intellect, by enabling him to command the instincts and faculties of the inferior animals, and to avail himself of them, in many respects, to promote his own interest, convenience, and pleasures, supersede in him the necessity of a greater number of organs, faculties, and instincts, or of a greater degree of acuteness and perfection in those he possesses. "To man," says a profound and eloquent philosopher," the faculties of observation or choice are given as an equivalent for every advantage which the lower animals may seem to possess over him, and every actual supply. is withheld from him, not through a penury in the economy of nature, or a defect of resource, but as a privation proper to the lot of a being who is fitted to accommodate himself, destined to cultivate his own faculties, and to be the artificer of his own fortune; and, though of a class superior to any of the other animals, destined to receive the first lessons of intelligence itself, in providing a supply for the comparative wants and defects of his animal nature *."

.

We see that animals, in the choice of their food, are guided by the senses of smell and taste, except where our species brings them into a sort of unnatural state by domestication; and this circumstance renders it probable, that they were intended to serve the same purpose, in the natural state of our species, although less calculated for this end, than they are in the brutes, in consequence of the great superiority of their smelling organs. But since it seems probable, that man, in the natural state, acts more by instinct than we do, so also it appears rational to suppose, that he possesses some of the senses, (for instance, those of smell. and hearing), in greater acuteness, than is to be met with among men in civil society. We cannot likewise but observe a great sympathy between the organs of smell and taste; for any defect or imperfection of the one, is generally attended with some corresponding defect of the other. There is also a greater similarity between the sensations of smell and taste, than between those of "any other two senses: and hence it is that we can sometimes tell the taste of an object from its smell, and its smell from its taste. Hence also the reason why we apply the same epithets to the names of both these classes of sensations; as a sweet smell or taste, &c. The word taste, it is well known, has been applied to objects of intellect. This metaphorical application I have heard an accurate and elegant philosopher affirm to be of modern origin, since it is not to be met with in any writer before Petronius, who uses the who supor as we do taste; and this circumstance has induced some critics to think that this part of his work is of modern origin; or at least, the production of a later age than

that

* See the Principles of Moral and Political Science, by Dr. Ferguson,

that of Petronius.. How this proportionally gross sense," says Mr. Smellie, "should have been selected and figuratively applied to the general perception of every thing beautiful and sublime, whether in nature or in art, it is difficult to determine. The inquiry, however, would not be incurious, whether men, who have an obtuse sense of tasting material substances, are likewise defi-. cient in the perception of beauty and deformity *."

To conclude my observations on the relations of both these senses, I must remark, that they are destined to be subservient to the preservation of the animal existence, rather, than to any other purpose; and that they are, accordingly, an object, rather of the natural history of man, than of intellectual or of moral philosophy." The other three senses, on the contrary, seem rather intended for, and essential to, our intellectual improvement, and become, of course, a proper object of investigation' in moral and in mental philosophy.

The organs of the five senses are not themselves the actual seat of sensation, although, without them, we could never feel or know what sensation is. They act only, the part of instruments, in transmitting to the mind, which is the real and only seat of sensa. tion, the impressions made on the body by external objects.→→ Nor are they in themselves sufficient even, for this purpose; since the organs, without the assistance of the nerves and brain, could never minister to Sensation and Perception. It is a long time since Cicero remarked, that the senses may be compared to windows; "veluti fenestræ ad animum perforatæ."-The comparison was cer..tainly a good one; for, as windows let in the light without seeing or feeling it, so the organs of sense convey to the mind what excites sensation, without being conscious of sensation themselves. It is therefore somewhat strange, that the learned author of the Elements of Criticism should have thought, that the organs of touch,, smell, and taste, were themselves sentient (that is, conscious of sensation), since the direct reverse seems capable of demonstration.* The sentient principle within us, whatever it be, not only can compare (as we know from consciousness) its different sensations with one another, but also with those various other modifications of itself, which we call judgment, desire, aversion, passions, &c. Now this comparison could not be instituted if the organs of smell, taste, and touch, were in themselves sentient;-for, in order that this comparison may be made, if these organs be sentient, each of them must feel (or be conscious of) not only its peculiar sensations, but the sensations also of all the other organs; and not these merely,

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The Philosophy of Natural History, vol. i, ch. 6.

+ Nus gaves anse, was the doctrine of an ancient philosopher, quoted by Aristotle.

merely, but it must also know and feel those other very different. modifications, which we call judgments, desires, aversions, reasonings, passions, in a word, every species of thought*.-But, certainly, it requires no great depth of metaphysical thinking, or research, to learn that one of the organs of sense is not susceptible of the sensations of the others, any more than it is of the different modifications of thought. For, surely, no man was ever mad enough to suppose, that his hand was susceptible of the sensations of smell, or of taste, or capable of being affected by love, hatred, desire, reasoning, and judgment. But, although, this is evident, it is still true, that we refer our sensations to the organs, and to different parts of the body. Thus pain is referred to the part injured, and we refer odours to the nose, and taste to the tongue and palate. But this can be easily explained, if we consider, that by our constitution, or by the nature of the union of our minds and bodies, we are led to refer each of our sensations to a change in some particular part of the body, by which we find it from experience constantly and uniformly preceded.-This being the čase, we are naturally led to confound them both, and to asso ciate the sensation with this change so intimately, that we refer both one and the other to the part affected. The purpose, which this association is calculated to serve, is well explained by Malebranche, when he remarks, that it was a wise provision of the Creator to constitute us so, that motions, or changes, in the different parts of our bodies, should be always followed by agreeable, or disagreeable feelings in the mind, in proportion as these motions, or changes, are calculated to contribute to its preservation, or to injure the body; and that we should, without reflection, suddenly and instinctively refer our sensations, whether agreeable, or disagreeable, to the particular parts of the body: for, in this manner, we are better enabled to attend quickly and unerringly to the preservation of the body, than if that matter had been left to deliberate calculation and reasoning t.

Though we have but five senses, properly speaking, other beings may possess many, of which we have no conception : and it would appear that we have something like an instance of this in the Torpedo, and in those fishes that give the electrical shock; although, in general, the sensitive organs of the lower animals seem not to differ in kind from our own. It is also certainly possible, if the Creator wished it, that we might perceive objects by numberless organs of sense, different from those we possess: and

VOL. II. NO. III.

H

* Reid's Intel. Powers of Man, Ess. II. ch. i. and iv.; and Condillac's Essai sur l'Originė des Connoissances Humaines.

+ De la Recherche de la Verite, liv. I. ch. x.

See Hume's Essays, Vol. II. sect. ii. ; aud Reid's Intellectual Powers

of Man, Essay II, ch. i.

and since we consist, as man is generally allowed to do, of one person, made up of mind and body, it seems in some degree confirmed by our own experience, that the exercise of the organs is in a manner essential to the mind, for the original, as it certainly is for the full exercise of its powers, or faculties; for, shut up as it is in a gross material tenement, by this union with the body, it seems an impossibility for it to begin the exercise of its faculties without materials.

It is a fundamental principle in Locke's Philosophy, that all our knowledge is derived from sensation and reflection; and there are some followers of his, particularly on the continent, who even maintain, that all our knowledge originates in sensation. alone. From the concluding remarks of the last paragraph, some may be inclined to think that I am also an abettor of his doctrine. I must, however, enter my protest, and beg leave to state, that I am as far from adopting it in its usual acceptation, or extent, as I am from giving any sort of sanction to the dangerous, and, I think, unphilosophical, conclusions, that have been deduced from it. The present subject is put in a very just light by Mr. Stewart, in his Philosophy of the Human mind; and as I agree fully with that learned writer on this point, and despair of setting it in a clearer light than he has done, I shall endeavour only to abridge his remarks on the subject. The opinion we form concerning the general question, whether all our knowledge may be ultimately traced to our sensations, is of much less consequence than is commonly supposed; nor can the mind, without the greatest absurdity, be looked upon as a receptacle, gradually furnished from without, with materials through the channel of the senses; nor in that of a tabula rasa, having imprinted on it pictures or resemblances of external objects; and should we even admit that, without our organs of sense, the mind must have remained destitute of knowledge, this concession would not at all favour the scheme of materialism, as it only implies, that the impressions made on our senses by external objects, furnish the occasions on which the mind is led by the laws of its constitution, to perceive the qualities of the material world, and to exert all the different modifications of thought, of which it is capable. This doctrine, which refers the origin of all our knowledge to the occasions furnished by the senses, must be received with many limitations. Every one allows that the ideas, called by Mr. Lock ideas of reflection (that is, the notions we form of the subjects of our own consciousness), are not suggested to the mind immediately by our sensations; so that the amount of the doctrinę just mentioned is this: that the first occasions, on which our various intellectual faculties are exercised, are furnished by the impressions made on our organs of *sense; and that without those impressions we could not arrive at the knowledge of our faculties.-Explaining the doctrine thus, it

may

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may be said with plausibility, and, perhaps, with truth, that the senses, either immediately or ultimately, furnish the occasions on which all our notions are formed: but this is not the meaning commonly annexed to the doctrine, either by its advocates or opponents; nor does it in this acceptation lead to those conse quences which have interested one party of philosophers in its defence, and another in its refutation. The following remarks will shew that the doctrine, understood in this manner, gives no support to the scheme of materialism.-For, even if we admit, that sensations are necessary to awaken the mind to a consciousness of its own existence, and to give rise to the exercise of its faculties, it is yet certain, that all this might have happened without our knowing any thing of the qualities, or even of the existence, of matter. To illustrate this, let us suppose a being, formed in every other respect like man, but possessed of no senses but those of hearing and smelling;-I make choice of these, because by these alone we never could have acquired any knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, or even of the existence of an external world; since all that could possibly be inferred from our occasional sen sations of smell and sound would have been, that there existed some unknown cause, by which they were excited. If we suppose a particular sensation to be excited in the mind of such a being, he must necessarily learn two facts at once; the existence of the sensation, and his own existence, as a sentient being. When the sensation has vanished, he can remember he felt it, and can conceive that he feels it again:-after having felt many different sensations, he can compare them together in respect to the pleasure, or the pain they have afforded him, and will naturally desire the return of the agreeable sensations, and be afraid of the return of those that were painful. If the sensations of smell and sound are both excited in his mind at the same time, he can attend to either of them he chuses, and withdraw his attention from the other; or he can withdraw his attention from both, and fix it on some sensation he has formerly felt. Thus might he be led, merely by sensations existing in his own mind, and giving him no information concerning matter to exercise many of his most important faculties; and, amidst all these different modifications and operations of his mind, he would feel with irresistible conviction, that they all belong to one and the same sentient and intelligent being; or, that they are all modifications and operations of himself. Various other simple notions (or, as they are called, simple ideas) would arise in his mind; thus, the ideas of number, of duration, of cause and effect, of personal identity; all of which, though perfectly unlike his sensations, could not fail to be suggested by means of them. Thus might he know all that we know of mind at present; and as his language, not being borrowed by analogy, like ours, from material phenomena, would be appropriated to mind solely

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