State v. Kessler (Iowa), The Danger of Not Limiting Proof of Character to Particular Traits Relevant to the Issue, R. D. 371. State v. McCulloch (Mo.), Are "Written Instruments" the Subject of Larceny, Ed. 241. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. (U. S. S. C.), The Transportation of Intoxicating Liquors by the Owner for Private Use Under the Volstead Act, Ed. 387.

Swanner v. Conner Hotel Co. (Mo.), Innkeeper -Guest's Negligence, ann. case, 360.

Texas Co. v. Brandt (Okla.), The Limitations on the Rule of Judicial Notice, R. D. 353. Thayer v. Leggett (N. Y.), The Co-Tenant's Equity in the Expectation of a Renewal of a Joint Lease, R. D. 243.

Twiss v. Herbst (Conn.), Brokers-Dual Agency, ann. case, 325.

Ullmann Realty Co. v. Kintara Tamur (N. Y.), Validity of Rent-Fixing Statutes, Ed. 459.

Venturini v. Carlin (Ala.), Bailment-Automobile, ann. case, 308.

Wetsel v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), What Is Meant by "Amount in Controversy" to Justify Removal of Suit to Federal Courts, R. D. 189.

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight (U. S. S. C.), Right of Telegraph Company to Change an Intra-State to an Inter-State Message by the Route of Transmission, R. D. 425.

Whittier v. Riley (Neb.), Validity of Judgments Entered on Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment, R. D. 442.

Williams v. Sweet (Me.), Innkeeper's Duty to Keep Flies Out of His Dining Room, R. D. 134.

Wynn v. Kendall (Miss.), Deed-Cancellation in Equity, ann. case, 214.

All the wealth of learning and zeal of argument consumed in the last year in discussions of the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment and the constitutionality of the Volstead Act have at least led up to a decision by the Supreme Court which firmly establishes the validity and constitutionality of both the Amendment and the Act passed in conformity therewith.

But the denouement is an anti-climax. Instead of the great opinion which everyone expected and which everyone believed would take its place beside Marbury v. Madison, Gibbons v. Ogden, and other great cases, we are furnished with no argument at all but a mere catalogue of conclusions, much on the order of the Roman Pandects. The opinion, if such it can be called, is written by Justice Van Devanter and is two pages in length.

The opinion itself, aside from the result reached, constitutes a radical departure from customs hitherto observed by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice White was astounded and expressed "profound regret" that "in a case of this magnitude, affecting as it does an amendment to the Constitution dealing with the powers and duties of the National and State governments, and intimately concerning the welfare of the whole people, the court has deemed it proper to state only ultimate conclusions without an exposition of the reasoning by which they have been reached." Justice McKenna, who objects to the conclusions as well as to the form of the Court's opinion, declares that it is difficult to dissent to an opinion where no reasons are given. "The instance may be a wise one," said Justice McKenna, "establishing a precedent now, hereafter wisely to be imitated." Is this

a threat that the majority may be in the minority some day and will be forced to puzzle their brains over similar cryptic expressions of judicial findings. Such a form of opinion writing, declares Justice McKenna, sarcastically, "will undoubtedly decrease the literature of the Court if it does not increase its lucidity."

There are eleven "conclusions" stated in the Court's opinion, only three of which are sanctioned by the citation of authority. These eleven conclusions are as follows:

1. The adoption by both houses of Congress, each by a two-thirds vote, of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution sufficiently shows that the proposal was deemed necessary by all who voted for it. An express declaration that they regarded it as necessary is not essential. None of the resolutions whereby prior amendments were proposed contained such a declaration.

2. The two-thirds vote in each house which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the members present-assuming the presence of a quorum—and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership, present and absent. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276.

3. The referendum provisions of state. constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it. Hawke v. Smith, U. S., decided June 1, 1920.

The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by Article V of the Constitution.

5. That Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument.

6. The first section of the Amendment -the one embodying the prohibition-is operative throughout the entire territorial limits of the United States, binds all legislative bodies, courts, public officers and individuals within those limits, and of its own

force invalidates every legislative actwhether by Congress, by a state legislature, or by a territorial assembly-which authorizes or sanctions what the section prohibits.

7. The second section of the Amendment -the one declaring "The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation does not enable Congress or the several states to defeat or thwart the Pro

hibition, but only to enforce it by appropri

ate means.

8. The words, "concurrent power," in that section do not mean joint power, or require that legislation thereunder by Congress, to be effective, shall be approved or sanctioned by the several States or any of them; nor do they mean that the power to enforce is divided between Congress and the several States along the lines which separate or distinguish foreign and interstate commerce from intrastate affairs.

9. The power confided to Congress by that section, while not exclusive, is territorially coextensive with the prohibition of the first section, embraces manufacture and other intrastate transactions as well as importation, exportation and interstate traffic, and is in no wise dependent on or affected by action or inaction on the part of the several States or any of them.

10. The power may be exerted against the disposal for beverage purposes of liquor manufactured before the Amendment became effective, just as it may be against subsequent manufacture for those purposes. In either case it is a constitutional mandate or prohibition that is being enforced.

11.

While recognizing that there are limits beyond which Congress cannot go in treating beverages as within its power of enforcement, we think those limits are not transcended by the provision of the Volstead Act, wherein liquors containing as much as one-half of 1 per cent of alcohol by volume and fit for use for beverage purposes are treated as within that power. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264.

Those who favor short opinions will rejoice over the precedent set by the Supreme Court in this opinion; but we call attention to the fact that one can rejoice over short opinions, where short opinions are called for, and still insist, as the Chief Justice does, that when the Court declares

a new principle or construes a new statute, it shall give reasons for its decision. In this very opinion we find no objection to but are delighted with the short form of opinion writing with respect to declarations 1 to 6, inclusive. These points are either self-evident or have been settled by recent authority which fully gives the reasons for the Court's decision. There is no

justification for a repetition of these reasons. But with respect to the important question of the meaning of the words "concurrent power," discussed in declarations 7, 8 and 9 and with respect to the proper construction of the word "intoxicating" in declaration number 11, we believe that not only the parties to the case, but the people themselves, are entitled to know the reasons which impelled the Court to the conclusions which it announces.

Fortunately, Chief Justice White discusses quite fully the question of the "concurrent power" of Congress and the states under the Eighteenth Amendment. He sets out the various contentions of counsel and admits that on the surface the words, "concurrent power," seem to imply a veto power in the states with regard to the enforcement of the amendment. "It is true," says the Chief Justice, "that the mere words of the second section tend to these results, but if they be read in the light of the cardinal rule which compels a consideration of the context in view of the situation and the subject with which the amendment dealt and the purpose whic' it was intended to accomplish, the confusion will be seen to be only apparent."

The Chief Justice then argues that the second section of the Eighteenth Amendment "clearly manifests a purpose to adjust, as far as possible, the exercise of the new powers cast upon Congress by the Amendment to the dual system of government existing under the Constitution. In other words, dealing with the new prohibition created by the Constitution, operating throughout the length and breadth of the United States, without reference to state