Rodecker and Samuel Levy, both of New York PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, CARDOZO, POUND, CRANE, and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department (177 App. Div. 277, 164 N. Y. Supp. 318), entered April 3, 1917, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon an order of the court at a Trial Term setting aside a verdict in favor of plaintiff and granting a motion for a dismissal of the complaint in an action to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff through the negligence of defendant, his employer. The plainHAMBURGER, Respondent, v. CORNELL tiff was a blacksmith employed by the defendant in its forge shop connected with its steel of New York. April 22, 1919.) Appeal, by UNIVERSITY, Appellant. (Court of Appeals manufacturing plant in the city of Lackawan- permission, from an order of the Appellate na, in the county of Erie. In the early hours Division of the Supreme Court in the Third of the morning, while the plaintiff was engaged Judicial Department (184 App. Div. 403, 172 in the use of a steam hammer and was hold- N. Y. Supp. 5), entered September 27, 1918, ing the heated end of a bar of steel between which reversed an order of Special Term susthe dies of the hammer by means of tongs clutched to the cold end of the bar, as claimed taining a demurrer to the complaint and directby him, at a stroke of the hammer the bar and ing a dismissal thereof. The action was to retongs were thrown back, and the handles of the cover for personal injuries alleged to have tongs penetrated his right leg just above the been sustained by plaintiff through the negliknee. In the wound thus caused blood poison- plaintiff was a pupil in the defendant univergence of defendant. The complaint alleged that ing developed and the leg was amputated above the knee. The complaint alleged that the sity and while performing an experiment in steam hammer leaked steam; that it leaked chemistry required as a part of her course unwater, which ran down and came in contact der the direction of defendant's instructors and with the hot metal, and thereby produced clouds with chemicals obtained from defendant's emof steam; that the dies were not properly ployé, an explosion occurred causing the inset, in that the upper die overlapped the lower juries complained of. The Special Term susdie; that the forge shop in the locality of this tained the demurrer on the ground that defendant was administering a government acsteam hammer, where the plaintiff was at work, was inadequately lighted; that the de- tivity or function and was, therefore, absolved fendant was negligent in failing to give plain- from liability for the negligence of its servtiff a safe place in which to work, and to keep ants and agents. The following question was the same in safe condition, and in failing to in-certified: "Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?" Oliver spect the same from time to time, and to warn and instruct the plaintiff concerning the condi- L. McCaskill and Mynderse Van Cleef, both of Nash Rockwood and tion of the dies, and to furnish the plaintiff Ithaca, for appellant. with a suitable and safe steam hammer. The Harry P. Pendrick, both of Saratoga Springs, answer admitted the accident, but denied the and Charles A. Winter, of New York City, for alleged. negligence of the defendant, and averred respondent. that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and assumed the risk of the accident. Irving W. Cole and Hamilton Ward, both of Buffalo, for appellant. Herbert W. Huntington, of Buffalo, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN, and CRANE, JJ., concur. PER CURIAM. Order affirmed, with costs, and question certified answered in the affirmative. CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, CARDOZO, MCLAUGHLIN, and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. In re HART'S WILL. (Court of Appeals of New York. April 22, 1919.) Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (185 App. Div. 940, 172 N. Y. Supp. 896), entered October 25, 1918, which GUTMAN v. LIVINGSTON et al. (Court of unanimously affirmed a decree of the Westches ter County Surrogate's Court admitting to pro Appeals of New York. March 21, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division bate the will of Lemuel M. Hart, deceased. Obof the Supreme Court in the First Judicial De-jections were filed to the effect that the alpartment (173 App. Div. 670, 160 N. Y. Supp.leged will was not the will of decedent, that 243), entered November 13, 1916, modifying it was not his free and unconstrained act, that and affirming as modified a judgment in favor it was not duly executed in conformity with of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term in an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property. Plaintiff held the mortgage through various assignments. Defendants, appellants, held subsequent mortgages. They interposed an answer setting up as a defense that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had been paid and discharged, and alleging fraud and conspiracy. Louis H. Levin, of New York City, for appellants. Reuben the statute, and that said decedent was not of sound mind and memory or understanding. Clinton T. Taylor, Arthur I. Strang, and Henry P. Griffin, all of White Plains, for appellants. Frederick P. Close, of Tuckahoe, for respond ents. PER CURIAM. Order affirmed, with costs. CHASE, HOGAN, CARDOZO, POUND, and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. HISCOCK, C. J, and MCLAUGHLIN, J., dissent. (123 N.E.) In re HELLMAN'S ESTATE. (Court of judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon Appeals of New York. June 3, 1919.) Appeal, a decision of the court on trial at Special Term by permission, from an order of the Appellate and directing a dismissal of the complaint. Division of the Supreme Court in the First The action was brought by the plaintiff against Judicial Department (174 N. Y. Supp. 905), en- a former employé to enjoin and restrain the tered February 21, 1919, which unanimously latter from selling or dealing in a product affirmed an order of the New York County known as "Mammut" and to enjoin and reSurrogate's Court confirming the tax fixed strain him from receiving, collecting or in any against the appellants for the interest which manner disposing of or interfering with the the deceased had in the good will of the firm moneys due or to become due to the plaintiff of Jacob S. Bernheimer & Brother, of which de- from sales of Mammut, which were made by ceased at the time of his death was a member, the defendant while in the employ of the plainand the appellants are the surviving members. tiff. Benjamin Reass, Hugo Hirsh, and EmanA. Stern, of New York City, for appellants. Schuyler C. Carlton and Lafayette B. Gleason, both of New York City, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Order affirmed, with costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, CARDOZO, POUND, CRANE and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. uel Newman, all of Brooklyn, for appellant. Louis Salant, of New York City, for respondJudgment affirmed, with ent. PER CURIAM. costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN, and CRANE, JJ., concur. HIGGINS, Appellant, v. CARTER'S INK CO., Respondent. (Court of Appeals of New HOGAN, Respondent, v. EDWARD ENGIYork. April 29, 1919.) Appeal from a judg-NEERING CO. et al., Appellants. (Court of ment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Appeals of New York. March 11, 1919.) ApCourt in the First Judicial Department (178 peal from an order of the Appellate Division of App. Div. 889, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1095), entered the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial DeApril 9, 1917, affirming a judgment in favor partment (186 App. Div. 921, 172 N. Y. Supp. of defendant entered upon a verdict directed by 897), entered November 25, 1918, affirming an the court. The action was brought by a land- award of the state industrial commission made lord against his tenant to recover for breach of under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Cona covenant in the lease requiring the defendant sol. Laws, c. 67). Claimant's son was employ"at its own cost * * during the whole of ed by defendant Edward Engineering Company said term, to comply with all the laws, rules, as a passenger elevator operator. Desiring to orders, ordinances, requirements and regula- go to the basement of the building he opened tions, ordinary and extraordinary, of the state the gate to a freight elevator, pulled the cable and city of New York, their departments and and the car coming up struck him on the head bureaus, so far as they affect the said premises causing his death. This particular elevator or the care and use thereof," and also for breach was the only means by which to get from the of a further covenant in the lease that defend-ground floor to the basement except an emergenant would "during the entire term, keep the cy ladder leading from the sidewalk to the demised premises and all appurtenances there-basement, but the regular way to reach the to in good repair, making all repairs whatever basement when the elevator was down was to that might become necessary." The breach ring the bell and wait for the chief engineer complained of was the defendant's failure to to bring the elevator up. Appellant contendcomply with certain requirements set forth in ed that the accident did not arise out of, or a letter from the state commissioner of labor, in the course of, the employment of the derequiring the provision of additional means of ceased, but that by his own actions he exposed exit, extension of stairway, and inclosure of himself to a distinctly new and additional peril interior stairways with partitions of fire-resist- which was not in the contemplation of the eming material, covering the well hole of the ele- ployer when it entered into the contract of emvator, and providing a new seat in a water clos-ployment with him, and that he was not simet, all matters specified by section 79b of the Labor Law, adopted in 1913 (Consol. Laws, c. 31), approximately a year after the execution and commencement of the lease. Selden Bacon, o New York City, for appellant. Theodore L. Frothingham, of New York City, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and CHASE, HOGAN, CARDOZO, MCLAUGHLIN, and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. POUND, J., not voting. HIRSH & SCHOFIELD, Inc., Appellant, v. GUSMER, Respondent. (Court of Appeals of New York. May 2, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment entered July 13, 1917, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (179 App. Div. 347, 165 N. Y. Supp. 555), reversing a ply doing his work in a negligent or careless manner, but was entirely outside of his employment. Bertrand L. Pettigrew and W. L. Glenney, both of New York City, for appellants. Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, of Albany, of counsel), for respondent. PER CURIAM. Order affirmed, with costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN, and CRANE, JJ., concur. ant entered upon a verdict. The action was to recover rent alleged to be due under a written lease. The defense was that the plaintiff after having received payment in advance for the premises, without notice to the defendant, sublet a portion of the premises, and thereby evicted the defendant therefrom. J. A. Edwards and Jarvis P. Carter, both of New York City, for appellant. Joseph P. Nolan, of New York City, for respondent. of such practices; and that, from the class of persons who were permitted to engage rooms, the hotel had an extremely bad reputation in the neighborhood. Robert H. Elder and Otho S. Bowling, both of New York City, for appellant. William P. Burr, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (Terence Farley, John F. O'Brien and George P. Nicholson, all of New York City, of counsel), for respondents. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed with PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed with costs. costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN, and CRANE, JJ., concur. CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN, and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. CRANE, J., dissents. HUDSON HOSTELRY COMPANY, Appellant, v. MITCHEL, Mayor of City of New York, et al., Respondents. (Court of Appeals of New York. March 4, 1919.) Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (177 App. Div. 908, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1120), entered March 14, 1917, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term. The motion was made upon the ground that the questions involved are academic only. William P. Burr, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (Terence Farley, of New York City, of counsel), for the motion. Robert H. Elder, of New York City, opposed. HUGHES, Respondent, v. ROACHE, Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. March 21, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (177 App. Div. 897, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1120), entered February 21, 1917, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict. The complaint alleged that defendant agreed to purchase for plaintiff at public auction 100 shares of stock and deliver them to him upon payment of the bid price; that the defendant purchased the said stock at $50 per share, but has refused to turn the same over to plaintiff, although the latter had tendered the amount of the purchase price. Judgment was demanded for the difference between the bid price of the stock and its PER CURIAM, Motion denied with $10 market value. Charles L. Craig, of New York costs. HUDSON HOSTELRY CO., Appellant, v. MITCHEL, Mayor of City of New York, et al., Respondents. (Court of Appeals of New York. May 20, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (177 App. Div. 908, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1120), entered March 14, 1917, affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on trial at Special Term. The action was for damages and an injunction restraining defendants "from in any manner assigning, stationing, placing or posting, or causing to be assigned, stationed, placed, posted or maintained, in and about the private premises of the plaintiff herein, the Hotel Plymouth, at No. 257-9 West Thirty-Eighth street, New York City, any police officer, and City, for appellant. John L. Wells, of New PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed with costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, CARDOZO, POUND, CRANE, and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. HURLEY, Respondent, v. PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS CO., Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. April 8, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (178 App. Div. 927, 165 N. Y. Supp. 1092), entered May 26, 1917, reversing a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term without a jury and directing judgment in favor of plaintiff. The action was brought to recover as for money had and received the amount received by the defendant on an interest in a bond and mortgage assigned to it by the plaintiff as collateral security for the payment of an indebtedness due by the plaintiff to the defendant arising out of an agreement of guaranty. The defendant had filed a mechanic's lien, and the action was brought on the theory that the satisfaction of this lien by the de from informing guests, prospective guests, visitors or other persons having lawful business upon the premises, when such persons enter, or attempt to enter, or leave the premises, that the said hotel is a disorderly house, or an alleged disorderly house, or that said persons are liable to arrest, or to be objects of a raid, or remain at the premises at their peril, or in any other manner threatening or intimidating them, or otherwise interfering with the lawful business of the plaintiff, and of the law-fendant for a less amount than that stated in ful use, occupation and enjoyment of the premises." In opposition to the application, it was shown that the hotel was a disorderly house; that it was frequented by women of loose morals who took men there for illicit purposes; that the hotel management was cognizant the face of the lien released the guarantor and that the moneys received by the defendant for the interest in the bond and mortgage were received for the benefit of the plaintiff, the guarantor. John J. Scanlan and Sidney G. De Kay, both of New York City, for appellant. Hugo (123 N.E.) Hirsh, Emanuel Newman, and Benjamin Reass, | sult that the plaintiffs can neither themselves all of Brooklyn, for respondent. conduct the contemplated enterprise nor sub- HYNES v. HAGEVILLE REALTY CO. et al. (Court of Appeals of New York. May 20, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment entered Octo-vember 15, 1913, upon the ground that their ber 10, 1917, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (180 App. Div. 903, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1099), reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and directing a dismissal of the complaint. The action was for the alleged conversion of personal property, consisting of hotel furniture and furnishings. The complaint was in short form, with an annexed list or schedule of the chattels claimed to have been converted. The answer of the defendant Adolph A. Hageman was a general denial. The answer of the defendant Hageville Realty Company contained a general denial and alleged as a defense that the plaintiff was a tenant of the defendant Hageman at No. 61 West Thirty-Ninth street, in the borough of Manhattan, city of New York, and had in his possession there the chattels mentioned in the complaint, which were subject to a chattel mortgage in favor of the defendant Hageville Realty Company for the face amount of $1,500; that plaintiff used these premises for the purposes of prostitution and was dispossessed for that reason by the defendant Hageman in summary proceedings in the Municipal Court; that after plaintiff had been dispossessed and had abandoned the property covered by the chattel mortgage, on which $1,200 was still due, the Hageville Realty -Company, deeming the property unsafe and at great risk, took possession thereof under the provisions of the chattel mortgage, and after due notice to the plaintiff sold them at public auction for $1,200, the full value of the property. S. Goodelman, of New York City, for appellant. Claude V. Pallister, of New York City, for respondents. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed with costs. INTERSTATE CHEMICAL CORPORA TION et al., Appellants, v. DUKE, Respondent. (Court of Appeals of New York. April 8, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (176 App. Div. 684, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1035), entered April 2, 1917, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on trial at Special Term. The complaint charged that the defendant, while occupying confidential relations with the plaintiffs, and engaged with them in a joint venture, fraudulently acquired and now owns all the properties brought to his attention by the plaintiffs in connection with the adventure, except the property of the plaintiffs, in the acquisition of which their entire profit rested, with the re Judgment affirmed with HISCOCK, C. J., and CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, and CRANE, JJ., concur. MCLAUGHLIN, J., not voting. IROQUOIS RUBBER CO. v. GRIFFIN. (Court of Appeals of New York. June 3, 1919.) PER CURIAM. Motion for argument denied, with $10 costs and necessary printing disbursements. See 226 N. Y. 297, 123 N. E. 369. J. B. KEPNER CO., Appellant, v. HUTTON et al., Respondents. (Court of Appeals of New York. May 20, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (179 App. Div. 130, 166 N. Y. Supp. 408), entered August 23, 1917, affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term without a jury. The action was brought by the appellant corporation, to recover money paid to the defendants on checks signed in the name of the corporation by its president,, J. B. Kepner, and its treasurer and delivered to the defendants by the president in payment of his individual indebtedness. It appeared that prior to April 10, 1912, said J. B. Kepner carried on business individually as a cotton converter and as sales agent for certain cotton mills. In 1912 he caused the plaintiff corporation to be organized with a capital of $5,000 divided into 50 shares, of which 49 were issued to Kepner's wife and one to Kepner himself. To this corporation PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs. HISCOCK, C. J., and CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN, and CRANE, JJ., concur. was transferred the good will of the business | J. J. McGuire, of Ithaca, for appellant. Clayformerly carried on by Kepner individually and ton R. Lusk, of Cortland, for respondents. said corporation continued to carry on the same business under Kepner's management. During the whole period covered by the transactions complained of in the complaint Kepner and his wife owned all the capital stock, and they, together with the bookkeeper, a man named Donohue, who held nominally one qualifying share, were the sole directors. During all that period Kepner alone managed and controlled the corporation, his wife and Donohue not interfering in any way. Prior to the incorporation of the plaintiff and when Kepner, as an individual, was doing the same business (turned over to the company as aforesaid), he had personal bank accounts, but after the incorporation of the plaintiff company the said Kepner had no individual bank account, and no attempt was made by the corporation, or by Kepner, to distinguish between the personal funds of Kepner and the funds of the corporation; and all checks received by him, personally, or made out to the order of the corporation, were indorsed by him and deposited in the bank account standing in the corporation's name. From the time the said company was incorporated, the plaintiff company made a practice of paying J. B. Kepner's individual debts and obligations by checks drawn from the corporation's bank account. John E. Brady and Francis C. Schwab, both of New York City, for appellant. Sumner B. Stiles and William F. S. Hart, both of New York City, for respondents. JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. BANGS et al., Respondents. (Court of Appeals of New York. April 8, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department (169 App. Div. 102, 154 N. Y. Supp. 439), entered July 15, 1915, affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on trial at Special Term. The action was to recover possession of a farm. By the will of William King, who died in 1856, a life interest in one-third of the property was given to his widow, a life interest in two-thirds to his adopted son and the fee to the plaintiff, a daughter of said adopted son. The property was subject to a mortgage. The son thereafter took an assignment of the mortgage and after the death of the widow foreclosed the same and bid in the property for less than the amount of the mortgage. He thereafter first mortgaged and then sold the property to defendants' predecessor in title. It was found that the present owner had no, notice of the plaintiff's title and purchased the same in good faith depending upon a clear record title coming down from the foreclosure sale. The court held that when a bona fide purchaser of real estate, the record title of which is clear, pays a valuable consideration, without notice of a prior unrecorded title or claim or equity, his title takes precedence over the unrecorded interest. See 197 N. Y. 35, 90 N. E. 109, 134 Am. St. Rep. 856. JOHNSTON HEATING CO., Appellant, BOARD OF EDUCATION, UNION FREE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 6, MANHASSET, TOWN OF NORTH HEMPSTEAD, NASSAU COUNTY, Respondent. (Court of Appeals of New York. April 8, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment entered December 7, 1916, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (175 App. Div. 140, 161 N. Y. Supp. 867), reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and directing a dismissal of the complaint. This action was brought to recover profits which plaintiff would have made in the performance of a certain contract with the defendant had it been allowed to enter into and perform that contract. Plaintiff was the lowest bidder for the work and the defendant board of education adopted a resolution accepting the bid. Thereafter the board rescinded its resolution of acceptance and let the contract to another. The Appellate Division held that in the absence of an authorized notice of acceptance of plaintiff's bid the board was within its right in rescinding its resolution, and that plaintiff could not recover. Lynn W. Thompson, of New York City, for appellant. James L. Dowsey and Erastus J. Parsons, both of New York City, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs. CHASE, HOGAN, CARDOZO, POUND, McLAUGHLIN, and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. HISCOCK, C. J., not sitting. JOSEPH WALKER CONST. CO., Appellant, v. DELAWARE & H. CO., Respondent. (Court of Appeals of New York. May 20, 1919.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department (179 App. Div. 469, 165 N. Y. Supp. 931), entered October 3, 1917, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a verdict. The complaint alleged that plaintiff applied to the defendant railroad company to furnish a car to transport plaintiff's steam road roller from Beekmantown, N. Y.; that defendant furnished and placed such car and while plaintiff was engaged in moving said roller upon the property of defendant for the purpose of placing the same upon said freight car so placed, the defendant, its officers, agents and servants carelessly and negligently moved a train of cars and engine over its tracks, striking and destroying said roller. The answer of the defendant denied any negligence on its part or of its officers and agents and alleged that the damage to the steam roller of the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff, its agents and servants. John N. Carlisle, of Al |