which they work, all poles, cross-arms and wires, and must know that
they are safe to work with or upon, before climbing or going upon
such poles and cross-arms." Held, that, notwithstanding this notice,
the company, in the construction of new lines in which it employed
two gangs of workmen, one known as "groundmen," who set the
poles, and one known as "linemen," who strung the wires, could not
escape liability for setting a defective pole, from the breaking of
which a lineman was precipitated to the ground and injured. (Neb.)
Ault v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 686.
12. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY-Kick by Mule-Assumption of
Risk. Where an employé is kicked by a vicious mule the first trip
the second day he has driven it, when he had no knowledge of the
vicious propensities of the animal, nor any occasion previously to
observe it while being driven by others, the instructions to the jury,
in an action by the injured employé, are not required to negative
the question of assumed risk. (Ill.) Miller v. Kelly Coal Co., 245.
13. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY-Knowledge of Viciousness of
Mule. In an action against an employer for personal injuries received
by a driver from the kick of a mule, an instruction that if the de-
fendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence would have
known, the dangerous disposition of the animal, but that the plaintiff
did not know it, and by reason of such disposition was injured while
performing his usual duties in the exercise of due care, then the de-
fendant is liable, is not erroneous because it submits to the jury the
liability of the defendant if he had constructive knowledge, while
the charge in the declaration is that he knew the mule was dangerous
and unsafe. (Ill.) Miller v. Kelly Coal Co., 245.
14. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY-Recovery for Medical Attend-
ance. An instruction that an injured employé is entitled to recover
the necessary expenses of nursing and medical care, "so far as these
are shown by the evidence," is not reversible error because there is
no evidence of any amount paid or indebtedness incurred on that
account, where the defendant's instruction emphasizes that no dam-
ages can be recovered except such as can be measured in dollars and
cents from the evidence in the case. (Ill.) Miller v. Kelly Coal Co.,
245.
Liability of Master for Servant's Torts.
15. MASTER AND SERVANT-Liability of the Former for the
Torts of the Latter.-A master is responsible for the torts of his ser-
vant, done in the course of his employment with a view to the further-
ance of his master's business, and not for a purpose personal to him-
self, whether the same be done willfully, but within the scope of his
agency, or in excess of his authority, or contrary to the express in-
structions of the master. (Minn.) Barrett v. Minneapolis etc. Ry.
Co., 585.
See Constitutional Law, 6-10; Railroads, 13-24; Work and Labor.
1. MECHANIC'S LIEN, Denial of, Because Statement of was for
an Excessive Amount.-Where the statute requires the statement of a
lien to be "a just and true statement of account of the demand due
over and above all legal setoffs," and a sum is claimed in the state-
ment from sixty to seventy per cent in excess of the amount due, the
bill to foreclose the lien is properly dismissed. (Mich.) Griff v.
Clark, 582.
2. MECHANICS' LIENS.-A Provision in a Building Contract
that the fireproofing shall be left open to bidders for any good
system, provided only the finest work will be allowed to go in, does
not take from the contractor power to control the fireproofing and
make the owner the principal in the contract for it so as to give
the subcontractor a direct lien on the property. (Tex.) Lonergan v.
San Antonio L. & T. Co., 803.
3. MECHANICS' LIEN.-A Proceeding by Which a Materialman
fixes a lien for material furnished and used in an improvement does
not create a debt against the owner of the property, but operates
as a writ of garnishment to appropriate so much of the money in the
hands of the owner as is then due or may become due to the con-
tractor to the extent necessary to establish that claim. (Tex.) Lon-
ergan v. San Antonio L. & T. Co., 803.
MINING CLAIMS, Relocation of Effected by Unlawful
Threats. If the employés of the claimants of a mine are in pos-
session and proceeding with the assessment work, but are caused to
leave such mine and discontinue the work by threats that if they
continue work they will be arrested, a relocation based upon the
failure to complete the work, and for the benefit of the persons
making the threats will not be permitted to destroy the rights of
the former claimants. (S. D.) Garvey v. Elder, 704.
See Conspiracy; Constitutional Law, 11-13.
1. MORTGAGE, What Conveyances Treated as.-In Vermont a
Conditional Deed is treated as a mortgage to secure the grantee's per-
formance of the conditions contained in it. (Vt.) Abbott V.
Sanders, 974.
2. A CONVEYANCE for the Support of the Grantor amounts to
a mortgage only. (Vt.) Davis v. Davis, 1035.
3. A MORTGAGEE cannot be Compelled to Rely upon a Portion
of the Mortgaged Property, though it is amply secured. (Vt.) Davis
v. Davis, 1035.
Rights of Mortgagee Paying Taxes.
4. MORTGAGEE-Right to Equitable Lien on Payment of Taxes.
A mortgagee has an equitable lien for taxes and special assessments
paid by him in good faith to protect his security under the belief
that his mortgage is a subsisting lien, when in fact it has been
barred by the statute of limitations. (Wash.) Childs v. Smith, 1107.
5. MORTGAGEE-Subrogation on Payment of Taxes-Limita-
tions. A mortgagee who pays the general taxes to protect his lien
is subrogated to the rights and liens held by the county and state,
and as against his equitable lien thus acquired the mortgagors can
interpose the plea of the statute of limitations. (Wash.) Childs v.
Smith, 1107.
6. MORTGAGEE-Subrogation on Payment of Assessments-
Limitations.-A mortgagee who pays special assessments is subrogated
to the rights of the city, but his equitable lien thus acquired may
become barred by the statute pertaining to such assessments. (Wash.)
Childs v. Smith, 1107.
MORTGAGE-Limitation of Actions.-A Provision in a Mort-
gage that if the note is not paid at maturity it may be renewed and
the mortgage continued a lien upon the premises does not bar the
mortgagor from pleading the statute of limitations in an action of
foreclosure. (Wash.) Childs v. Smith, 1107.
8. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE Under a Power-Statute of
Frauds. To a sale made under a power contained in a mortgage it
is not essential that there be a memorandum to satisfy the statute
of frauds. Without such a memorandum and before any deed is
executed, the equity of redemption is cut off, and if the want of a
writing can be alleged as an objection, it is only by the mortgagee
or the purchaser. (Ala.) Drake v. Rhodes, 62.
9. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE Under a Power-Purchase by
the Mortgagee.-A stipulation in a mortgage containing a power of
sale conferring on the mortgagee the privilege of becoming a pur-
chaser is valid, and renders a sale to him as efficacious as if made
to a stranger. (Ala.) Drake v. Rhodes, 62.
10. MORTGAGE Containing a Power of Sale-Mistake in the No-
tice of Sale in the Name of the Mortgagor.-A notice of sale under
a power giving the name of the mortgagor as A. J. P. D., when it
was A. P. J. D., does not vitiate the sale where the notice in other
respects correctly describes the mortgage, its date and place of
record, and the lands included therein. (Ala.) Drake v. Rhodes, 62.
11. MORTGAGE-Sale Under a Power.-It is not necessary that
the notice of a sale to be made under a power contained in a mort-
gage state that there had been a default in the payment of the debt
secured thereby, when the mortgage itself does not require such
statement. (Ala.) Drake v. Rhodes, 62.
See Chattel Mortgages; Homesteads.
MOVING PICTURE SHOWS.
See Theaters.
1. A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, Though not Legally Organ-
ized, is a De Facto Corporation, and its acts and officers are, as to
third persons, lawful and binding, and its legal existence and the
right to continue to exercise its functions can be questioned only by
the state in a direct proceeding. (Minn.) State v. Bailey, 592.
2. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-Sufficiency of Enacting Clause.-
An enacting clause to a municipal ordinance which follows the stat-
ute is sufficient. (Tex. Cr.) Ex parte Keeling, 884.
3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Acquisition of Corporate
Name. A city may, by custom, usage and prescription, acquire a cor-
porate name in fact, as where for more than thirty years it uses the
name of "City of Calvert" in all official acts and proclamations; the
addition of the word "Texas" occasionally or even continuously is
immaterial. (Tex. Cr.) Ex parte Keeling, 884.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-Whether Void Because Unreason-
able. An ordinance passed in pursuance of an express power to enact
one of that character cannot be set aside by the courts because they
deem it unreasonable. (Ill.) Block v. Chicago, 219.
5. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-Special or Local Legislation.-
The constitutional prohibition against local and special laws does not
apply to ordinances adopted by a city within the powers conferred
upon it. (Ill.) Block v. Chicago, 219.
Regulating Sale of Produce.
6. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE Forbidding Sale of Products by
Persons who do not Raise or Produce Them.-If a municipal corpora-
tion is by statute authorized to restrain and punish forestalling and
regrating, its ordinance forbidding and punishing the sale of produce
by persons who do not raise it, but have purchased it for the purpose
of sale, is valid. (Tenn.) Dalton v. Knoxville, 748.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Classification, Discriminating Be-
tween Persons Who Produce Foodstuffs and Those Who Purchase
for Resale.-A municipal ordinance discriminating between persons
who produce provisions and sell them to consumers at first hand and
persons who purchase them for resale by allowing the former to sell
their products within the municipality and denying to the latter the
right to make sales, does not make an unlawful discrimination.
(Tenn.) Dalton v. Knoxville, 748.
Estoppel to Claim Street.
8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Estoppel to Claim Street.-A
municipal corporation that has led a person to erect permanent im-
provements upon a portion of a public street will be estopped after
the lapse of many years to claim the property as part of the high-
way and remove the improvements. (Tex.) Krause v. El Paso, 831.
Street Fairs.
9. MUNICIPALITY—Granting Use of Streets for Fair or Carni-
val.-A city has no power to authorize the use of its streets for a
carnival and street fair; and the occupancy of a street for that
purpose by permission of the municipal authorities is unlawful and
the tents and platforms are a nuisance per se. (Ill.) Van Cleef v.
Chicago, 275.
10. MUNICIPALITY-Liability for Nuisance Created by Street
Fair. A city that authorizes the occupation of its streets with the
tents and platforms of a street fair becomes a participant in creat-
ing and maintaining a public nuisance, of whose existence or charac-
ter it is not entitled to notice as a condition precedent to its liabil
ity to persons who receive personal injuries therefrom, although it
does not itself put up the structures. (Ill.) Van Cleef v. Chicago, 275.
11. MUNICIPALITY—Street Fair-Liability for Dangerous Plat-
form. Where a city permits the use of its streets for a fair or
carnival, the negligence of one who constructs a platform does not
exempt the city from liability to a person thereby injured if the
permission of the city was a proximate cause. (Ill.) Van Cleef v.
Chicago, 275.
12. MUNICIPALITY—Liability for Structures Maintained by
Street Fair. Where a city permits the use of its streets for a fair
or carnival, it assumes the obligation to use reasonable care to see
that the structures erected for that purpose are reasonably safe. If
it fails to do so, and a person attending the fair is injured in con-
sequence of the negligent construction of a platform over which he
must pass in reaching a tent show, he may recover from the city.
(Ill.) Van Cleef v. Chicago, 275.
13. STREET ASSESSMENT-Original Construction.-A city, in
ordering a street to be graded and paved after a part of it has already
been improved by an abutting owner, at his own cost, orders the
Am. St. Rep., Vol. 130-76
original construction of the street for which abutting owners may be
taxed. (Ky.) Sparks v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 492.
14. STREET ASSESSMENT—Original Construction.-A street is
not constructed, within the meaning of the law, until its construction is
prescribed by the city authorities; and until the construction is so
prescribed and property holders required to pay therefor, the cost
thereof as required by the city may be assessed against their prop-
erty. (Ky.) Sparks v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 492.
15. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS. A Municipality may Lay a Tax
upon Abutting Land for purposes of local improvement, and assess
it according to the frontage of the property without regard to its
value. (Ky.) Owensboro v. Sweeney, 477.
LOCAL ASSESSMENTS.-Local Assessments are Based upon
the Ground that the property subjected thereto is benefited by the
improvement for which the assessment is made; they rest upon the
theory that they may be imposed as an equivalent for benefits con-
ferred that are not enjoyed by the general public. The right to im-
pose them is not derived from the police power. (Ky.) Owensboro
v. Sweeney, 477.
17. LOCAL ASSESSMENTS.-Special Taxes cannot be Levied
unless the property charged receives a corresponding physical, material,
and substantial benefit from the exaction. (Ky.) Owensboro v.
Sweeney, 477.
18. LOCAL ASSESSMENTS—Imposition for Street Sprinkling.—
The legislature cannot authorize a city to impose a frontage tax to
defray the cost of sprinkling the streets upon which the property
abuts, since sprinkling streets does not confer a special benefit upon
the adjacent property in the sense of contributing to its value. (Ky.)
Owensboro v. Sweeney, 477.
See Limitation of Actions; Telephones, 1-3.
NAMES-Doctrine of Idem Sonans.-The names "Minnie E.
Tilter" and "Minnie E. Tiller" are idem sonans. (Wash.) Kelly v.
Kuhnhausen, 1093.
1. NEGLIGENCE.-Without Legal Duty There cannot be action
able negligence. (Ky.) Swartswood v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 465.
2. NEGLIGENCE, What Essential to a Right of Recovery for.-
To sustain a recovery for alleged negligence, there must be estab-
lished the legal relation of cause and effect between the negligence
relied upon and the injury suffered. (Ala.) Malcolm v. Louisville &
N. R. R. Co., 52.
3. NEGLIGENCE in the Use of Dynamite.-To have a whole box
or case of dynamite brought out before the hole is ready, when only
a few sticks are to be used, and leaving the whole thereof without
returning it to a place of safety, is negligence, and may properly be
found to be such when the explosion of the portion so failed to be
returned has caused an injury and death. (Tenn.) Walton & Co.
v. Burchell. 788.
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