ence in the Senate, of having his words and acts pass for naught when others with less effort and little obstruction were notoriously successful in the same direction. So fruitless were all his efforts at writing that this part of the work of the commission eventually by force of necessity went into the hands of Mr. Gallatin with whom nobody had a quarrel.

Of this matter Mr. Adams wrote in his Diary :

This is a severity with which I alone am treated in our discussions by my colleagues. Almost every thing written by any of the rest is rejected, or agreed to with very little criticism, verbal or substantial. But every line that I write passes a gauntlet of objections by every one of my colleagues, which finally issues, for the most part, in the rejection of it all."

Finally, after a tedious and vexatious continuance of the negotiations, what was deemed a satisfactory result was reached, and the treaty actually signed on the evening of the 24th of December, 1814, and an hour afterwards Mr. Baker was on his way to England. Mr. Carroll also soon set out for America with the treaty and dispatches from our commissioners, who at once prepared to break up their quarters at Ghent. But even this was a thing not easily done by a set of very inharmonious men. A question arose as to what should be done with the records and papers relating to the entire negotiation, then in the hands of Mr. Adams. Mr. Clay proposed that they should all be packed and put on board the Neptune, the vessel on which he was to sail for home, saying that he wanted to refer to them and that they ought to be placed in the care of the State Department of the Government. Mr. Adams claimed that by usage and precedent the papers and books should all be left in his hands. Whereupon Mr.

Clay fell into a violent passion, and although this trifle was amicably settled, it came near separating the Americans in a general quarrel, when their great work was achieved. But the peace-maker, Mr. Gallatin, now stepped, for the hundredth time, between his hot-headed colleagues, and on his proposal it was agreed that the records and effects of the commission, saving a certain class of the papers left with Mr. Adams, should be sent to Mr. Beasley in London, to be held for orders from the Government, the papers in possession of Mr. Adams also to be subject to the orders of the Government. So the commissioners dispersed in apparent peace. A few days subsequently Mr. Adams wrote in his Diary that this had been the most memorable year of his life, and of his habits while at Ghent he said

"I have risen during the month almost always before six, and without exception before daylight. Make my fire, read five chapters in the Bible, and write until nine and ten. Breakfast in my chamber alone. Write, read papers, receive visits, and attend mission meetings until three, afternoon. Walk from one to two hours, dine at half-past four, and sit at table until six. Go to the theater, concert, or party at a friend's house, or write in my chamber until eight in the evening. Spend one or two hours at Mr. Smith's lodgings, and about ten at night return home and retire to bed."

He then observes that this mode of life would soon be varied by a change in his situation. If a change of location would be all the change in this style of living, it would seem hardly worth mention, however a little variation might have improved its character. Whatever exceptions may be made to Mr. Adams's mode of life, it was out of all reach above that of some of his colleagues, a fact made clear enough in his Diary, where it is recorded that he frequently heard the gam

blers breaking up in Mr. Clay's rooms as he rose to make his fires of mornings. No one can read the account Mr. Adams wrote so minutely of the Ghent negotiations and the conduct of the American commissioners there, without feelings of surprise and disappointment, if not disgust also. While a war was waged at home, towns burned and citizens outraged, and all the evils of a war with a foreign nation exaggerated by partisan and sectional strife, these five men, supposed to have been selected with great care, appeared totally oblivious of these things, and spent no small part of their time in dinners, wine-drinking, parties, balls, cardplaying, theater-going, and such other dissipations as were within their reach.

As if there were no other way of celebrating a great work than by eating and drinking and making themselves foolish and ridiculous, the result of the negotiations was celebrated in a banquet. In barbarous ages, and yet among uncivilized people of all countries, great events have been celebrated in some kind of debauch. This practice, like many others borrowed from rude states of society, morals, and philosophy, even a Puritan of a Puritan race would aid in perpetuating. The American commissioners met in harmony only where the lowest of men could have done the same thing, where the mere animal found gratification. Yet it would not, perhaps, be correct to say that the commission was unfortunately constructed, or that it would have been easy for the Administration to constitute it more wisely. Two very momentous points sprung during the negotiations were the British claim to the navigation of the Mississippi, and the American claim to the fishing privileges on the north-eastern

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coast. The only guardians of these important matters in the commission were Clay and Adams. The other commissioners did not understand the value of these questions, and both Adams and Clay had utterly inadequate ideas of the relative importance of the two questions. Mr. Clay deemed the fishery claims and privileges of New England of little or no moment, and said so, while with him the failure to exclude the British from the Mississippi River would be ground enough for rejecting any other terms, or even for continuing the war indefinitely, while Mr. Adams thought the fisheries of paramount importance, and would have complied with the British demand in reference to the Mississippi as a matter of little consequence. Mr. Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana had really disposed of the Mississippi question, and Mr. Clay and the West did greatly overestimate its value. That ceased to be a question, but quite the reverse was the case with the fishing privileges on the coast of New England.

The fisheries are still in the way of perfect harmony between this Government and that of England. This Mr. Adams foresaw would be the case, and in the zeal and heat of discussion he startled his colleagues by declaring in favor of demanding of England then, while they were at it, the cession of all its possessions on the north to the United States. This would have put a sudden and everlasting end to the fishery question, as well as several others of no little interest.

The place of Mr. Gallatin in the commission it would have been difficult to fill. Of the other two members little need be said here, as Jonathan Russell will be mentioned in another chapter. While they were men of ability and watchful of the general honor of

their country, they represented no especial point in issue, and their places could have been well filled by others from among their countrymen. The general superiority of the American over the British commissioners was plainly visible, and was bitterly acknowledged in England, and the British newspapers were quite free in their comments of the unfavorableness of the treaty to their side. In the House of Lords it was openly declared by a member that, "in his opinion the American commissioners had shown the most astonishing superiority over the British, during the whole of the correspondence." This statement acquires its full value when it is remembered that the three irascible British commissioners were only the mouth-pieces of the entire British Ministry, taking no step without direction from home.

Of Albert Gallatin it may be truly said without necessarily detracting from the character of any of his colleagues, that while probably being no less positive and unyielding than any of them, with, perhaps, the exception of Mr. Adams, his temper and manner were far more suited to such a mission; the purely national light in which he viewed all points, his great caution, coolness, exactness, watchfulness, readiness, diplomatic courtesy, and general ability, really placed him in dig nity and importance at the head of all the negotiators in this memorable treaty.

The one important thing accomplished by this successful negotiation was the ending of the war. Beyond that the treaty accomplished very little. From ideas of accession of territory, and the settlement of vexed questions, the commissioners little by little gave way, and were finally glad to fall in with the