to THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I hope to detain the House but for a very short time, and do not intend to follow the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) into his examination of the statements of my noble Friend, Lord Cranbrook, nor into his financial examination of the statements of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State as to the Indian Budget, because I am sure that were it necessary to tell anything further on that subject my hon. Friend ever Government was friendly to him. | the Chamberlain Mission. That was Further, that the Mustaufi urged him the question which, in his opinion, come to terms with the British called for an answer from the GovernGovernment, as they were moderate, ment; for who could doubt that, but whereas the Russians were shameless; for this delay, there would have been and that Wali Mahommed, when ap- no war? pealed to, concurred. It would also be see that on the 18th of June news, stated to be authentic, was reported from Peshawur to the effect that Russian Agents had laid proposals before the Ameer for permission for Russian troops to be quartered in his territories. Reports of the coming of the Mission were received on the 5th, the 11th, and the 13th of June-so that early in that month the Government had information, if not in detail, at any rate from several different sources. How-would be better able to tell it than I; ever, the first complaint we made at but with regard to one or two questions St. Petersburg as to the movement of raised, it is my duty to make some troops was on August 14, and the first remarks. With reference to one of the communication to the Ameer was of charges, he mentioned the delay which the same date. There was, then, the he notices as having taken place in the strange circumstance of the Govern- communications made with Russia and ment having information from a variety of sources-information which, though not official, was strictly correct, and some described in the Papers themselves as authentic-of the movement of Russian troops and the approach of a Russian Envoy, and yet the Government for two months did nothing. If that was so, what were they entitled to say of the Government ? Had it been a question solely of India, and the Indian Government had been acting free from dictation at home, could there be any question that the Government of India would have sent at once to the Ameer and have told him that his fears seemed likely to be justified, and that we were, therefore, prepared to step forward, as he wished, and we had promised, in defence of his Frontier? But, unfortunately, it was an English and not an Indian question, and they waited two months. And why? At the end of May the SalisburySchouvaloff agreement was signed, which the Government believed would settle all things satisfactorily; so that, feeling that the danger reported to them from so many quarters was over, they made no representation to Russia or to the Ameer for two months. And then, on the same day, they ordered Lord Augustus Loftus to protest to the Russian Government against a movement of troops which was long over, and the Viceroy to summon the Ameer to receive VOL. CCXLIII. [THIRD SERIES.] to the Ameer with respect to the Russian Mission. I admit that undoubtedly it was the case that for a considerable period-even extending much further back than the month of June last year-we were continually receiving communications of more or less authority, pointing to the movement of Russian forces in Central Asia. It was, however, exceedingly difficult to get at the exact truth of these reports. Reports often reached us which at first sight appeared very formidable, but which were afterwards explained away, or reduced in their importance; and frequently we were led to the conclusion that they were spread for the purpose of causing anxiety, or accidentally magnified by the imaginations of those who had made them. Without going too minutely into details, I may say that it was not until the middle of August that we were distinctly informed by the Indian Government that a Russian Mission had actually come to Cabul; and until that Mission had actually arrived there, we had no right to say that Russia was moving in parts of Asia in which she had no right to interfere; while we might always have been met with the denial on her part, as to the intention of overstepping the limits. assigned to her influence. We were in no hurry to raise a question which might have produced a quarrel; but, as far as 2 L we could, wished matters to cool down, as we hoped they would after the negotiations at Berlin; and it was not until we were absolutely certain that the Russian Mission had arrived at Cabul that we sent conditional instructions to the Viceroy to take certain steps as soon as he was able to ascertain this beyond doubt. With regard to another point raised by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers)-who I see has left his place-in passing, upon which he quoted the authority of the present Lord Chancellor and of Lord Salisbury from opinions expressed some years ago in the House of Lords, he seems to have forgotten that on that very occasion the Lord Chancellor of his own Government then in power-Lord Hatherley --answered the observations of Lord Cairns, and that he laid down with authority that "an order to the Governor General to declare war against a border State would not require the assent of the Council, though, of course, it would, in its consequences, involve expenditure.”—[3 Hansard, cxcv. 1830.] This latter view is against the contention with which we are met; but it is not my intention to pursue that subject, which is unnecessary for the purposes of this discussion. The right hon. Gentleman has made a very great part of his speech turn upon the terrible word "defray" -indeed, we have had that word so dinned into our ears by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, as well as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract that we have come to feel uncomfortable about it. I quite agree with the right hon. Member for Pontefract, that in our proceedings, when we are setting precedents, it is desirable and incumbent on us to be cautious about the language which we use; and I must say upon that point, with reference to that particular statute, that I think the Government, drawn from the front Bench opposite, were exceedingly cautious when they had to take proceedings under that Act. For very shortly after it was passed, upon one occasion when they did use Indian troops, and allowed Indian monies to be applied for the maintenance of those troops upon an expedition beyond the borders of India-in China-they were so afraid of using this terrible word "defray," that they did not use any word at all, and never came to Parliament either, to tell them anything about the affair. That was a very curious and interesting circumstance. When I have had occasion before to refer to it, I have always been met with this observation"Oh! that was a case which did not fall within the meaning of the statute at all; that was a case which was provided for by the exception clause, in which it is said that "Except for the purpose of repelling or preventing invasion, or in case of some sudden or urgent necessity, the Forces of India should not be used without the consent of Parliament." The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) told us that the Peiho affair was a case of "urgent necessity;" that what happened in that case was this-a friendly Mission was being sent by the British and French Governments to the capital of China-to Pekin-and on its way it was suddenly assaulted and stopped in its progress, and therefore the emergency was so sudden that it was absolutely necessary to take steps to redress the insult. There are, certainly, some parallels which might be suggested in the present case, and, let me add, some points of difference. Notwithstanding the suddenness of the emergency, one year and two months were allowed to elapse before the Force was dispatched; and during that time a Session of Parliament took place, but nothing was said about it; and we are driven to the conclusion that in the view of Gentlemen opposite, when an insult is offered to the British Power beyond its own Frontiers, it is such an emergency that it will justify the employment of Indian troops without Parliament being consulted. You cannot say that the case in question was in any sense one of preventing or repelling invasion. In the case of Afghanistan, it might, perhaps, have been contended, with some little plausibility, that it was a measure of precaution, used to prevent invasion; and, certainly, with regard to its suddenness, that it was one of the very greatest emergency; because we could not wait 14 months, nor even 14 days, for it was a question of the season of the year, which, if the troops had not been ordered to move, would have been lost, and this would probably have led to much greater bloodshed and suffering, as well as added to the cost of the war. part of the Indian Exchequer to bear the expense of that war? I apprehend that, supposing it to have arisen in ordinary circumstances, there would be no question whatever that the charge should be rightly laid on the Indian Revenues. If you were to adopt a different principle, and say that the Indian Government should be at liberty, whenever they thought right, to undertake wars against their neighbours, and that they should be held harmless, I ask, what would be the temptation of the Government of India to go into quarrels which would be of a dangerous kind, and which would bring anything but satisfaction or economy to the people of India? But knowing that if they get into complications with their neighbours they will have to bear the expense is a check which, in their interest, as well as in the interests of the people of England, ought not to be disregarded. Again, where you have to deal with immediate border neighbours-such as Nepaul, Burmah, or any other StatesI apprehend the case is clear that India ought to bear the expense. And similarly, I believe, within the Indian system, in which I include Afghanistan, upon the rule I have laid down, if a quarrel arose between that country and India, the Indian Revenues should bear the expense. I now want to qualify that doctrine by another consideration. I have said it is right that India should bear the expense of hostilities against immediate neighbours; but I have drawn a distinction between them and distant enemies: and when I speak of distant enemies, I especially refer to enemies who may be moving against If we are to be so careful about prece- | place between them-is it or is it not the dents in the use of this ambiguous word "defray," our conduct is, I think, more excusable than that of right hon. Gentlemen opposite. It is said you cannot apply the word "defray" to the payment of temporary charges; and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) observed that there was a great difference between the language used in this case and that used in the Vote for the Abyssinian Expedition. Of course, there was; because in the latter it was distinctly intended that the British Government should pay for the whole, or the greater part, of the expenditure-the object being avowedly an Imperial and British object. All that was then proposed was, that we should use the Indian Army and relieve the Indian Revenue of all charges; and, therefore, anything that was put upon it was distinctly of a temporary character. But what is proposed now is something wholly different. It is proposed to apply the Indian Revenue to this expenditure; not thereby meaning to say that it is not a matter that will require serious attention as to how far the British or Imperial Exchequer is to come in aid of that expenditure. But the right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that it will fall, in the first instance, upon the Indian Revenue; and I wish to go into this matter and face it, without attempting to disguise what is my view of it. I have said that I wish to put our view of the case before the House; and I hope hon. Members on both sides will endeavour to free their minds from any feeling of prejudice, and not be guided by mere impulse, without consideration of all the consequences at which they may arrive. What I ask the House is this-her, not on account of any direct are we or are we not to understand that quarrel with her, but on account of India is to be a self-supported part of some quarrel with the British Empire the British Empire? The hon. Member of which she is a part. In such a case, for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) says it is. we ought to recognize the justice and Then, if India is self-supporting, is it to equity of the Imperial Exchequer pay for her own self-defence? That is coming in aid of that part of our a question which must be answered with dominions which is attacked, not from some little reserve. I think there is to be any special local cause but from Impethe greatest distinction drawn between rial causes. We must bear in mind, defence against immediate neighbours therefore, what the Imperial Power and defence against distant enemies. does towards the general defence of Take, for instance, the strongest case India. There is no doubt we do a on the one side. Suppose a quarrel to great deal to keep back the tide of arise between the British Government invasion. If anybody will look at in India and the Nizam or Maharajah the history of India, they will see Scindia, and a contest or war takes that wave after wave of different na tions At came over that country and necessary to put forward anything like overran it, generally from the North- our Imperial strength, I am sure that West and through these very Passes of the people of England will be ready which we have been speaking. Anyone to bear their full share-and even more will see that this would again be the than their full share-of the burden of natural course of events, if there were this war. I wish to remind the House not some strong Power in India like the of the position of affairs under which we British Power; and that if a great are called together. Up to the time of Power were advancing over those the period allowed for the Ameer's regions of Asia, that advancing Power reply to our Ultimatum we fully hoped would sooner or later sweep over India that war might be avoided, and a peacealso. I believe that if it were not for ful settlement arrived at. From the mothe presence of British Power there, the ment when the advance began-namely, shadow which such invasion would throw on the 21st November-until now, the before it would even now be producing interval is less than four weeks, and it alarm and disturbance in that country of is really exceedingly difficult at present a serious character. But the great Power to tell what is the real nature of the of England, and the warning hand of resistance to be offered, or the upshot or England, keeps India quiet, and thereby outcome of the war. In the course of confers great benefits upon her. But another month or two we shall have what is the real cause, extent, and mean- learned a great deal, and be in a very ing of the present war? This is one much better position to make to Parpoint upon which we require further liament a serious proposition approinformation than we have at the present priate to the real state of the case. moment. As to the actual and imme- the present moment in our uncertainty diate cause of the present war, it was as to the extent of the operations necesthe refusal, with insult, offered in the sary to obtain the submission of the eyes of all India, of a Mission sent by Ameer, it would be impossible for us to the Indian Government. There can be come forward and do what we have done no doubt that if that were submitted to in other cases-propose a definite Vote the Government of India would have of Credit. If we are to give aid it must been fatally, or at least seriously, not be by undertaking that we should weakened; and the country would have bear the expense of a war administered been put to considerable expense and by others, set free from all consideraexertion in order to redress the evil tions of economy, who might press it suffered. If there were nothing more in beyond the length which might be dethis quarrel than that insult offered sirable, because they are exempt from perhaps from the peculiar character, the all risk of having to pay for it; but what moodiness, or ill-will and obstinacy we may think it right to give should be of a particular Ruler, which might be in the shape of a Vote in aid of the exspeedily avenged, and that Ruler penditure of the Indian Government. brought to his senses-and if the ex- The principle upon which we proceed is penditure is to be of a moderate cha- one which we have adopted with referracter as we are told by the authori-ence not only, and not even principally, ties of India it may be expected to be- to the interests of taxpayers in England; and if, as I earnestly hope and pray but with the sincere belief that it would may be the case, we have nearly arrived be better for the interests of India at the conclusion of this business, it will be a matter of considerable doubt whether the Imperial Exchequer ought to be called upon to pay anything at all. But if, on the other hand, there should be more in the war than at first sight appears-if it should seem that this is a war-of course, not openly or avowedly, but secretly, and against the will of another Government, but, nevertheless, by unofficial means stirred up and maintained against us by a European Power; and if it becomes herself that she should be made to feel the responsibility under which she carries on war, and that it would be a very bad principle to allow her Administration to believe that they might go to war and cast the expense upon the Imperial Exchequer. I admit that there is much which raises the presumption that this should be treated as an exceptional case; but all I can say at present is that the Government will be fully prepared when we meet after the Recess to give full explanations to the House as to what proposals we shall have to make. ward to say that by our instructions and by our directions all this expenditure has been incurred? How is it possible that the House should turn round and say we decline to pay? We have been fulfilling one of our most important functions. To this House is confided, no doubt, the guardianship of our Indian subjects to a very great extent; but I think its primary duty is to guard the interests of the British taxpayer. Under the circumstances in which we have been debating this question, it has been impossible to enter into it at length; but I am anxious that the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer should not pass without a protest; and I am of opinion that when we meet again, this question will be seriously considered than the Government think it should be at the present moment. more THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: There is one point in the observations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which I think ought not to be left altogether without remark. I think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had some injustice done to him at an earlier period of the evening, inasmuch as the right hon. Gentleman has now given us some information as to what are the actual intentions of the Government. It appears that Her Majesty's Government intend the first charge of the war to be defrayed by the Indian Government; and their further intention is that according to the amount of resistance, or, in any case, according to the nature or object which they desire to gain by the war, they will come forward and ask this House to grant a subsidy in aid of the Indian Revenues. MR. JACOB BRIGHT said, he would This appears to me to be a new and not detain the House more than two altogether unprecedented view of the minutes while he alluded to a matter subject. We have in former times fre- which he had hoped would be mentioned quently conducted wars by means of by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. subsidies to foreign Powers; but I am Hardcastle), who had been more fortunot aware that we have ever subsidized nate than himself in getting a place in one of our own Dependencies to conduct the debate. A great deal had been said a war for us. There is this difference, I in the course of the debate about taking believe that when a foreign Power has a surplus which ought to be devoted to been subsidized to carry on a war in our the unfortunate people of India. He behalf, there has been a distinct under- wished to remind the Government that' standing and distinct stipulations as to there were many poor people in this the amount to be paid and the amount of country who had some interest in that assistance to be rendered. In this case, surplus. Large deputations had come however, everything remains vague. up from the North of England, from It is in the power of the Government time to time, to ask for the removal of at home to issue such orders as they the cotton duties of India; and a may think fit to the Indian Govern- Minister of the Crown had more than ment as regards the prosecution of the once promised those deputations that as war; and when the work has been per- soon as there should be a surplus it formed, they can come down to the House should be devoted to the removal of and ask us to vote money in order to re- those duties. The Minister who made imburse the taxpayers of India for the those promises was Lord Salisbury; and services rendered. In this case, what it would be rather a curious coincidence becomes of the power of this House to if, on looking up the dates, it should be control questions of peace and war; and discovered that at the moment when he what becomes of the power of this House was making those promises to the Lancato protect the purse of the British shire people he was reversing the-policy nation? If Her Majesty's Government, of peace in India, and making it imposthrough the agency of the Indian Go-sible to apply the surplus to any such vernment, conducts the war, the control purpose. Representing a part of Lanof Parliament over the expenditure en-cashire, and knowing the condition in tirely vanishes. And as to the guardianship of the resources of the taxpayers, what becomes of that when, after the Indian Government has done the work, the Government comes for which Lancashire was at the present moment, he felt it his duty to say a word on this subject. The mills were being closed or working short time, and a great number of poor people would look with |