him from being fairly able to take care of himself," does not entitle him to recover, except to the extent to which the policy authorized recovery while under the influence of an intoxicant. (Vt.) Furry v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 1012.

11. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Self-inflicted or Accidental Death. In an action upon an accident insurance policy the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that the injuries which caused death were accidental and not self-inflicted; but the fact of accident may be established by circumstantial evidence. (Ill.) Wilkinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269.

12. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Accidental or Self-inflicted Death. In an action upon an accident insurance policy the plaintiff may invoke the presumption that all men are sane and do not ordinarily take their own lives; and this presumption, taken with evidence that the injuries which caused the death were violent and external, is sufficient to require the court to submit to the jury the question whether the injuries causing the death of the insured were accidental or self-inflicted. (III.) Wilkinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

269.

13. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Burning of Building or Contents. An accident policy which provides for double indemnity in ease of injuries "in consequence of the burning of a building in which the insured shall be at the commencement of the fire," covers accidental injuries from fire while he is in a building, perhaps from the burning of its contents, and not alone from the burning of the building itself. (Ill.) Wilkinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269.

14. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Self-inflicted or Accidental Death. Where the evidence in an action on an accident policy shows that the insured has suffered an injury which has caused death, and there is no proof in the record from which it can be determined whether the injury was accidental or self-inflicted, the presumption is that the injury was accidental and not self-inflicted. (Ill.) Wilkinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269.

15. ACCIDENT INSURANCE,-Evidence of the Habits and Temperament of the insured is admissible, in an action on a policy for death caused by burning in a building, as bearing upon his mental condition at the time of the accident; and if the insurance company has filed a plea that the insured suicided, the introduction of such evidence in chief is proper in anticipation of such defense. (Ill.) Wilkinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269.

16. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Exposure to Danger.-To Constitute Voluntary or Unnecessary Exposure, the danger must either have been known to the insured in fact, or one which in the exer cise of his faculties as an ordinarily prudent person should in reason have been known to him. (Iowa) Correll v. National Accident Soe, 294.

17. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Exposure to Danger-Burden of Proof. The burden of proof that the danger was apparent and the exposure thereto voluntary or unnecessary, in an action on an accident insurance policy, rests upon the insurer. (Iowa) Correll v. National Accident Soc., 294.

18. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Death While on a Railroad Track. In an action on an accident insurance policy which exempts the insurer from liability for an injury sustained by the insured while on a railway roadbed, the insurer may rest his case when he proves that the insured met his death while on the track of a railroad by being struck by a moving train. (Iowa) Correll v. National Accident Soc., 294.

19. ACCIDENT INSURANCE- Exposure to Danger.-Provisions in an accident insurance policy exempting the insurer from liability for an accident resulting from voluntary and unnecessary exposure, or while the insured is on a railway roadbed, present separate exemptions; and an instruction which recognizes them as constituting only one and as therefore presenting but a single defense, and which applies rules of proof thereto which are not applicable to both, is erroneous. (Iowa) Correll v. National Accident Soc., 294.

Accident Policy-Notice and Proof of Death.

20. ACCIDENT INSURANCE.-The Preliminary Notice of Death contemplated by an accident insurance policy is no part of the proofs of death. It is intended to advise the insurer that an accident has happened on account of which a claim will be made, and to the end that the insurer may for himself make inquiry into the facts and circumstances thereof; "full particulars," as required by the contract, means sufficient of the particulars to enable the insurer intelligibly to prosecute such inquiry, and not all the details of the accident. (Iowa) Correll v. National Accident Soc., 294.

21. ACCIDENT INSURANCE― Notice of Death, Waiver of Insufficiency.-If an accident association raises no objections to the sufficiency of the notice of a death, but merely calls for the names of witnesses to the accident, which the beneficiary is not bound to furnish, the association is thereafter in no situation to complain of the sufficiency of the notice. (Iowa) Correll v. National Accident Soc., 294.

22. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Proof of Death-Absence of Blanks. An accident insurance association that has agreed to furnish blanks on which to make proof is in no position to complain, if it does not furnish them, that proof is not made on time. (Iowa) Correll v. National Accident Soc., 294.

of

23. ACCIDENT INSURANCE - Proof of Death-Absence Blanks. Where the beneficiary under an accident policy gives notice to the insurer of the death of the insured in a letter sufficient to present the idea that she wants to be put in position to prove her claim, she has the right to wait for the coming of the blanks which the insurer has agreed to furnish, and, if they are not received within the time limit, to thereafter proceed in her own way and within a reasonable time to make up the proofs. What is a reasonable time is a proper question for the jury. (Iowa) Correll v. National Accident Soc., 294.

Sick Benefits.

24. INSURANCE-Sick Benefits-Time to Sue.-By Denying Its Liability for sick benefits and refusing to pay them, an insurance company waives a provision in the policy that no action shall be commenced against it until three months after the receipt of proof of loss. (Colo.) Jennings v. Brotherhood Accident Co., 109.

25. INSURANCE-Sick Benefits-Time of Notice of Disability.— Under a policy requiring one claiming sick benefits to give notice "within ten days from the commencement of total disability," the time limited does not commence to run until he realizes that his illness is sufficiently serious to prevent him from following his usual vocation. Notice immediately given on the discovery of such serious condition is seasonable, although the illness, first diagnosed as a slight indisposition, commenced twenty days before, at which time the insured quit work by advice of his physician, and although the notice fixes the beginning of the disability at the time of the inception of the illness. (Colo.) Jennings v. Brotherhood Accident Co., 109.

26. INSURANCE - Sick Benefits - Total Incapacity Defined.-A person may be regarded as totally incapacitated, within the meaning of a policy insuring him against sickness, notwithstanding he takes outdoor exercise by the advice of his physician, provided he is entirely incapacitated for work or business on account of his illness. It is not necessary that he should be helpless, or confined to his bed or house. (Colo.) Jennings v. Brotherhood Accident Co., 109.

27. INSURANCE-Sick Benefits-Unknown Illness.-Under a policy insuring against sickness, the insured is not required, as a condition to recovery, to definitely name the illness on account of which his claim is made, or its origin or cause, but he must furnish evidence of a physical condition as the result of illness which incapacitates him for labor. (Colo.) Jennings v. Brotherhood Accident Co., 109.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
See Commerce.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Liability of Saloon-keeper.

1. SALOON-KEEPER — Liability for Act of Barkeeper.-The owners of a saloon who leave the place in charge of a bartender are liable for his act in pouring alcohol into the shoe of a patron and setting it on fire. (Wash.) Beilke v. Carroll, 1103.

Prosecution for Illegal Sales.

2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS, Prosecutions for Sales of by Agent. In prosecutions for unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors the defendant may be found guilty though he did not himself perform the physical act of handing out the liquor to the customer. (Kan.) State v. Pigg, 387.

3. EVIDENCE-Judicial Notice.-A "Manhattan cocktail" is generally and popularly known as an intoxicating liquor, and no proof of its intoxicating character is necessary in prosecutions under the prohibitory law. (Kan.) State v. Pigg, 387.

4. LIQUORS-Illegal Sale by Mistake.-In a Prosecution for a violation of the local option law, it is proper to charge the jury that if the defendant intended to deliver ino, but through mistake and with no want of proper care delivered beer to the purchaser, he should be acquitted. (Tex. Cr.) Coleman v. State, 896.

JOINT TENANCY.

JOINT TENANCY, Statute Abolishing, When not Retrospective. The act of 1891 abolishing the right of survivorship did not affect joint tenants who became such prior to the passage of the act. (Kan.) Best v. Tatum, 365.

Note.

Joint Tenancy, trust estates are held in, 508–512.

trust estates, exceptions to the rule that they are held in, 512514.

In General-Parties.

JUDGMENTS.

1. DECREE Taken for Want of Answer, to What must be Restricted. Where, in a suit to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant's wife does not answer, she has the right to assume that the decree will be limited, as against her, to petitioner's rights as stated in his bill. (Vt.) Davis v. Davis, 1035.

2.

JUDGMENT AND DECREE, Persons not Parties not Affected by. Where a conveyance is alleged to have been fraudulent as against the creditors of the grantor, and they have extended the property under execution, commenced a suit and obtained a decree for relief against the conveyance, but omitted to make the grantee of the original grantee a party, he is not affected by the decree, whether he is chargeable with notice of the fraud or not. (Vt.) Tudor v. Tudor, 977.

3. JUDGMENT - Misnomer in Partics.-One Who Voluntarily Makes Himself a Party to an action under a name not his own is in fact a real party to the suit, and parol evidence is admissible to identify him as such. (Tex.) Haines v. West, 839.

Service and Return of Process.

4. JUDGMENT.-The Statement of the Return of Service of summons controls the recital of service in the judgment when the only evidence of service is that contained in the return; hence a recital in the judgment showing proper service does not aid a return showing a want of proper service. (Iowa) Stubbs v. McGillis, 116.

5. JUDGMENT-Time to Vacate.-A Judgment Rendered Without Service upon the defendant is void, and subject to direct attack at any time. (Iowa) Stubbs v. McGillis, 116.

Judgment by Confession.

6. JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION Without Antecedent Process have no basis other than the statute, and a full compliance with its provisions is necessary to their validity, and such provisions will be strictly construed. (Vt.) Mason v. Ward, 987.

7. JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION Without the Consent of the Creditor. A judgment by confession made without the request or consent of the creditor and entered at the instance of the debtor alone is not valid unless ratified by the creditor. (Vt.) Mason v. Ward, 987.

8. JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION - Specification to Support, Creditor cannot be Compelled to File.-A creditor cannot be compelled to file a specification in support of a judgment which his debtor desires to confess, but which the creditor has not agreed to accept, though the statute provides that a justice may accept and record the confession of a debt to the creditor made by the debtor personally, with or without antecedent process, as the parties shall agree, and render judgment upon such confession, but that the judgment shall not be rendered except upon a specification in writing filed with such justice setting forth the claim upon which the judgment is rendered. (Vt.) Mason v. Ward, 987.

Insane Persons.

9. JUDGMENT-Validity as Against Insane Person.-A judgment against an insane person is not void, and binds him in a subsequent action involving the right to the property determined by it. Hence, error by the trial court in finding him sane becomes immaterial in the second suit. (Tex.) Haines v. West, 839.

Unrecorded Judgment.

10. JUDGMENT.-An Unrecorded Judgment for the Recovery of Land is not void under the Texas statute, but simply inadmissible in evidence against an innocent purchaser. (Tex.) Haines v. West, 839.

11. JUDGMENT-Unrecorded Decree-Innocent Purchaser.-Under a statute providing that judgments for the recovery of land if not recorded shall not be admissible in evidence against an innocent pur

chaser, a purchaser is not protected against a properly recorded judg. ment by the fact that through a mistake in the proceedings and judgment the record does not disclose the true name of the person against whom the judgment was rendered. (Tex.) Haines v. West, 839.

Res Judicata Criminal Cases.

12. RES JUDICATA — Judgment in Garnishment, Discharging Garnishee Without Contest or Trial.-If the garnishee answers derying his indebtedness to the defendants, and the plaintiff, failing to file a contest to the answer, permits a judgment of discharge of the garnishee to be entered, this is a judgment on the merits, and conclusive between the plaintiff and the garnishee that the latter was not indebted to the defendant. (Ala.) Roman v. Montgomery Iron Works, 106.

13. RES JUDICATA.—A Judgment in a Criminal Case is generally admissible and conclusive evidence in another criminal case against the defendant as to any fact determined by the judgment. (Vt.) State v. Sargood, 992.

14. JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, Facts of Which Evidence in Another Prosecution.-If, in a prosecution for attempt to poison certain persons, the state attempts to connect the accused with the offense of poisoning certain colts by showing the purposes and motives involving both offenses to be the same, the record of the conviction of the accused on the charge of poisoning the colts is admissible, and conclusive that he did poison them. (Vt.) State v. Sargood, 902.

15. RES JUDICATA — Judgment in One Criminal Prosecution, When not Admissible in Another.—A judgment in a criminal prosecation is not admissible in a subsequent prosecution to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused, unless the measure of proof required in the previous case was as great as in that on trial. (Vt.) State v. Sargood, 995.

16. RES JUDICATA — Judgment in One Criminal Prosecution, When not Admissible in a Subsequent Prosecution for Perjury.—If on a prosecution for committing an alleged crime, the accused, notwithstanding his testimony in his own behalf given as a witness for himself, is convicted and is subsequently placed on trial for perjury alleged to have been committed by him in giving such testimony, the record of his former conviction is not admissible against him to prove his commission of the crime and his consequent guilt of perjury, because his conviction on the former trial might have been sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, whereas he cannot be convicted of perjury on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. (Vt.) State v. Sargood, 995.

Vacation and Relief.

17. JUDGMENT-Vacating for Want of Service.-A judgment is properly set aside on motion when it is shown that no service of process was made upon the defendant. (Colo.) Stubbs v. McGillis,

116.

18. JUDGMENT-Motion to Vacate.-An Affidavit of Merits is unnecessary to vacate a judgment obtained without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. (Colo.) Stubbs v. McGillis, 116.

19. JUDGMENT.—A Delay of Five Years in Moving to Vacate a Judgment for want of service on the defendant does preclude relief, in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff is in any different position than he otherwise would have been, or that the rights of innocent third persons will be violated. (Colo.) Stubbs v. McGillis,