Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 20. 1920.

THE CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS.

One of the most unique legislative bodies in the world is meeting this week in the City of St. Louis. That body is the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and it is unique in that it works more slowly and more thoroughly than any legislature in the world, and though it has no constituency, its enactments are in force in every state of the union.

We welcome this great body of law-givers to the home of the Central Law Journal and are delighted to take this occasion to call attention once more to the valuable contribution which this great conference is making to the codification and standardization of American commercial law. In this respect its work can be compared more nearly than to anything else to the labors of the great commission which, during the reign of Justinian, codified the laws of Rome.

The editor of this Journal has always appreciated the work done by this commission, but this appreciation was inspired more by wonder than by an understanding. of the vast indirect benefits that have come from the work of this conference. He, with many others, wondered at the accuracy of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and its quick acceptance throughout the country. He wondered that men could be found who could give the time and the study to produce a code so perfect as to be able to wipe out all the learning and destroy all the textbooks on a great subject of law. He did not then see that the great fact of uniformity in the laws regulating commerce was making the United States a great homogeneous nation and helping to build up a great national commerce to which state lines were no longer insuperable barriers.

But the editor is now more than a mere onlooker. He is a member of the Conference from the State of Missouri and must in the future contribute his share to the real labors of the Conference. At the meeting of the Conference in St. Louis this year he shall perform the obligations of host, having been assigned to these delightful duties by Hon. Frederick W. Lehmann, the President of the St. Louis Bar Association.

The program this year includes a further, and possibly, the concluding, discussion of the Uniform Corporation Act. A new uniform act will be put into tentative form-a Uniform Banking Act. The Uniform Occupational Diseases Act is also nearing completion. In this connection it should be said that demands are constantly increasing from many persons for uniform laws on many new reform measures. Such matters are usually regarded as beyond the scope of the Conference. The argument is often advanced, however, by the proposers of some new popular legislation that it is better for the Conference to prepare a wise law on a new subject and prevent errors being made in such law than to try to correct errors after much conflicting and confusing legislation has been passed. This view looks upon the Conference as a mere drafting bureau, and in the mind of many of the members weakens the influence and dissipates the energies of the Conference which should be devoted to the codification of well-settled branches of the common law in which the element of uniformity is desirable.

One of the most interesting indications. of the remarkable influence of the Conference over legislation affecting any of the great commercial codes for which it is responsible is seen in the appeals that come every year from various organizations for some amendment in these codes. These men, who are interested in working a change in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law or the Uniform Bill of Lading Act or any other uniform law, do not go to the legislatures of the various states with

their propositions for the simple reason that very few legislatures will agree to make any changes in the uniform commercial codes without the recommendation of the Conference. Therefore all persons or organizations that seek to change any of the provisions of these vital commercial codes must first present their suggestions to a body which is capable, by reason of study and experience, to give to such suggestions the proper consideration. This fact insures the integrity and permanence of these great codes and that they will not be destroyed by legislative tinkering.

This year two great organizations, the American Bankers Association and the American Vehicle Manufacturers Association have made an appeal to the Conference in elaborate briefs to change or add certain provisions in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act respectively. The subject of each amendment is thoroughly briefed by competent counsel, who will also present oral arguments in support of their positions to the particular committees having charge of the laws sought to be amended.

The Conference is having difficulty where it was least expected from the courts. While legislatures appreciate the element of uniformity to such a degree that they will not consider amendments to the uniform laws without the approval of the Conference, some appellate courts, on the other hand, have been either so ignorant or so obstinate as not to recognize this essential principle of uniformity and have construed the provisions of the uniform acts as if they were nothing more than declaratory of the former law of the state and had nothing to do with the law in other states. The uniform acts are not codifications of the law of any particular state; they are codifications of the law of all the states and when passed are not merely declaratory of former decisions of the local courts but absolutely supersede them. Moreover, the principle of uniformity is ex

pressly declared to be one of the chief purposes of the legislatures in passing the uniform acts, and this declaration of policy on the part of the legislatures is binding on the courts and should constrain them so to construe such acts as to keep them uniform in construction as well as in letter with the law of every other state.

The Commissioners appeal to the Bar in every community to support the work of the Conference. They have a right to expect that every judge and lawyer shall acquaint himself with the origin and purpose of the uniform acts and seek to make and keep the law of his state on these particular subjects uniform with the law of every other state. In so doing the Bar will not only render a distinct public service, but will also materially lighten their own labors in making it possible for them to advise clients with some confidence concerning any question arising under that branch of the law covered by these codes.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

INNKEEPER'S DUTY TO KEEP FLIES OUT OF HIS DINING ROOM. The world moves on and that which our fathers tolerated is today regarded as a nuisance. In the time of the world's ignorance, the fly was regarded as a harmless insect; today the powerful microscope has shown him to be a dangerous enemy of mankind, carrying about on his body the deadly germs of typhoid fever.

Of this fact the courts will take judicial notice and therefore the presence of the fly in the dining room of a hotel is a nuisance justi fying the guest in leaving his meal untouched and even violating his contract reserving a suite of rooms for a definite period of time. Such was the decision in the recent case of Williams v. Sweet, 110 Atl. Rep. 316.

The plaintiff kept a summer resort in Maine and defendant had spent many summers at his place. As was his custom he contracted for a suite of rooms. He came with his family and declared himself pleased with the room, the food, and the service-but the flies! -they were unbearable. The innkeeper had become used to them, but the defendant, whose revolt against the fly had been inspired by many "swat the fly" campaigns, could not

stand for it. So the next morning he arises from the table, packs his trunk and leaves without paying for any of the service he had contracted for and found another resort where the fly was taboo. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, having lost several weeks' occupancy of the suite contracted for by the defendant, but the Supreme Court of Maine held he was justified in leaving. The Court declared the rule of law applicable to this case in a few words. The Court said:

"Our conclusion is that under the evidence the defendant was fully justified in leaving this hotel in view of the implied duty on the part of the plaintiff to provide the defendant and his party, as his guests, a dining service that was reasonably free from insanitary conditions, having in mind at all times, upon the question of reasonableness, the particular dangers that are now well known to be effective in causing such conditions, and the verdict of the jury to the contrary was manifestly wrong. Reasonable care is always measured by the imminence of the danger to be avoided. Reasonable conditions of sanitation are likewise always to be measured by the fatality of the diseases liable to be communicated as the result of the lack of such conditions. It might be improvident to expose one to the germs of measles, but it would be a base and degenerate act to knowingly tolerate conditions that would tend to the communication of a fatal disease."

The law does not lag so far behind science after all. It has not been so long ago that the fy and the mosquito were indicted by science as the carriers of malaria, typhoid and yellow fever germs. When that indictment was fully proven the courts took judicial notice of the finding and anyone having the care of other people under his charge, who did not screen against these pests would be negligent in the performance of his duty. The Court in the principal case shows how much of the discoveries of science in respect of flies and mosquitos the courts are willing to accept without proof. The Court said:

"It is a matter of common knowledge that the common house fly has come to be regarded by the enlightened understanding not only as one of the most annoying and repulsive of insects, but one of the most dangerous in its capacity to gather, carry and disseminate the germs of disease. He is the meanest of all scavengers. He delights in reveling in all kinds of filth; the greater the putrescence the more to his taste. Of every vermin, he above all others is least able to prove an alibi when charged with having been in touch with every kind of corruption, and with having become contaminated with the germs thereof. After free indulgence in the cesspools of disease and filth, he then possesses the further obnoxious attribute of being most agile and

persistent in ability to distribute the germs of almost every deadly form of contagion. "It is a matter of common knowledge that yellow fever was formerly the scourge of certain localities in our own and other countries. For years no one mistrusted or was able to detect the cause. But one day it was announced that a certain kind of mosquito by his sting communicated the germs of this dread disease. The knowing introduction of one of these mosquitos now would constitute a criminal offense. While the house fly has not yet been regarded as fatal as a mosquito, he nevertheless is now attracting the serious attention of sanitary and health departments all over the country, in fact all over the world. The dangers with which his presence is fraught is also a matter of common knowledge, and hence of judicial notice."

RAILWAY TRAINMAN ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE THOUGH CARS NOT BILLED TO DESTINATION WHEN HANDLED BY HIM.-The Supreme Court's decision in the recent case of Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512, so enlarges the definition of what constitutes interstate commerce within the meaning of the Employers' Liability Act as practically to deny to railway employes within a state the benefit of the local Workmen's Compensation Acts.

In this case the Court held that a railway trainman, belonging to a crew operating a train of loaded cars from a colliery to yards two miles away, was engaged in interstate commerce, where the ultimate destination of some of the cars was outside the state, as appeared from the instruction cards or memoranda delivered to the conductor by the shipping clerk at the mine, and freight charges were paid for the entire distance, beginning at the mine, though the cars were not weighed and billed to the consignee until another crew moved them from such yard to scales some ten miles away, where they were inspected, weighed and billed.

The duties of the deceased never took him out of Pennsylvania; they related solely to transporting coal from the mines. When injured he belonged to a crew operating a train of loaded cars from Locust Gap colliery to Locust Summit yard, two miles away.

The fact that the ultimate destination of one or more of these particular cars was outside the state was taken to be controlling, although the cars destined to go out of the state had not as yet been billed to specific consignees. In fact, all the cars were later to be turned over to another crew to be weighed, billed and made up into trains for foreign

and its exercise is subject only to the limitations contained in the State and Federal Constitutions that are designed to secure private rights against the exertion of arbitrary and oppressive governmental authority. The most usual limitations that are by the courts imposed upon legislative exertions of police power, are that organic private rights be not unreasonably invaded at all, and that any permissive invasion of organic rights to conserve the public health, safety, morals and general welfare shall be appropriate to the particular dominant public purpose and shall not in substance, extent or application be arbitrary or inexpedient or in excess of reasonable and just requirements to meet the public need.

While that portion of governmental authority known as the "police power" when it is asserted by the states, is inherent in the state's sovereignty, though not conferred by the organic law, a somewhat similar power, confined to the particular subjects of regulation and authority that are committed to Congress by the Federal Constitution, may be exerted by the Federal government pursuant to Acts of Congress designed to effectuate granted or inherent powers. The Federal Constitution expressly provides that "the Congress shall have power to * * * provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," "to regulate (interstate and foreign) commerce," "to declare war," "to raise and support armies," "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia," "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall

arsenals, dock yards and other needful buildings," and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer, thereof." Under some, if not all, of these express grants, the Congress of the United States may exert powers somewhat analogous to "police power," when the exercise of such power may be expedient to effectuate powers that are expressly granted or that may be inherent in sovereignty, and the particular power asserted and the manner of its exercise are not forbidden by the paramount law.

Some of the later amendments to the Federal Constitution confer upon Congress power that in some respects may be regarded as resembling the power exerted by the states that is called "police power."

In the District of Columbia the governing authority of Congress is complete and all-embracing. Somewhat similar powers

exist in the Congress as to ceded reservations, territories and provinces of the United States.

In view of numerous decisions of the Federal Supreme Court sustaining Acts of Congress under the war power, the commerce power and other powers of Congress, it may not be seriously doubted that powers akin to the police power of the states may be exercised by Congress to effectuate any power that is conferred upon Congress or that is inherent in paramount sovereignty, unless the action taken clearly violates some express provision of the Federal Constitution. Such power apropriately exercised to conserve the public safety, morals, health, peace and general welfare, may be essential to the integrity, efficiency and continuance of the Federal government; and a primary purpose of a sovereign government