-the direction in which humanity must pass to escape from the hopeless treadmill of the millenniums with their wearying repetition of struggle, some prosperity, war, slaughter, chaos and struggle again.

Theocracy and autocracy, forceful application of the big idea, inevitably leads to inequality before the law and so to tyranny, revolution and chaos or to decadence, conquest and chaos. That way lies no hope.

Let the Bolsheviki and their supporters in all lands prate as they will of reactionaries and imperialists. They themselves are the reactionaries. Their admitted doctrine is to establish a privileged class which they call the proletariat but they mean by that term a select body of their own supporters. Their whole creed is to force on society a great idea which has been revealed to them and to them alone and like it or dislike it, society is to swallow it wholeand that is nothing but pure theocracy. But remember that in the theocratic theory might is right because it is divine and apply that remembrance to the position of affairs today.

But let us not forget that though the Bolshevik creed is one of reaction, there are others who in their hearts believe almost exactly what the Bolsheviki believe though they pass as good democrats-people who claim privilege on account of birth or wealth.

We have in fact to maintain the heritage of freedom against assault from within and without, the priceless heritage of a great idea conceived by the Nordic people and slowly and painfully brought into practice in workable form in England, then brought here and developed and strengthened, then passed to British dominions, then transplanted into countries that never have understood it and though at each transplantation it has been modified, its original catchwords have spread far and wide. Its

superficial glamour has dazzled many misunderstanding eyes. It is now in danger from its popularity. Even its enemies try to conceal their actions behind its phrases.

Whatever difficulties might arise between our nations, I believe that nothing is more important than this, that you and we stand together to defend the hard-won hope of mankind that through law made by the people for their own disciplining, man will at last escape from the toils that have snared the feet of his ancestors and will have taken a great stride towards the solution of the problem of how he with his physical weaknesses and his mental strength shall live in communities in peace and ordered freedom one with the other.

Our nations are co-trustees for humanity that the theory and practice of democracy shall not suffer distortion or diminution in spite of avalanches of assaults loosed upon it by its enemies, by all who desire to benefit humanity through some great idea of incalculable good, by all who as individuals. seek for themselves privileges over their fellows and deny the equality of man before the law.

But let us also remember that in a real democracy, the law merely marks the line. at which society must forcibly punish, to save itself from disintegration and that democratically made laws can never hope to set the standard of life at which good citizens must aim. Each must find his star within the recesses of his own being, for it is the great strength of the democratic. practice of government that it sets no bounds to upward movement, it lays down. no code of morals, it guarantees freedom to each though it says sternly to the wreckers "Transgress and you will be punished." The spring of the upward movement in democracy is in religion, not in law, and that must ever be, for "The children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light."

DEED CANCELLATION IN EQUITY.

WYNN et al. v. KENDALL.

Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 28, 1920.

85 So. 85.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Where a deed is given in consideration of an agreement to support grantor, but containing no provision for forfeiture for failure to perform agreement, and reserving no lien in the deed to secure performance of consideration, it will not be canceled in equity for failure to furnish support.

ETHRIDGE, J. Mrs. Kendall filed a bill in the chancery court, alleging that on the 20th day of August, 1912, she conveyed certain land to C. K. Wynn and Mary M. Wynn, the consideration of which, as set forth in the deed, reads as follows:

"That for and in consideration of the sum of five dollars ($5.00) cash in hand paid to the said Mary J. Kendall by the said C. K. Wynn and Mary M. Wynn, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and in further consideration of the said C. K. Wynn and Mary E. Wynn furnishing the said Mary J. Kendall with board and lodging for and during the term of her (the said Mary J. Kendall's) natural life in the home or house of the said C. K. and Mary M. Wynn, or wherever the said C. K. and Mary M. Wynn should reside, the said Mary J. Kendall to be treated and looked after the same as one of the family of the said C. K. and Mary M. Wynn, and in further consideration of the sum of forty dollars ($40.00) to be paid by the said C. K. and Mary M. Wynn annually to the said Mary J. Kendall on the 15th day of November, and thence annually thereafter during her said natural life, the said Mary J. Kendall by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey, and confirm unto the said C. K. Wynn and Mary M. Wynn the following described land, lying, being, and situate in Holmes County. State of Mississippi, and described as follows."

And that the said writing, though absolute on its face, was not so intended and agreed, but that it was agreed and understood between the parties that the premises conveyed were to be held by the defendants, conditioned upon the carrying out of the agreements set forth in the bill, and more particularly in the deed made Exhibit A to the bill, the pertinent provisions of which are above set forth, and alleging that upon failure of said defendants to carry out said agreement the said premises were to revert to the complainant; that the appellants entered into possession of

the premises and are still holding the same; and that in accordance with the said writing the defendants came to live with her in her said home, and at first treated the complainant kindly, but soon thereafter began to grow unkind and inconsiderate, and at times it amounted to abuse and insult, and that finally she learned indirectly of proposed attempts upon her life by C. K. Wynn; and that through his treatment, and her fear, she cannot live with him and prayed for a cancellation of said deed, or if that could not be done, then to be allowed her support during the remainder of her natural life, and that such maintenance and support be decreed a lien upon the land. The answer denied the material allegations of the bill so far as the understanding of the deed and the alleged fraud, violence, and mistreatment were concerned, and denied that they had refused to carry out their agreement to support the complainant.

The complainant testified that she lived with the defendant from August, 1912, until November or December, 1916. Her testimony fails to show fraud in the execution of the deed. The deeds were drawn by an attorney named Wiener, who then lived at Durant, Miss., and who is shown to be an attorney of good standing and character. Complainant testifies that the deed was read over to her, according to her understanding of the agreement as set forth in the bill. The deed was placed on record, and no effort was made to set it aside until March, 1917, when this bill was filed. Her testimony in reference to her treatment shows that she was treated well in the early part of this arrangement, and that she had plenty to live upon; but the treatment complained of is abusive language, and her testimony that on one occasion he drew a gun, all of which was denied by both Mr. and Mrs. Wynn.

The evidence shows that Wynn is solvent, and that a judgment against him could be collected on execution. The chancellor decreed the cancellation of the deed, reciting that the

"Court finds that the deed executed by the complainant, Mary J. Kendall, to C. K. Wynn and Mary M. Wynn on the 20th day of August, 1912 (reciting the description of the land), was entered into under a material mistake on the part of Mrs. Mary J. Kendall, but without fraud on the part of the complainants."

The bill is drawn upon the theory of a mistake in the deed and breach of the consideration, and we think the proof falls far short

See,

of the standard required by law to cancel a conveyance for mistake. In Ayers v. Mitchell, 3 Smedes & M. 683, the rule is laid down that a complainant who seeks to rescind a contract for the sale of real estate must show clearly the defect in the title and that there has been fraud, accident, or mistake, and the remedy must have been pursued in good time. also. Johnson v. Jones, 13 Smedes & M. 580; Jones v. Smith, 33 Miss. 215; Christian v. Green, 45 South. 425. This court has held in several cases that the failure to furnish support in accordance with the promise, which was the consideration of the deed, is not sufficient to support a suit for cancellation of the deed. Lowrey v. Lowrey, 111 Miss. 153, 71 South. 309; Dixon v. Milling, 102 Miss. 449, 59 South. 804, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 916; Lee V. McMorries, 107 Miss. 889, 66 South. 278, L. R. A. 1915B, 1069. And these cases held, also, that if there was no express lien reserved to secure the performance of such promise no equitable lien will be implied.

The complainant does not show that she was incompetent to understand the deed, does not allege any weakness of mind, nor any confidential relation between her and the grantees in the deed, nor is there any averment of undue influence, nor proof of same, nor is there any showing of inadequacy of consideration. We think the showing made is wholly insufficient under the authorities above cited to sustain the chancellor's decree. If the proof should show that the complainant could not live with the defendants because of their mistreatment, brought about by their conduct, she could maintain a suit for support for such amount as would be reasonable in the community where she lived, and in the condition or station of the parties to the suit; but there is not sufficient ground to cancel the deed.

The judgment will, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded, for such further proceedings in consonance with this opinion as may be deemed proper.

Reversed and remanded.

NOTE-Cancellation in Equity of Deed for Nonsupport of Grantor.-The facts in the instant case do not show that there was any special relationship at the time the conveyance was executed. existing between grantor and grantees or that there was any question of fraud involved.

In a note to Grant v. Swank, W. Va., 81 S. E. 967, as reported in L. R. A. 1915B, at page 881, it is said: "While as held in Grant v. Swank and by the weight of authority, a provision in

a deed for the support of the grantor does not constitute an equitable lien upon the property conveyed in favor of the grantor, nevertheless this doctrine will not preclude courts of equity from changing the grantor's support upon the premises conveyed whenever, from the language of the parties or the attending circumstances, they can infer an intention to create such a change."

Thus the peculiar character of contract may warrant such an inference, as where a party well advanced in years makes a conveyance to a child or other relative for the purpose of suitable support and being relieved from the care and responsibility of management of property. Thus in Bruer v. Bruer, 109 Minn. 260, 123 N. W. 813, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 608, in speaking of grantors, it is said: "They part with their property in the expectation and belief that their future necessities and comforts are fully provided for, and in an abiding faith that natural affection and filial duty will prompt and secure a faithful discharge of the obligations assumed by the child to whom they convey. There is in such transactions an element of confidence reposed by the old people in their grantee, sacred in its nature, a breach of which, and retention of the benefits, no court could tolerate by a refinement upon technical rules and principles of law."

In Bogie v. Bogie, 41 Wis. 209, speaking of a parent grantor, it was said: "A person incapacitated by the infirmities of age from active pursuits naturally feels a strong desire to place the fruits of his industry and enterprise where they will secure to him during the remnant of his life, a suitable and proper maintenance without further care and labor on his part. *** He relies upon the filial affection of his child for the faithful and cheerful performance of the obligation. ***Such a transaction on the part of the father is prompted often by necessity, always by affection for and trust in the son to whom he has transferred his means of support. *** This is not only a moral and religious duty, but it is a duty of which courts of equity will take cognizance and grant proper relief for its nonperformance."

In a later Wisconsin case it is pointed out that in a voluntary conveyance made for a valuable consideration it was held not essential to a valid condition that right of re-entry should be expressly reserved. Gilchrist v. Foxen, 95 Wis. 428, 70 N. W. 585. See also Knutson v. Bortrak, 99 Wis. 469, 75 N. W. 156; Glocke v. Glocke. 113 Wis. 308, 89 N. W. 118, 57 L. R. A. 458. And in Brenger v. Brenger, 142 Wis. 26, 125 N. W. 109, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 387, 135 Am. St. Rep. 1050, it was ruled that where the consideration of support wholly fails without reasonable excuse on the part of grantee, the condition subsequent of cancellation will be enforced. See also Lowrey v. Finkleston, 149 Wis. 222, 134 N. W. 691.

Other cases, quite numerous, hold grantor is left to his remedy at law. See Gardner v. Knight, 124 Ala. 273, 27 So. 298; Thompson v. Lanfair, 127 Ga. 557, 56 S. E. 770; Anderson v. Gaines, 156 Mo. 664, 57 S. W. 726; Shepardson v. Stevens, 77 Mich. 256, 43 N. W. 918.

But there is another consideration that may be involved in all of such cases of which a court

of equity takes cognizance and that is fraud in the inception of the contract; that is to say, if grantee secures the deed without intending to carry out the performance which he has promised. Many cases adjudge cancellation under such circumstances as for example Salyers v. Smith, 67 Ark. 526, 55 S. W. 936; Cooper v. Gum, 152 Ill. 471, 39 N. E. 267; Sherwin v. Flinn, 155 Ind. 422, 58 N. E. 549. And some cases hold that retention of the estate conveyed is strong proof of fraud. Diggins v. Doherty, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 172; Reid v. Burns, 13 Ohio St. 49, and Bogie v. Bogie supra.

In Reid v. Burns it is declared in effect that the reason of this doctrine is its being against justice and good conscience for such a grantee being allowed to abandon performance and hold the fruits of a presumptive fraud.

It should be thought true that where intimate relationship arises and there is a moral duty in addition, that equity may intervene to prevent any profiting at the expense of grantors. C.

ITEMS OF PROFESSIONAL

INTEREST.

PROGRAM OF THE MEETING OF THE CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION.

The eleventh annual meeting of the California Bar Association will be held September 23, 24 and 25, 1920, at Sant Cruz. The headquarters will be the Hotel St. George.

The President's address will be given by Mr. Bradner W. Lee of Los Angeles; his subject will be "Some Problems of the Hour and the Responsibilities and Duties Concerning Them." The annual address will be given by Mr. M. R. Kirkwood of Stanford University.

The following special committees will report: Committee on Community Property Law, Perry Evans of San Francisco, Chairman; Committee on Status of Laws Relating to Disbarment of Attorneys, Grant H. Smith of San Francisco, Chairman; Committee on Laws Relating to Franchises, W. P. Bosley of San Francisco, Chairman.

There will be the reports of the usual sections of the Association and of the regular standing committees.

The annual banquet will be held at the Hotel St. George on Friday evening, September 24.

MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSO

CIATION.

The meeting of the American Bar Association in St. Louis, August 25 to 28, 1920, was a success from every angle. The soul-stirring addresses, the fine receptions and social entertainment and the cool, clear, crisp weather, made the thousand delegates enjoy every minute of their stay.

The meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws preceded the meeting of the American Bar Association convening on August 19 and adjourning August 24. The sessions were held in the small banquet hall of the Statler Hotel. A remarkaable thing about this meeting was the fact thirty-nine states were represented. Four acts which have been pending before the Conference many years were finally passed and recommended to the states for adoption. They were the Uniform Act Concerning Proof of Statutes of Other States, the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act, the Uniform Vital and Penal Statistics Act, and the Uniform Occupational Diseases Act.

The greater time of the Conference was consumed in discussion of three tentative Uniform Acts, namely, the Uniform Corporation Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and the Uniform Occupational Diseases Act. Some discussion took place over amendments to the Conditional Sales Act. Representatives of farm implement manufacturers appeared before the Conference and pleaded for a change in the Act with respect to their right to take back property sold to dealers without the necessity of a public sale, on giving to the dealer full credit for the amount already paid on machines. A slight change in the Act to take care of this particular case was made and recommended to the various state legislatures for adoption.

The meeting of the American Bar Association convened on Tuesday, August 25, 1920. Hon. Hampton L. Carson of Philadelphia delivered the President's address. His subject was the Evolution of Representative Government, and his treatment of the subject was noteworthy from a literary and historical as well as a legal point of view. Following Mr. Carson's address was that of the new British Ambassador, Sir Auckland Geddes. Strangely enough, his subject supplemented the address of President Carson, being a discussion of the Philosophy of Representative Government. This address aroused much interest and was discussed not only by the delegates but by the local press of the city. It developed the thought that Democracy was comparatively a new idea in the world

Lord Cave carefully avoided any direct rel erence to the League of Nations, except to say that some such League is absolutely necessary to give force and sanction to international law. He dwelt more at length on the work of Mr. Root and those who labored with him and who last July laid the foundations for a Court of International Justice under the League of Nations. Lord Cave explained that the court is to consist of eleven judges and four supplementary judges, holding at least one session a year and, except when otherwise agreed, is to sit with a full court of eleven or at least nine of the members. This court is to have power to adjudicate upon the usual juridical questions which are fully enumerated in the scheme, but is to adjudicate between states only and not individuals. It is to be guided not by arbitrary opinion, but by international law, and its judgments are to be reasoned, a judge who dissents being able to record his dissent.

Lord Cave aroused enthusiasm when he declared that "there can be no real and effective international law until there is some standing tribunal composed of men of outstanding ability and judicial temper who have the confidence of the civilized world and are authorized, on the application of any nation aggrieved, to interpret and administer that law."

On Thursday evening, August 26, 1920, Hon. Albert J. Beveridge delivered an address on "The Attack on American Fundamentals," in which he made a plea for the right of freedom of speech, declaring that neither Congress nor the Executive could hope to stamp out Bolshevism or anarchy by repressive measures. The floodlight of an open forum is the best antidote to such distempers declared the speaker.

Senator Beveridge recalled a period in American and world history very similar to that caused in America and the world today by the Russian Revolution. He referred to the effect of the French Revolution on England and America. On this point he said:

"The French Revolution terrified the world. Established order everywhere was threatened and quaking. The Christian and civilized governments, as they then styled themselves, Great Britain, Prussia and Austria, combined to crush by force of arms what they fervently believed to be a menace to civilization.

"In many countries, but particularly in the United Kingdom and in America, the Jacobins of France had earnest adherents. In England organizations were formed, principally among workingmen, but including scholars and writers, for the purpose of securing democratic changes in the British constitution, such as universal suffrage and annual Parliamentsreforms which, at that time, were regarded by static minds as destructive, revolutionary, anarchistic. These suctctics were comparatively small as to numbers and without much infu

ence.

"Yet not only the Royal Government, but also the higher classes,' as May calls them in his 'Constitutional History of England,' became wildly alarmed, and, together with men of property and substance everywhere, formed counter societies for the purpose of preserving law, order and the existing constitution. It was these societies that Sir Thomas Erskine publicly branded as enemies of freedom.

"These organizations raised funds, employed spies, and in every way supported and encouraged the government in a crusade to suppress and punish obnoxious writings and speeches: and everywhere men were arrested, indicted, tried and convicted for sedition or constructive treason. Mere statements, which today are the commonplaces of liberty, were condemned as incitements to subvert the British constitution and overthrow the government. A period of repression and suppression occurred-a legal reign of terror.

"Judges held to be criminal mere proposals to change or improve British institutions. One eminent justice avowed that universal suffrage 'would unquestionably be tantamount to a total subversion of this British constitution,' a statement typical of those which, at that time, fairly spouted from the bench. Among felons that crowded the 'convict ships' bound for Australia was an occasional hero of conscience. Botany Bay was enriched by some of the best and noblest characters in the kingdom, deported for sedition and constructive treason.

"The government procured the enactment of the celebrated repressive measure of 1795. Fox denounced them as destructive of liberty, and prophesied that they would increase the agitation they were designed to suppress. Arrests, trials, convictions increased. In the name of patriotism a sort of holy war against ideas was proclaimed and ruthlessly carried on; the government required everybody to incase their