(G) Reservations and Trusts for Grantor. § 113. Certain fact held to have the effect of showing that a secret trust existed between grantor and grantee, which necessarily had the effect of burdening and delaying creditors of grantor.-Grigsby v. Larson (S. D.) 856.

(I) Retention of Possession or Apparent Title by Grantor.

Retention of possessions by chattel mortgagor, effect as to mortgagor's creditors, see Chattel Mortgages, § 190.

§ 139. Under Comp. Laws, §§ 9520, 9521, a transaction between a debtor and a creditor construed as a sale of personal property held presumptively fraudulent as against other creditors of the debtor.-Grand Rapids Brewing Co. v. Pettis (Mich.) 577.

143. A conveyance of personalty by a debtor to his creditor construed as one to secure an existing and continuing indebtedness held fraudulent as against the debtor's creditors.-Grand Rapids Brewing Co. v. Pettis (Mich.) 577.

(J) Knowledge and Intent of Grantee. § 163. A fraudulent grantee held not entitled to resist payment of the debt sought to be hindered.-McGovern V. Milwaukee Motor Co. (Wis.) 269.

VI. PROCEEDINGS TO SUPPORT OR

Review on appeal of answers of garnishee, see Appeal and Error, § 548.

§ 130. The equitable doctrine of set-off may be applied in garnishment proceedings in all cases where plaintiff presents no superior right. -Armitage Herchel Co. v. Jacob Barnett Amusement Co. (Minn.) 223.

§ 130. A bank, a garnishee in an action against a depositor may set off against his general account unmatured notes; he being insolvent.-Armitage Herchel Co. v. Jacob Barnett Amusement Co. (Minn.) 223.

§ 130. A bank may set off in garnishment unmatured notes due by the depositor, without showing that the depositor had been adjudged insolvent.-Armitage Herchel Co. v. Jacob Barnett Amusement Co. (Minn.) 223.

GENERAL APPEARANCE

See Appearance, § 9.

GIFTS.

I. INTER VIVOS.

§ 22. Although a gift of a mare by a daughter to her father had not been consummated, a delivery to a carrier at his direction and to be shipped by it to him under a contract with him accomplished this, and transferred the title to 202. him. Cox v. American Express Co. (Iowa)

GOOD FAITH.

Of mortgagee, see Mortgages, § 154.
Of purchaser of bill or note, see Bills and
Notes, 362.

PURCHASERS.

$ 295. Evidence held to show that a mortgage was given as security for claims and not in settlement thereof.-McLanahan v. Chamberlain (Neb.) 684.

FREEHOLDERS.

er, 88 226-244.

Of purchaser of public lands, see Public Lands, $ 89.

of purchaser of railroads, see Railroads, § 129.

GOODS.

Confusion, see Confusion of Goods. Mortgage, see Chattel Mortgages.

GAMING.

Designation of place of offense in information, see Indictment and Information, § 86.

GARNISHMENT.

In justice court, see Justices of the Peace, § 87.

V. LIEN OF GARNISHMENT AND LIABILITY OF GARNISHEE.

§ 105. A garnishment lien is, in the absence of some special right in plaintiff, subject to all equities existing between the garnishee and defendant.-Armitage Herchel Co. v. Jacob Barnett Amusement Co. (Minn.) 223.

GRAIN.

GRAND JURY.

See Indictment and Information.

34. Under Rev. Codes 1905, § 9372, the Attorney General and his assistants may appear before the grand jury and lay before it matters relating to the violation of the prohibitory law. -State v. District Court of Burleigh County (N. D.) 417.

§ 34. Under Rev. Codes 1905, § 2494, the Attorney General may appear before the grand jury whenever in his judgment the interests of the state require it.-State v. District Court of Burleigh County (N. D.) 417.

§ 34. Right of Attorney General and his assistants to go before the grand jury is not affected by Rev. Codes 1905, § 9829.-State v. District Court of Burleigh County (N. D.) 417.

HOLDING OVER.

I. ESTABLISHMENT, ALTERATION, AND DISCONTINUANCE.

Dedication, see Dedication.

(B) Establishment by Statute or Statutory Proceedings.

$ 19. Statutory provisions for laying out public highways must be liberally construed.Baldwin v. Board of Sup'rs of Town of Rosendale (Minn.) 641; Jacobson v. Same (Minn.) 643.

§ 33. Under Rev. Laws 1905, § 1173, held that, where supervisors, after meeting to determine the petition for laying out a highway, separated without determining it and without adjournment, and met three weeks thereafter and ordered the road laid, the order was void.Baldwin v. Board of Sup'rs of Town of Rosendale (Minn.) 641; Jacobson v. Same (Minn.) 643.

$58. A notice of appeal from an order laying or refusing to lay out a highway need not show by what right appellant appeals.-Baldwin v. Board of Sup'rs of Town of Rosendale (Minn.) 641; Jacobson v. Same (Minn.) 643.

(D) Title to Fee and Rights of Abutting Owners.

Evidence of damages in proceedings to condemn right of way for telephone and telegraph company, see Eminent Domain, § 203.

V. REGULATION AND USE FOR

TRAVEL.

(A) Obstructions and Encroachments.

$153. A growth of grubs, brush, and trees in the middle of a highway is prima facie evidence of an obstruction thereof.-De Boer v. Adams (Mich.) 540.

§ 157. 2 Comp. Laws, § 4163, relating to removal of trees along a highway, held to apply only to trees growing upon the margin of the highway, and not to those in the middle.-De Boer v. Adams (Mich.) 540.

(B) Use of Highway and Law of the

Road.

Collisions of street cars with animals or vehi-
cles, see Street Railroads, § 90.
Right of way over street railroad tracks, see
Street Railroads, § 85.

Use of street as highway, see Municipal Corporations, §§ 703-706.

$ 175. Rev. Laws 1905, § 1258, held not to apply to vehicles crossing from one side of a street to the other; such cases being governed by the rules of the common law as to negligence.-Lyford v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. (Minn.) 831.

(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions. Accidents at railroad crossings, see Railroads, §§ 327-352.

In streets, see Municipal Corporations, §§ 812

821.

HINDERING.

By tenant as affecting liability for rent, see Landlord and Tenant, § 196.

By tenant as extension or renewal of tenancy, for years, see Landlord and Tenant, § 90.

$ 115. A delivery of a mortgage on the homestead by a wife not in compliance with instructions of the husband held valid where the mortgagee received it in good faith.-McLanahan v. Chamberlain (Neb.) 684.

$ 115. A deed of a homestead, given as security for a debt, may be foreclosed as a mortgage, and the homestead sold as prescribed by statute for mortgages.-White v. Daniel (Wis.) 405.

§ 118. Under the law in force in 1895, a husband's deed granting merely an easement for a right of way across the homestead is valid, though not signed by the wife.-Maxwell v. McCall (Iowa) 760.

§ 118. Where a deed of a husband's homestead signed by the wife was used as security for the debt of the husband, which was the purpose for which the wife executed it, there was a compliance with St. 1898, § 2203, requiring that any conveyance or incumbrance of the homestead must be executed by the wife.-White v. Daniel (Wis.) 405.

§ 122. Husband held estopped as against conveyance of homestead, notwithstanding its invalidity because his wife did not join therein. -Ford v. Ford (S. D.) 1108.

7-101.

II. MURDER.

Plea of guilty, see Criminal Law, § 273.

§ 21. Murder is divided into two degrees, depending upon the absence or presence of premeditation and deliberation; such degrees not constituting distinct crimes.-State v. Noah (N. D.) 1121.

V. EXCUSABLE OR JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE.

$ 118. Where a person is assailed, he may not take the life of his assailant, unless he cannot reasonably avoid danger of death or serious injury, except where he is assailed on his own premises.-State v. Dyer (Iowa) 629.

§ 118. In a prosecution for homicide, defendant held not entitled to take the life of deceased without retreat, on the ground that deceased assailed him on defendant's premises.State v. Dyer (Iowa) 629.

VI. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. Surplusage, see Indictment and Information, §

119.

§ 139. An indictment for homicide held to sufficiently charge murder in the first degree. State v. Dyer (Iowa) 629..

§ 139. An allegation in an information charging murder, designating the offense as murder in the first degree, is not controlling as to the degree.-State v. Noah (N. D.) 1121.

VII. EVIDENCE.

(B) Admissibility in General.

§ 163. In a trial for homicide, certain evidence held competent to show the quarrelsome and homicidal disposition of accused.-Bradley v. State (Wis.) 1024.

(C) Dying Declarations.

§ 203. Declarations of deceased, made while in articulo mortis, held admissible.-State v. Dyer (Iowa) 629.

VIII. TRIAL.

(B) Questions for Jury.

§ 276. Defendant's reasonable belief of imminent danger from assault by a third person, at the time he shot and killed deceased, held for the jury.-State v. Clayton (Iowa) 605.

§ 276. In a prosecution for homicide, whether accused shot deceased in lawful self-defense held for the jury.-State v. Dyer (Iowa) 629. (C) Instructions.

§ 300. In a trial for homicide, an instruction on self-defense held not erroneous.-Bradley v. State (Wis.) 1024.

§ 300. In a trial for homicide, an instruction on self-defense approved.-Bradley v. State (Wis.) 1024.

§ 307. Where deceased died within a few days after he was shot by defendant, the court did not err in refusing to submit defendant's guilt of some offense lower than a degree of homicide.-State v. Dyer (Iowa) 629.

§ 309. In a trial for murder, the evidence held not to warrant the submission of instructions as to manslaughter in the third degree under St. 1898, § 4354, such section not applying where self-defense is relied on.-Bradley v. State (Wis.) 1024.

§ 311. Where a jury was impaneled to determine the punishment after a plea of guilty of murder, a certain charge held improper.State v. Noah (N. D.) 1121.

§ 311. Where a jury was impaneled to fix the punishment after a plea of guilty of mur

der, a charge on the court's power to reduce the punishment assessed held erroneous.-State v. Noah (N. D.) 1121.

HORSES.

Injuries to horses on railroad tracks, see Railroads, §§ 413-439.

HOSTILE POSSESSION.

Of occupant of real estate holding adversely, see Adverse Possession, §§ 60, 81.

HOSTILE WITNESS.

Impeachment for interest or bias, see Witnesses, §§ 364, 372.

HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE.

Injury avoidable notwithstanding contributory negligence, see Street Railroads, § 103.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Curtesy; Divorce; Dower; Marriage. Allowance to survivor from estate of decedent, see Executors and Administrators, §§ 179–185. Competency to testify to transaction with person since deceased or incompetent where testimony of spouse is excluded, see Witnesses, § 146.

Delivery of mortgage on homestead, see Homestead, 115.

Joinder of wife in transfer or incumbrance of homestead, see Homestead, § 118. Privileged communications, see Witnesses, 188, 195.

II. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. Bar to or waiver of allowance from estate of deceased husband, see Executors and Administrators, § 185.

Invalidity, ground for cancellation, see Cancellation of Instruments, § 4.

Limitation of action to cancel, see Cancellation of Instruments, § 34.

Right of wife to cancellation during life of husband, see Cancellation of Instruments. § 8.

Waiver of statutory allowances to widow, see Executors and Administrators, § 185.

§ 29. Complaint in an action to cancel an antenuptial contract held to state a cause of action.-Slingerland v. Slingerland (Minn.) 19.

§ 29. While a valid antenuptial agreement may be made, it will be closely scrutinized to see that the prospective wife has not been overreached or deceived.-In re Deller's Estate (Wis.) 278.

§ 29. In an antenuptial agreement, making a provision of $5,000 for the prospective wife out of the prospective husband's estate at his death, entitled her to nothing more, and the estate amounted to $85,000, the provision would not be so inadequate as to render the agreement unenforceable because of the mere insufficiency of the provision.-In re Deller's Estate (Wis.)

278.

§ 31. Rule for construing an antenuptial contract stated.--In re Deller's Estate (Wis.) 278. § 31. An antenuptial agreement construed.In re Deller's Estate (Wis.) 278.

III. CONVEYANCES, CONTRACTS, AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

§ 46. While a contract between husband and wife was invalid under Code, § 3154, as one as to dower inchoate, held, money paid by him to her was for the good consideration of her