pronounces it "better suited to America." Vattel's definition is clearly inadequate to the notion of a principal (j) domicil received in British Courts of Justice. XLVIII. Boullenois, in his Treatise on the Personality and Reality of Laws, &c., says, "Though it be true that man is born to be in motion, and "to traverse this earth which God has given him, he is not "made to dwell in all the places which necessity compels "him to traverse; he must have a place of repose, a place "of choice and predilection, a place of society, a place where "he can enjoy, with his family, the advantages of his "labours and cares: this place it is which we call Domicil, "and where a man, by a kind of fiction, belongs. He "cannot be said to belong to a place unless he be there in "the spirit and meaning of abiding there, and having his "ordinary habitation there" (k). XLIX. Lord Alvanley commends the wisdom of Bynkershoek (1) for hazarding no definition; and it must be admitted, that among the various definitions (m) to be found in publicists, none are completely satisfactory. Donellus, after criticising the definitions of the Roman Law, says, "Pressius igitur et certius sic domicilium cujusque definie"tur-ut sit locus in quo quis habitat eo animo ut ibi perpetuò consistat nisi quid avocet" (n). Perhaps, however, the American Judges have been the most successful in their attempts, and from a combination of their dicta upon different occasions, we may arrive at a tolerably accurate definition in designating it "a residence at a particular place, accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of "an intention to remain there for an unlimited time" (o). 66 66 (j) See below, chapter v. Can a man have two domicils ?" (k) Traité de la Personalité et de la Réalité des Lois, Coutumes, Statuts, par forme d'Observations, Obs. 32, p. 40. (1) Somerville v. Lord Somerville, 5 Vesey's Reports, p. 750. (0) Guier v. Daniel, 1 Binney's Reports, 349, note; "a residence at Domicil answers very much to the common meaning of our word "home;" and, where a person possessed two residences, the phrase, "he made the latter his home," would point out that to be his Domicil (p). L. All jurists agree that there must be both intention and fact to constitute a Domicil. The French jurists seem to have rather leant to the extreme doctrine of the Civil and Canon Law, that, without intention, no length of time can constitute a Domicil, to which, I shall have occasion to show in another part of this Treatise, the law in England has been less inclined (7). It seems, however, to be universally admitted by all jurists, that the fact is admitted only as a proof of the intention (r); but, then, there are certain facts which the law considers as undoubted evidence of that intention-facts which may be regarded as speaking a language on this point, at least, equally entitled to belief with a particular place, accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of continuing there for an unlimited time." Elbers and Kraffts v. United Ins. Company, 16 Johnson's Reports, p. 128, “an indefinite intention of remaining." The Frances, 8 Cranch's Rep. 363, "a permanent settlement for an indefinite time." Johnson v. Sundry Articles of Merchandise, Peter's Condensed Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. iii. p. 171, "the time is not so essential as the intent." (p) Wolff, Jus Gentium, c. i. s. 137, says, "domicilium dicitur habitatio aliquo in loco constituta perpetuo ibidem manendi animusidiomate patrio dicitur die Behausung.” This idiom, however, appears to have been superseded in the German of the present day by the words "Wohnort," and "Wohnsitz." The former word is used by Savigny in his last work, System des Römischen Rechts, Band v. s. 243 (319), the latter is said to be the correct expression, viii. s. 353, (58). I find no trace of any Greek law on domicil. Cicero renders "oiknois" by domicilium. See the passage in Plato, IIɛpi vóμwv, xii. p. 206, translated by Cicero, De Legibus, 1. ii. c. xviii. (q) "Domicilium, domus, sedes domestica, habitatio certa et diuturna," is the not inelegant definition of Forcellini, Lexicon curâ Facciolati. Some Etymologists derive Domicilium from "domus” and "colo." (r) See Locré, Législation Civile de la France, tome iii. 1. i. t. iii, partie ii. p. 415. any declarations, oral or written, even of the person himself. This part of the subject will be discussed in considering the change of domicil, the criteria of which are nearly the same as those of its original existence (s). (s) "Probatur mutatio eisdem ferè modis ac prima constitutio.”Voet, l. v. t. i. s. 9. CHAPTER V CAN A MAN HAVE TWO DOMICILS? LI. CAN a man have two Domicils? is a question which should be resolved at an early stage of any disquisition upon this branch of law. The Roman Law answered in the affirmative (a), that is, when a man had so set up his household gods in both places as to appear equally established in both: and this answer, properly understood and qualified, is not incorrect, with reference to the International Law of the present day (b). LII. It is the remark of Domat (c), and of other jurists, that though it may be difficult, or impossible, for a man to have two domicils, which shall be equally the centre of his affairs, according to the definition already given; and though a man can have but one principal domicil, yet a man may have two or more domicils (d) for different purposes. In the (a) Though it was the boast of the Roman that he could not be the civis of another State: "Sed nos (Romani) non possumus et hujus esse civitatis et cujusvis præterea: cæteris omnibus concessum est."Cic. pro Balbo, 12. (b) "Viris prudentibus placuit duobus locis posse aliquem habere domicilium si utrubique ita se instruxit, ut non ideo minus apud alteros se collocâsse videatur."-Dig. lib. 1. t. i. s. 5, Ad Municip. (c) Domat, 1. i. t. xvi. s. 6. Duranton, Cours du Droit Français, 1. i. t. iii. s. 357. (d) "Mais on peut avoir deux domiciles, dit la demoiselle de Kerbahu, et n'est-ce pas ce qui a été jugé dans la succession du Prince de Guimené, par l'arrêt du 6 Septembre, 1670? Ainsi le Comte d'Hautefort pouvoit être domicilié à Paris et à Hauterive. Deux responses font cesser une pareille objection. La première est que si l'on pouvoit avoir deux domiciles, ce seroit par rapport à des objets tout différens ; ainsi l'une pourroit être un domicile de fait qui influeroit sur tout ce qui regarde directe case of Somerville v. Lord Somerville, the Master of the Rolls observed on the novelty of the question, as being "between two acknowledged Domicils" (e), and upon the question, "which of two Domicils shall preponderate, or, "rather, which is the Domicil, according to which the per"sonal estate shall be regulated?" It cannot, therefore, be too carefully recollected, that Domicil is distinguished by the various situations to which it is applied (f); that is to say, the circumstances which will be of force to impress the character of a Domicil in one instance, will fail to do so in another. LIII. The European and American Law require the characteristics of the principal (g) Domicil for cases of a testament, or distribution under intestacy. ment la personne domiciliée ; l'autre un domicile de droit et de volonté, qui décideroit du sort de la succession. Le cas est sans doute fort extraordinaire, et peut-être même que dans les règles il ne devroit point être admis," &c. Cochin's argument in the case of the Marquis d'Hautefort, Euvres, t. iii. p. 327. (e) 5 Vesey's Rep. p. 750. (f) Mr. Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on American Law, Lecture 37, s. 4, note-“There is a political, a civil, and a forensic domicil." (g) "Le domicile de tout Français quant à l'exercise de ses droits civils est au lieu où il a son principal établissement."-Code Civil, t. iii. Du Domicil. "A man can have but one domicil for the purpose of succession."-Kent's Comment. L. 37, s. 4, note. So Grotius (in his opinion cited by Henry) says, "To the solution of this question, if we follow the written or Roman law and the com. mentators thereon, "originis domicilium est immutabile, et ideo qui alibi habitat consetur habere duo domicilia."-L. Origine, C. de Municip. et orig. lib. x. l. Assumptio. ff. ad Municip. et ibi Bart. But this difficulty ceases if we consider the general custom of the Netherlands, nay even of the whole world, at this time: "Secundum quam consuetudinem domicilium originis solâ voluntate mutatur ita ut originarius nullo modo maneat subjectus jurisdictioni originis: an consuetudini testimonium etiam prohibet Gail, 1. ii. obs. 36, dicens eam et in Germania et ubique obtinere." This, says Henry, does not extend to cases of allegiance: Odwin v. Forbes, Appendix, p. 197; and in an opinion from a Dutch jurist, cited by the same author, occurs this passage: Sed ista omnia ita non procedunt (cum locus originis det domicilii præsumptionem secundum ante dicta, pluribus tamen, puta tribus locis, quis domicilium habere possit) quin considerandum |