adverse chances would again preponderate, while even success would impair our present situation? The contiguity of our territory with that of Russia would afford facilities to our powerful rival, by an armed demonstration on our frontier, or by intrigue with our Indian subjects and feudatories, to disturb, at any time, the tranquillity of our Indian Empire.

If the fear of Russia, which has driven our Government to so many unprovoked attacks on the Afgháns, be well founded, and we eventually have to encounter a Russian advance, should we not be placed at very great disadvantage in having to fight a powerful enemy in a difficult country, far from our main resources, and amidst a hostile population thirsting for revenge, and ready to aggravate any reverse which may befall us in the contest?

As regards Chitrál and the surrounding countries, our diplomatic and military operations in those regions since 1886, seem to have been governed by the policy under which all our frontier expeditions of the last sixteen years were undertaken, namely, for bringing the territories which separate India from Afghánistán under British control, in order to facilitate the long-desired conquest of the latter country. Hitherto those operations have not achieved success, and the recent fall of Afzul-ul-Mulk, whose accession to the throne of Chitrál received our support and countenance, is doubtless regarded by the people of the country and the neighbouring States, in the light of a British defeat. This circumstance realises the danger so clearly indicated in the following passage of Earl Grey's letter published in the Times in March 1887, warning us against mixing up ourselves with the politics of the Central Asian States: "I am persuaded that the only wise policy for this country to pursue is to keep absolutely aloof from all the quarrels of the Afghans and our other neighbours, and to avoid all meddling in their affairs, unless, by plundering our subjects or by other acts, they inflict upon us injuries which ought to be promptly punished."

NOTES ON RECENT EVENTS IN CHILÁS

AND CHITRÁL.

That

IN 1866 I was sent by the Punjab Government on a linguistic mission to Kashmir and Chilás at the instance of the Bengal Asiatic Society and on the motion of the late Sir George Campbell, who hoped to identify Kailás or the Indian Olympus with Chilás.* Although unable to support that conjecture, I collected material which was published in Part I. of my "Dardistan" and which the Government declared "as throwing very considerable and important light on matters heretofore veiled in great obscurity." some obscurity still exists, is evident from the Times telegram of to-day (5th December, 1892), in which an item of news from the Tak [Takk] valley is described as coming from Chitrál, a distant country with which Chilás has nothing to do. The Takk village is fortified, and through the valley is the shortest and easiest road to our British district of Kaghán. It is alleged that some headmen of Takk wished to see Dr. Robertson at Gilgit, who thereupon sent a raft to bring them, but the raft was fired on and Capt. Wallace, who went to its assistance, was wounded. [Chilás is on the Kashmir side of the Indus, and the Gilgit territory is reached by crossing the Indus at Bunji.]

The incident is ascribed either to "the treachery of the men who professed willingness to COME IN" or to the mischievousness of "other persons." It is probable from this suggestion of treachery and the unconscious use of the words "to come in," which is the Anglo-Indian equivalent for "surrender," that the headmen of Takk were not willing to make over their Fort to the British or to open the road to Gilgit. The Takk incident, therefore, is not a part of the so-called "Chitrál usurpation," under which heading it

* I was again on special duty in 1886, and its result was Part I. of the Hunza-Nagyr Handbook," of which a second and enlarged edition will appear shortly. My material, some of which has been published, has been collected between 1865 and 1889 in my private capacity as a student of languages and customs.

immediately appears, but is a part of our usurpation on the tribes inhabiting the banks of the Indus. In 1843, these tribes inflicted a severe loss on the Sikh invaders, and in my "history of the wars with Kashmir" the part taken by the manly defenders of Takk, now reduced from 131 to some 90 houses, is given in detail. It seems to me that as the Gilgit force was unable to support "the Chitrál usurpation" of our protégé, Afzul-ul-Mulk, owing to his being killed by his uncle Sher Afzul, it is to be employed to coerce the Indus tribes to open out a road which ought never to have been withdrawn from their hold. About 50 years ago the Takk men were stirred into so-called rebellion by Kashmir agents in order to justify annexation. It is to be hoped that history will not repeat itself, or that, at any rate, the next 50 years will see the Indus tribes as independent and peaceful as they have been since 1856, especially in Chilás (before 1892), and as mysterious as Hunza ought to have remained till our unnecessary attack on that country caused practically unknown Russia to be looked upon as the Saviour of Nations "rightly struggling to be free" (see Baron Vrevsky's reply to the Hunza deputation). Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat; and no greater instance of folly can be conceived, than the construction of a military road through countries in which the chamois is often puzzled for its way. Nor was the attention of the Russians drawn to them before we made our own encroachments.

As for the Pamirs, whatever may be the present interpretation of Prince Gortchakoff's Convention, the Russians were unwilling to let political consequences or limits accompany the erratic wanderings of Kirghiz sheep in search of pasturage in that region. Prince Gortchakoff's advocacy of a Neutral Zone and of the autonomy of certain tribes was justified by the facts (which he, however, rather guessed than knew) and was worthy alike of that Diplomatist and of our acceptance in the interests of India and of peace. The incorporation of certain Districts in the domain, or

rather the sphere of influence, of Afghanistan, was distasteful to tribes attached to their hereditary rulers or to republican institutions and was not too willingly accepted by the Amir of Afghanistan, who now expects us to defend the white Elephants that we have given him better than we did Panjdeh. Some Muláis that had fled from Russian tyranny to Afghan territory assured me that "the finger of an Afghan was more oppressive than the whole Russian army." Indeed, so far as Central Asia is concerned, Russia, with the exception of certain massacres, has hitherto behaved, on the whole, as a great civilizing power.

He spoke

As for Sirdar Nizám-ul-Mulk, this is his name and not his title. He is the "Mihtar" or "Prince" Nizám-ul-Mulk, and neither an Indian "Sirdár" nor a "Nizám.” He is also the "Badshah" of Turikoh, this being the district assigned to him in his father's lifetime as the heir-apparent. He was snubbed by us for offering to relieve that excellent officer, Col. Lockhart, when a prisoner in Wakhan! He has written to me from Turikoh for “English phrases and words with their Persian equivalents as a pleasure and a requirement." This does not look like hostility to the British. to me in 1886 of his brother Afzul's bravery with affection. and pride, though he has ever maintained his own acknowledged right as the successor of his father Amán-ul-Mulk. If he has been alienated from us or has ever been tempted to throw himself into the arms of Russia, it has most assuredly been our fault. Besides, just as we have abandoned the Shiah Hazaras, our true friends during the late Afghan War, to be destroyed by their religious and political foe, the Sunni Amir Abdurrahman, so have the Amir Sher Ali and the Tham of Hunza, Safdar Ali Khan, rued their

* In spite of Russian attempts to conciliate the orthodox Muhammadans of Turkey and thus to take the place of the British as "the Protector of Islám," the news of the revision of the Korán by a Russian Censor and the bévue of putting up the Czar's portrait in Central Asian Mosques, have injured Russia's propaganda among Muhammadans, whom also the accounts of the persecution of the Jews have estranged from a Power that began its rule in Central Asia by repairing and constructing Mosques, helping Mosque Schools and even subsidizing an employé to call "the faithful" to fast and break-fast during the month of Ramazán.

trust in Russian Agents. I regret, therefore, to find in the Times telegram of to-day that "the Nizám" "is acting without the support of the British Agent" "who has not interfered," when he had already interfered in favour of the usurper Afzul-ul-Mulk.

As for the connivance of Amir Abdurrahman, my "rough history of Dardistan from 1800 to 1872" shows that, in one sense, Chitrál is tributary to Badakhshan and as we have assigned Badakhshán to the Amir, he, no doubt, takes an interest in Chitrál affairs. I believe, however, that interest to be somewhat platonic, and he knows that his friend Jehandár Shah (the late wrongfully deposed hereditary ruler of Badakhshan) never paid any tribute to Afghanistan. But Chitral once also paid tribute to Dir, with whose able Chief, Rahmat-ullah-Khan, "the Nizám" is connected by marriage. Chitral on the other hand has received a subsidy from Kashmir since 1877, but this was as much a tribute from Kashmir to Aman-ul-Mulk, as a sign of his subjection to Kashmir, for shortly after he made offers of allegiance to Kabul. With all alike it is

"The good old rule, the simple plan,

That they should take who have the power,

And they should keep who can."

It is misleading to speak of their relations to neighbouring States as "tributary." tributary." Are the Khyberis tributary to us or we to them, because we pay them a tribute to let our merchants travel through their Pass? Have we never ourselves come, first as suppliants, then as merchants, then as guests, then as advisers, then as protectors, and, finally, as conquerors?

The procedure of Afghanistan, of Chitrál, of Kashmir, and of our own is very much alike and so are the several radii of influence of the various factors in "the question." We have our fringe of independent frontier tribes with whom we flirt, or wage war, as suits the convenience of the moment. Afghanistan has a similar fringe of independent Ishmaelites round it and even through it, whose hands are against everybody and everybody's hands against them.