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MOTIONS.

10

STANDING ORDERS.

Select Committee on Standing Orders nominated: Mr. MOWBRAY, Mr. BRUEN, Sir EDWARD COLEBROOKE, Mr. CUBITT, Mr. FLOYER, Mr. THOMSON HANKEY, Mr. HOWARD, Sir GRAHAM MONTGOMERY, The O'CONOR DON, Mr. RODWELL, and Mr. WHITBREAD.

SELECTION.

Committee of Selection nominated:

- Mr.

Resolution reported: - Bill ordered to be
brought in by Mr. JAMES BARCLAY, Mr. BAX-
TER, Mr. JAMES COWAN, and Mr. COURTNEY.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 73.]

MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Major O'GORMAN, Bill for the assimilation of the Irish Municipal Franchise to that of England, ordered to be brought in by Major O'GORMAN, Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA, Mr. RICHARD POWER, and Mr. BLENNERHASSETT. Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 74.]

SERVANTS BILL.

FLOYER, Mr. THOMSON HANKEY, Sir GRAHAM EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO
MONTGOMERY, The O'CONOR DON, Mr. WHIT-
BREAD, and the Chairman of the Select Com-
mittee on Standing Orders.

INCLOSURES.

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed, Six Members to be nominated by the House and Five by the Committee of Selection, to consider every Report made by the Inclosure Commissioners certifying the expediency of any Provisional Order for the inclosure or regulation of a Common, and presented to the House during the present Session, before a Bill be brought in for the confirmation of such Order :-That it be

an Instruction to the Committee, That they have power with respect to each such Provisional Order to inquire and report to the House whether the same should be confirmed by Parliament, and, if so, whether with or without modification; and in the event of their being of opinion that the same should not be confirmed, except subject to modifications, to report such modifications accordingly with a view to such Provisional Order being remitted to the Inclosure Commissioners.-(Sir Matthew Ridley.)

ELECTION PETITIONS (COSTS) BILL.

On Motion of Major NOLAN, Bill to limit the amount of the Costs recoverable in Election Petitions, ordered to be brought in by Major NOLAN, Mr. GRAY, Mr. MACDONALD, and Mr. PATRICK MARTIN.

Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 72.]

VALUATION OF PROPERTY BILL.

On Motion of Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Bill to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to the Valuation of Property for the purposes of Rates and Taxes, ordered to be brought in by Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Mr. CHANCELLOR of the ExCHEQUER, and Mr. SALT.

On Motion of Mr. BRASSEY, Bill to extend and regulate the Liability of Employers to make compensation for personal Injuries suffered by persons in their service, ordered to be brought in by Mr. BRASSEY, Mr. MORLEY, Mr. M. BASS, and Mr. SULLIVAN.

Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 75.]

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PUBLIC WORKS LOANS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. CHANCELLOR of the ExCHEQUER, Bill to amend the Acts relating to the Public Works Loan Commissioners and the

Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 71.] Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland,

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ordered to be brought in by Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER and Sir HENRY SELWINIBBETSON.

Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 70.]

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House adjourned at Three o'clock till Monday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, 17th February, 1879.

but generally delegated his authority to other persons. What the Bill proposed to do was this-that when any work was carried on, be it a mine, a factory, a workshop, a railway, a building trade, or any such like industrial undertaking, by a company or by persons who did not themselves superintend the manageMINUTES.]—PUBLIC BILLS-First Reading-ment, but delegated their authority and Disqualification by Medical Relief (6); Workman's Compensation (7); Bankruptcy Law Amendment (8); Debtors Act, 1869, Amendment (9).

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superintendence to managers or others acting in their stead, the employers or company should be responsible for the acts of those persons whom they had, in fact, put into their places and invested with their authority. It was only comparatively of recent occurrence that large industrial undertakings had grown up which made it, in many instances, impossible for the owners and employers personally to superintend the management; and the consequence, owing to the extent of the work, was this-that a considerable number of persons were

EARL DE LA WARR, in rising to call attention to the state of the law with regard to the liability of employers to make compensation for injuries to persons in their service, and to lay upon the Table of the House a Bill to amend the law on that subject, said, that be-appointed, with various responsible fore asking their Lordships to give a first reading to the Bill of which he had given Notice, he must beg the indulgence of the House if he very briefly referred to the state of the law in respect of the liability of employers to make compensation for injuries to persons in their service. The question was one which very materially affected a large portion of the industrial classes of this country, and he thought it could be shown that the difficulties which surrounded the operation of the law, as it now existed in this respect, had in a great measure arisen from the altered circumstances affecting industrial enterprize. The measure, therefore, which he proposed to introduce would not materially alter the existing law; but was intended to adapt that law to the changed conditions of things. He believed that the law, as now interpreted and acted upon, made a master or employer of labour personally liable for injuries which might occur to persons in his employ when it could be traced to any negligence or want of due precaution on his part. The Bill did not propose to alter that-it commended itself as fair and reasonable. But as matters now stood in regard to large undertakings-such as mines, collieries, factories, railways, workshops, or other industrial occupations the employer rarely had anything or very little to do

duties assigned to them, in superintending the work which the employers were carrying on. The Bill proposed to make the employers liable for the negligence or want of precaution of those persons, the same as if it were the negligence and carelessness of the employers themselves. That seemed to be really only an adaptation of the principle of the liability of the employer for injuries to his servants when it arose from his own want of proper care or precaution; and it might have been supposed that such would have been the natural development of the law when circumstances which he had described became altered. But not so. The law had been interpreted differently-and he might add that there was by no means unanimity between Her Majesty's Judges on the subject-for the law, as at present administered, removed all liability from the employer or master, and gave the workman no redress beyond what he could obtain from the manager or person exercising superintendence. A new difficulty in the administration of the law had arisen in the doctrine of "common employment." This doctrine had been developed to such an extent that the manager or other person in authority in the case of a mine, a railway, a factory, or other industrial undertaking was now considered to be in what was called "common employment"

stated that they proposed to introduce a measure on the subject; but owing to the state of Business during last Session, it became impossible to do so. Her Majesty's Government are perfectly prepared now to redeem the pledge which they gave. They have prepared a Bill upon the subject, and that Bill will be introduced forthwith into the House of Commons. In these circumstances, I hope the noble Earl will understand that it is not through any want of courtesy or respect to him that I do not pursue the subject any further at present; and although I am sure we should be glad to see the Bill which he proposes to lay upon the Table, I do not doubt he will think it right, after laying it on the Table, to await the progress of the measure which will be introduced "elsewhere."

in the same work. The consequence | It has been under consideration and dewas that the company or real employer bate in the other House of Parliament escaped all liability, as the manager or during the last Session, and, if I misperson in authority was considered to be take not, it was considered in that a fellow-workman with all those whom House before a Select Committee. After he was appointed to superintend. The the Report of that Committee, Her MaBill he now submitted proposed to af-jesty's Government, in the other House, ford some remedy, while it would not, as he had said, materially affect the principle of the existing law. It proposed to alter the law of "common employment" so far as to exclude managers or persons exercising superintendence from being in common employment with those placed under them. But it was not proposed to alter the law with regard to those engaged in actual labour, and the employer would not be liable for injuries caused by one workman to his fellow-workman in the ordinary course of his occupation. It was further provided in the Bill that no compensation should be given if the workman himself had contributed to the accident; and whatever might be the nature of the accident, if there had been exercised by those in charge for the time being necessary care and competency, neither the owner nor anyone else was intended to be made responsible for such accident. The main object of the Bill was to render an employer responsible, when it was shown BANKRUPTCY LAW AMENDMENT BILL. in evidence that the accident might have been prevented by the exercise of care and ability on the part of those in charge to whom the master or employer had delegated his authority. Such were the chief features of the Bill, and he thought it might be affirmed that it did not alter the principle of the existing law; but proposed, rather, to adapt it to the change of circumstances affecting industrial employments. He could assure their Lordships that the greatest moderation had been shown by those who were interested in this question, and that they desired only what was fair and just.

Bill to amend the law relative to the liability of employers to make compensation for injuries caused by accidents to persons in their service-Presented (The Earl DE LA WARR).

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Earl has brought before your Lordships a subject of great importance and of very considerable difficulty.

Bill read 1; and to be printed. (No. 7.)

BILL PRESENTED. FIRST READING.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in rising to call the attention of the House to the General Report of the Comptroller in Bankruptcy for the year 1877, and to present a Bill, said: My Lords, some years ago-in the Session of 1876

it was my duty to call your Lordships' attention to the subject of the Law of Bankruptcy as it now stands. At that time the question did not attract a great deal of public attention, and the urgency of other measures before Parliament made it impossible to carry through the Bill which, on the part of the Government, I had proposed. Since that Session, various occurrences have attracted a much greater amount of public attention to the law of insolvency in this country. I own that I am not sorry that has been the case. I cannot help thinking that very considerable changes in that law are required, and I feel persuaded that those changes would be much better made under the vigilance of a large and interested body than at

a time when attention would have been divided by other subjects. I have placed upon the Notice Paper a reference to a Report of great interest and importance -I mean the Report which the Comptroller in Bankruptcy presents annually as to the subjects over which he has control. Several copies of that Report are on your Lordships' Table. It is not very long, and it is a Report to some parts of which I shall ask your Lordships' particular attention. There are two other documents to which it is my intention to refer at the same time, although they are not included in my Notice. One of these is a Report made in the year 1876 by a small Committee of gentlemen whom I asked to favour me with their views upon the working of the Bankruptcy Law as it then stood. That Committee consisted of Mr. Kettle, a most experienced County Court Judge; Mr. Parkyns, one of the Comptrollers in Bankruptcy; Mr. Brougham, one of the Registrars; Mr. Nicol, an official of experience in connection with the County Courts; and Mr. Hackwood, a solicitor in the City of London, who has had much experience in the administration of the Bankruptcy Law. In 1876 I referred to some parts of the Report made by these gentlemen, and I ventured to recommend the document to your Lordships. The third document is one which I propose to lay upon the Table of your Lordships' House to-night-I allude to the Memorial recently addressed to the Prime Minister, and signed by twentythree of the principal bankers and an equal number of leading commercial houses in the City of London. It will be satisfactory that I should say that in all of these three documents there is a substantial agreement as to the nature of the evils which exist in the present Law of Bankruptcy; and that they go far in agreement as to the mode in which it will be desirable to cure those evils. Avoiding as far as possible all technicalities, I will state as shortly as I can what I myself understand to be the defects of the existing system, and then I will lay before your Lordships the proposals of Her Majesty's Government. The legislation in regard to bankruptcy in this country during the last 40 or 50 years, has-if I may so describe it -oscillated very violently between two extremes. At one time, the theory has

been to leave the administration of bankrupt estates to the creditors, and to constitute them the sole judges as to the manner in which the proceedings should be conducted. At another time, the favourite idea has been to take everything out of the hands of the creditors and to hand the estate over to Courts and officials. The first of these theories

that of administering the law through delegates of the creditors-prevailed up to the year 1832. In that year there was a violent move in the opposite direction, the plan not having been found to work satisfactorily. In that year a Court was consequently instituted, with numerous officials, and from that time to 1860 almost everything connected with bankruptcy was done through the medium of the Courts and officials. In 1860 there came a very strong demand to do away, as much as possible, with the control of the Courts, and to place as much as possible in the hands of creditors. The two great Acts of 1861 and 1869 yielded to the demand which had been very clearly expressed throughout the country. The dominion of the Court was reduced to a very great degree, and the administration of bankrupts' property was handed over to creditors to an extent that had never been the case before. There are two broad distinctions as to the manner in which those who cannot pay their debts are dealt with in this country. Sometimes they are made bankrupt in name, and at others they proceed through a course of what is called "liquidation." In the case of a man who is formally adjudicated a bankrupt in name, the law provides that a meeting of his creditors shall be called, who shall appoint a trustee, whose duty it shall be to take possession of his property, if he have any, and to wind up the estate in the best possible way for the benefit of the whole body of the creditors. In doing this the trustee is to be assisted by a committee of inspection, also chosen by the creditors. In theory nothing could be better than this; because one would naturally suppose that the creditors would be the persons most anxious to make the best of an estate in which they were interested; but the practice has turned out very different from the theory. It was very soon discovered that it was a source of profit to become a trustee under bankruptcy proceedings,

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and there immediately arose a number | ing the eight years which followed the of persons who laid themselves out to passing of the Act of 1869 only 1,843 be appointed trustees and to reap the out of 7.126 bankruptcies were ever profits that were to be derived from the closed with the payment of a dividend; proceedings. Therefore, when a man the remainder were kept open and floatbecame bankrupt, one of these persons ing for the benefit of the trustees, who found out who his creditors were, and as had the use of the balances as long as the creditors were, as a rule, supine and there was any money remaining. indifferent as to estates out of which much for cases in which persons are they expected to get little or nothing, actually adjudicated. I will now turn they did not make much difficulty about to the other and much larger class of giving proxies to these would-be trus- cases, where the debtor who cannot pay tees for use at the meeting of creditors, his creditors is not adjudicated bankrupt, the result being that these meetings be- but has his affairs wound up "by liquicame mere matters of form, some person dation by arrangement as it is termed appearing with his pocket full of proxies, which enabled him to propose and carry the appointment as trustee of some friend of his own; and, further, these proxies were drawn in such a way as that they could be used by the trustee at each and every subsequent stage of the bankruptcy proceedings. One result of this in practice has been that there has existed no means of bringing bankruptcies to an end; and as it sometimes happens that the same person is trustee under 20 or 30 bankruptcies, and has control of the balances belonging to each estate, your Lordships will see that, if he wishes to do it, the same trustee can retain in his hands the control and use of all these balances for years. The Committee of 1876-to whose Report I have referred--describe this state of things in their Report. They say―

"We are informed that in a certain class of cases it is the common practice for proxies to be held by persons who at the meeting apparently represent the views of independent creditors, but who are in reality paid or retained by the debtor or the candidate for the trusteeship; and that wherever there are assets, out of which heavy costs may be paid, there is much canvassing, and what has been commonly called touting, for proxies. Proxies are, it is also said, often bought and sold, where required to

turn the scale in favour of some resolution. It happens, not occasionally, but so frequently as almost to form the rule, that a stranger, so far as appears upon the face of the proceedings, is enabled, by the proxies he has obtained, to vote himself trustee, to fix his own remuneration, to nominate the committee of inspection, to order the payment of his costs, and finally to vote, in liquidation cases, the debtor's discharge.

Such is the way in which the system which was designed to be so beneficial has been worked. And, as showing what I have said as to bankruptcies never coming to an end, I may say that dur

which in practice, appears to me even worse than the cases in bankruptcy. Now, my Lords, these liquidations by arrangement came about in this wayThe Bankruptcy Statute of 1869 provided a code for the administration of the Bankruptcy Law; but then it was naturally supposed that there might be cases where a debtor might arrange with his creditors without bankruptcy, and two sections were put into the Statute to meet those cases. One of these sections provided for the case where a debtor could agree with his creditors to hand over his property to them without going to the Bankruptcy Court at all, so that they might make the most they could of it. The other related to the case where the debtor offered his creditors a composition, by himself or by some of his friends, of so much in the pound on his debts. These two processes were what was called "liquidation by arrangement." There is no doubt that nothing could be better in theory. Clearly nothing could be more desirable than that a man should meet his creditors face to face, tell them the whole truth about his affairs, and make the best proposal he could in the circumstances; but, as in the former case, the practice has worked very differently from the theory. What has been the fact? In these cases, a man who cannot pay his debts is able to fix his own time and place for calling a meeting of his creditors-and, I am sorry to say, the debtor takes care to fix a time and place which are not the most convenient for his creditors to meet him. And, moreover, there is nothing whatever with regard to the principal class of those cases which insures the necessity of his giving notice to all his creditors of the meeting. And then,

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