rounded by monstrous and faint imagery. The attention is unable to deal with such pictures, because when it is engaged on one part of them the remainder slips out of memory. All parts of an image must be congruous and well defined before the attention can sweep so swiftly over the entire field of view as practically to bring it all at once into sight. If an image is incongruous and vague, the mind follows the course already described when the illustration was used of a clergyman in a pulpit.

The conclusions to be drawn from what I have said are that composite portraits are perfectly trustworthy when made by optical means and with proper precautions, and that photographic composites are as correct representations of these as photographs ever are of the pictures from which they are taken. Composite portraits are therefore to be considered as pictorial statistics. Also it is conceivable that general mental images should sometimes closely resemble these portraits except in one important respect; namely, that the effect produced by the huge bulk of ordinary facts is never in proportion to their numbers. Consequently we find that undue consideration is inevitably given in generic images to all exceptional cases. When the exceptions in excess are balanced by those in deficiency, the value of the average will not be affected, and there is always a tendency towards that result. The fault that remains wholly uncorrected is that the great prevalence of mediocre instances is overlooked, and the number and importance of the deviations are largely over-estimated. The tendency of the mind of the child and of the savage, and in all branches of knowledge in their pre-scientific stage, is necessarily towards the marvellous and the miraculous.

The generic images that might arise in a mind superhumanly logical and active would be subject to no other error than this, but in the human mind it is not so. Some of the images in every presumed generic group are sure to be aliens to the genus and to have become associated to the rest by superficial and fallacious resemblances, such as common minds are especially attentive to. Again, the number of pictures that are blended together is sure to fall far short of the whole store that would be available if the memory were immeasurably stronger than it is, and more ready in its action. Knowing also, as I do, from considerable experience of composites, what monstrous and abortive productions may result from ill-sorted combinations of portraits, and how much care in selection and nicety of adjustment is required to produce the truest possible generic image, I cease to wonder at the numerous shortcomings in our generalisations and at their absurd and frequent fallacies. The human mind is a most imperfect apparatus for the elaboration of true general ideas. Compared with the mind of brutes, its powers are marvellous; but for all that they fall vastly short of perfection. The criterion of a perfect mind would be the power of always creating

vivid images of a truly generic kind, deduced from the whole range of its past experiences.

General impressions are the faint traces left by generic images, and have all their defects, as well as others due to their own want of definition. They are never to be trusted. Unfortunately, when general impressions are of long standing they become fixed rules of life, and assume a prescriptive right not to be questioned. Consequently those who are not accustomed to original inquiry entertain a hatred and horror of statistics. They cannot endure the notion of submitting their sacred general impressions to coldblooded verification. But it is the triumph of scientific men to rise superior to such superstitions, to devise tests by which the value of beliefs may be ascertained, and to feel sufficiently masters of themselves to discard contemptuously whatever may be found untrue.

FRANCIS GALTON.

HOW NOT TO RETAIN THE

COLONIES.

HOSTILE colonial tariffs have provoked one at least of even our leading statesmen into fresh thoughts of the necessity of an increased Imperial control over colonial legislation. Canada is the chief culprit, and the question is of Imperial control over the freest colonies, whose governments are responsible to their own elected representative legislatures.

Of such colonies only, I will consider the expediency, or practicability, of such increased control, and the probable results of attempting it.

There is no dispute as to the entire control which all such British communities have over matters of their own internal and local concern. The Imperial Parliament would never think of interference in exclusively colonial legislation, nor could the Sovereign constitutionally withhold the Royal assent from responsible Ministers possessing the confidence of the Parliament passing such measures.

The legislative authority of the Imperial Parliament is in theory transcendent, and extends over colonies and all dominions of the Sovereign; but in colonies under government responsible to their own representative legislatures, it is practically never directly exerted at all. If it were, it would reduce constitutional government, recognised and established in a colony, to a fiction, sham, and delusion, fraught with mischief alike to the bastard colony, and to the mother country so degrading herself abroad.

Yet this is clearly within the limits of the Imperial control over colonial legislatures proposed by Lord Grey in his recent article. He laments the abdication of Imperial authority in more than one branch of colonial administration: he thinks even self-governed colonies should be qualified, that is tutored, before being allowed their own way; and he would look to the superior wisdom of Imperial Ministers to check their ignorance, mistakes, and illiberality. He implies that whatever the great majority of the people of this country may be convinced is utterly unsound and mischievous, they have a right to forbid to colonies. Yet the colonies of which we are speaking have as complete a guarantee, as Queen Elizabeth's Patent gave to Sir

Walter Raleigh and his associates, to the enjoyment of all the rights and freedom which their fellow-subjects enjoy at home. Such rights should indeed be accompanied with all the co-ordinate responsibilities of free citizenship, especially those of self-defence, otherwise no healthy relationship of common citizenship can exist between the colony and the mother country. A vain assumption of patronage, such as is now proposed, on one side, would be submitted to from a mean calculation of profit on the other; and no sound or permanent connection between communities so affecting to be homogeneous components of a British Empire could be long retained: yet this idea of extended Imperial control is advocated in the special view of retaining colonial connection.

There are, however, subjects of legislation which cannot be considered of exclusive interest to any colony, affecting the interests of the whole Empire, or based on universal principles, which may be looked on as a sort of common law, or even jus gentium; or comprised within great Imperial statutes and decisions, which would be violated by contrary legislation in a colony.

Questions of making war must by their nature be outside Parliamentary action, in the breast of the Sovereign. Parliaments can only subsequently condemn any action taken by Ministers, and refuse supplies. Alas! as things are, colonial Ministers, responsible to local legislatures based on universal suffrage, make wars for us, and we cannot refuse the material, men, and supplies.

There are questions of universal principle, such as slavery; or of common domestic intercommunity, such as marriage laws; or of general commercial policy, such as protective duties; over all of which it is matter of prudence and expediency, and for the judgment of the Imperial Government, how far to exert a paramount authority.

Lord Grey, of course, had such subjects chiefly in his mind, though his arguments evinced a much wider principle of interference.

On such questions even the freest British colonies must of necessity be somewhat curtailed of perfect British freedom, for the simple and obvious reason that the representatives of widely scattered communities cannot deal with them together in one assembly, and a paramount authority is the only possible medium of any agreement and common action.

There are two ways in which colonial legislation in matters of general concern may be brought into harmony with Imperial requirement. First, by actual Imperial statutory prohibition of any contrary action on the part of a colonial legislature; or, secondly, by the exercise of the Royal veto in the process of colonial legislation.

The first was the mode pursued in the Australian Constitution Act of 1850 with regard to differential duties. A section of that Act,

in giving the power to levy customs duties, forbad any differential imposition of them. That section was repealed in 1873 by an Act brought in by Lord Kimberley, but not so as to relate to importations from foreign countries, nor do I believe there is any thought of Imperial consent being ever given to anything prejudicially affecting Imperial treaties.

The second and more usual guard against colonial legislation clashing with general policy is by Royal instructions to the Governors of colonies, either to veto certain descriptions of Bills involving such danger, or to reserve for the Sovereign's decision at home such as they might think questionable.

There were such instructions always given to Canadian Governors to withhold assent from Bills imposing differential duties, but it has been doubted whether they were consonant with the Dominion constitution, and they have been omitted.

Both modes of control have become of rarer and rarer adoption, as the principles of English Constitutional government more fully develop themselves in the colonies.

A Return was made to Parliament, in 1864, of all the Bills of North American legislatures which had been lately refused the Royal Assent. It went back to times of Canadian rebellion, and the correspondence attached to it, in which successive Secretaries of State explained to the Governors their reasons for such refusals, is very significant of the subsequent advance which this country has made in recognition of colonial self-government. The late Lord Derby, in 1843, gave as his reason for refusing a Canadian Bill for discouraging secret societies that the Queen would not allow any class to be put out of the protection of the law.

Lord Grey, in 1853, refused a Bill for relief of disbanded loyalists on the ground that her Majesty would not allow a colonial Act to assume the guarantee of the British Treasury. Sir John Pakington in 1856 refused exemptions from duties because legislation conferring exclusive privileges of commerce was opposed to our commercial policy. Other Bills were refused on the subjects of coinage, currency, postage, land-grants, abolition of oaths, incorporation of an Orange lodge, &c., on various grounds of Imperial authority.

In New South Wales, a Bill to enable a woman to obtain divorce on the sole ground of her husband's adultery has lately been disallowed for the reason that there would be confusion occasioned throughout the Empire as to the status of persons divorced in New South Wales, and as to their offspring.

In Queensland a Bill prohibitory of Chinese immigration has been disallowed because in the East there are many Chinese British subjects who would be likely to go to Queensland and would be aggrieved, and because the spirit of our treaties with China demands reasonable legislation as to Chinese immigration.