Goodwin v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. result at which the court has unanimously arrived, it may be due to some of my brethren to say that, while they regard the subject essentially as I do, they have some doubts as to the propriety, where it is not clearly demanded of us, of laying down what may seem to be a rule of action in such a matter for other departments of the government. I take therefore the personal responsibility of all which is now added, feeling sure that, whatever sense of delicacy would keep any of my brethren silent on the subject, we all agree as to the moral question involved. The practice referred to may be viewed in two aspects: first, its effect on the railroad companies; next, on those who receive the tickets, and through them on the community. It may be safely assumed, generally, that the directors and managing agents of these corporations have the interest of those corporations primarily in view. Good dividends being the supreme object, they will probably issue no more of these tickets than are likely to redound to that end. A full equivalent, in some form, will doubtless be looked for in each case, and if not realized, it may be presumed that the issuing of such tickets will be discontinued. Should the issue at any time be extended beyond profitable limits, the stockholders must have abundant power in their own hands to correct the evil by a change of agents. Among the obvious effects of receiving these tickets, by persons in official positions, is the public scandal which it creates. That may not be a sufficient cause for abolishing the practice, but it is an evil of such magnitude that rightminded men should be willing to make some sacrifice to prevent it. The members of the executive and legislative branches of the government are no doubt fully competent to decide for themselves as to the propriety of accepting these tickets. It would be an assumption of superiority most unbecoming in us, were we thus, prematurely and gratuitously, to volunteer an opinion. For judicial officers, however, I feel free to say, that I condemn the practice, wholly and entirely. Not because we should any of us be conscious that our judgment would be warped or influenced by so slight a Goodwin v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. cause. We flatter ourselves that it would not be. Still, it would provoke comment, if not condemnation, from suitors against whom judgments might be rendered where the interest of these corporations was concerned. The charge, or the suspicion, of bias is to be avoided. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 3 H. L. cases, 793. The administration of justice should not only be pure, but, as far as possible, free from suspicion. To attain the high ends of his office, a judge must be of good report. That a gift perverteth the ways of judgment, is a truth coming to us with so lofty a sanction that it may not be questioned. Lord Chief Justice Hale, whom Lord Campbell justly describes as an object of admiration and love to all his contemporaries, and as a model of public and private virtue by succeeding generations, refused to try the cause of a party who had sent him a present of some venison, until his butler had ascertained and paid its full value. The payment being refused, the cause was postponed. This, by some, was thought to be over scrupulous, and possibly it may have been so; but for myself, I prefer, on this subject, to err with Lord Hale, rather than to follow Lord Bacon. There is no error in the judgment below. In this opinion the other judges concurred. Wheeler v. Wheeler. SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS. COUNTIES OF NEW LONDON AND WINDHAM. MARCH TERM, 1876. Present, PARK, C. J., CARPENTER, FOSTER, PARDEE AND LOOMIS, JS. CARRIE S. WHEELER vs. LUCRETIA T. WHEELER. A husband may make a valid gift of property to his wife, if it is bonâ fide and not prejudicial to creditors. A husband purchased a horse, intending to make an immediate gift of it to his wife, who was with him, and he declared at the time that he bought it for her, and that it was hers. He however took it into his possession and kept it in his stable. Held that there was a sufficient delivery to make the gift a valid one. The same change of possession was not necessary that would have been if he had previously owned the horse. The only possession that he ever had was that taken by him in her behalf. TROVER for a horse; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New London County, and tried to the court, upon the general issue, before Mather, J. The court found the following facts: On the 23d of April, 1874, the plaintiff was married to Edwin C. Wheeler, then of Bozrah in this state, and on the same day started with him for Mount Carmel, in the state of New York, for the purpose of visiting a family named Powers who were residents of that place. They arrived at the house of Mr. Powers the next day and remained there about a week. While there, on the 27th of April, Mr. Wheeler bargained with Powers to buy of him the horse described in the plaintiff's declaration, for $190, and to give his note therefor payable in five months, intending to give the horse to the plaintiff. 43 503 63 456 די Wheeler v. Wheeler. After making the bargain, and on the same day, he told the plaintiff, in the presence of Powers, that he had bought the horse for her, and that it was hers. On the 30th of April he gave his note for the horse to Powers, the latter agreeing to deliver the horse to him in the city of New York on the 4th of May. Mr. and Mrs. Whecler left Mount Carmel on the 30th of April and went directly to Charles Hinckley's, in Brooklyn, in the state of New York, and there remained on a visit until the afternoon of the 4th of May. While there he told Hinckley that he had bought the horse for the plaintiff and had given it to her. In the afternoon they left Hinckley's for their home in Bozrah by the way of New York city. During the same afternoon the horse arrived in that city and was there delivered to and received by Mr. Wheeler, and was by him immediately put on board the freight steamer bound for Norwich that night. Mr. Wheeler and his wife took passage on board the passenger boat bound for Norwich the same night. Both boats arrived at Norwich on the morning of May 5th. On their arrival at Norwich they went immediately to his residence in Bozrah, and the horse was by his order taken by an employee of his to Bozrah and put in his barn. there, with two other horses belonging to him which were kept for livery purposes, he being the keeper of a livery stable at that place. The expense of shipping the horse to Norwich was paid by him. The horse, after its arrival at Bozrah, was used but twice before Mr. Wheeler's death-once by him to take himself and the plaintiff to the plaintiff's father's in Bozrah, and once to carry a messenger for a physician for him. Nothing was said by him to the plaintiff about the horse from the time they left Hinckley's, in Brooklyn, on the 4th of May, to the time he died, which was on the 11th of May following. On the 24th of June, 1872, Mr. Wheeler executed a will, which remained unrevoked at the time of his death, by which he gave to the defendant, his mother, all his estate, real and personal, and appointed her his executrix. The will was duly proved and an appraisal was made soon after, and the horse in controversy was included in the inventory. The Wheeler v. Wheeler. defendant purchased of the plaintiff her right of dower in the real estate for the sum of $900 and took from her a deed of the same, and the court of probate, upon the application of the plaintiff, made an allowance to her of $500 out of the estate for her support during the settlement of the estate. The order making such allowance was appealed from and is now pending in the Superior Court. The defendant paid the note given for the horse to Powers and paid the expenses of keeping the horse, until May, 1875, when she sold him. On the 12th of April, 1875, the plaintiff, through the officer who served the writ in this case, demanded the horse of the defendant, who refused to deliver it. Its value at the time the demand was made, was $175. On the 21st of April, 1875, the defendant settled her administration account. In that account the $900 paid to the plaintiff for her dower, was charged against the estate. The allowance of $500 was not charged. The estate was settled as a solvent estate. On the foregoing facts the plaintiff claimed title to the horse by gift from her husband, and that she was entitled to recover the value of it from the defendant, and requested the court so to rule but the court refused so to rule. The defendant claimed to have proved that, at the time the plaintiff claimed to have acquired title to the horse, Mr. Wheeler was so largely indebted that he could not make a valid gift of the horse to her. On this part of the case the court found that he was largely indebted at the time, but that the value of his property, real and personal, exceeded the amount of his indebtedness. The court however found that, as the estate now stood, without reference to the claim of the plaintiff, there was a balance in favor of the estate to the amount of $78.35, but that, adding the value of the horse to the charges against the estate, it would be insolvent. The plaintiff further claimed that the defendant had no right to charge the $900 paid for her dower, to the estate, and that, upon the defendant's own showing, the estate was not insolvent. Upon the foregoing facts the court ruled that there was no VOL. XLIII.-64 |