interpose the condition that notice should be given the plaintiff. If the contract, as testified by the first witness, was, that the cotton should be delivered to the warehouseman indicated by the defendant, it is, in our judgment, a matter of no importance whether he was indicated as a warehouseman or as the agent of the defendant. The general rule with respect to consignments to third persons, so as to place the property at the risk of the buyer, is, that notice shall be given: Goom v. Jackson, 5 Esp. 112; but where the carrier or warehouseman is named or indicated by the buyer, a delivery to the carrier, etc., is a delivery to the buyer: Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330; Cooke v. Ludlow, 2 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 119. If, however, the contract was in point of fact so modified afterwards, as to make it a condition that the plaintiff should give timely notice to the defendant of the delivery to the warehouseman, then the latter has the right to insist on this, as upon any term of the contract. We have nothing to do with the improbability that the jury could come to the conclusion that such a condition was made, either as to the whole of the cotton, or to that part not then delivered. It is sufficient to warrant the defendant in asking the charges involving this point, that there was evidence on it for them to weigh and decide upon. 6. In this connection, we may properly advert to an argument made in this cause, though the question does not seem involved in any of the requests, that the warehouse receipts being in the name of the plaintiff, there was no delivery to the defendant. Without entering upon the question, whether such receipts are negotiable, so as to pass the legal title by an assignment, we think it very clear that no question of law, decisive of the rights of the parties, arises out of this circumstance. The proper matter for the jury to ascertain was, whether the delivery of the cotton to the warehouseman was made on account of the defendant, or did the plaintiff cause the receipts to be taken to himself, to preserve his right of property? In this view, the concurrence, or the want of it, by the plaintiff, in requiring the receipts to be thus taken the assumption by the defendant of the right to ship it the payment of a part of the price, etc., were all facts bearing on the determination, which, in our opinion, was one solely for the jury. 7. All the other requests relate more or less to the question how far charges for storage, if any were due from the plaintiff, and constituting a lien on the cotton, prevented the title from passing to the defendant, until they were discharged. We think this is a question which the defendant is not permitted to raise, even if it is admitted the cottons were subject to liens, for charges which the plaintiff was bound to pay. The warehouseman was indicated by the defendant himself, and if charges accrued, he must have known of the general right of lien, and the title passed to him notwithstanding the lien. In Phillimore v. Barry, 1 Camp. 513, and King v. Meredith, 2 Id. 639, it was held, that a lien for storage or transportation, to be paid by the plaintiff, did not prevent the property from passing when the other essentials of delivery were complete. To the same effect is Tuxworth v. Moore, 9 Pick. 347 [20 Am. Dec. 479], and the cases cited by defendant seem to contain nothing opposed to these decisions. Indeed, a different doctrine would work incalculable mischiefs, as there is scarcely any bulky article of commerce which is not at all times under some sort of lien, either for storage or transportation. We come, then, to the conclusion, that the charges in this connection were properly refused; but independent of general principles, there is abundant proof in the cause to warrant the inference, that the warehousemen had waived any claim to their specific lien. The court, however, having erred in considering there was not sufficient proof to warrant the charges which we have endeavored to show were unexceptionable as legal propositions, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. DELIVERY OF PROPERTY SOLD VESTS TITLE IN THE BUYER, and subjects him to risk of future loss of the property. See Hunt v. Thurman, 40 Am. Dec. 683; Scott v. Wells, Id. 568, note 578. DELIVERY, What SufficienT TO PASS TITLE TO CHATTELS: See Jewett v. Lincoln, 31 Am. Dec. 36, note 39. SCALES v. ALVIS. [12 ALABAMA, 617.] EVERY PREREQUISITE OF STATUTE DIRECTING SALE OF LAND FOR TAXES must be substantially complied with, or the sale will be illegal. LAND CAN NOT BE SOLD FOR TAXES, UNDER THE ALABAMA STATUTE, where the delinquent owner has goods and chattels within the county. NO PROPERTY IS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION IN CASE OF DEFAULTS for taxes. TWO INSUFFICIENT ADVERTISEMENTS OF TAX SALE CAN NOT BE COUPLED together so as to make one complete legal advertisement, even though a verbal consent thereto is given by the delinquent. ERROR to the circuit court of Talladega. Trespass to try titles. The plaintiff claimed title to the land in controversy, through a deed made by the collector of taxes. The other facts appear from the opinion. J. T. Morgan, for the plaintiff in error. Parsons, contra. By Court, GOLDTHWAITE, J. 1. The revision of the statutes prescribing the manner of selling lands upon which the taxes have not been paid, is greatly to be desired, inasmuch as the numerous alterations at different periods have so perplexed the system, that it is quite difficult to ascertain what course is proper, and the result is, that the purchaser, instead of securing the land, or even a safe investment for the money expended, finds himself involved in an expensive litigation, almost always productive of no other end than that of vexation to himself and to the land owner. It certainly deserves consideration from the proper department of the government, whether it would not be better to facilitate the recovery of the land by the purchaser, and allowing the owner a longer time for redemption. With these preliminary remarks, we proceed to the examination of the questions presented by this record. It may, perhaps, be stated, as the general rule pertaining to sales of this description, to which no exception has come within our notice, that every prerequisite of the statute directing the sale, must be substantially complied with, or the sale will be illegal: Lyon et al. v. Hunt et al., 11 Ala. 295 [ante, 216]; Ronkendorff v. Taylor, 4 Pet. 349; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77; Michie v. Mullins, 5 Hayw. 90; Davis v. Simms, 4 Bibb. 465; Holt v. Hemphill, 3 Ohio, 232; Birch v. Fisher, 13 Serg. & R. 208; Bush v. Davison, 16 Wend. 550; Jackson ex dem. Cook v. Shepard, 7 Cow. 88 [17 Am. Dec. 502]; Blossom v. Cannon, 14 Mass. 177. Now, when the statute is looked at, it will be seen to contain this provision: "All lists of taxes shall be considered as having the force and effect of an execution; and it shall be lawful, from and after the first day of September, to proceed and make distress and sale of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of all persons in arrear for taxes; provided, that notice of such sale shall have been given, by advertisement at the court-house of the proper county, and at least two other public places, within the county, at least ten days previous to the day of sale, where the distress shall be of goods and chattels; and where the delinquent has no goods and chattels within the county, then the lands and tenements of said delinquent may be sold by the collector, or so much, etc.; provided, that the collector shall have given in the nearest newspaper published within the state, at least three months' notice, and in case of non-residents, at least six months' notice, of the time and place of sale, which notice shall contain," etc.: Dig. 566, sec. 50. It will thus be seen the power of the collector to sell lands is limited to those cases where the delinquent has no goods or chattels within the county. There is no provision made for cases where the collector is unable to find, or the delinquent unwilling to surrender goods. The power exists only where there are no goods, and conforming to the principle of the many cases on this subject, we are constrained to declare, that as there was personal property of the delinquent within his county, the collector had no discretion to sell the land: Jackson ex dem. Cook v. Shepard, 7 Cow. 88 [17 Am. Dec. 502]. 2. The fact that the property then possessed by the delinquent was exempt by law from being sold under ordinary executions, does not, in our opinion, prevent the operation of the general tax law. It is impossible, we think, by any proper construction of the statute which exempts certain property from execution, to consider the exemption as extended to the case of defaults for taxes. Without resting our opinion upon this point, on the principle that the state is not bound by a statute unless named in it, we think it clear the one referred to was not intended to create an exemption, when the revenue of the state is to be collected. 3. The only other point in the charges given, is covered by the precise terms of the statute. Neither of the advertisements covered the space of three months, and the supposed consent of the delinquent to the amendment, by extending the time after it had received one month's irregular publication, can not invest the collector with the authority to sell. That, as will be seen by the cases already referred to, must be derived from a strict compliance with the statute. See also, Hughey v. Horrel, 2 Ohio, 231; Jackson ex dem. Watson v. Esty, 7 Wend. 148. The charges which the plaintiff requested are sufficiently considered in what has already been said. Our conclusion is, that the record presents no error. Judgment affirmed. TAX SALES: See Perkins' Lessee v. Dibble, 36 Am. Dec. 97, note 103, where other cases are referred to. Moss v. McCALL. [12 ALABAMA, 630.] CONVEYANCE TO TRUSTEE FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, providing that the profits, uses, and issues of the property conveyed be paid to them "for their joint maintenance during their natural lives, or to the survivor of them during the time of his or her natural life," does not exclude the marital rights of the husband, and the property may be sold under a fi. fa. against him. ERROR to the circuit court of Lowndes. A slave was levied on under a writ of fi. fa. against C. B. Easley. The defendant in error thereupon interposed a claim and entered into a bond with surety, conditioned to try the right pursuant to the statute. There was a verdict for the claimant, and judgment was rendered thereon. The other facts appear from the opinion. J. E. Belser and N. Harris, for the plaintiff in error. By Court, COLLIER, C. J. The cases of Cook v. Kennerly, 12 Ala. 42, and Bender v. Reynolds, Id. 446, at this term, are decisive of the present, unless the intention that the profits of the property embraced by the deed should be paid over to the defendant in execution and his wife, "for their mutual support" and "joint maintenance," distinguishes them. In Fellows, Wadsworth & Co. v. Tann, by her Next Friend, et al., 9 Id. 999, a father gave to his widowed daughter, "and the heirs of her body, by deed, a female slave," who he provided should be under her control and employment, in the most profitable way for the use and support of herself and "her heirs," during their joint lives; after her death it was directed that the property should be divided "among her heirs." Shortly after the gift, the daughter took possession of the slave, who, together with her increase, has for more than twenty years been treated as the separate property of the daughter and her children; though the daughter married soon after acquiring the possession: Held, that the deed invested the daughter and her children collectively with interests which the creditors of the husband could not divest through the medium of any forum, and as it respected the daughter (his wife), not by sale under execution. But, if the husband acquired an interest in virtue of his marital rights, his creditor must proceed in equity to subject it to his judgment. In Spear v. Walkley, 10 Ala. 328, the testatrix bequeathed to the husband certain slaves, to be held and worked by him, for |