"His Majesty has judged it indispensably necessary to give orders for making such preparations as may put it in His Majesty's power to act with vigour."-[Parl. History, vol. 28, p. 765.] war had begun; but when the danger | informed in due time of what was inbecame serious, it was at once made tended. In the one case, the support of known to Parliament, and the support Parliament induced Spain to give way, of Parliament requested. And the ad- and to abandon an untenable position; vantage of that practice was also illus- and in the other, such a manifestation trated by two cases in which no war ac- of opinion was produced that so powertually followed after Messages from the ful a Minister as Mr. Pitt thought it Crown to announce its probability, and proper and necessary to yield to the in which the sending of those Messages opinion of the country; so that in both contributed much to avert the threatened instances the practice of making a timely danger. In 1790 great indignation communication to Parliament had been was excited in this country by the seizure the means of saving the nation from by Spain of two British ships in Nootka the calamity of war. Nothing could Sound, and on the 5th of May Parlia- more clearly support the principle for ment was informed by a Message from which he contended-that Parliament the Crown that no satisfaction had been ought not to be committed to a war made or offered by Spain for this out- without timely information, so that it rage, and might judge of the necessity and justice. of the war. He maintained that when war was imminent the announcement to Parliament should not be deferred until hostilities had actually commenced; but that, when danger became so serious as to make warlike preparations necessary, it should be made known, and the support of the Legislature invited. Parliament ought not to be led into a war without timely information, so that, if its judgment should be against hostilities, it might have an opportunity of interfering; and he felt so strongly on this subject-believing the old Constitutional principle for which he contended to be so important, and holding that the departure from it, in the present instance, had been accompanied with so much injury to the country-that it was his intention now to move, as he did in a similar case in 1857, an Amendment to the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne. His Amendment was to insert after the first paragraph the following words : This appeal was promptly and unanimously answered; and the Spanish Government, influenced probably by the determination of the country and the Legislature to support its Government, gave way, and war was avoided. In the following year the British Government was disposed to interfere between Russia and Turkey, in order to obtain better terms than Russia was inclined to grant, and a Message was sent to Parliament asking for a grant of money to increase our Naval Force to enforce our mediation. But that proposal was met with strong opposition in Parliament and the country. The Government carried the Vote it had proposed, and Resolutions which were moved against its intended measures were rejected, but by majorities so small, in comparison with those that Mr. Pitt was usually supported by, that, although the Naval Force was for a short time augmented, it was speedily reduced, and it was not used in the manner the Government originally intended, and the policy of the Government was very considerably modified, so much so, that when the subject_was referred to in the following Session Lord Hawkesbury said it had been clear that the opinion of the country had been against war with Russia, and Ministers were not ashamed of deferring to it. These two cases showed completely the great importance of Parliament being (“We beg humbly to express to your Majesty our sorrow that the great calamity should have occurred of a war with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and we feel it to be our duty very respectfully to express to your Majesty our regret that that war had become so probable as to impose as soon as your Majesty's servants were satisfied upon them the necessity of ordering costly preparations for it to be commenced, they did not advise your Majesty to summon Parliament to meet with the least possible delay, in order that due provision might be made for the expense to be incurred, and that an opportunity might be offered to Parliament, before the war was begun, of considering the grounds on which it was to be undertaken, and of forming a judgment as to its justice and necessity.") That Amendment was, he thought, couched in moderate and respectful terms; at the same time, it might be of service in upholding what he believed to be a great Constitutional principle. He asserted the right of Parliament to be consulted upon a matter of this kind, and especially to express an opinion upon the objects of a war. He agreed that they must now postpone a discussion of the policy and justice of the war; but though he could not then state his reasons for so doing, he would not shrink from taking this earliest opportunity of expressing his strong opinion that the war in which they were now engaged was flagrantly unjust, and as impolitic as it was unjust-so impolitic that even if its success were complete the consequences might be only less disastrous and injurious to the country than defeat. For what would happen-what would be the result of success? It must, however successful it might prove, cause an expense which, in the present state of the finances, both of England and of India, would be most inconvenient; and, at the same time, it would have the effect of totally alienating Afghanistan from us, and making its population our bitter enemies, driving them to throw themselves into the arms of that very great Power of whom we were so much afraid-Russia. That was not his own opinion only; it was the opinion entertained and publicly expressed by men of far greater knowledge, whose opinions and judgment were entitled to far greater weight than his own. It was the opinion entertained by a very large number of people in this country; and though you might prove it to be wrong, he maintained that before we were involved in a war of this kind Parliament ought to have had an opportunity of discussing the question. Nor would it have been difficult to afford Parliament that opportunity. It appeared, from the Papers before the House, that as early as the end of September, or the beginning of October, measures for collecting troops and other measures of a preparatory nature were actually in progress. This, therefore, was the time when, according to the practice of former times and the conduct pursued by Governments in earlier periods, what was going on ought to have been made known to Parliament, and Parliament ought to have been enabled to pronounce its judgment. If every Cabinet, no matter of what Party it might be com posed, were to be entitled, without the slightest previous warning or intimation, to enter on a war which might extend indefinitely, as this war might extend, from hostilities with the Ameer to hostilities with Russia, then there was virtually an end of anything like a free Constitution. In regard to the present war, Parliament and the country had been kept entirely in the dark; and not only that, but they had been expressly assured that there was no change of policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government which was likely to involve us in such a war. So late as 1877 a positive assurance was given by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) that there was no such change intended; although it was now perfectly clear from the Papers on the Table that already a great change had actually taken place. Whereas formerly the Ameer of Afghanistan had been assured that he would not be pressed to receive a British Agent, that course was ultimately pressed upon him in such a manner as to lead to the war now going on. Looking at the practice of former times and Governments, he maintained that the course adopted by Her Majesty's Ministers in the present instance was a fatal departure from that practice, and that the country ought not to have been involved in an unjust and impolitic. war in a secret and clandestine manner; but that proper notice ought to have been given of what was taking place, so that Parliament might have had an opportunity of discussing the matter. Entertaining that feeling so strongly, he felt it his duty to submit his Amendment, as expressing his strong disapproval of, and protest against, the course which had been adopted by Her Majesty's Government. Amendment moved, to insert after the first paragraph— ("We beg humbly to express to your Majesty our sorrow that the great calamity should have occurred of a war with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and we feel it to be our duty very respectfully to express to your Majesty our regret that that war had become so probable as to impose as soon as your Majesty's servants were satisfied upon them the necessity of ordering costly preparations for it to be commenced, they did not advise your Majesty to summon Parliament to meet with the least possible delay, in order that due provision might be made for the expense to be incurred, and that an opportunity might be offered to Parliament, before the war was begun, of considering the grounds on which it was to be undertaken, and of forming a judgment as to its justice and necessity.")-(The Earl Grey.) THE DUKE OF SOMERSET: My Lords, I cannot approve the noble Earl's Amendment. It appears to me that the propositions laid down in that Amendment interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown and diminish the responsibility of Ministers. The noble Earl has mentioned several precedents. He quoted the case of 1793; but in that case we did not declare war. The war was declared on the opposite side of the Channel: that precedent, therefore, was inapplicable. In the case of the Abyssinian War there was a debate in the House of Commons, and on that occasion Mr. Gladstone stated that it was the right course -that it was the duty of Ministers to take the responsibility of declaring war upon themselves, coming to Parliament afterwards. I shall not go into the personal question to-night. It would take some time; but surely nobody can suppose that the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India would intentionally mis-state the case. He has tried to do what, no doubt, is very difficult-to draw up a précis of the opinion of the opposite party-and he only failed where all historians have failed. Going into details, it would not be difficult to show that every history is untrue in some respects; and, for my own part, I do not know any history that is perfectly true. But I come to the more serious question-the question of this war. I cannot agree with the speech of my noble Friend below me (Earl Grey). He says it is an unjust war-not only an unjust, but an impolitic war-a war which, whatever its result, you will be worse off at the end of than you are now; but, on the other hand, the noble Earl (Earl Granville) said he would go on with it, and although it was contrary to justice and to policy, and likely to be profitless, nevertheless, he would urge the country to give every assistance to carry it through. There seems to me, my Lords, a very serious contradiction there. If I thought a war both unjust and impolitic, I would do what I could to prevent it. As to Russian aggression, I remember in 1873 my noble Friend, representing Mr. Gladstone's Government, stated that Russia coming to Khiva was to be looked upon with great concern, not only on account of England, but on account of India. But surely if Russia reached Cabul, there would be still more danger. And what did the late and the present Government say? Both the former and the present Government had agreed that Russia could not be allowed to have a preponderating influence in Afghanistan. Will you, my Lords, allow it? If you will, then say so. There was a neutral zone; but that is gone. What, then, are you asked to do? You must make some other provision. I confess, my Lords, much as I regret it, this war appears to me to be unavoidable. I do not see how the Government could take any other course than that they have taken. I say so with deep feeling, because I well remember the disasters and the deplorable mismanagement that occurred in 1838. My Lords, then we were united; now, I am sorry to say, there has been formed what is called "an Afghan Committee," who are anxious to encourage the Ameer and the enemies of the Queen. I think it a misfortune that any such Committee should have been formed; and I deeply deplore that a noble Lord who has been Governor General, and who is peculiarly acquainted with that country (Lord Lawrence), should have thought fit, no doubt conscientiously, to put himself at the head of that Committee. I regret it, because that noble Lord was an ornament to India, and is an ornament to your Lordships' House. In speaking thus I do not mean to pledge myself that all the measures taken from 1873 to the present time were judicious in all respects. Far from it. But the great question of all is, What are we to do? I, for one, give my cordial assent to the policy of the Government, because I do not see what else they could do. It is not speeches that are wanted, but action; and I hope that vigorous action on their part will bring the war to a successful issue. THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, after the small personal details to which we have had to listen this evening, your Lordships must have listened with pleasure to the courageous and patriotic speech which we have just heard. I wish it may produce the same effect upon others who share the general political opinions of the Speaker, but who have not been able to imitate his patriotism. But, my Lords, that speech makes me the more regret that I am compelled, on personal grounds, to pursue another course. I deeply feel the wretchedness of the small personal details which I am obliged, out of deference to others, to bring before your Lordships, but I have no other alternative. I have often noticed the singular skill of the Leader of the Opposition and noble Lords on the other side. Perhaps some might have thought that when the fallacies employed were being exposed by my noble Friend (Viscount Cranbrook) the noble Earl opposite would have felt discomfited; but I traced no sense of discomfiture upon his countenance. He is too well satisfied with the result of the stratagem to which recourse has been had. The noble Earl's policy is to draw aside the attention of the country from the broad issues before it, and, if possible, to conceal the fact that his favourite, his most attached, political Friends have been taking the side of the enemies of their country. That is a matter upon which the traditions of the Party to which he belongs naturally make him sensitive. The noble Earl has shown singular judgment and astuteness at this, perhaps the most important, political juncture which this country has witnessed in this generation, in turning your debates almost entirely upon questions of small personal attack. I admit, however, that though the imputations which he had to make were not of a very pleasant nature, he put them in words to which no exception can be taken. I do not wish to detain your Lordships on this personal matter; but the accusation which the noble Earl made against me was substantially this-that being questioned by the Duke of Argyll I misled the House as to the real state of the The noble Earl quoted my words in justification of that charge. He began by saying that my words would indicate what the nature of the Duke of Argyll's Question had been. I regret that he did not quote the actual Question of the Duke of Argyll. When a legal opinion is produced, it is usual to give the question on which the legal opinion was founded. When the dictum of a Judge is quoted it is a matter of ordinary practice to ask what was the precise nature of the case to which the dictum refers. Words taken by themselves are often misleading, instead of giving information. As I understand the charge case. of the noble Earl, it is that at a time when I knew that Sir Lewis Pelly had been commissioned to go to Cabul I denied that any Envoy had been sent to Cabul at all. Now, my Lords, it is necessary to read the Question of the Duke of Argyll to which I replied. What he said is spread over a speech of considerable length-I will not read many passages, but I will select some of them. They go to show that what the Duke of Argyll was asked was as to whether it was true that I had forced on the Ameer of Cabul a Resident at his Court. The Duke of Argyll said— "No doubt it would be very convenient to have a Resident at Cabul, if you could get a man for the place, and that he was received with cordiality; but it was notorious for a long face against having such an officer in his Court. time past that the present Ameer had set his Rumour said that the Government of India had determined upon a change of policy, and had resolved to insist on the Ameer having a resident British Envoy at his Court."[3 Hansard, ccxxxiv. 1830.] Well, my Lords, the noble Earl said, parenthetically in the course of his remarks, that I should not attempt to explain the statement by observing that what we had deliberately attempted to do was to attempt to induce the Ameer to receive resident Envoys at other places besides Cabul. I dare say when the noble Earl made that observation, he thought it was unimportant whether the Ameer received an Envoy at Cabul or Herat. But the difference is essential. Her Majesty's Government had been impressed with the opinion that to ask the Ameer to receive an Envoy at Cabul would be not only idle, but unwise, because of the turbulent and revengeful character of the population, which would render the residence of the Envoy dangerous. Moreover, there is no doubt that a Resident at Cabul would have such powers of interfering in the internal government of Afghanistan, and of overshadowing the dignity of the Prince himself, that such a proposal would have very naturally raised objections in the mind of the Ameer-objections which it was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid raising. We did not want to interfere in the internal government of Afghanistan or to overshadow the authority of the Ameer. What we wanted was to have officers on the Frontier, who might see something of what was going on within them and beyond them. I need hardly explain | be called upon to perform, this, at least, to the House why we should wish to was our duty-not to bias in any way know what was going on in Afghan- the policy of the country, nor to add to istan. It is sufficient to say that the its difficulties and dangers by any imyear before Khiva had been occupied prudent language of our own. It was, without going further I am sure therefore, our duty not to say much of the House will understand why we de- that which I say now, and which is said sired to know what was going on in in the Papers before the House. ConTurkestan and in the Ameer's territories, sequently, I told the Duke of Argyll without having any intention whatever that I could not give him much positive of interfering in the internal govern- information, but that I could give him ment of Afghanistan or overshadowing some negative information. The negathe Ameer in his own Court. I dwell upon tive information was this-that we had this point to show that the difference not tried to force an Envoy on the Ameer between asking for an Agent at Herat at Cabul, and that we had not suggested and at Cabul is immense. It was a Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy at Cabul. distinction upon which the Ameer in- Now, I want to know why the noble sisted all along. We have a curious Earl opposite (Earl Granville) insinuates account in Lord Lytton's letters in that I said anything contrary to the 1877, derived from officers who saw most perfect truth in the reply I made the Ameer at Umballa. A consider- to the Duke of Argyll. The noble Earl able number of them represented that who sits on the cross-benches (Earl they knew from personal knowledge Grey) talked of my having stated that that while the Ameer was willing to there had been no change of policy as admit an Agent at Herat, or on his Fron- regards Afghanistan. I must charitably tiers, he would not admit one at Cabul. suppose that the noble Earl spoke We were exceedingly careful to avoid without having taken the trouble to read making this particular demand to which the speech to which he referred. There the Ameer was certain to object. My is no such statement in that speech. first instructions to Lord Northbrook The noble Earl; remarked that I said were, that he should take measures for that our relations with the Ameer had obtaining the assent of the Ameer to the undergone no material change since establishment of a British Envoy at last year, and that the Ameer's feelings Herat; but I did not suggest any similar towards the British Government were step with regard to Cabul. Lord Lytton, not more embittered than they had been. when he came to propose the terms on Now, if I had said that his feelings were which the negotiations should be con- not more embittered towards us than ducted, was careful to make a similar they had been when Lord Mayo met him distinction. He says, in Article 5 of at Umballa, there might be a consithe Treaty, he proposed that for the derable doubt as to the accuracy of that protection of the Afghan Frontier British statement. His feelings are undoubtedly Agents should reside at Herat, and at a matter of some mystery; but I have such other places as might be agreed little doubt that they have gone on deupon by the contracting Powers; but teriorating progressively against us from further on the Treaty says, that unless the time when Sir John Lawrence came and until it is otherwise agreed, a Native to the unfortunate resolution not to take Agent only should reside at Cabul. what has been called the honest doubleWith this understanding I think your dealing policy with regard to the candiLordships will see that my reply to the dates for the Throne of Afghanistan. I Duke of Argyll was absolutely correct. have no doubt they became worse and I had first to inform him that I could worse. There was a slight improvement, not give him any positive knowledge. however, during the Viceroyalty of Lord The circumstances at the time were Mayo; but during the Viceroyalty of difficult and critical in the extreme. Lord Northbrook there were several cirRussia was in arms; great irritation cumstances which caused them to become prevailed; no one knew whether the worse and worse. There was that unwar would not spread much further than fortunate arbitration at Seistan, with its original area; and whatever the which the Ameer was profoundly dissapolicy of Her Majesty's Government tisfied; and which only added one to the might be, and whatever duties it might list of those arbitrations which have not |