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IV. OPERATION AND EFFECT OF
BAR BY LIMITATION.

Right to quiet title as against unpaid mortgage
barred by limitations, see Quieting Title, § 14.
V. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL,
AND REVIEW.

§ 182. A defense of limitations is unavail-
able unless pleaded.-Hazelton v. New York
Life Ins. Co. (Wis.) 1014.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.

Of carrier in respect to live stock, see Carriers,
§ 218.
LIQUIDATION.

In general, see Assignments for Benefit of Cred-
itors; Bankruptcy.

Of corporations in general, see Corporations, §§
542, 547.

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Carriage of, see Carriers, §§ 207-230.

remove trees during that time, and, if the time
is not specified, then within a reasonable time.
-Baker v. Kenney (Iowa) 901.

of timber on certain land with the right to cut
§ 3. A grant of all the timber and growth

and remove the same held to include future
growth of timber.-Baker v. Kenney (Iowa)
901.

§ 3. In view of Code, §§ 2913, 2958, an in-
strument held to convey a perpetual right to
cut and remove timber from the grantor's land,
though the word "heirs" was not used.-Baker
v. Kenney (Iowa) 901.

cut and taken from land within a specified
3. A purchaser of standing timber to be
time acquires no interest in the land.-Baker
v. Kenney (Iowa) 901.

§ 3. In construing an instrument selling tim-
ber and the growth of timber on land, what the
parties called the instrument, the description
of the property, or where the instrument was
recorded held immaterial, except so far as such
circumstances threw light on the intent of the
parties.-Baker v. Kenney (Iowa) 901.

§ 4. The right to timber which a licensee is
authorized to remove becomes vested only when
the trees are severed and converted into chat-
tel property.-Baker v. Kenney (Iowa) 901.

§ 4. Under a license for the cutting of tim-

ber, held a condition precedent that the licensee
should pay one-half of the taxes assessed
against the property, and that his default for
three successive years forfeited the license.-
Scott v. Sullivan (Mich.) 29.

§ 4. A contract for the sale of timber held
a license passing title only to such timber as
was cut and removed.-Scott v. Sullivan (Mich.)
29.

§ 18. Title to unmarked logs held not to vest
in the St. Croix Boom Company under its char-
ter (Sp. Laws 1870, p. 434, c. 116, § 22) until
they are driven or float into the booms of the
company.-Astell v. McCuish (Minn.) 458.

§ 18. Under Rev. Laws 1905, § 2580, un-
marked logs in St. Croix river held the prop-

Injuries to, by operation of railroad, see Rail- erty of the person who picks them up and marks
roads, 88 413–439.

LOAN COMPANIES.

See Building and Loan Associations.

LOANS.

Interest on, see Interest.

LOCAL ACTIONS.

See Venue, § 13.

LOCAL ASSESSMENTS.

See Municipal Corporations, §§ 429-523.

LOCAL LAWS.

See Statutes, §§ 71-93.

LOCAL OPTION.

Traffic in intoxicating liquors, see Intoxicating
Liquors, 88 14, 27-37.

LOGS AND LOGGING.

Requirements of statute of frauds as to license
to cut timber, see Frauds, Statute of, § 61.

3. Under a contract for the sale of grow-
ing trees to be removed within a specified time,
the licensee acquires only the right to cut and

them before they reach the boom of the St. Croix
Boom Company.-Astell v. McCuish (Minn.) 458.

25. Under St. 1898, §§ 3329-3342b, an own-
er of logs cut by a contractor held liable for the
payment of liens of laborers of the contractor,
whether he owes the contractor or not, but the
lien claimants are creditors of the contractor,
who is the principal debtor, and the logs oc-
cupy the position of surety.-St. Croix Timber
Co. v. Joseph (Wis.) 1049.

See Sunday.

LORD'S DAY.

LOSS.

Causes of loss within insurance policy, see In-
surance, 454.

Of writing as ground for admission of secondary
evidence, see Evidence, § 183.

LUMBER.

See Logs and Logging.

LUNATICS.

See Insane Persons.

MACHINERY.

Annexation to real property, see Fixtures.
Dangerous machinery, liability for injuries in
general, see Negligence, § 20.

Dangerous machinery, liability of master for in-
juries to servant, see Master and Servant, §§
101-129, 234.

§ 3. When the boards of drain commission-
ers of two or more counties act together for the
construction of a drain through two or more
counties, the remedy on their contract is by

Voting machines, see Elections, $8 27, 198.
Voting machines, partial invalidity of statute, mandamus.-Reed v. Heglie (N. D.) 1127.
see Statutes, § 64.

MAGISTRATES.

See Justices of the Peace.

MAINTENANCE.

See Champerty and Maintenance.

MALICE.

Element of liability for false imprisonment, see
False Imprisonment, § 31.

Element of liability for libel or slander, see
Libel and Slander, §§ 51, 104.
Instructions, see Criminal Law, § 772.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

See False Imprisonment.
Wrongful execution, without malice, see Execu-
tion, § 472.

I. NATURE AND COMMENCEMENT
OF PROSECUTION.

§ 3. Defendant held not liable for malicious
prosecution, not having instituted the prosecu-
tion.-Davies v. Kent (Iowa) 1076.

II. WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE.

§ 22. Recovery cannot be had for a prosecu-
tion for assault which was instituted on the
advice of the county attorney after a full and
fair statement of the facts.-Greenlee v. Ealy
(Iowa) 166.

V. ACTIONS.

§ 71. Where it is shown that defendant did
not consult counsel until after commencement
of the prosecution and was then advised by coun-
sel that the proceeding was improper, whereupon
he dismissed it, plaintiff is entitled to go to the
jury on his claim for damages.-Greenlee v. Ealy
(Iowa) 166.

$71. In an action for malicious prosecution,
the question whether defendant in making the
complaint made a full and fair disclosure to the
prosecuting attorney held, under the evidence,
a question for the jury.-De Boer v. Adams
(Mich.) 540.

§ 71. In an action for malicious prosecution,
the question whether defendant had probable
cause for making complaint against plaintiff
held, under the evidence, for the jury.-De Boer
v. Adams (Mich.) 540.

§ 71. In an action for malicious prosecution
of plaintiff arrested for cutting trees along a
highway, held, that it cannot be found as a mat-
ter of law, under the evidence, that plaintiff ad-
mitted that he had no authority to cut them.-
De Boer v. Adams (Mich.) 540.

MANDAMUS.

Mandatory injunction, see Injunction, § 5.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS IN GEN-

ERAL.

§ 1. Nature and scope of writ of mandamus
stated.-State v. Willis (N. D.) 706.

§ 3. The propriety of issuing mandamus to
vacate an order for writ of possession, on dis-
missal of a bill to restrain the judgment at law
for possession of land, denied.-Hulan v. Murfin
(Mich.) 574.

§ 3. Mandamus will lie against the board of
drain commissioners of a county on its contract.
-Reed v. Heglie (N. D.) 1127.

§ 4. If an order is a final order so as to be
reviewable on appeal, mandamus will not lie to
set it aside.-Price v. Perkins (Mich.) 525.

§ 16. A person, applying for mandamus to
require the county board of canvassers to recan-
vass the vote at an election, will not be entitled
to the writ unless he show that if the board pro-
duce a new abstract, it will show an aggregate
result the reverse of the former one.-State v.
Willis (N. D.) 706.

§ 23. A petition for mandamus to the board
of supervisors to compel them to call an elec
tion under the local option statute, held to suf-
ficiently show relator's special interest in the
matter as to entitle him to the writ.-Flanders
V. Board of Sup'rs of Van Buren County
(Mich.) 1101.

23. A private person of a locality affected
may apply for mandamus in the name of the
state to vindicate a public right, in which all
electors and taxpayers of the locality are con-
cerned.-State v. Willis (N. D.) 706.

II. SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF
RELIEF.

(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Offi-
cers and Boards and Municipalities.

Remedy for enforcement of claims on division
of counties, see Counties, § 16.

(C) Acts and Proceedings of Private Cor-
porations and Individuals.

§ 129. A stockholder of a corporation, with
a valid claim against it, held entitled by man-
damus to compel the corporations to allow him
& Yellowstone Stage Co. (Minn.) 971.
an examination of the books.-State v. Monida

§ 134. A railroad, failing to put in force rates
fixed by the Railroad Commission pending liti
gation to set the order aside, may be compelled
to do so by mandamus.-Michigan R. Commis
sion v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (Mich.) 564.
III. JURISDICTION,

PROCEEDINGS,

AND RELIEF.

§ 143. Laches of a relator in mandamus pro-
ceedings held not so gross as to preclude a con-
sideration of his application upon the merits.-
State v. Willis (N. D.) 706.

§ 155. On motion for mandamus made on
November 18th, based on accused's affidavit
made on the same date, to compel the circuit
judge to cause an amended return to be made
by the examining magistrate, an affidavit by ac-
cused's counsel, not made until March 20th fol-
lowing, should not be considered.-Oblaser v.
Mandell (Mich.) 590.

§ 155. In mandamus to compel an amended
return of a magistrate of accused's preliminary
examination, prior return held not established by
averments on information and belief.-Oblaser
v. Mandell (Mich.) 590.

§ 160. In mandamus to compel the county
auditor to certify to the result of an election for
the division of a county, the alternative writ
held sufficient.-State v. Meyers (N. D.) 701.

§ 164. In mandamus to compel certification
of the result of an election on a county division
proposition, an order striking from defendant's
answer allegations under which he might estab
lish invalidity of the election held prejudicial
error.-State v. Meyers (N. D.) 701.

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See Divorce; Husband and Wife.
Contracts in restraint or derogation of mar-
riage, see Contracts, § 111.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Lists of employés of liquor dealers, see Intoxi-
cating Liquors, § 116.
Words imputing unfitness for or misconduct in
employment as libel or slander, see Libel and
Slander, § 10.

I. THE RELATION.

(B) Statutory Regulation.

Employment of children, see Infants, § 14.

(C) Termination and Discharge.

§ 30. Circumstances under which a master is
warranted in discharging a servant on the
ground of dissatisfaction stated.-Lieberman v.
Weil (Wis.) 262.

II. SERVICES AND COMPENSATION.
(A) Performance of Services.

Restraining breach of contract, see Injunction,
$ 60.

(B) Wages and Other Remuneration.

§ 70. A contract of employment construed,
and held, that a provision of the contract as to
commissions was inoperative so long as commis-
sions did not exceed an annual salary provided
for.-Lieberman v. Weil (Wis.) 262.

§ 81. In an action by a firm against an em-
ployé to recover for shortage in his accounts,
evidence held to sustain a judgment for plain-
tiff.-Greenberg v. Millette (Minn.) 824.

III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR IN-
JURIES TO SERVANT.
Statutory actions for death, see Death, §§ 7-
101.

(A) Nature and Extent in General.
§ 86. Under Code, § 2071, as amended by
that a switchman suing in Iowa for a personal
Acts 27th Gen. Assem. p. 33, c. 49, the fact
benefits in a sister state, and had there re-
injury occurring there had made a contract for

Effect of remarriage on right to alimony, see
Husband and Wife, § 128.
Of administratrix, see Executors and Adminis-ceived such benefits, which contract and set-
trators, § 34.

§ 60. In an action to annul the marriage on
the ground of fraud, the burden is on plain-
tiff to establish the fraud.-Kutch v. Kutch
(Neb.) 108.

§ 60. Evidence in an action to annul a mar-
riage held insufficient to sustain judgment for
plaintiff.-Kutch v. Kutch (Neb.) 108.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.

See Husband and Wife, §§ 29, 31.
Operation and effect as to allowances to surviv-
ing spouse from decedent's estate, see Execu-
tors and Administrators, § 185.

MARRIED WOMEN.

See Husband and Wife.

MARSHALING ASSETS AND SE-
CURITIES.

Application of maxims and principles of equity,
see Equity, § 66.

MASONIC SOCIETIES.

tlement were valid there, held no defense.-
Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (Iowa)
363.

§ SS. Evidence held to show that defendant,
in whose employ plaintiff was, was an inde-
pendent contractor.-Anderson v. Foley Bros.
(Minn.) 987.

§ 88. Whether an employer is an independ-
ent contractor does not necessarily depend up-
on the contracts under which he operates, but
may depend entirely upon the conduct of the
parties. Anderson v. Foley Bros. (Minn.) 987.

895. The employment of a minor in the op-
eration of a circular saw contrary to Laws 1907,
P. 405, c. 523, § 1728a, is negligence per se.--
Sharon v. Winnebago Furniture Mfg. Co. (Wis.)
299.

$95. Under Laws 1907, p. 405, c. 523, §
1728a, held, that where a minor is employed in
violation of the statute, and is injured, the ele-
ment of the master's liability that he should
have anticipated the injury is supplied by the
statute. Sharon v. Winnebago Furniture Mfg.
Co. (Wis.) 299.

(B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and
Places for Work.

§§ 101, 102. It is the duty of the master to
exercise ordinary care to provide a reasonably
safe place for the servant to work and to exer-
cise reasonable care in so maintaining it.-
327.

As charitable institutions exempt from inherit- Streicher v. Davenport Brick & Tile Co. (Iowa)
ance taxes, see Taxation, § 876.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Amer. Digs. 1907 to date & Indexes see same topic & section (§) NUMBER

§§ 101, 102. A railroad company must use
ordinary care to keep its switchyards and depot
grounds in a reasonably safe condition for its
servants.-Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.
Co. (Iowa) 363.

§§ 101, 102. A master must furnish a suita-
ble place where the servant with due care may
perform his work without being exposed to any
but the ordinary dangers of the occupation.—
Kaukola v. Oliver Iron Mining Co. (Mich.) 591.
§§ 101, 102. It is not negligence for the
master to furnish particular appliances for
doing his work where they are not inherently
or latently dangerous.-Ladwig v. Jefferson Ice
Co. (Wis.) 407.

§ 103. The duty of the master to provide
servants a reasonably safe place in which to
work is absolute, and cannot be delegated to
a third person.-Winslow v. Commercial Bldg.
Co. (Iowa) 320.

§ 105. A master may not escape the conse-
quences of failing to exercise ordinary care to
furnish reasonably safe appliances by showing
that all other masters in the same line of busi-

ness are equally negligent.-Winkler v. Power
& Mining Machinery Co. (Wis.) 273.

§ 106. The owner of building is liable for
injuries to his servant resulting from the neg-
ligence of an independent contractor in failing
to properly fasten a fire escape to the building
-Winslow v. Commercial Bldg. Co. (Iowa)
320.

$107. Negligence of a master held to make
the servant's place of work dangerous, so that
an injured servant could recover for injuries
proximately caused thereby. Forseth v. Iron
River Lumber Co. (Wis.) 1036.

§ 112. In an action for injuries to a switch-
man occasioned by his toe becoming caught
against the end of planks in a crossing over
switch tracks, the jury held justified in finding
that the railroad negligently constructed and
maintained the crossing. Hamilton v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co. (Iowa) 363.

§ 124. Sufficiency of inspection to relieve
master from liability for injuries to a servant
from defects in appliances determined.-Win-
slow v. Commercial Bldg. Co. (Iowa) 320.

$ 129. The negligence of a master in violat-
ing Laws 1907, p. 405, c. 523, § 1728a, prohibit-
ing employment of minors under 16 in the op-
eration of a circular saw, held the proximate
cause of an injury to a servant.-Sharon v. Win-
nebago Furniture Mfg. Co. (Wis.) 299.

§ 129. Removal of a discharge spout from
a woolen mixer in a mill held not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury, and therefore imma-
terial.-Lillis v. Beaver Dam Woolen Mills
(Wis.) 1011.

§ 129. Removal of a lever from wool mixer
by the sudden abnormal starting of which plain-
tiff was injured held not a proximate cause of
the injury.-Lillis v. Beaver Dam Woolen Mills
(Wis.) 1011.

(C) Methods of Work, Rules, and Orders.
§ 130. It is not negligence for the master
to lay out a particular mode of doing his work
where it is not inherently or latently danger-
ous.-Ladwig v. Jefferson Ice Co. (Wis.) 407.
§ 139. The proximate cause of an injury to
a servant held to have been the negligent com-
mand of the foreman to place himself in a dan-
gerous position.-Rathjen v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. Co. (Neb.) 473.

$142. The sufficiency of a rule used by a
railroad at the time of a collision held not a
proper question for the jury.-Moyer v. Ann
Arbor R. Co. (Mich.) 542.

§ 146. A railroad has the right to rely on the
observance of its rules by trainmen.-Moyer v.
Ann Arbor R. Co. (Mich.) 542.

(D) Warning and Instructing Servant.
§ 153. Master held not to have performed his
duty to furnish a safe place to work, unless the
persons repairing the car were ordered to keep
a lookout for a laborer under it and warn him.
Wickham v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co.
(Minn.) 639.

$153. Facts held to authorize a finding of
negligence of a master in sending an inexperi-
enced employé without instructions to pull off
the gear wheels of a machine.-Novak v. Nord-
berg Mfg. Co. (Wis.) 282.

(E) Fellow Servants.

$ 170. In employing a servant the master im-
pliedly undertakes to exercise ordinary care in
the selection and retention of co-employés and of
the machinery and implements with which the
work is to be done.-Streicher v. Davenport
Brick & Tile Co. (Iowa) 327.

§ 170. Master held liable to an employé, in-
jured by the fault of an incompetent servant.-
Kronzer v. Spencer-Kellogg Co. (Minn.) 6.

171. The duty to exercise ordinary care in
the selection and retention of co-employés and
of machinery and implements cannot be dele-
gated by the master.-Streicher v. Davenport
Brick & Tile Co. (Iowa) 327.

$171. A master cannot delegate selection
of competent servants and determination as to
their work, so as to avoid liability for their
negligence.-Kronzer V. Spencer-Kellogg Co.
(Minn.) 6.

$ 185. The duty of the master to provide
servants a reasonably safe place in which to
work is absolute, and cannot be delegated to a
fellow servant.-Winslow v. Commercial Bldg.
Co. (Iowa) 320.

in a clay pit of the firing of a blast held to be
§ 185. The duty to warn servants at work
that of the master.-Streicher v. Davenport
Brick & Tile Co. (Iowa) 327.

§ 185. Where a lighting of a passageway in
a mine was necessary for the safety of the work-
men to enable them to do their work and to get
to and from their work safely, the rule that a
safe place to be furnished by the master applies.
-Kaukola v. Oliver Iron Mining Co. (Mich.)
591.

$ 185. A master must provide his servants
with a safe place in which to work, and, where
he employs one to do so, the latter is a vice
ligence.-Kaukola v. Oliver Iron Mining Co.
principal, and the master is liable for his neg-
(Mich.) 591.

$ 185. Whether a workman is the fellow
servant of another workman depends upon the
character of the act performed, which may be
a question for the jury.-Kronzer v. Spencer-
Kellogg Co. (Minn.) 6.

$ 185. Where a master clothes an employé
with authority to control another servant, the
superior servant is a vice principal to the
servant under his control.-Benak v. Paxton &

Vierling Iron Works (Neb.) 461.

§ 196. Whether a duty is that of a fellow
servant or of a master does not depend so much
on the relative situations of servants as upon
the nature of the duty.-Streicher v. Davenport
Brick & Tile Co. (Iowa) 327.

(F) Risks Assumed by Servant.

§ 205. A servant need not familiarize him-
self with all the machinery or appliances which
he does not use himself, and he may presume
that his safety has been reasonably provided for,
and in general he may use an appliance without

first particularly inspecting it.-Kaukola v. Oli-
ver Iron Mining Co. (Mich.) 591.

$206. Assumption of risk held to refer to
risks incident to the employment.-Duffey v.
Consolidated Block Coal Co. (Iowa) 609.

$216. A servant held to assume the risk of
injury from machinery and implements and co-
employés, when selected by the master with or
dinary care.-Streicher v. Davenport Brick &
Tile Co. (Iowa) 327.

§ 216. A section hand riding on an engine
held to have assumed the risk of negligence of
his fellow servants in causing a collision.-Moy-
er v. Ann Arbor R. Co. (Mich.) 542.

$216. Under the statute a railroad employé
in the line of his duty held not to assume the
risk of negligence in a co-employé, except, per
haps, where he knowingly, voluntarily, and
unnecessarily submits himself thereto.-Hack-
ett v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co. (Wis.) 1018.

§ 217. Where the work is of a character to
render the place in which it is performed un-
safe, or the place is rendered unsafe by the work
in which the servant is engaged, the servant,
when charged with knowledge of the peril, as-
sumes the risk.-Streicher v. Davenport Brick
& Tile Co. (Iowa) 327.

$217. A switchman, having no notice of the
defects in a plank crossing over switch tracks.
does not assume the risk incident to the use of
the crossing.-Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.
Co. (Iowa) 363.

$217. Assumption of risk held to refer to
risks from the master's negligence, when known
to the servant, and its danger appreciated by
him.-Duffey v. Consolidated Block Coal Co.
(Iowa) 609.

217. A master assumes the risk of dangers
which he either knows or should know.-Kauko-
la v. Oliver Iron Mining Co. (Mich.) 591.

§ 220. Where a servant had complained of a
defect in a machine he was operating, and had
been informed by the foreman that it had been
remedied, he did not assume the risk thereof,
since it was not incumbent upon him to make
an investigation to see that the defect, which
could not have been readily discovered, had
been remedied.-Holacek v. T. M. Sinclair &
Co., Limited (Iowa) 331.

$222. A risk resulting in a servant's injury
held not one of the ordinary incidents of the
employment assumed by him.-Rathjen v. Chica-
go, B. & Q. R. Co. (Neb.) 473.

§ 224. A fireman in a locomotive cab was
acting in the line of his duty within the statute
even if he performed some negligent act, in the
course of his conduct.-Hackett v. Wisconsin
Cent. Ry. Co. (Wis.) 1018.

(G) Contributory Negligence of Servant.

§ 234. A servant induced to continue work
by his master's promise to remedy dangerous
conditions held not guilty of contributory negli-
gence.-Benak v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works
(Neb.) 461.

§ 234. Employé held not guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in placing his hand under the
knew nor could have known of the danger.-
die of a stamping machine, where he neither
Berger v. Abel & Bach Co. (Wis.) 410.

$234. A timberman injured by a log on a
rollway, held not negligent in failing to get out
of the way.-Forseth v. Iron River Lumber Co.
(Wis.) 1036.

§ 240. A conductor of a train traveling
backwards held negligent in not keeping a look-
out on the top of the caboose.-Steele v. Great
Northern Ry. Co. (Minn.) 978.

§ 240. In an action for the death of a switch-
man on a terminal engine by being caught be-
tween the engine and the box car loader of a
fuel company which was on a track opposite the
terminal engine, a finding of contributory neg
v.ligence by decedent held sustained.-Fitzpatrick
v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Co
(Wis.) 1054.

§ 217. Evidence held not to show as a mat-
ter of law that plaintiff assumed the risk of
dangerous and unguarded machinery.-Snyder
Waldorf Box Board Co. (Minn.) 450.

§ 217. An employé injured by the fall of a
scaffold on which he was at work held to have

assumed the risk.-Ladwig v. Jefferson Ice Co.
(Wis.) 407.

§ 217. An employé who enters and continues
in the service of an employer, knowing that the
latter had laid out a particular mode of doing
his work, assumes the ordinary risk of such
service arising from such mode which he knows
by ordinary observation.-Ladwig v. Jefferson
Ice Co. (Wis.) 407.

§ 217. When an employé knowing that his
employer has furnished particular appliances
for doing his work enters and continues in the
service of his employer, he assumes the risks
arising from such appliances, which are simple
in their construction, and not worn out, broken,
or defective.-Ladwig v. Jefferson Ice Co. (Wis.)
407.

§ 217. In an action for injuries to a serv-
ant by the sudden starting of a machine, plain-
tiff held to have assumed the risk of placing
his hand in the machine to remove clogged ma-
terials as he did.-Lillis v. Beaver Dam Woolen
Mills (Wis.) 1011.

§ 219. A servant in a mine who had no actual
knowledge of a danger in a pathway did not as-
sume the risk of danger, unless it was obvious
to a person of ordinary prudence.-Kaukola v.
Oliver Iron Mining Co. (Mich.) 591.

§ 219. A danger in employment held not an
open and obvious one which a servant injured
thereby assumed as incident to his duties.-
Forseth v. Iron River Lumber Co. (Wis.) 1036.

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Credibility of witnesses, see Evidence, § 588.
Error in instructions cured by giving other in-
structions, see Trial, § 296.

Form of special interrogatories to jury, see
Trial, 352.
Instructions giving undue prominence to partic-
ular matters, see Trial, § 244.
Questions to be submitted to jury, see Trial, §
350.

Requests for special findings, see Trial, § 351.

$262. The assumption of ordinary risk, in-
cident to the employment need not be specially
pleaded, but the assumption of the risk of in-
cially pleaded to be available.-Duffey v. Con-
jury from the master's negligence must be spe-
solidated Block Coal Co. (Iowa) 609.

§ 262. An answer, in an action for injuries
to a servant, held not to raise the defense of as-
sumption of risk.-Duffey v. Consolidated Block
Coal Co. (Iowa) 609.

§ 265. A servant suing for a personal inju-
ry must show freedom from contributory negli-
gence.-Duffey v. Consolidated Block Coal Co.
(Iowa) 609.

$265. Assumption of risk is an affirmative
defense, and the burden is on the master to
plead and prove it.-Duffey v. Consolidated
Block Coal Co. (Iowa) 609.

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