kill and murder her; by reason whereof the said Charlotte Heath was grievously injured, and her life greatly endangered, against the statute, &c.

Mary Cruse was charged as being present, aiding and abetting.

Mr. Carrington for the prisoners proposed to demur to this indictment, upon the ground that the nature of the bodily injury dangerous to life should have been stated with certainty.

The learned Judge thought the point well deserving of consideration, but suggested that the prisoners should plead, he reserving to them the same benefit as if they had demurred.

in

The prisoners pleaded not guilty.

It appeared by the evidence that both the prisoners

company had ill-used Charlotte Heath, a girl of seven years of age, daughter of Mary Cruse, whereupon Mr. Carrington for Mary Cruse contended that she was entitled to be acquitted as having acted under the coercion of her husband, and that the only excepted cases were treason and murder. The learned Judge thought otherwise, and put the case to the Jury as to both.

The Jury acquitted both prisoners of the felony, not being satisfied that they had any intent to murder, but found them guilty of the assault, under the eleventh section of the 7 W. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 85.

The learned Judge respited the judgment, and requested the opinion of the Judges as to the sufficiency of the indictment as if upon a demurrer, and also on

the point with regard to the wife being under the coercion of her husband.

This case was argued before all the Judges except LITTLEDALE, J., PARKE, J., and BOLLAND, B., in Michaelmas term, 1838.

*CARRINGTON for the prisoners.

[*55] The first question in this case arises on the form of the indictment, and is whether the indictment would be good on demurrer, as framed under the second section of 7 W. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 85, which enacts "that whoever shall administer to or cause to be taken by any person any poison or other destructive thing, or shall stab, cut, or wound any person, or shall by any means whatsoever cause to any person any bodily injury dangerous to life, with intent in any of the cases aforesaid to commit murder, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall suffer death." The indictment ought to have specified the injury dangerous to life, and is too general without it. There are in this clause three distinct applications of the word any, viz. any person, any means, any injury dangerous to life. In each of these cases the general term any in the statute ought in the indictment to be satisfied by specifying what. The person must be specified, the means must be specified, and so must the bodily injury dangerous to life. In criminal pleading the rule is general, that every specific fact must be distinctly stated. General pleading is only allowed where a subject comprehends a multiplicity of matters, to avoid

[*56]

prolixity. But if there be anything specific in the subject, though consisting of a number of acts, they must all be enumerated. The rule is laid down by BULLER, J. in J'Anson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 753. The object of the indictment is to give such particularity, that there shall be little to prove in case of a plea of autrefois acquit or convict. The more particular the indictment, the better this object is answered. Rex v. Parry, 7 C. & P. 836. If the matter be left general the prisoner is put to a disadvantage, inasmuch as the Grand Jury might find the bill on one injury as dangerous to life, and the *Petty Jury be asked to convict on another. In Rex v. Pinney, 5 C. & P. 254, LITTLEDALE, J. told the Jury they must all agree on some particular neglect of duty: it would not be enough for some of the Jury to suppose the defendant guilty of one act of neglect, and the rest of another. In Regina v. Martin, which was in error and reported in 3 N. & P. 472, the indictment was held bad because it did not state whose goods were obtained, though it stated from whom they were obtained, and the person intended to be defrauded; and that though the term any is used throughout the fifty-third section of 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29. In Rex v. Chalkley, Russ. & Ry. 258, it was held that an indictment for maiming certain cattle was not enough, under 9 G. 1, c. 22, the particular cattle must be specified, and that though the words of the statute are 66 any cattle." So in Rex v. Ridley, Russ. & Ry. 515, for night poaching, an indictment

for entering a certain close was held too general. In Rex v. Holland, 5 T. R. 624, the same principle was acted on; and, in Rex v. Fowler, 4 C. & P. 492, a conspiracy to defraud the just and lawful creditors of W. F. was said to be too general.

WILLIAMS, J. In the charge of intent to do grievous bodily harm, the bodily harm is never specified, though Mr. Justice CHAMBRE, I know, thought it ought to be.

That is an intent, and not a fact, and it may not be known what bodily harm was intended; and the intent may, in fact, be general, and not directed to any specific injury. Rex v. Hepper, 1 C. & P. 608, Rex v. Witheringham, 1 Strange, 2, Rex v. Rober, 2 Str. 999, Davy v. Baker, 4 Burr. 247, are all authorities against general statements in indictments and declarations. The precedents in general use are framed on this principle.

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*PARKE, B. Indictments for wounding do not state the wound.

The objection to an indictment for wounding, that the wound is not specified, has never been taken on demurrer; and by 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 64, s. 21, it would be good after verdict. In Rex v. Fuller, 1 B. & P. 180, the judgment goes on the same principle as J'Anson v. Stuart, 7 T. R. 748.

As to the second point, the wife must be taken to be acting under the coercion of the husband when present, and therefore is entitled to an acquittal, except in cases of treason and murder, to which the presumption is

held not to apply. As to the text writers there is great discrepancy on this subject. The only cases to be found in which women have been convicted of treason or felony jointly with their husbands are that of Somerville and Ardin, in the reign of Elizabeth, 1 Anderson, 104, 1 Hale, P. C. 45, and the Countess of Somerset, who was attainted of the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury as an accessory before the fact, (a) of which LORD COKE says, 2 Institute, 50, "That the proceeding herein was by great advisement." The first case on the other side took place in the 2 Edw. 3. Fitz. Abr. Tit. Coron. 160, Staun. P. C. lib. i. c. 19. In 27 Edw. 3, a woman was acquitted of stealing two pennyworth of bread on the ground of coercion. Fitz. Abr. Tit. Coron. 199, Bro. Abr. Tit. Coron. 108. So Day's case, 1 Hale's P. C. 47.

TINDAL, C. J. Suppose the husband to be a cripple and confined to his bed, his presence then would not be sufficient.

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VAUGHAN, J. There was a cause of arson before me on the Home Circuit. The man and wife were tried together, and it appeared that the man, though present, was a cripple and bedridden in the room, and I held, after conferring with my LORD CHIEF JUSTICE TINDAL, that the circumstances under which the man was, repelled the presumption of coercion. (b)

(a) 1 Hargrave's St. Tr. 347.

(b) This was a case of houseburning, with intent to defraud the insurance office. Tried at Maidstone Spring assizes, 1838.