made and for which it is used, and is per se a nuisance.14

For seven boys to coast down a hill on one sled, at such a high rate of speed as would necessarily follow, and to run into. a city street at the foot of the hill, was held to be a wrongful act.15

And in a New York case, it was said that the construction and maintenance of a toboggan slide across one of the principal streets of a populous city, with little or no protection against collision between those riding thereon at a very high rate of speed and travelers passing along the street, is a wrongful, dangerous, and negli

gent act.

16

When Violative of Statute or Ordinance The fact that one is coasting in a highway in violation of a statute or ordinance does not preclude him from recovering for injuries inflicted by the negligence of other users of the way. In such a case the violation of law is a mere incident, and not a proximate cause of the injury; there being

no causal connection between the two.

In a Missouri case it is held that the driver of an automobile approaching a street intersection in a thickly populated district at a rapid rate of speed owes a boy who is coasintg in the street in violation of a statute, not only the duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him after his peril is actually discovered, but also the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep a lookout and discover his presence.17

Nor is he prevented from recovering because his act of coasting constitutes a public nuisance.18

(14) Rensch v. Licking Rolling Mills Co., 118 Ky. 369, 80 S. W. 1168.

(15) Eastburn v. United States Express Co., 225 Pa. 33, 73 Atl. 977.

(16) Hayden v. Clarke, 56 Hun 645, 10 N. Y. Supp. 291.

(17) Rowe v. Hammond, 172 Mo. App. 203, 157 S. W. 880. But see Osgood v. Maxwell, N. H., 95 Atl. 954.

(18) Lynch v. Public Service R. Co., 82 N. J. L. 712, 83 Atl. 382.

A municipality is not liable to answer in damages to one who is injured while coasting in one of its streets when such use of the streets is forbidden by an ordinance, although the city officers habitually neglect to enforce the ordinance.19

Liability of Municipality for Injuries Caused by Coasting-A municipal corporation is not liable for failure to prevent coasting in its streets, to one who is injured by collision with a sled being so used.20

This is true although the street in question had been used for several years for coasting, and there was an ordinance in effect forbidding such use.21

In the absense of a statute creating such

liability, a city is not liable for injury to a pedestrian incurred by being run against by a coaster on a footpath in a common used as a place of recreation and public resort, the path not having been laid out city's system of streets, although the city as a highway and not being a part of the permitted boys to coast on the path, and had fitted the path for such coasting by building a bridge across it at an intersecting path and by turning water onto it to freeze and render it smooth.22

It has also been held that a city is not liable for injuries to a pedestrian received by reason of the slippery condition of a sidewalk, and by being run against after

(19)

Fluckiger v. Seattle, Wash., 174 Pac. 456, L. R. A. 1918F 780. (20) Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330: Dudley v. Flemingsburg, 115 Ky. 5, 72 S. W. 327, 60 L. R. A. 575, 103 Am. St. Rep. 257, 1 Ann. Cas. 958; Altrater v. Baltimore, 31 Md. 462; Brumbaugh v. Bedford, 23 Pittsb. L. J. N. S. 462; Toomey v. Albany, 14 N. Y. Supp. 572, 38 N. Y. S. R. 91; Wilmington v. Vandergrift, 1 Marv. (Del.) 5, 29 Atl. 1047, 25 L. R. A. 538, 65 Am. St. Rep. 256; Weller v. Burlington, 60 Vt. 28, 12 Atl. 215; Faulkner v. Aurora, 85 Ind. 130, 44 Am. Rep. 1. For the law of Maryland, see Taylor v. Cumberland, 64 Md. 68, 20 Atl. 1027, 54 Am. Rep. 759.

(21) Stevenson v. Phoenixville, 1 Chester Co. Rep. 113.

(22) Steele v. Boston, 128 Mass. 583.

dark by a boy sliding thereon, at a point where boys had been in the habit of sliding without interruption from the city authorities.23

Sliding in the public streets does not constitute an "obstruction" of the streets, so as to render the city liable to a traveler for injuries received by reason thereof.24

The question of right to use the highways resolves itself into the question of reasonable use and reasonable care, and if these exactions are met it is thought that it is beyond the power of the state to prohibit such use. However, a proper use and care does not depend alone upon the character of the vehicle and the degree of care exercised in its operation, but to a great extent upon the character of the uses of the ways by the public generally. It might be unreasonably dangerous to the

highways is not an absolute and unqualified right, but is subject to limitation and control by proper exercise of the police power when necessary to provide for and promote public safety and well being.27

In an early Illinois case it was declared that, "a street is made for the passage of persons and property, and the law cannot define what exclusive means of transportation and passage shall be used."'28

It has been decided that the regulation of the use of the public highways, even to the exclusion of certain classes of vehicles from particular roads and places, is a proper exercise of the police power for the safety of the public.29

On the other hand, it has been held, in a case involving the right of motorists to use the highways, that while the state may regulate the use of automobiles upon its highways, it can no more prohibit their use thereon than it can prohibit the use of lumber wagons.30

(23) Shepherd v. Chelsea, 4 Allen 113. (24) Ray v. Manchester, 46 N. H. 59, 88 Am. Dec. 192.

(25) Schultz v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 254, 5 N. W. 342, 35 Am. Rep. 779; Hutchinson V. Concord, 41 Vt. 271, 98 Am. Dec. 584.

(26) Pierce v. New Bedford, 129 Mass. 534, 37 Am. Rep. 387; Hutchinson v. Concord, 41 Vt. 271, 98 Am. Dec. 584.

(28) Moses v. P., F. W. & C. R. Co., 21 Ill. (27) State v. Phillips, 107 Me. 249. 516, 523.

(29) State v. Phillips, 107 Me. 249; Com. v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542.

(30) State v. Gish, 168 Ia. 70.

even any of the ways in a particular community, at all.

St. Louis, Mo.

C. P. BERRY.

LAWYER'S OFFICE SYSTEMS-REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF THE IOWA BAR ASSOCIATION.

It is time the legal profession was waking up to the need of more modern methods in the law office. In all lines of industry and business great strides have been made in the last few years in efficient management, Closer competition, increased costs, higher prices and wages, and now war demands, have all conspired to force greater efficiency in business methods. But the average law office is the same old conservative institution.

All around us, in every line of business, and in every walk of life, we find modern tools and machinery, up-to-date methods, and progressive ideas forging to the front. Yet the law office remains an archaic institution. In spite of the progress on every side, there are today law offices where the telephone is on the wall in the outer office, and every time the bell rings the stenographer has to get up to answer the call, call the lawyer out to do his telephoningrepeating this many times, day after day,

week after week, year after year, a useless and expensive waste of time and energy.

There are lawyers today still using the oldfashioned letterpress copy book, with its mussy, tedious copying process, and with replies to important correspondence scattered through many bound volumes, and the corresponding letters from clients packed away in bulging, dusty transfer files. There are lawyers today using the old-fashioned bound dockets and indexes, that are cumbersome and weighed down with deadwood.

There are lawyers today who keep their papers in folded envelopes, folding and unfolding them time and time again, filing them away in dusty pigeonholes, where they may be found if they search long enough. There are others who open their mail, put each letter back in the envelope again, and every time the letter is referred to, back it goes into the same envelope, thus needlessly repeating the folding and an opening process again and again, with its consequent loss of time and energy.

There are law offices today still using the old-fashioned bookkeeping method that was invented and used in the counting house when clerks sat on high stools before big ledgers and wrote with quill pens. There are lawyers who still insist upon using antiquated, roundabout methods, and who dribble along with office routine, and are bound hand and foot by the rule of thumb method which they learned from their fathers, grandfathers, or early employers, and, deep in the rut, refuse to even look at the paved road of progress within easy reach.

Not long ago a business man went into a law office and found the head of the firm posting the office books. He personally did the bookkeeping for the firm, and it was a prosperous and reputable firm of attorneys at that. But think of it-a $50 a day man dawdling over work that any $15 a week girl could do as well. Yet that is typical of many offices, where brainy lawyers, ground down by routine tasks, never get

above mediocrity in their profession, and go to seed without half a chance to show their real ability.

As Herbert Kaufman so well says: "The engineer, who tries to be fireman, conductor, and brakeman as well, is headed for a smash. Hold the throttle-watch the gauge and signals. Stick to your cab; keep the schedule."

Many a lawyer of ability is held down by office routine and the little things in practice. They lack the foresight and the courage to get out of the rut. Efficient scientific management has lifted the executives in big business to a high plane, where their brains and ability are unhampered and can get results. It has paid in business. It pays just as much in a law office.

A lawyer is selling the product of his brains to his client. The lawyer, like the manufacturer or the mechanic, is paid for

the amount of work he turns out. If, then, the lawyer as the producer is unhampered by the details of his business-if the purchasing, manufacturing, distributing, and accounting departments, so to speak, are taken care of by his office organization— then it stands to reason that the lawyer produces more, both in quality and quantity, and his brain is free to concentrate upon the vital things in his practice.

But we so often hear the remark from the uninformed lawyer. "That is all right in business, but the law practice is different we can't do the things they do in business." Why not? Leaving out the advertising feature of business, a lawyer sells his services, just as the merchant sells his goods. The good lawyer is a good salesman without knowing it. If he gives service the people will come to him, just as they will flock to the merchant who gives service.

Is it unethical for a lawyer to have a business system that helps him to do his work with neatness and dispatch? Is it unprofessional for a lawyer to have a

smooth working office organization, that assists him to give satisfactory service to his clients? Is it contrary to the traditions of the profession for the lawyer to use an office system that enables him to be punctual in fulfilling his engagements, prompt in getting out his work in accordance with his promises, and vigorously effective in his work as counsel or in court? If it is then it is high time the canons of ethics and the traditions of the profession were changed.

Someone has said that "the most valuable things any man knows were learned outside of the beaten track of his trade." From the very nature of his work, the lawyer comes in close touch with his clients in every line of business and in all phases of life. This breadth of experience is the lawyer's great asset, and is one of the great factors in making the lawyers the leaders in every community. And yet, while all lawyers delight in public in describing the wonders of science and invention, it never seems to dawn upon their minds that science can also work wonders in that little old law office.

The lawyer's wife has her electric stove, modern electric sweeper, electric hair curler, percolators, toasters, and everything new and modern to assist herself and servants, while the head of the house boasts that he believes in lightening the burdens of home management. Yet the same lawyer slaves along in his office with a typewriter and a fountain pen.

Most lawyers consider that, when they have a nicely furnished office and a good filing system, that this is as far as a law office can go. In fact, that is only the beginning. The law office where everything is standardized for the purpose of maximum production, and where the work is expedited by the pressure of electric buttons and the turning of levers, is no longer a fiction. It will pay the lawyer, who prides himself on being efficient, to use some foresight.

The average lawyer's desk is like a funnel, through which the business of the office passes, and, as it piles up at the large end, he wonders why it clogs at the small producing end. "My work is never done," says the busy lawyer, "the day isn't long enough to get half my work done." And yet efficiency stands ready to double the hours of your day, by making it possible to do twice the work with less effort.

No one can provide a ready-made sys-tem for another. It is as impracticable as providing him with a ready-made character. His system must be an outgrowth of his business, just as his character is formed by his habits and thoughts. Any man, however, who is sincerely desirous of progressing and accomplishing results, may benefit by the researches and results of others, and apply such results to his own business, and work out his own solution of the problem of practical efficiency.

Every man must lay out his scheme of work for himself. Too close and mechanical a schedule will break down under strain. It must be flexible. A brain worker must have a more flexible schedule than a routine worker, as there are constantly special demands on his time. But all workers must plan for systematic work to gain the most efficiency. Aimlessness is the thief that steals the lawyer's time.

The average lawyer would resent the imputation that he was dawdling away the best part of his time. But it's true, and any lawyer who keeps no time record will be astounded at the time wasted without knowing it. Progressive lawyers keep a record of their time, and it pays in increased capacity and increased revenue. If to this is added a careful planning of the day's work and carrying out that schedule still more wonderful results will be obtained. Any lawyer who works on this plan will testify that it has saved him hours every day and greatly increased his income.

More important still, such a system will enable the lawyer to plan his work to the

best advantage, to get the rush or important work out on time, to prepare ahead for approaching work, instead of waiting for it to pile up at most inopportune times. It relieves him from the worry, bustle, turmoil, and grief of an unorganized office. These time records and schedules should also be used by all members of the office organization. This gives a basic system that will enable him to stop the leaks, wastes, and inefficiencies that hide in every corner. It brings order out of chaos, and knowledge where before ignorance was an expensive bliss.

The cynical busy lawyer says that it is foolishness to order our life by schedules, plans, charts, and hard and fast rules and restrictions. These utensils are the preliminaries to real efficiency. A person learning to play chess must first learn the rules of the game and practice until he becomes proficient. Then he can lay aside the rules, that at first were indispensable for every move. So the records of efficiency are the rules that show us how to play the game efficiently, and, when we once know how, we do not have to depend upon them longer.

Efficiency is an Aladdin's lamp. If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you can rub the polished surface of the lamp, and system will come forth with a thousand effective hands and brains, that will lighten your burdens and help you with your work. But, like all magic, there must be some common sense back of it. Work -Work-Work is the only real key to success. All the system in the world will be of no avail without conscientious effort. But it is the glory of scientific efficiency that it raises drudgery to the higher level of intelligent effort. Work, well planned, well directed, well executed, and well remunerated, becomes a pleasure.

There are eight fundamental requirements for an efficient law office:

(1) Standardize letters, pleadings, files, forms, methods, and office operations.

(2) Delegate to subordinates all routine. work and all possible standardized minor tasks.

(3) Plan and schedule each day's work in the office, and then dispatch the work according to schedule.

(4) Reduce all standardized routine and methods to writing as Standard Practice Instructions.

(5) Use a modern bookkeeping system, that gives exact information at all times as to the condition of the business.

(6) A convenient, well-lighted, wellventilated office, with healthful, congenial environment for the office force.

(7) Use all lavor-saving devices and machinery suitable to the size of the busi