Lorenson, Plaintiff in Error, v. Shock. pears that the cause of action was not that they (plaintiffs) * * * the jurisdiction of a justice. "The true criterion seems to be, according to what Lord C. J. DeGray says, in Scott v. Shepherd, whether the plaintiff réceived an injury by force from the defendant. If the injurious act be the immediate result of the force originally applied by the defendant, and the plaintiff be injured by it, it is the subject of an action of Trespass vi et armis by all the cases both ancient and modern. It is immaterial whether the injury be wilful or not." Hazelton v. DeKieffer, 8 Phila. 53. "Trespass vi et armis lies immediate injuries to the person, or to the personal or real property of another, accompanied with force, either actual or implied, whether the act be wilful or unintentional, or whether it be committed by the defendant, or by another, at his command or procurement, or, having been done for his use or benefit, he afterwards assents to it." Troubat & Haly Vol. 2 (5th Ed.) Section 1572, page 57. The allegation here is, as we understand it that the defendant drove his automobile against the plaintiff inflicting the injuries for which judgment was rendered. Hence the form of action for the recovery of damages would be trespass vi et armis, and being vi et armis, the magistrate would have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Common Pleas not to exceed $300.00, and the judgment being less than the sum, it follows that the amount recovered was within his jurisdiction. The exceptions are now, August 16, 1917, therefore overruled and the record is remitted to the magistrate for such proceedings as are necessary under the circumstances. HANLEY V. STEWART. The opening of a judgment is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the court, and is an appeal for equitable relief, and the rules of Equity must govern. Rule to Open Judgment. No. 284 September Term, 1914. C. P. Erie County. Miles R. Nason and Franklin B. Hosbach for Plaintiff. PER CURIAM-February 4, 1919. This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment of Alderman Hayes, entered August 21, 1914, in favor of the plaintiff. Although the defendant appeared in person and by attorney before the Alderman, he offered no evidence. A transcript of appeal was duly entered in the Prothonotary's office Sept. 11, 1914. December 13, 1916, plaintiff filed his statement of claim, with notice to the defendant to file anaffidavit of defence thereto within fifteen days; which was the same day duly served on defendant. The defendant neglected to file an affidavit of defence, and judgment was entered against him for want thereof Jan. 3rd, 1917, on which judgment execution was issued and levy made on the personal property of defendant in November, 1918. The defendant now claims that although a copy of plaintiff's statement was served upon him by John Flannagan, Constable, he was not aware that it was a Court paper, and did not know that it was necessary for him to pay any attention to said paper; and he therefore ignored it, not realizing or knowing that in so doing he was permitting plaintiff to obtain judgment against him by default; and on the 18th of November, 1918, the defendant presented his affidavit of defence denying his liability for the claim of the plaintiff, upon which a rule to show cause why judgment should not be opened was granted. Whether or not the defendant is liable for plaintiff's claim would seem to be a question of fact for a jury to decide, in case the judgment is opened and he is let into a defence. There does not seem to be any doubt but that the opening of the judgment is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the Court, and Hanley v. Stewart. is an appeal for equitable relief, and the rules of equity must govern. Riegel vs. Wilson, 60 Pa. 394. Breden vs. Gilliland, 67 Pa. 37. Roth vs. Pechin, 260 Pa. 450. Although the defendant has been negligent in making a defence to the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff has not been very active in the prosecution of his claim against the defendant. The liability, if any, was incurred according to the plaintiff's statement Nov. 16, 1910, for which suit was not brought until Aug. 14, 1914, and appealed to this Court Sept. 11, 1914, and then judgment by default for want of an affidavit of defence Jan. 3, 1917. In view of the fact that defendant in his affidavit alleges what appears to be a good defence to plaintiff's claim, we conclude to open the judgment and let him into a defence upon payment of all costs to date. ORDER. And now, to-wit, February 4, 1919, upon payment by defendant of all costs to this date, the rule to show cause why judgment should not be opened is made absolute; the lien of the judgment and levy to remain. PELTON V. STRYCKER. Injunction-Riparian rights on great lakes-Low-water mark -"Bank" and "shore" are interchangeable terms-Trespassers on lake beach. A reasonable construction of the descriptions in deeds conveying land to the "shore" or "bank" of Lake Erie is that the grantee takes title to the ordinary low-water mark of the lake, unless otherwise limited in the grant. As against a stranger and wrongdoer, it is immaterial whether the occupant has a good title to the possession of the land or not. Where the riparian owner has title by deed to the "bank" or "shore," the strip known as "the beach" of Lake Erie is his property to low-water mark, and a person who enters; against his protest, to dig and haul away the sand, gravel or other material from the beach is an intruder and trespasser thereon, and has no standing to contest his title or possession. The remedy in equity will lie in such a case, and an injunction will be made permanent at costs of defendant. Pelton v. Strycker. Bill in equity to restrain defendant from removing sand and gravel from the beach of Lake Erie. C. P. Erie Co., Feb. T., 1917, No. 1. Gunnison, Fish, Gifford & Chapin, for plaintiff. S. Y. Rossiter, for defendant. WHITTELSEY, J., July 15, 1918.-This case was heard on bill, answer, testimony and argument of counsel, from which the following facts are found: 1. That the plaintiff is the owner and in the actual possession of the piece of land described in the first paragraph of the plaintiff's bill. 2. That the title to the said land was conveyed to her by Orange Godfrey by deed dated Jan. 2, 1909, and recorded Jan. 4, 1909, in the office for recording deeds, in Deed Book No. 171, page 561. That the title to the said lands as described in the said deed extends to the waters of Lake Erie at low-water mark. 3. The northerly portion of said described land fronting upon and bounded by the waters of Lake Erie aforesaid consists of a sandy beach of about thirty to seventy feet in width extending from low-water mark to the foot of a bluff or ridge of higher land, the said sand beach being used for access to the waters of the lake for bathing and boating purposes in connection with summer cottages and residences which the plaintiff has built upon said land and which are occupied by the tenants of the plaintiff during the summer season, from whom she received valuable rentals. 4. At the time of the conveyance to the plaintiff by Orange Godfrey, as aforesaid, and prior thereto, the said Orange Godfrey had been in possession of the said land and had erected upon the sandy beach a barn-like structure and a pier. 5. That at the time of the conveyance to the plaintiff, to-wit, Jan. 2, 1909, she went into possession of the said land, and has continued in the possession of the same until the present time. 6. That the defendant, from time to time, has entered upon the said land by himself, his agents and servants with his teams, and has excavated and loaded sand and hauled the same away from the said premises, although he has been forbidden by the plaintiff to do so and been warned not to trespass on the said premises, but has disregarded said warnings and has persisted in trespassing on the said premises against the protest of the plaintiff, and threatens to continue to trespass thereon. 7. The evidence as to the amount of the sand taken by the defendant from the premises of the plaintiff is not definite enough from which the amount and value thereof can be found and the damages to the plaintiff assessed. Pelton v. Strycker. Conclusions of Law. 1. That the plaintiff is the owner of the land described in the first paragraph of the plaintiff's bill, which extends to the lowwater mark of Lake Erie, and has been in possession thereof since the conveyance to her by Orange Godfrey, Jan. 4, 1909, and that the said Orange Godfrey was in possession thereof prior to said conveyance to the plaintiff. 2. The defendant has no standing to contest the title or possession of the plaintiff to said lands, he being an intruder and trespasser thereon. As against a stranger and wrongdoer, it is immaterial whether the plaintiff has a good title to the possession of the land in question or not. 3. The plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for, and the preliminary injunction heretofore granted must be made perpetual, and the defendant ordered to pay the costs. Discussion. The defendant does not claim to have any title, possession or right of possession to the land described in the first paragraph of the plaintiff's bill, but contends that the land claimed by the plaintiff does not extend to the waters of Lake Erie at low-water mark so as to include the sand beach from which he took the sand as claimed by the plaintiff. It seems that the original survey, made June 9, 1794, by Thomas Rees, deputy surveyor, in pursuance of a warrant issued by Governor of the Commonwealth to Nicholas B. Waters, April 13, 1792, located the original tract, of which the land in question is a part, on the side of Lake Erie, which survey is followed by a patent issued March 12, 1799, to John Field et al., in trust for the Pennsylvania Population Company. The title to this tract, which was numbered two hundred and ninety-four (294) by the Pennsylvania Population Company, became vested by various conveyances in Thomas Astley, who conveyed the land in question to Conrad Zinn by warranty deed dated Nov. 3, 1836, recorded in Deed Book "H," page 552, describing it as follows, viz. "All that certain piece or parcel of land lying and situate in Girard Township, Erie County aforesaid, being part of Tract No. 294 of the land of the late Pennsylvania Population Company, and bounded as follows, Beginning at the northwest at a post on the shore of Lake Erie, thence by the residue of the tract being land in possession of Coats south twenty-six degrees east, fortythree and eight-tenths perches to a post, thence by land of Shepard Sternes north twenty-six degrees east, thirty and eight-tenths perches to a large sugar tree; thence by the same north fifty and |