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from himself the dangers lying before | be more unjust than to attribute to him, them in the way of Indian finance, he could not admit that the state of affairs was at all unsatisfactory. During the past week the House had been discussing with some warmth, but in a most interesting manner, the question of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government towards Afghanistan. At the conclusion of that discussion the House, like the House of Lords, expressed, by a large majority, approval of the conduct of the Government. This being so, and the war having begun, he would only ask the House to accept the very wise advice tendered by the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington), in the course of the debate to which he referred, and say that, the war having been begun, they were now prepared unanimously to strengthen the hands of Her Majesty's Government to bring it to a satisfactory and speedy conclusion. The hon. Member concluded by moving his Resolution.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."-(Mr. Edward Stanhope.)

and to those who were going to support him, any such intention to place the slightest obstacle in the path of the Government as regarded the expenditure hitherto incurred. Before Parliament met he declared to his constituents-and he repeated the declaration-that when war had once been commenced nothing was so idle as to suppose that the House of Commons could stop the expenditure which had been incurred. The duty of the Opposition when war was declared was stated with admirable force and admirable clearness by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, when he stated that, however anxious he might be to limit the scope of the war, he could be no party to any effort to stop the Supplies. The reason of this was obvious. The soldiers who were in the field must be paid; the stores procured or ordered must be paid for, unless the House was prepared to sanction an act of national repudiation; if bribes or promises of money had been offered to independent tribes, however greatly he might regret the fact on moral grounds, there was something which would be worse still-namely, a disregard of the Therefore he depromises so made. sired, in the most emphatic way possible, to state that it was unfair, because they opposed this Resolution, to fasten upon them the responsibility of attempting to stop the Supplies. Indeed, so absolutely impossible, when a war had been once begun, was it to stop Supplies, that the House of Commons could practically exercise no control; and he felt this so strongly that he had no hesitation in saying that he did everything said, although the speech of the Under in his power to get Parliament sumSecretary of State offered him many moned before war was declared; and he temptations to go astray, he would en- felt that had that been done, and if bedeavour, to the best of his ability, not to fore the war they had only had the insay a single word which should lead the formation they now possessed, this war House to loose its hold upon the issue would never have begun. The question which it now had to determine, and they had to determine was not whether which he should be able to show was as or not the money should be paid, but important to England as it was to India. whether it should be paid by England, But there were some remarks in the or, as was proposed by Her Majesty's closing sentences of the Under Secre- Government, entirely by India. The tary's speech which he could not pass Under Secretary had attempted to put a over without some notice. He knew it gloss upon the Amendment. The prowould be said that the effect of passing posal of the Government amounted to this Resolution would be to stop Sup-this-that India should pay every sixplies, and to prevent the Government pence of the ordinary and extraordinary from bringing this war to an honourable expenses of the war, and that at some and a speedy conclusion. Nothing could future time-it might be when the Greek

MR. FAWCETT, in rising to move, as an Amendment,

"That this House is of opinion that it would be unjust that the Revenues of India should be applied to defray the extraordinary expenses of the Military operations now being carried on against the Ameer of Afghanistan,"

Kalends arrived-the Government would take it into their serious consideration whether the Imperial Revenues should not pay some portion of the cost. It was said his Amendment was not sufficiently specific. Then nothing would be casier than to introduce some words to make it more distinct. He did not, of course, propose that India should make money out of this war, or that the pay of soldiers, whom it would otherwise have to maintain, should be paid by England; but all that he did propose was to give a direct and absolute opposition to the Government. They declared that this war was for Imperial far more than Indian purposes; and therefore it was as unjust as it was ungenerous to come down and say-" India should pay everything, and some day we will take it into our consideration whether some slight contribution towards the expense ought not to be made by England." This question was in no sense a Party one, and he said this not as an ordinary common place, but because the debate in "another place" had shown that many of those who were most strong in their support of the Government most strongly objected to the entire charge being thrown upon India. The Under Secretary had spoken of the unanimous decision of the other branch of the Legislature; but, as a matter of fact, every single Peer who spoke, whether he was a supporter of the Government or not, and who referred to the proposal to throw the entire charge of the war upon the Revenues of India, unhesitatingly condemned it. Therefore, so far as the opinion of the other branch of the Legislature was ascertained, instead of being unanimous in approval, it was one of unanimous condemnation. Further, a specific fact would show that, however much they might differ as to the justice or the necessity of the war, some of those who were strongest in supporting it were foremost in declaring that it was a great Imperial undertaking, and that it could not be fairly treated as if it were a purely Indian war. Another remarkable fact was that there were three Peers in the House of Lords who had all held high office in India. Two of them (Lord Lawrence and Lord Northbrook) opposed the policy of the Government; while Lord Napier of Ettrick, a former Governor of Madras, cordially supported it both by

speech and by vote. Yet Lord Napier was, if possible, still more opposed than Lords Lawrence and Northbrook to throwing the charge for the war upon the Revenues of India. He thought this showed that the issues they had to discuss were entirely and absolutely distinct from the issue discussed on Friday. The Under Secretary stated that nothing would be more unfortunate to the financial stability of India than that she should receive subventions from England, and in that view he entirely concurred. Now, he wished to discuss this question as one of absolute justice, and not as one of honour and generosity to India. He was accused of taking a gloomy view of Indian finances; but he never took so gloomy a view of them as to suppose that if they were judiciously and wisely administered, India could not pay all claims justly made upon her Revenues. He was not expressing that opinion for the first time. It would be remembered that when last September twelvemonth the suggestion appeared to gain much approval that a grant should be made out of the Imperial Revenues for the relief of the Famine in Madras and Bombay, so great was his objection to subventions that he felt it to be his painful duty to oppose the movement in question. He should have occasion to show how entirely the Under Secretary had misstated the condition of the finances of India, and to call attention to the heavy burdens which were placed upon the people of India. The question before them must, however, be determined by a consideration of the character of the war. If this were an Imperial war, England was bound, both legally and equitably, to pay for it; and he based this opinion on the 55th clause of the Government of India Act, which had been read by the Under Secretary of State for India, and which clause especially said that

"Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent defray the expenses of any Military operation of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by Her Majesty's Forces charged upon such Revenues."

He did not raise the question whether it was legal to spend the Revenues of India before Parliament was summoned, which might be deferred to another occasion.

There could be no doubt of the meaning | distinct and precise than that. But and purport of the clause, for it was in- supposing hon. Gentlemen opposite were troduced into the other House by the late to discover that this war did not simply Lord Derby, who had charge of the Bill, concern a small cantonment, but that it and who said he introduced it for the pro- was distinctly intended to maintain the tection of the Revenues of India: that if influence and uphold the greatness the Indian forces were employed in a of England in India, would not they war beyond the Frontier of India it be the first to say that nothing could would be for Parliament to decide whe- be more mean, nothing more shabby ther the war was an Imperial or an than that the greatness and influence Indian one, and that if it were an Im- of England should be maintained perial war the money must be paid by by the money of the people of India? England. This was the common-sense Lord Beaconsfield himself had said and the reasonable interpretation of the that this war was not merely one clause. What would be the position of concerning the Khyber Pass, or some the House and the country if it were small cantonment at Dakka or Jellalapossible to employ the Indian troops in bad; but that it was one which conImperial matters, and maintain them cerned the influence and character of out of the resources of India without England in Europe. How could they first obtaining the sanction of Parlia- escape from that? If the war was to ment? One of their greatest and most maintain the influence and character of precious privileges would be swept England in Europe, could there be anyaway, and an Imperial war might be thing more unfair, more unworthy of carried on without the sanction of the this country than to use the moneys of House, as the Government would be the people of India to maintain that able to carry it on entirely out of the position and character, and to enable us Revenues of India without asking for a to parade ourselves before the world as single Vote of Supply. Therefore, this a great Imperial Power? Every cloud clause he considered as vital to the had a silver lining however, and in this liberties of Parliament, and to the pro- matter there was something good. He tection of the people of England. As did not think that that Imperialism to the interests of the people of India, would long survive, which was decked nothing seemed to him more unfair than out in garments purchased with the that the Government and their sup- money of starving ryots and the porters, when they wanted to obtain miserable peasantry of India. To support approbation, represented to Parliament the view that India was prosperous and the country that this war was a enough to bear the cost of the war, it great Imperial war, and that, when on was said that when he spoke of Indian the other hand, they wanted to obtain finances, he produced confusion by demoney from the unfortunate Indian ducting extraordinary expenditure from people, they should minimize the scope the estimated surplus; but in doing so of the war, making it out to be a "mere he was supported by the highest financial Frontier war." They must have one authorities in England, and it was almost thing or the other. For weeks the sup- a financial truism to assert that extraporters of the Ministry on the platform ordinary Budgets and extraordinary and in the Press had been saying to expenditure had been in numerous their opponents-"You do not appre-instances the ready resort of embarrassed ciate the true character of a great Imperial enterprize; you are such parochial politicians you won't understand that this is only a branch of the great Eastern Question." When Lord Lytton went to India he declared that, having had personal interviews on the subject with the Secretary of State for India, he went out determined to treat Indian Frontier questions as indivisible parts of a great Imperial subject, mainly to be determined by the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. Nothing could be more

European Powers. In this case he asserted-first, that there was no surplus at all; secondly, that the money about to be taken was money that had been appropriated as a Famine Fund, and was obtained by some of the most onerous taxes over imposed upon the Indian people; and, thirdly, that this was the most extraordinary proposal ever brought forward, as it was intended to show that India was so rich and England so poor that England must come like a suppliant pauper and ask India to

relieve her in her necessities, and this was done by a Ministry which wanted to exhibit their country's influence and power. To make India pay for this war, instead of exhibiting England as a great European Power, would exhibit her as a mean, grasping, and selfish nation. He was not objecting now to expenditure on Public Works; but he contended that in order to arrive at the true financial position of India, that expenditure must be considered in estimating the surplus. To spend on Public Works £3,000,000 or £4,000,000, borrowed at 4 per cent, and receive a return of per cent was like a landowner forgetting that he had spent £10,000 on farm buildings. The late Secretary of State for India had stated that millions had been spent upon irrigation works in Bengal, borrowed at 4 and 5 per cent, and that it was yielding to the Government a return of only per cent per annum. What was the good of ignoring the fact? It was beyond any possibility of dispute that this £1,200,000, which the Government was now about to apply to the purposes of the war, was money raised for a distinct object. It was raised by enormous taxation to provide a security against famine; but the latest news from India was that the public works in Bombay were to be stopped-that water which was to have been brought to the parched land was not to be brought; and why? Because the Government had not the courage to come to the House and ask for a special Vote. This money had been obtained by imposing a tax on incomes of 48. a week, and raising the salt duty by 40 per cent on the famine-stricken people of Bombay and Madras. In the levying of these taxes they must remember that there were no exemptions on incomes of £150 a-year as in this country, the tax reaching £10 a-year. True, there were some exemptions in the case of the military and other professional men, Civil servants, and others, who went to the country clamouring for war, knowing full well that they would not have to pay for it, that part of the duty falling on poor carpenters and day-labourers. And the result of this appropriation of Indian money to Imperial purposes, according to the latest news from India, which the Under Secretary of State had judiciously avoided alluding to, was that almost all public works in Bombay were

to be stopped-works which the Government themselves had declared to be necessary for the prevention of famine. They knew that not long ago no less than 2,000,000 of Indian people died from the most terrible of all deaths in Madras and Bombay; and what was the first news they heard when just able to lift their heads from the suffering which laid them low? That the salt duty had been increased to 40 per cent. They accepted that strain in calmness, in order to protect their country in future years from the terrible famines which came upon it; but did the people of this country think that the people of India would learn with calmness that it was intended to use that money to maintain our influence and greatness? Government could not escape from the fact that the present Indian surplus had been obtained from the two taxes which he had described, and Lord Salisbury knew that taking this money meant taking it from the actually starving. In a speech on the subject of the Indian Famine, Lord Salisbury said—

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"The recent mortality and distress were not due so much to a want of food or to a want of means of bringing that food to the people, but that distress and mortality were far more due to the people not having the means of buying food when it was brought within their reach." After such a statement as that, he posed to take still more from these unfortunate people in order to enable himself to perorate in "another place" about our great Imperial policy, and the magnificent position occupied by England under the auspices of the present Government. The House should remember that the expenditure of £1,000,000 of Indian money was far more serious than the spending of £20,000,000 of English money. Though he was fully aware of the distressed condition of England at the present, he considered that that was the relative position. No doubt, additional taxation in England meant a diminution in the comforts of the people, and would be a serious burden upon many; but such taxation as he had indicated in India was altogether of a worse character. The financial condition of India had been so desperate that the Government did not know how to raise an additional £1,000,000. If they did, why were they so unjust as to impose such taxation as he had alluded to last year?

The only justification of the Government they come forward with proposals to policy, then, was that the money must extend the income tax from incomes of be forthcoming, and this was the only 48. a-week to incomes of 2s. a-week? way in which it could be obtained. With Were they prepared to increase the salt regard to precedent, it was true that tax from 40 per cent to 80 per cent? the former Afghan War was borne out Increase of taxation in India was not to be of Indian Revenues; but two blacks did regarded as a mere financial question; it not make a white. The circumstances was a political question of the greatest of that time were different from those of moment. Lord Mayo had said that an the present. The former war was not increase of taxation would produce disprofessedly undertaken as an Imperial content, which would create dangers the enterprize; and India had a protection magnitude of which could not be exat the time of the East India Company, aggerated. Before the Committee last which she did not possess now. An Session Lord Northbrook was asked a authority whom hon. Members opposite question with reference to this statewould respect, speaking of that war, ment, and he said that, after careful said "If it had been undertaken to inquiries, he had come to the conclusion check Russia or to assert the Imperial that Lord Mayo was right. He (Mr. position of England in Europe, he Fawcett) asked for justice, not for geneshould like to know how England could rosity, for India. It was a most serious possibly refuse to pay the bill?" The thing for the House to throw on India speaker was no less a person than Lord the entire expense of this war-at any Beaconsfield, the present Prime Minis- rate, until the Government were in a ter. Another point which had been lost frame of mind to suggest some different sight of was that, even if the Resolution proposal. It might appear hard to sugof the Under Secretary of State were re-gest that additional burdens should be jected, a great part of the charges connected with the war must necessarily fall on India and not on England. If the war expenses came to £5,000,000, it would represent only an addition of about £160,000 per annum to England; but the expense to India in any case should be carefully considered. Lord Lawrence, and his Council, in a memorable despatch, said the "forward policy" would paralyze the finances of India. That despatch was important, not only considering the high authority from which it proceeded, but because it was endorsed by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government of which he was a Member. Lord Sandhurst, distinguished alike as a financier and soldier, said the forward policy would cost India not less than from £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 a-year. On Tuesday last the Under Secretary of State for India told them that before the war had lasted one month, the Native Army of India had been increased by 15,000 men. That increase amounted to about 12 per cent; and there was not a military authority, in the House or out of it, who would not be prepared to say that a proportionate increase of European officers would also be necessary. That would involve at least £1,500,000 a-year. If India was to bear the burden how was the money to be provided? Would

thrown on England when trade was bad, employment scarce, and thousands could not find the means of maintenance. He believed the depression of trade would continue for some time longer. It was hopeless to look for a revival of industrial prosperity in the midst of wars and rumours of wars, and at a time when no one knew what new entanglement or fresh complication tomorrow might bring. He represented a district (Hackney) upon which additional taxation would fall as heavily, if not more heavily than upon others. No one could suppose that the inhabitants of the East End of London were anxious for additional burdens; but grievously as they would feel it, they would sooner bear it than be exposed to the reproach that they were relieved of the expense of maintaining England's influence and character by the starving millions of India. The Government were certainly not pursuing a popular course; it was a course characterized by meanness and the absence of everything like generosity, and he believed it would be repudiated by every constituency in the Kingdom. India, it was said, should not be treated in that House from a Party point of view, and if he thought of it solely as a Party question he would not attempt to prevent the Government doing as they desired; but to maintain our position in

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