to be, the prisoner's order for the payment of money, and so genuine.

LORD ABINGER. If so, the pretence is not false, and you are entitled to an acquittal on the facts on those

counts.

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*If the meaning of the words be, that the cheque was true and good in respect that it would be paid, then those counts are nothing more than a repetition of the first count, and open to the same objections. As to the fourth count, the addition to the words "of the value of 257." does not carry the case any further; they only mean that the liability on the cheque is for 257., and though the cheque may be dishonored, the drawer would still be liable, and so in contemplation of law, the cheque would be of value.

BOSANQUET, J. The cheque is post dated, is it not

void?

PARKE, B. No, the statute only prevents it being given in evidence; it does not declare it absolutely void.

Then it would be of some value, and besides the fact of its being post dated was known to the prosecutor. It would be too much to contend that the prisoner has not committed an indictable offence by obtaining goods on a cheque on bankers with whom he had no funds, as in Rex v. Jackson, 3 Camp. 370, but then the offence ought to have been alleged differently. The pretence might perhaps have been stated sufficiently that he had funds or credit at the bank; as it is, there is no such al

legation, and it cannot be supplied by intendment from the words, "good and genuine order."

GREAVES for the prosecution.

1. The first count states an offence within the 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 53. It may be that the facts here stated would not amount to an offence at common law, or under the 33 H. 8, c. 1, for that statute only applied to cases of "privy tokens" or "counterfeit letters in other men's names," and not to a case like the present; here the party uses his own name. Then came

[*7] the 30 G. 2, c. 24, s. 1, which includes all persons who knowingly, designedly, by false pretence or pretences, "obtain goods or money;" and, lastly, by 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 53, the offence is extended to "any false pretence." The words of this statute are as large as can possibly be, and it is clear from the proviso (that no person shall be acquitted on an indictment for false pretences by reason of the facts amounting to larceny), that it was the object of the legislature to include every possible case where a false pretence had been used. It is submitted, that under this statute every false representation of a state of things, whether past, present, or future, is an offence.

The mischief in the one case is as great as in the other, and a person has as little means of ascertaining the truth of a representation as to a future fact in every instance, as he would have as to a past or present transaction. How can a man at Gloucester, for instance, ascertain what will take place the next day

in London, or vice versa. Rex v. Young, 3 T. R. 98, is a strong authority to show that the statute ought to be construed largely, so as to comprehend cases like the present. In that case, also, the pretence was of a bet that William Lewis would, on the next day, run a race; it is therefore like the present, a pretence of a future fact. So in Coleman's case, 2 East, P. C. 672, the prisoner pretended that she came from a neighbor for a half guinea's worth of silver, and that she would send the half guinea presently.

LORD ABINGER. Part of the pretence there is past, viz., that she came from the neighbor.

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That is so; but the pretence which induced the party to give the silver is future. The precedent in 2 Stark. C. P., and the judgment against John Scott, who was convicted before Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE at Hereford *Spring assizes, 1832, also contain future pretences. The cases relied on, on the part of the prisoner, are clearly distinguishable in Rex v. Goodall, R. & R. C. C. R. 461. The pretence was that the prisoner would pay for some meat on delivery, and send the money back by the prosecutor's servant. That was a mere naked promise, the credit was given to the prisoner, and to him only, for his bare promise could not gain him any additional credit. It did not come within the statute, because that applies to cases where credit is created by the pretence, and the goods parted with in consequence.

ALDERSON, B. That was merely a case of goods sold and delivered.

In Rex v. Douglas, Moody's C. C. R. 462, the representation was, that the prisoner would tell where a horse and mare were. That is at most merely a promise; in both these cases, the future act was to be done by the prisoner himself. In this case the representation was, of what would be done by a third person, it therefore is not a promise, but a pretence; and it will be most dangerous to hold, that no representation whatever of any future state of facts will come within this act.

2. At all events the fourth count is good, and the conviction on it fully warranted by the finding of the jury. It alleges the pretence to be, that the order was a good and genuine order for the payment of 251., and it never was good for any sum whatever. Besides, this count further alleges that the order was of the value of 251., now that is clearly negatived, and it is the essential part of the pretence; and that being so, it is sufficient. Rex v. Perrott, 2 M. and S. 379.

LORD DENMAN, C. J., TINDAL, C. J., VAUGHAN, J., BOLLAND, B., PATTESON, J., WILLIAMS, J., COLERIDGE, J., COLTMAN, J., were of opinion that the conviction was *good on the fourth count. LORD ABINGER, C. B., PARK, J., LITTLEDALE, J., PARKE, B., BOSANQUET, J., and ALDERSON, B., were of the contrary opinion; and the conviction was affirmed.

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REX v. WILLIAM LEA, HENRY PARRY, JAMES REA, GEORGE JONES, and JOSEPH WRIGHT.

A verdict for a prisoner on an issue of autre fois acquit cannot be set aside and a new trial had, though without evidence and against the opinion of the Judge.

THE prisoners were tried before Mr. BARON BOLLAND at the Spring assizes 1837, for the city of Gloucester for a rape.

The indictment in the first count charged William Lea with ravishing Mary Lea, at the parish of St. Nicholas, on the 14th of December last, and that Henry Parry, James Rea, George Jones, and Joseph Wright, were present aiding and abetting.

Second count like the first, but charging Henry Parry as the principal in the first degree, and the others as the aiders and abettors.

Third count like the first, but charging James Rea as principal in the first degree.

Fourth count like the others, but charging George Jones as principal in the first degree.

Fifth count like the others, but charging Joseph Wright as principal in the first degree.

Sixth count charged a certain evil-disposed person to be principal in the first degree, and the others as aiders and abettors.

There was a second indictment against Henry Parry, James Rea, and Joseph Wright, which in the