1876. January Term. V. & als. it themselves, that it was not his intention to give the whole of his property to the appellant. That seems to be conceded on all hands, and he objects to the deed only upon the ground that as represented to him, Morrison it in effect takes the property from him during his life Morrison and transfers it to his nephew. It is not clear that it may not be differently construed. It does not seem to contemplate any removal of property, or transfer of possession during the life of the grantor. It is true the deed passes the title to the grantee in præsenti; but it can only be enjoyed by the grantee during the life of the grantor by his living with him. The grantor's right to his home is recognized by the clause which requires the grantee to live with him during his life. Under the provisions of this deed I do not think it would have been in the power of the grantee to have ousted the grantor of his possession during his life. And I think he could only have enjoyed the use of the personal property during his life, whilst he lived with him. It seems to me that is implied in the grantee's covenants. And to make it more effectual the deed is signed and sealed and acknowledged by him as well as by the grantor. Whether the deed will bear this construction in law or not, it might have been so understood by the parties, and such, as I understand the record, has been its practical working. When the grantee was forced to leave, by the conduct of the grantor in the maltreatment of his wife, he did not seek to disturb the grantor in his possession whilst he lived. If the foregoing construction was given to the deed, as we have seen might have been fairly given to it, it is not really different in effect from what the plaintiff below alleged he understood it to be. And according to his understanding of the deed he enjoyed his pro Term. 1876. perty in the main during his life; and there is nothing January shown by this record to warrant a court of justice to divest the appellant of the title to the property after Morrison the death of the grantor, which, by his deed in his lifeMorrison time, which he deliberately, understandingly and willingly executed, he vested in the appellant. V. & als. I am of opinion therefore to reverse the decrees of the Circuit court, and to dismiss the plaintiff's bill with costs. DECREE REVersed. Richmond. ADAMS & al. v. LOGAN & als. February 10. I. A and B are sureties of W in a bond to L for $3,000, executed in 1. W not having paid the interest, the parties were left in the same 2. The agreement only operated to postpone a sale of the property 3. If L had sued W at law and recovered judgment and levied 4. But if the agreement operated as an extension of the time of 5. The principle upon which an agreement for an extension of 1876. January Term. 1876. January Term. Adams & al. V. Logan & als. time discharges a surety is, that the creditor thereby deprives the surety of the means of relieving himself, by paying the debt and proceeding immediately against the principal; or by his filing his bill quia timet to compel the debtor to pay the debt; or by notice to the creditor under the statute. The sureties cannot be discharged by an act which in no manner affected their rights, or impaired the remedies of the creditor. II. W having been declared a bankrupt in the United States court, I., and the assignees of W, by compromise agreed that the debt of L for $7,500 should be scaled to $3,500, with interest from date, and L should retain the benefit of the deed of trust; and that L should not object to the exemption in favor of W, or to the allowance of 200 acres of land to his wife, in commutation of her contingent right of dower; and this agreement was confirmed by the Bankrupt court. S sold the balance of the trust fund, and apportioned the net proceeds between the two debts of W to L. HELD: 1. A and B cannot complain of the scale applied to the debt of $7,500, which seems reasonable in itself, and was agreed to by L and the assignees of W, and approved and confirmed by the court. 2. If there was error in the decree of the Bankrupt court in allow. ing W the exemption claimed by him, or in assigning to his wife the 200 acres of land, they are acts of a court of competent jurisdiction, and cannot be questioned elsewhere. 3. A judgment having been rendered in favor of L against W for two years' interest on the bond for $3,000, upon an insufficient notice, and execution levied on his property, W gives L notice that he will move to have it set aside; and L being aware of the insufficiency of the notice, releases the property. The sureties are not entitled to a credit for the amount of the judgment. This was a suit in equity in the Circuit court of Pittsylvania, brought in January 1871, by James M. Adams and David Barber, to enjoin a judgment recovered against them and A. B. Womack, by William Logan, for $3,000, with interest from the 2d of August 1858, subject to credits endorsed thereon. It appears that A. B. Womack, the principal, and the plaintiffs and J. C. Thompson, since deceased, as his sureties, executed a bond for $3,000, to William Logan, payable one year after date. That in 1862 Barber becoming uneasy on the subject of his securityship for Womack, gave notice to Logan to sue upon the bond; but he was induced to withdraw the notice for the time, and shortly afterwards, viz: on the 23d of May 1862, Logan lent to Womack, in Confederate money, $7,500, for which he took Womack's bond payable two years after date, with interest from the date, in lawful money of Virginia; and Womack at the same time, executed a deed by which he conveyed to Richard Logan and Beverly Sydnor, two tracts of land, twenty-three slaves, and their future increase, all his stock of horses, cattle, hogs, his plantation tools and his household and kitchen furniture, in trust to secure the said two bonds; and it was provided that upon the prompt payment annually of the interest accruing upon the said bonds at the rate of six per cent. per annum, Womack should keep quiet possession of the property for the term of two years, unless he should determine otherwise. It appears further that in 1867 Logan gave a notice to Womack that he would move for a judgment against him for one year's interest due upon the debt for $7,500; that a judgment was rendered on this notice for $450, and execution was issued and levied on the property of Womack; and proceedings were stopped for a time by order of the plaintiff. The explanation of this given by Logan in his answer, in response to the charge in the bill, is, that at the court to which the notice was given his counsel ascertained that the notice was not served on Womack twenty days before, as the law required, and therefore declined to apply for a judgment thereon; that after said counsel had 1876. January Term. Adams & al. V. Logan & als. |