ties. There were some instructions given to the jury, to which exceptions were taken by the defendant, but we have not found it necessary to examine them. The first question in this cause is, whether the copy of the record of the patent to Stephen Pelton was admissible evidence? The patent was recorded in the general land-office, under an act of congress, and the copy was evidence, provided the absence of the original was sufficiently accounted for. The plaintiff might, perhaps, rest this point on the fact, that as his lessors were not the patentees, they can not be presumed to have the custody or control of the patent; but they need not rely solely on that ground. There was proof that diligent search for the original patent had been made without effect among the papers of Aaron Remer, deceased, under whom the joint lessors claim; and that the search was made by the person into whose hands those papers came at Remer's death. It is true, that this evidence does not appear to have been given until after the copy of the patent had been read; but that circumstance is not material. The plaintiff, we think, might show, at any time during the trial, that the evidence previously given was admissible. The next question is, was there evidence to authorize the jury to say that the land in dispute, supposing it to have been Aaron Remer's, descended to the lessors (except R. G. Wait) as said Remer's heirs? And we think there was such evidence. Those lessors were proved to be the legitimate children of said Remer; and though the deceased made a will, nothing was proved as to its contents, or as to the manner of its execution. The presumption is, that the children of the deceased took his land here as his heirs, until it is shown that his will was so executed that conformably to our laws it would pass real estate; and that its contents were inconsistent with his children's claim to the land as his heirs. The next question is, was the record of the attachment suit admissible in evidence? In January, 1818, a statute was passed forming the county of Vigo out of the county of Sullivan. That act took effect from and after its publication; and it was published in July, 1818. It was, from the nature of it, a public act: Commonwealth v. Springfield, 7 Mass. 9. The judgment, the record of which was offered in evidence, was rendered by the Sullivan circuit court several months after the said statute took effect; and though it was a judgment rendered in the suit commenced by attachment, it was not for the sale of the lands attached; but it was merely that the plaintiff recover of the de fendant a certain sum of money. The execution, which afterwards issued on that judgment, was no authority for the sheriff of Sullivan county, to whom it was directed, to levy on the land now in dispute, which was situated in Vigo county. His levy on that land, and his sale of it, were void; and the record of the proceedings was no evidence to show a title in the purchaser of said land at that sale. There is another objection to said record as evidence. The attachment was issued under the act of 1807, and the proceedings in the suit were pending when the act of 1818 relative to foreign attachments took effect. The fifth section of the act of 1818 enacts, "That all laws and parts of laws heretofore in force relative to foreign attachments are hereby repealed:" Acts of 1818, p. 97. There being no clause in the repealing act providing for pending suits, the said attachment suit was at an end upon the taking effect of that act. The proceedings in the suit, which were subsequent to the absolute repeal of the law to which they owed their existence, were coram non judice and void. This point was expressly decided by this court in Hunt et Ux. v. Jennings, 5 Blackf. 195 [33 Am. Dec. 465]. Since that case, the subject has been very fully examined by the supreme court of New York, and the doctrine above stated clearly established: Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324. The next question is, was there an adverse possession of the land in dispute which would bar the action? There is no evidence that, twenty years (the time limited by the statute) before this suit was brought, there was an adverse possession taken by any person of the quarter section of which the land sued for is a part. Such possession was not shown by the proof that Jonathan Lindley, in 1819, walked over the land once and set up some of the corners; and that three or four years afterwards he walked across the end of one of the tracts. The only evidence of adverse possession for twenty years before the commencement of the suit, is the building and occupation of a cabin, and the inclosing of three or four acres of land adjoining it, on the quarter section called the Timber tract, which is a different quarter section from the one containing the land now sued for. The quarter section on which said improvement was made was not adjoining the other, but was distant from it a half a mile. That the conveyance to said Lindley, and his lease to Bray who built the cabin, were for both quarter sections, is not material. The small improvement made upon one of the tracts, whatever effect it might have as to that tract, could be no au thority for setting up an adverse possession of the other tract: Carson v. Burnett, 1 Dev. & Bat. L. 546 [30 Am. Dec. 143]; Farrar v. Eastman, 1 Fairf. 191. The last question raised is, whether, if there had been an adverse possession of the premises in question for twenty years, the action would have been barred? The lessors, and those under whom they claim, had none of them resided in this state within twenty years before the suit was commenced, they being all resident in the state of New York. The statute of limitations of 1831, which was in force when the suit was commenced, excepted from its operation persons beyond the seas. In 1843, pending this suit, the legislature passed an act declaring that the words, "or any person beyond the seas," in the proviso to the act of 1831, etc., should, by all courts in this state, be construed to mean beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States: Acts of 1843, p. 24. Previously to this act of 1843, the words "any person beyond seas" had been frequently decided to mean beyond the jurisdiction of the state. That is the decision of the supreme court of the United States, in Murray v. Baker, 3 Wheat. 541; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Id. 361; Bank of Alexandria v. Dyer, 14 Pet. 141. The same decision has been made in several of the state courts: Forbes v. Fool, 2 McCord, 331 [13 Am. Dec. 732]; Pancoast v. Addison, 1 Har. & J. 350 [2 Am. Dec. 251]; Richardson v. Richardson, 6 Ohio, 125 [25 Am. Dec. 745]; West v. Pickesimer, 7 Id. 589. In the present case, the circuit court determined that the words "beyond the seas" in the statute of 1831, then in force, meant beyond the limits of the state; and we think the decision is correct. There could not be the slightest doubt on the subject, were it not for the act of 1843; and we are satisfied, after much reflection, that that act can make no difference. The plaintiff had a right to the decision of the court as to the meaning of the statute applicable to his case, independently of the declaratory act, which was passed whilst the suit was pending. This point is settled by the supreme court of the United States, where the question was, whether an action was barred by a statute of limitations of North Carolina, passed in 1715? Doubts having been entertained whether that act had been repealed or not by an act of 1789, the legislature, to remove those doubts, passed a declaratory act in 1799. The last named act declared, that the act of 1789 should not be considered a repeal of the statute of limitations of 1715. The suit in which the question arose, as to whether the said statute of limitations was repealed, was commenced in 1798, and was pending when the declaratory act of 1799 was enacted. The court decided, in direct opposition to the declaratory act, that the said statute of limitations was repealed by the act of 1789, and that the suit was not barred: Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272. If that case is law, and we think it is, the present suit can not be affected by the act of 1843; and without that act, the lessors' claim could not be barred by an adverse possession. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. COPY OF UNITED STATES PATENT, WHEN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE: Scanlon v. Wright, 25 Am. Dec. 344; Clarke v. Diggs, 44 Id. 73. SHERIFF OF ONE COUNTY CAN NOT SELL OR LEVY on land in another county: Bybee v. Ashby, 43 Am. Dec. 47. ADVERSE POSSESSION, WHAT AMOUNTS TO: See the prior cases in this series collected in the notes to Union Canal Co. v. Young, 30 Am. Dec. 212; Rung v. Shoneberger, 26 Id. 95; Overton's Heirs v. Davisson, 42 Id. 544. "Beyond the SEAS," MEANING OF: See Forbes v. Foot, 13 Am. Dec. 732, and note; Pancoast v. Addison, 2 Id. 520; Richardson v. Richardson, 25 Id. 745; Whitney v. Goddard, 32 Id. 216, and note; Field v. Dickinson, 36 Id. 458. THE PRINCIPAL CASE IN CITED to the effect that the repeal of a statute carries with it all actions brought thereunder, unless saved by the repealing act, in State v. Youmans, 5 Ind. 282; Gaspar v. State, 11 Id. 549; Roush v. Morrison, 47 Id. 417; that it is the duty of the court to admit any legitimate evidence, whenever offered, tending to establish a fact in issue, in Rushville etc. R. R. v. McManus, 4 Id. 279. CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. PAYNE V. COUCH ET AL. [1 G. GREENE, 64.] NOTE PAYABLE IN SPECIFIC PROPERTY IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE under the money counts. ERROR to the Washington district court. Assumpsit. The opinion states the case. Hall and Everson, for the plaintiff in error. C. Bates, for the defendants in error. By Court, WILSON, J. This was an action of assumpsit brought upon the following instrument: "$100. "Twelve months from date, we promise to pay J. G. Smith, or bearer, one hundred dollars, to be paid in horses or other good property, at cash prices, for value received. "Mt. Pleasant, Feb. 10. 1841. (Signed) D. A. COUCH. On the note is the following indorsement, viz.: "I assign the within note to Jesse D. Payne. J. G. Smith." The declaration contains a special count setting out the note; counts for money paid; laid out and expended; had and received; and the account stated. To this declaration a special demurrer was filed for the following causes: 1. The breach in said declaration does not state that said horses, or property, |