A municipality has the right to regulate in the interest of public safety the running of jitneys, but the regulation must not be carried to the extent of prohibition. Such regulations may properly include requirement of a bond to secure the payment of such damages as may be recovered for loss of life or injury to person or property occasioned by the negligent operation of a jitney, provided the bond be not made prohibitive in its nature either by being too large in amount or by being unnecessarily restricted as to the sureties who may sign it. Jitney Bus Asso. v. Wilkes-Barre (1917) 256 Pa. 462, 100 Atl. 954. The right to operate a jitney bus is not such a right as is protected by any treaty with any foreign nation, as the rights of property protected by treaty are such as are capable of sale or transfer, and are not such as are purely personal. Lutz v. New Orleans (1916) 235 Fed. 978, affirmed in (1916) 150 C. C. A. 654, 237 Fed. 1018. Discrimination and classification. See also Greene v. San Antonio, Tex. Civ. App. 178 S. W. 6, cited in note in L.R.A.1915F, p. 842; and Re Cardinal (1915) 170 Cal. 511, L.R.A. 1915F, 850, P.U.R.1915E, 282, 150 Pac. 348, cited in note in L.R.A.1915F, p. 842. An ordinance defining as a public utility vehicles inter alia a jitney bus, and providing that public utility vehicles shall not operate without first obtaining a franchise, is not invalid as discriminatory class legislation because of the fact that it excludes from its operation and effect railroad cars, street 1 railway cars, hotel busses, and automobiles and taxicabs used exclusively as sight-seeing cars, and carriages. Cummins v. Jones (Or.) supra. The power of classification of motor vehicles for the purpose of administering a motor vehicle law may be properly delegated by the legislature to a municipality, or to an official, or to a board charged with the administration of the statute. Smith v. State (1917) 130 Md. 482, 100 Atl. 778. An operator of jitney busses is not deprived of any constitutional privileges because of the fact that by reason of his financial condition he is unable to comply with the reasonable terms of an ordinance regulating the jitney business. Lutz v. New Orleans (Fed.) supra. A statute regulating jitney busses is not invalid as class legislation because it excludes from its operation street cars and taxicabs, where it operates on all jitney busses alike. Huston v. Des Moines (1916) 176 Iowa, 455, 156 N. W. 883. is not unconstitutional in that it exAnd an act regulating jitney busses empts from its provisions carriers of United States mail. State v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co. (1916) 90 Wash. 416, 156 Pac. 837; State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co. (1916) 93 Wash. 614, 161 Pac. 467. So also an ordinance regulating jitney busses is not unconstitutional as discriminatory class legislation in that it imposes upon them taxes and restrictions which it does not impose upon the operators of auto stages, sight-seeing automobiles, taxicabs, horse stages, street cars, and other carriers transporting passengers for hire within the city. Allen v. Bellingham (1917) 95 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18. Nor is it unconstitutional as discriminatory class legislation in that it makes certain acts penal when committed by a jitney bus operator which it does not make penal when committed by the operators of other automobiles. Ibid. The imposition of a tax of 5 per cent on the gross receipts of the operators of jitney busses when no such tax is imposed upon the operators of other vehicles is not such an unjust discrimination as to deprive the owners of jitneys of the equal protection of the laws. West v. Asbury Park (1916) 89 N. J. L. 402, 99 Atl. 190. That only jitneys which follow certain routes are permitted to go through certain streets is not an unwarranted discrimination that renders an ordinance Supplementing L.R.A.1916B, 1157. A corporation which under contract with a ferry line company maintains and operates auto busses between designated termini for the purpose of transporting passengers to and from such ferry is a common carrier of passengers within the meaning of an act regulating jitney busses which requires a permit to do business. State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co. (Wash.) supra. Regulations as to license fees. Supplementing L.R.A.1916B, 1157. An ordinance regulating the operation of jitney busses is not invalid on the ground that it imposes upon persons operating jitney busses a much larger license fee than that imposed upon persons operating taxicabs. Hazleton v. Atlanta (1916) 144 Ga. 775, 87 S. E. 1043. Nor on the ground that the graded license fee imposed by the ordinance is unreasonable. Ibid. Nor will an ordinance fixing a license tax for jitney operators be declared invalid as imposing an occupation or other tax merely because of the fact that the license fee imposed may result in the producing of a revenue. Huston v. Des Moines (Iowa) supra. An ordinance which exacts for each jitney as the condition precedent to its operation, "as an occupation license or tax," the sum of $5 for each passenger seat capacity of the jitney operated and the sum of $4 per annum for each driver's permit exacts an occupation license or tax within the meaning of the statute, which prohibits requiring of the owner or operator of any motor vehicle "any license other than an occupation license or tax." Allen v. Bellingham (Wash.) supra. Regulations as to bonds. Supplementing L.R.A.1916B, 1058. A city under its police power may require operators of jitney busses to furnish an indemnity bond in the sum of $5,000 for each vehicle operated. Lutz v. New Orleans (1916) 235 Fed. 978, affirmed in (1916) 150 C. C. A. 654, 237 Fed. 1018; and see Dallas v. Gill (1918) Tex Civ. App., 199 S. W. 1144. A statute which requires operators of jitney busses to furnish an indemnity bond in the sum of $2,000 to protect any person who may receive bodily injuries or suffer death by reason of the negligence or misconduct on the part of the driver or operator of the machine is not invalid as depriving such jitney owner of his property without due process of law. Huston v. Des Moines (Iowa) su pra. Nor as requiring a bond in a prohibitive amount. Ibid. The court stated that "if a bond may be required at all for the purpose of indemnifying the public, which of course means the individuals going to make up that public, else it means nothing, it is perfectly apparent that this bond, rather than being excessive, is, to say the least, inadequate in amount as compared with the damages which may be done any day through the carelessness of an operator. If it results in keeping irresponsible people off the streets it is not an unmixed evil. That it will have a tendency to make drivers more careful in the operation of their machines needs no argument and that it may be beneficial to the owner or operator himself is not beyond the pale of reason. Many private individuals carry automobile insurance believing it to be a good business investment, and this has not been productive of accidents. But, aside from all speculation upon the point, it is clear that, if any bond may be required for the purposes indicated, the one fixed by the council is not unreasonable." So also an ordinance requiring jitney operators to furnish an indemnity bond in the sum of $5,000 was held not to be invalid as requiring the furnishing of a bond in an unreasonable and oppressive amount. Hazleton v. Atlanta (Ga.) supra. And the requirement of a municipal ordinance regulating the operation of jitney busses that as a condition of the granting of a license there should be furnished an indemnity bond in the sum of $5,000 was held in New Orleans v. Le Blanc (1915) 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248, not to be unreasonable, especially in view of the absence of any evidence to rebut the presumption of the existence of conditions which required the enactment of such ordinance and its application to the jitney nuisance. The requirement of an ordinance regulating jitney busses that the owners thereof shall furnish a bond when it is not required from the owners of other vehicles is not such an unjust discrimination as to deprive the owners of such busses of the equal protection of the of unquestioned financial responsibility. We know of no other instance in which where security is required by law to be given an attempt has been made to confine such security to surety companies to the exclusion of solvent and respon Nor is an ordinance requiring common carriers of passengers in city streets to furnish a bond in the sum of $5,000 for each vehicle operated invalid as dis-sible personal sureties. criminating against jitneys in favor of street cars. Lutz v. New Orleans (Fed.) supra. The court states that while it may be easier for the street cars to comply with the ordinance than for the plaintiff to do so, and by a mathematical calculation it may be shown that the security required is more for each passenger carried in the case of jitneys, these facts would not make the provision so unequal so as to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights in this regard. The requirement that jitney bus operators shall furnish a surety bond while no such bond is required of street cars is not invalid as class legislation or a denial of equal protection of the laws. State v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co. (1916) 90 Wash. 416, 156 Pac. 837; State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co. (1916) An ordinance requiring a jitney bus operator to furnish bonds which provides that the obligors shall continue to be liable for other and additional amounts without limit after recovery to the amount of the penal sum in the bond is clearly unreasonable, as no surety company could possibly be asked to undertake such an indefinite and unlimited responsibility. Ibid. 93 Wash. 614, 161 Pac. 467. & Nor is such requirement invalid because restricted to bonds of surety companies. State v. Seattle Taxicab Transfer Co.; State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus (Wash.) and Lutz v. New Orleans (Fed.) supra. And especially where it is not shown that the surety company exacts exorbitant fees, or that personal surety could be secured on a better basis or at all. Lutz v. New Orleans (Fed.) supra. Nor is it invalid as prohibitive because of the fact that persons of insufficient financial ability to meet losses are refused bonds by the surety company; and especially where it is shown that persons of financial ability have no difficulty in procuring them. State v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co. (Wash.) supra. But an ordinance which restricts the bond to be furnished by the operator of a jitney to one furnished by a surety company is unreasonable, where it is difficult to procure a bond from a surety company. Jitney Bus Asso. v. WilkesBarre (1917) 256 Pa. 462, 100 Atl. 954. The court stated that the municipality is entitled to require good and sufficient security, but beyond that it should not go. The terms of the ordinance in this respect would forbid the deposit of cash or of a certified check or municipal bonds as security by the applicant for a permit, or the acceptance as sureties upon his bond of individual freeholders Regulations as to routes, schedules, and fares. Supplementing L.R.A.1916B, 1159. charter powers to regulate the use of The commissioners of a city under its its streets have authority to regulate the use of the streets by jitney busses despite the fact that there is a state and regulating it from the viewpoint of statute dealing with the subject-matter state policy, where there is no express charter authority or legislative intent to intent in such statute to repeal the Irwin v. Atlantic City (1917) — N. J. L. deal de novo with the entire subject. - 100 Atl. 565. A provision of a municipal ordinance regulating jitney busses that an applicant for license shall state in his application certain classified information which such motor bus is to be operated, regarding his car, the termini between and a schedule showing the times of departure from the termini, according motor bus, is valid as a regulatory measto which he intended to operate such ure. Huston v. Des Moines (1916) 176 Iowa, 455, 156 N. W. 883. The operator of a jitney bus who regularly transports passengers for hire between two termini for a fixed compensation may not by varying his route from time to time between such termini change the classification of his vehicle. Smith v. State (1917) 130 Md. 482, 100 Atl. 778. The following regulations have been held to be reasonable: -Requirement that jitney busses operate on fixed schedules over designated routes, Allen v. Bellingham (1917) 95 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18; -Requirement that routes and schedules be fixed, Huston v. Des Moines (Iowa) supra. -Requirements as to places for stop ping, Allen v. Bellingham (Wash.) su-, Requirement that operator of bus be pra; And a provision of a municipal ordinance regulating jitney busses prohibiting trailers is not unreasonable. Huston v. Des Moines (Iowa) supra. Nor is the provision prohibiting overloading. Ibid. So also the following regulations have been held to be reasonable: -The requirement of a city license and the display of the city license number in addition to the one required by the state, Ibid; -Requirement that body of jitney bus be illuminated after dark, Ibid; -Requirement that jitney bus come to a full stop before crossing any street, interurban, or steam railway in the city, Ibid; -Regulation as to number of passengers carried, Allen v. Bellingham (Wash.) supra; -Regulation as to lights, Ibid. Certificate of convenience and necessity. Supplementing L.R.A.1916B, 1159. See also infra, under "Decisions and orders of public service commissions." One operating a horse-drawn vehicle must procure a certificate of public convenience and necessity as required by § 26 of the Transportation Corporations Law, although it is shown that his only passengers are employees of a certain manufacturing plant who have formed themselves into a mutual transportation club, each paying 5 cents fare when he rides. Public Service Commission v. Fox (1916) 96 Misc. 283, 160 N. Y. Supp. 59. Forbidding transfer of license. An ordinance which denies the transfer of a license of a motor bus to another is not void as arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjust, and the unlawful taking and confiscation of property. Dallas v. Gill (1918) Tex. Civ. App. 199 S. W. 1144. the owner. The requirement that operators of jitneys shall be the owners thereof is unreasonable. It does not tend to promote the safety or convenience of the public and is therefore not a proper exercise of the police power. Parrish v. Richmond (1916) 119 Va. 180, 89 S. E. 102. Decisions and orders of public serv ice commissions. Supplementing L.R.A.1916B, 1160. It is not necessary for an applicant for a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing the operation of an auto bus line to show that an absolute necessity exists therefor in the sense that no such necessity would exist if there were already in the field a carrier prepared to furnish and actually furnishing adequate facilities for transportation; since a public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want of the public and supply a need, if existing facilities, while in some sense sufficient, do not adequately supply that need. Re Troy Auto Car Co. (1916; N. Y.) P.U.R.1917A, 700. Public convenience and necessity for the operation of an auto bus line in competition with a street railway is sufficiently shown where it appears that there is such a diversion of the routes, and so much greater convenience afforded by the stage route, that it may fairly be said that it supplies a want of the public not already adequately met. Ibid. suffer serious loss through the admission That the existing street railway will of competition is not a sufficient reason to warrant the refusal of the certificate of public convenience for the operation of a better and more convenient form of transportation than that furnished by the street railway. Allegheny Valley Street R. Co. v. Greco (Pa.) P.U.R. 1917A, 723. the transportation of the public for hire Individuals operating automobiles for along fixed routes or wherever passengers and public service companies within the desire to go are common carriers Service Company Law, requiring all meaning of the Pennsylvania Public public service companies to secure a certificate of public convenience from the Commission before engaging in business. Ibid. The Pennsylvania Public Service Commission refused to issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of ordinary small-sized automobiles in com petition with the street railway, where the competition would seriously interfere with the revenues of the street railway, upon the ground that such vehicles cannot meet the public demand for transportation in all kinds of weather on a sufficiently safe and stable basis to warrant accepting them as satisfactory substitutes for street car service. Ibid. The operation of an auto bus for hire parallel to an electric railway between municipalities will not be allowed merely because of inadequate railway service, since if complaint is made against the service the Commission can order it remedied. Southern Pennsylvania Traction Co. v. Hartel (1917; Pa.) P.U.R.1917C, 627. Public convenience and necessity was held not to require the operation of small busses for hire parallel to an electric railway between municipalities, it appearing that railway cars were run on a 10 minute schedule from 5:50 A. M. to 7:30 P. M., and from that time on a 15 to 25 minute schedule until 1:05 a. M.; that on Saturdays and Sundays the 10 minute schedule was adhered to until 9:30 P. M. and that the railway was run at a loss when the motor busses were in operation. Ibid. A person operating a jitney bus in a city in Pennsylvania must secure a certificate of public convenience from the Commission, since the Pennsylvania statute (Act of June 1, 1915) authorizing cities to regulate and license certain motor vehicles did not repeal the Public Service Company Law declaring it unlawful for any public service company to exercise any municipal franchise or privilege without securing such a certificate. Wilkes-Barre R. Co. v. Parsons (1917; Pa.) P.U.R.1917E, 371. J. H. B. COLORADO SUPREME COURT. (In Banc.) a curve a cable used to lower cars down an incline from a mine, a witness cannot be permitted to state that they were fastened in the manner customary in the mines in GIUSEPPE VELOTTA and Wife, Plffs. in which he had worked without anything to Err., show that such was the general custom or that it was a proper one. For other cases, see Evidence, VII. 1, in Dig. 1-52 N. S. Same - res ipsa loquitur. 3 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ap Master and servant- negligence in fas-plies in case the fastenings of sheaves which tening of sheaves. 1. A mine operator who fastens the sheaves which carry a cable around a curve in the incline down which ore is lowered in cars in a manner not reasonably and prudently sufficient to carry the weight for which they are intended is guilty of negligence towards his employees. For other cases, see Master and Servant, 11. a, 4, c, in Dig. 1-52 N. S. Evidence-method of fastening sheaves. 2. Upon the question of negligence in the method of fastening sheaves to carry around Note. -The general subject of the applicability of the rule res ipsa loquitur as between master and servant is discussed at length in the annotation in L.R.A.1917E, 4, and the other annotations there referred to. Some parts of the opinion in VELOTTA V. YAMPA VALLEY COAL Co. indicate a disposition to affirm the applicability of the rule in its strict and distinctive sense even between master and servant, notwithstanding that, as pointed out at page 85 of the annotation above referred to, the contrary position has apparently been taken in previous cases in this state. The concession by the court that negligence will not be in ferred from the happening of an accident is not necessarily inconsistent with the inten carry a cable around a curve in an incline down which ore is lowered from a mine give way and permit the cable to sweep over ground occupied by an employee who has no connection with the construction or maintenance of the fastenings, to his injury. For other cases, see Evidence, II. h, 1, e, in Dig. 1-52 N. S. (White, Ch. J., and Garrigues and Bailey, JJ., dissent.) (April 2, 1917.) tion to affirm the application of the rule in its strict and distinctive sense between master and servant, since, as pointed out at page 16 of the annotation referred to, something more than the mere fact of the accident is necessary to make the rule applicable even between carrier and passenger; the immediate physical cause, at least, of the accident must appear in order to furnish a predicate for the doctrine even between persons in that relation. Upon its facts, however, the VELOTTA CASE does not seem to call for the application of the rule in its strict and distinctive sense, since the manner in which, as shown by the evidence, the sheaves were fastened, in view of the great strain upon them, would seem |