a proper case in mitigation of punitory damages, but not as justifying an unlawful assault. -Pfluger et al. v. Schoen, Tex., 221 S. W. 1090. 4. Assignments-Collateral Security.-A debt due for commission under an agency contract when assigned to secure the payment of a note is an assignment as collateral security, and not a general, unconditional assignment of the debt. -Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Humphrey, Miss., 84 So. 625.

5. Bailment-Burden of Proof.-By showing bailee had control of and refused, or

that a

Bankruptcy-Equitable Rights.-Where, to enable the bankrupt to manufacture staves, a cooperage company made advances, and by reason of such advances the bankrupt was able to acquire materials, and at time of bankruptcy had a number of staves manufactured, the equitable rights of the cooperage company to such staves are superior to those of the trustee or unsecured creditors.--Greif Bros. Cooperage Co. v. Mullinix et al., U. S. C. C. A., 264 Fed. 391. $.--Deceit.-Discharge, by buyer's bankruptcy, of his contract indebtedness for goods whose sale was procured by his fraud, does not discharge his liability for the deceit, and, although the seller could waive the tort and file a claim in bankruptcy based on the contract, yet he could also bring a subsequent action in deceit. -Sanger Bros. v. Barrett, Tex., 221 S. W. 1087. 9. Preference.-A trustee in bankruptcy suing to set aside as a preference a conveyance by the bankrupt in consideration of a pre-existing debt must show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant knew the bankrupt was insolvent at the time of transfer and was indebted to other persons and did not have sufficient other property to satisfy all of them, or show fact sufficient to put a reasonable prudent man upon inquiry.-Worden v. Morigeau,

Brokers-Fiduciary Relationship.-Where a customer deposits money with brokers to be used in the purchase of securities on margin, a fiduciary relationship arises between the parties, entitling the customer to require the brokers to account in equity for money received.Lipkien et al. v. Krinski et al., N. Y., 182 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 454.

12. Carriers of Live Stock-Commission Merchant. A live stock commission merchant, who had an arrangement with a railroad company by which stock consigned to him was delivered and the freight charged to his account, which he settled later, cannot avoid liability for a proper charge in connection with a shipment, on the ground that he was known to be merely an agent, and that he had settled with the shipper before he knew of such charge.-Rice v. Louisville & N. R. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 264 Fed.,

427.

13. Carriers of Passengers-Duty to Children. -Primary duty of care for children is upon parents or nurse, SO that motorman and conductor were not under absolute obligation to close and latch doors of car to prevent children from running onto platform.-Longacre v. Yonkers R. Co., N. Y., 182 N. Y. Sup. 373.

14. Intent to Board.-A person intending to become a passenger on a railroad train does not need to stop. look and listen before starting to cross the tracks to reach a platform preparatory to boarding, where a path has been provided for the purpose of such crossing.-Lynn v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co., Pa., 110 Atl. 271.

15. Chattel Mortgages-Constructive Notice. -Recording in real estate mortgage record book of a mortgage covering both real estate and chattel property is constructive notice of the incumbrance of the chattels, under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, §§ 7472, 7473, 9492, 9495, 9497.-Woodbury Glass Co. v. Beeson et al., Ind., 127 N. E. 573.

v. Great Northern Ry. Co. et al., Mont., 190 Pac. 136.

17. Compromise and Settlement-Old Contract. After a new contract is made by virtue of a compromise agreement, questions relating to custom affecting terms of original contract are immaterial.-Kerr Grain & Hay Co. v. Marion Cash Feed Co., N. C., 103 S. E. 375.

18.

Contracts-Construction.-Contract should should not be construed as demanding the impossible if a meaning so repugnant to the presumed purpose and intent of the parties can be reasonably avoided.-Edward de V. Tompkins, Inc., v. City of Bridgeport, Conn., 110 Atl. 183.

19. Public Policy.-A contract for services to be rendered by an attorney before a Legislature, or the Congress of the United States, in securing the passage of a law providing for the payment of a just claim, is not unlawful and not against public policy, if it does not contemplate the use of improper means and if the services to be rendered are such as appeal to the reason of those whom it is sought to persuade.— Herrick v. Barzee, Ore., 190 Pac. 141.

conver

20. Conversion-Equity.-"Equitable sion" is a fiction wherein money directed to be employed in the purchase of land is treated as land, and land directed to be sold is treated as money, created to sustain and carry out the intention of the testator or parties; it being sometimes necessary for certain purposes of devolution and transfer to regard the property in its changed condition as though the change has not absolutely taken place.-Davidson V. Bright, Pa., 110 Atl. 301.

21. Corporations-Intervention by Stockholder. Before a stockholder can intervene to enforce corporate rights, every effort must be made to cause the directors to act.-Passmore et al. v. Allentown & Reading Traction Co. et al,, Pa., 110 Atl. 240.

22. Notice of Equity.-A buyer of corporate stock with notice of equities therein vested in a third person under the contract whereby the stock was transferred to the seller can assert no title to the stock as against the third person. Kuhn v. Wagoner et al.. Wis., 177 N. W. 896.

23. Counties-Implied Power. The implied powers of a county are those only which are necessary to enable it to exercise either its inherent or express powers. The grant to counties of power to issue and sell their bonds carries with it implied power to do whatever is essential to the efficient exercise of the power expressly granted.-In re Board of County Commissioners of Cook County. In re Myers. First Nat. Bank of St. Paul v. Cook County, Minn., 177 N. W. 1013.

24. Courts Jurisdiction.-Where a court, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, with authority, transfers a cause of action to another court, any subsequent order or action of the first court, tending to deprive the latter of its exclusive jurisdiction of the cause of action and all its incidents, is a nullity.-Phebus et al. v. Learch et al., U. S. C. C. A., 264 Fed, 407.

25.- -Stare Decisis.-The doctrine of "stare decisis" relates to the binding effect of legal principles, while the doctrine of "res adjudicata" relates to the conclusiveness of prior judicial findings based upon the same facts as those involved in pending controversy between the same parties over the same subject-matter.State Hospital for Criminal Insane v. Consolidated Water Supply Co., Pa., 110 Atl. 281. 26. Curtesy-Joint Deed.-Where husband and wife conveyed land in trust for the wife, and the wife died intestate as to such land, the husband was not barred by such conveyance of his right of curtesy in the land.-Chance et al. v. Weston et al., Ore., 190 Pac. 155.

27. Covenants-Breach.-Where a party is in actual undisputed possession of land, there can be no constructive eviction, on the theory of the want of title on which to base an action for breach of covenant. -Strong et al. v. Nesbitt, Pa., 110 Atl. 250.

28. Criminal Law-Accessory.-An "accessory before the fact" is one whose will contributes to a felony committed by another as principal

while himself too far away to aid in the felonious act; one who was not present actually or constructively when a felony was committed, but who counseled, procured or commanded another to commit it.-Krueger et al. v. State, Wis., 177 N. W. 917.

29. Accomplice.-If a witness of a homicide was under the restraint of terror of the guilty party, neither his presence at the scene of the crime, nor his failure to report it, made him an accomplice.-Commonwealth v. Loomis, Pa., 110

Atl. 257.

30. Arraignment.-In prosecution for felony, an arraignment is essential, and it is error to proceed without arraignment and plea.Pritchard v. State, Ind., 127 N. E. 545.

31. Confession.-A confession when offered in evidence against defendant is prima facie ndmissible, and the necessity of showing its incompetency devolves upon defendant.-Ogle v. State, Ind., 127 N. E. 547.

32. Statutes.-A statutory definition of a felony should not by construction or interpretation be extended to cover acts or omissions of persons that are not within the intent of the statute, for the law-making power can legally designate or define the criminal offenses for which penalties may be imposed.-Bradley v. State, Fla., 84 So. 677.

33. Police Power.-In case of violation of a statute enacted under the so-called police power, the intent is immaterial; the usual rule of the common law that in every crime there must be a union or joint operation of act and intent, which is likewise declared by the Montana statutes, having no application.-State v. Smith. Mont., 190 Pac. 107.

34. Damages-Liquidated.—When performance of a construction contract is prevented by the owner, liquidated damages cannot be recovered for delay, and where the delay is due to the fault of both parties the court will not attempt to apportion such damages.-Board of Education of City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Chaussee et al.. Mich., 177 N. W. 975.

35. Deeds-Grantee Not Named.-A deed without the name of a grantee therein, although complete and properly executed in all other respects, is a nullity until the name of a grantee has been lawfully inserted.-Hedding v. Schauble. Minn., 177 N. W. 1019.

36. Voluntary Deed.-The law makes stronger presumptions in favor of delivery of deeds in cases of voluntary settlements than in ordinary cases of bargain and sale.-Philips et al. v. Decker et al., Ind., 127 N. E. 570. 37. Divorce Abandonment.. Abandonment and desertion, to constitute ground for divorce a mensa, must be the deliberate act of the party complained of. done with intent the marriage relation should no longer exist.-Young V. Young, Md.. 110 Atl. 207.

a

38.Alimony. Since alimony is granted as the equivalent of the obligation for support of wife arising out of the marriage contract. and she obtains the same obligation for support by a second marriage, the obligation to pay alimony should be terminated on remarriage of the wife, and thereafter it cannot be revived by death or divorce of the subsequent husband.Nelson v. Nelson, Mo., 221 S.W. 1066.

39. Ejectment-Paper Title.-Where plaintiff relies on paper title, he must establish his chain of title back to the commonwealth, without any gap.-Payne v. Edwards, Ky., 221 S. W. 1073.

40. Election of Remedies-Definition.-An "election of remedies" is the choosing between two or more different and co-existing modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same state of facts.--Vose v. Penny et al., Okla., 190 Pac. 97.

41. Executors and Administrators-Eminent Domain. An administrator cannot bind the estate to pay claims for the services of himself or counsel in defending condemnation proceedings, if the needs of the estate did not require the income or proceeds of the real estate for that purpose.-In re Brown's Estate, Mich., 177 N. W. 969.

42.——Fraud.—Administrator of insolvent decedent may maintain bill to set aside conveyance

by latter in fraud of creditors.-Swarty v. Bachman et al., Pa.. 110 Atl. 260.

43. Evidence-Contradiction.-In an action by a wife to cancel a deed executed by her and her husband, who has made a party defendant, the court and jury were not bound to acknowledge the testimony of the husband and wife, although uncontradicted.-Dendinger V. Martin et al.,

Tex., 221 S. W. 1095.

44.-Judicial Notice.-Although judicial notice is taken of facts of common knowledge. of the succession of seasons, of seedtime and harvest, and of the general course of agriculture, when the issue is whether the plaintiff, under the circumstances stated in the preceding paragraph and more fully in the opinion, should have lessened his loss by replanting, judicial notice will not be taken of the custom among prudent farmers to replant, and upon such custom judiclally noticed a legal duty to replant rested. The custom and the duty of the plaintiff should be determined as a fact upon evidence directed to the issue.-Casper v. Frederick, Minn., 177 N. W. 936.

45. Extradition-Fugitive from Justice.-A person who, after committing crime, leaves the state, in whatever way or for whatever reason, and is found in another state is a "fugitive from justice"; the motive inducing his departure from or his intent to return to the demanding state being immaterial, as is also the fact that he could have been arrested in the demanding state or that he left with the knowledge and consent of the prosecuting witness.-Ex parte Henke, Wis., 177 N. W. 880.

46. Frauds, Statute of-Parol Agreement.-A parol agreement by the attorney for a landowner to pay a broker's commission is not within the statute of frauds, Act April 26, 1855 (P. L. 308), requiring a special promise to answer for the debt or default of another to be in writing, where the agreement was original and not collateral-Lieberman et al. v. Colahan. Pa., 110 Atl. 246.

47.-Part Performance.-Where there has been a sale of land without being in writing, if the vendor accepts the whole of the purchase money, or any part thereof, it is not an estoppel on him to recover the land, but he must account for the purchase money received and betterments; such payment not being part performance.-Manney v. Norvell, N. C., 103 S. E. 372. 48. Fraudulent Conveyances-Acquiescence.— Where a creditor was notified that debtor had placed certain credits with a bank, to be collected and distributed pro rata between the creditors, and acquiesced therein to the extent of accepting dividends, he cannot assume an inconsistent position and attempt to forestall other creditors by proceeding against the bank in garnishment on a judgment in his favor subsequently obtained, even though the transaction was designed to hinder and delay creditors; such party impliedly becoming a party to and being benefited by the transaction.-Allaire v. Laurel Canyon Mining Co. et al., Ariz., 190 Pac.

79.

health to exercise the governmental function of protecting health by abating and removing nuisances-State v. Laabs, Wis., 177 N. W. 916.

33. Highways-Surface and Sub-surface.Where one owns a fee in minerals under the surface of a highway and mines on the surface adjacent thereto, he may work such mines, but must do so in such a way as not to cause the road to subside.-Breisch et al., Tp. Sup'rs, v. Locust Mountain Coal Co. et al., Pa., 110 Atl. 242.

54. Homicide-Degrees.-Even after an unlawful killing is shown to the satisfaction of the jury, the law's presumption makes it murder in the second degree until the commonwealth proves all essential elements of murder in the first degree.-Commonwealth v. Berkenbush, Pa., 110 Atl. 263.

55. -Motive.-Motive is no part of the offense of murder, and the commonwealth is not obliged in any case to prove it.-Commonwealth v. Feci et al., Mass., 177 N. E. 602.

56. Indemnity Insurance.-A contract by one doing work on premises to indemnify the owner is not an "insurance contract." and where the indemnitor was subjected to increased hazard by reason of the indemnitee using the premises in an unexpected manner, indemnitor is not liable for ensuing injuries.-Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roydhouse et al., Pa., 110 Atl. 277. 57. Injunction-Use of Photograph.-Under Civil Rights Law, §§ 50, 51, one whose picture had been used in designing a poster may enjoin the posting for advertising purposes, although changes were made by the artist in the pose.— Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., Inc., et al., N. Y., 182 N. Y. Sup. 428.

58. Insurance Fraternal Society.-Under the by-laws of a fraternal benefit society requiring payment of dues and assessments, and providing for the suspension of members on conviction or ipso facto for non-payment of dues and assessments, a formal suspension required a conviction, which presupposes a record; a mere letter from the society to the member that he had been suspended bing insufficient.-Labrecque v. Catholic Order of Foresters, Maine, 110 Atl. 194.

59. -Estoppel.-A fire insurance company may be estopped by the authorized acts of its agents and by the misrepresentations of its general agents.-Levinton et al. v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. of Leroy, Ohio, Pa., 110 Atl. 295. 60. Intoxicating Liquors Seizure. --- Under National Prohibition Act, tit. 2. § 25, relative to searches and seizures, and section 33, placing the burden of proof on any possessor of liquor in any action concerning the same to prove that it was lawfully acquired. possessed. and used, an officer seizing liquors under search warrant must cause appropriate proceedings to be brought to determine whether the liquor has been lawfully possessed, or is liquor to which no property rights exist.-United States ex rel. Soeder v. Crossen, Supervising Prohibition Agent, U. S. D. C., 264 Fed. 459.

as

a

sion, and if the statute is made applicable to a class of suits only, it will not be extended to other cases by implication.-United States v. Kern River Co. et al., U. S. C. C. A., 264 Fed. 412.

65.

Marriage-Common Law.-Neither cohabitation and repute nor circumstances, whose sole function is to show mutual consent of the parties, establishes a common law marriage of itself, for to constitute the marriage relation de praesenti the parties must contemplate that the relation is being created at the present time when the contract is being made.--Chaves v. Chaves, Fla., 84 So. 672.

66. Master and Servant-Assumption of Risk. -Where neither the mechanism of ripsaw nor the dangers incident to operating it were explained to employe who had never before operated such a machine, he did not, by operating the machine without a divider for only 21% hours prior to his injury, assume the risk incident to operation of machine without a divider, in absence of a showing that he knew a divider was a necessary part of the machine and that absence entailed additional hazard.-Chickasaw Cooperage Co. v. McGraw, Ark., 221 S. W. 1057. 67.-Employment.-Where a contract of employment is entire and indivisible both as to the period of service and as to the payment of compensation, a breach of contract by the employe deprives him of any right of action for compensation for partial performance.-Schneider Hagerstown Brewing Co., Inc., Ind., 110 Atl.

218.

V.

68.-Imputability.-The son of an automobile owner, who was the only member of the family competent to drive, and who was permitted by his father to drive when requested by any other member of the family, was the agent of his father in conveying his sister to town with his father's knowledge, so that the father is liable for injuries to another resulting from his negligence.-Jaeger v. Salentine et al., Wis., 177 N. W. 886.

69.Non-delegable Duty. It is one of the non-assignable duties of the master to use due care to furnish the servant a reasonably safe place to work, and, if he fails to do so, he is liable. Whittington v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., N. C., 103 S. E. 395.

70. Municipal Corporations-Abutting Owner, -The abutting lot owner owns to the center of the street or alley, and his ownership includes trees growing therein. The public has but an easement and the abutting owner may use his land for a purpose compatible with the use of the public easement.-Pederson v. City of Rushford et al., Minn., 177 N. W. 943.

71. Minimizing Cost.-Where city canceled contract for construction because contractor was financially embarrassed, when contractor's surety undertook to take over and complete work, it was under duty to use reasonable care and good faith to do so at minimum cost, and to account to contractor for difference between cost and amount received from city, a duty not escaped by letting the contract to a construction company for an arbitrary sum.-Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. O'Kelly, Ill., 221 S. W. 1115. 72. Officers-Presumption of Knowledge.— One executing an official bond is bound to know the conditions imposed by the statute, and is powerless to change the same by inserting in the bond restrictive provisions.-Southern Surety Co. et al. v. Kinney, Ind., 127 N. E. 575.

one

73. Parties-Indispensability.-The only "indispensable party" in a federal court is who has such an interest in the controversy or its subject-matter that a final decree between the other parties cannot be made without seriously injuring his interest, or leaving the controversy in such a situation that its final determination may be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.-Jennings v. United States, U. S. C. C. A., 264 Fed. 399.

74. Partnership-Fraud.-Fraud vitiates a voluntary settlement of partnership affairs as it will any other contract.-Woldert v. Pukli, Tex., 221 S. W. 1112.

wall to prevent rain going through it.-Thompson v. De Long, Pa., 110 Atl. 251. 76. Principal and Agent-Acceptance of Benefit. A principal cannot accept the benefits of a chattel mortgage taken by the agent in his own name, but for the benefit of the principal. and at the same time repudiate the agency, so as to avoid the burdens.-Hall v. Geissell & Richardson, N. C., 103 S. E. 392.

77. Railroads Licensee.-Railroad's duty toward shipper's employe who, while assisting in loading and unloading of shipper's freight at depot, was required to help in moving flat car which the railroad had failed to properly place, was that of exercising ordinary care, since such employe was rightfully upon premises, and was not a volunteer, trespasser, or mere licensee.Rio Grande, E. P. & S. F. Ry. Co. et al. v. Guzman, Tex., 221 S. W. 1102.

78.- -Priority of Right.-If both a passenger in an automobile and a railroad desired to use the highway at a crossing at the same time, the railroad with its train had the priority of passage, upon giving due notice of its approach. -Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v. Sams, Ind., 127 N .E. 566. 79.- -Proximate plaintiff's Cause. Where mare was killed by a train while she was caught in cattle guard at a road crossing, the negligent failure of the railroad employes to sound the statutory warnings for the crossing could not be proximate cause of the killing.-Hines. Director Gen. of Railroads, et al., v. Collins, Tex., 221 S. W. 1105.

80. Sales-Food for Consumption.-Where the manufacturer of a cake containing a nail or piece of wire, which could not be discovered by examination without breaking the cake open, gold it to a retail dealer, knowing that he would sell it to a consumer, the implied warranty of fitness of the cake for human consumption inured to the benefit of the consumer, though there was no direct contractural relation between her and the manufacturer.-Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., Inc., N. Y., 182 N. Y. Sup. 459. 81. Street Railroads Wanton Injury.-Contributory negligence on the part of a motorist will not justify intentional or wanton injury or negligence on the part of those in charge of street car.-Armour & Co. v. Alabama Power Co., Ala., 84 So. 628.

82. Trusts-Resulting Trust-A "resulting trust" is based on intention, presumed or implied from the circumstances of the transaction; a "constructive trust" is not based on intention, but arises in invitum to work out justice in the most efficient manner.-Millard v. Green, Conn., 110 Atl. 177.

83.

Usury-Corrupt Intent.-The corrupt intent necessary to make a transaction usurious under the statute consists in the charging or receiving the excessive interest with the knowledge that it is prohibited by law and the purpose to violate it.-Ector v. Osborne, N. C., 103 S. E. 388.

84. Vendor and Purchaser-Misrepresentation. A misrepresentation, in order to affect the validity of a contract of sale of land, must relate to some matter in which, from the relative position of the parties and their means of information, the one must be presumed to contract on the trust he reposes in the representations of the other.-Darnell et al. v. Bibb, Ark., 221 S. W. 1061.

85. Waters and Water Courses-Wrongful Diversion. One who diverts water from the ditch of another, against the will and without the consent of the latter. cannot thereby initiate a water right.-Rabido et al. v. Furey, Idaho, 190 Pac. 73.

86. Wills Repugnancy. Where testator gave his son a fee-simple estate in land, provision that such land should not be subject to son's debts will be dismissed as repugnant to the fee. Breinig v. Smith et al., Pa., 110 Atl. 285.