subject of transfer by his debtor, and hold it for his security; but until
such an act done by him, he has no title to the same. Id.

See TENDER, 5.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

See STREETS.

MURDER.

See CRIMINAL LAW.

NAVIGABLE WATERS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9-13; WATERCOURSES.

NECESSARIES.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 6.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Recovery for PERSONAL INJURIES CAN NOT BE HAD, if the proximate and
immediate cause of the damage was the want of ordinary care and cau-
tion on the part of the plaintiff, although the defendant's misconduct
may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of. Irwin v.
Sprigg, 667.

2. OWNER OF A HOUSE IS LIABLE FOR INJURIES occasioned by a person falling
into a front area, which he negligently allowed to remain open, although
at the time of the injury the premises were in the same condition as they
had been for years before the defendant became the owner. Id.

See COMMON CARRIERS, 5; CORPORATIONS, 29, 30; LIENS, 6.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

1. WORDS, "I HEREBY GUARANTEE THE PAYMENT OF THE WITHIN NOTE, R. D.
H.," written on the back of a note, R. D. H. being the payee, are a suf-
ficient indorsement to enable the holder to sue in his own name. Myrick
v. Hasey, 583.

2 MAKER OF A NOTE IS NOT ENTITLED TO PROVE IT USURIOUS by his own
oath, in an action upon the note by an indorsee. Id.

FORGED NOTE IS RATIFIED IF THE PERSON WHOSE NAME IS FORGED ac-
cepts a deed of trust to indemnify him from loss by the note. Neither
re-execution nor redelivery is necessary. Fitzpatrick v. School Commis-
sioners, 76.

4. DEMAND IS SUFFICIENT TO CHARGE AN INDORSER, if the notary on the day
the note falls due, goes to the place where it is payable, and finds the
place shut up or deserted. Spann v. Baltzell, 346.

5. FACTS EXCUSING A DEMAND OR NOTICE FOR PAYMENT may be given in evi-
dence under the ordinary allegation of demand and notice. Facts which
dispense with a demand or notice, will, in law, be deemed proof of a de-
mand or notice. Id.

& PROTEST OF A FOREIGN BILL CAN NOT BE MADE BY A DEPUTY NOTARY, or
otherwise than by the notary in person, except when the law of the place
where the protest is made, authorizes the act to be done by a deputy or
other agent of the notary. Carter v. Union Bank, 89.

7. PROTEST OF FOREIGN BILLS should be made out and drawn up in the manner required by law or usage at the place where made. When so made and drawn up, it is sufficient and valid. Id.

8. PROTEST PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED, is exclusive evidence of presentment and demand, in all foreign courts. Id.

9. NAME OF PLACE, ANNEXED TO NAME OF INDORSER ON A FOREIGN BILL, is deemed a part of the indorsement, and notice of dishonor may be directed to the indorser at such place. Id.

10. BILL OF EXCHANGE NEED NOT BE ACTUALLY SHOWN when presented in order that the party on whom it is drawn may bind himself by an acceptance of it. Fisher v. Beckwith, 174.

11. BILL OF EXCHANGE MAY BE ACCEPTED BY PAROL. The contract of acceptance is not within the statute of frauds. It is rather the agreement to pay one's own debt than the debt of another. Id.

12. CONTRACT OF ACCEPTANCE BETWEEN ACCEPTOR AND PAYEE can not be abrogated by the acceptor paying the drawer of the bill all he owed him. Id. 13. SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR IS SUFFICIENTLY PROVED by evidence showing that such notice was deposited in the post-office, directed to the defendant at his reputed place of residence, naming it. Spann v. Baltzell, 346.

14. NOTICE OF DISHONOR Need not be IN ANY PARTICULAR FORM. It should substantially describe the note, so as to identify it; and state the presentment for payment, the refusal to pay, and expressly or by implication, that the person notified is looked to for payment. Id.

15. NOTICE OF DISHONOR NECESSARILY IMPLIES THAT THE PARTY NOTIFIED IS LOOKED TO FOR PAYMENT, when it is directed to him and informs him of the presentment for payment and that the note remains unpaid. Id. 16. SPECIAL INDORSEMENT BY THE PAYEE of a promissory note, without delivery, is not sufficient to divest his title. May v. Cassiday, 292.

17. INDORSEMENT OF A NOTE IS NOT A COLLATERAL UNDERTAKING for the debt of another, but is a new contract between the indorser and indorsee. Spann v. Baltzell, 346.

18. INDORSER MAY ALTER, REVISE, OR WAIVE HIS CONTRACT of indorsement with the assent of the indorsee. Id.

19. INDORSEMENT OF NOTE, "PAY CONTENTS OF THE WITHIN NOTE TO W. P. B.," is in legal effect an indorsement to W. P. B. or order, and W. P. B.'s indorsee may maintain an action upon it. Hodges v. Adams, 181. 20. LEGAL Holder of a Note MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION thereon, although he has disposed of his interest in it, but without a transfer. Thompson v. Cartwright, 95.

21. NAKED FACT OF PLAINTIFF NOT BEING REAL OWNER OF A NOTE is not a matter of defense, either in bar or in abatement. Id.

22. CASES MAY ARISE IN WHICH MAKER OF NOTE MAY SHOW that plaintiff is not the actual owner of the note, for the purpose of letting in any defense arising between himself and the actual owner, but such matters must be specially pleaded in the answer.

Id.

23. POSSESSION OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT INDORSED IN BLANK IS SUFFICIENT TO AUTHORIZE AN ACTION THEREON, in the name of the holder, though he hold as trustee only. Bacon v. Smith, 549.

24. BURDEN OF PROOF.-Where the defense to a suit on a note is that the plaintiff holds as trustee, and that the note is attached as the property

of the real owners, the proof is upon defendant to show that the proceed. ing is still in force. Id.

25. MERE ANNOUNCEMENT OF READINESS TO PAY A NOTE IS NOT A LEGAL TENDER, and can not have the effect of arresting interest. Id.

26. PAYEE OF A PROMISSORY NOTE, after it has been negotiated, who takes it up, may recover on it, in the same manner as if it had never been nego. tiated. Merrills v. Swift, 315.

27. POSSESSION OF A NOTE BY ONE OF THREE joint promisors, upon which payments have been made, and which has been taken up and a new note for the balance due given by two of the promisors, furnishes no presump tive evidence that the amount paid upon the note was paid by the party in possession of it. Mills v. Hyde, 177.

28. NOTE NEGOTIATED AFTER HAVING BEEN DISHONORED BY THE MAKER is subject to any defense in the hands of the indorsee that might have been made to it in the hands of the indorser. Thompson v. Shepherd, 676. 29. RIGHT OF AN INDORSEE TO ENFORCE PAYMENT IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE FACT that as between the maker and the indorser the note was an accommodation paper, even when known to the indorsee, if he received it before due and for a valuable consideration. Id.

30. ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPAL SUM DUE ON A NOTE, not bearing interest on its face, but due for many years, with the understanding that such sum was to be in full discharge of the note, constitutes a good discharge to an action upon the note; for the question whether interest could have been collected upon the note or not, was a matter of so much doubt and uncertainty that the acceptance amounted to a compromise of a doubtful claim. Tuttle v. Tuttle, 701.

See AGENCY, 3, 4; ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS, 1; ASSIGNMENTS OF CONTRACTS; NON-NEGOTIABLE NOTES; PAYMENT; SUBROGATION; SUNDAYS; USURY.

NEW TRIAL.

1. COURT WILL NOT INTERPOSE and Grant A NEW TRIAL, unless it be in order to remedy some manifest error, where it is a question of fact to be ascertained by the jury. Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 108.

2. OBJECTIONS TO A VERDICT MUST BE VERY COGENT to induce the court to grant a new trial where the controversy is chiefly upon questions of fact. Id.

3. VERDICT WILL NOT BE SET ASIDE AS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE where there has been evidence on both sides, and no rule of law violated, nor manifest injustice done, although there may have been a preponderance of evi dence against the verdict. Peck v. Land, 368.

4. NEW TRIAL WILL NOT BE GRANTED where the verdict is contrary to the charge of the court, if such charge is erroneous, and the verdict is not contrary to the law. Id.

5. FACT THAT ONE PARTY'S COUNSEL WAS NOT AWARE that the case had been set for trial will not entitle the party to relief from the effect of surprise and an ex parte trial, in the absence of proof that the counsel could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have ascertained the condition of the cause and been present at its trial. Riley v. City of Louisville, 560. See DAMAGES, 1.

NON-JOINDER.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 21.

NON-NEGOTIABLE NOTE.

1. WHERE OBLIGATION IS MADE PAYABLE IN SPECIFIO ARTICLES on a certain
day, no demand is necessary on the part of the obligee. If the obligor
fail to pay in the articles at the time named, he renders himself liable to
pay in money. Dunman v. Strother, 97.

2. NOTE PAYABLE IN SPECIFIC PROPERTY IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE under
the money counts. Payne v. Couch, 497.

NOTARIES.

See EVIDENCE, 5–7.

NOTICE.

1. WHERE NO NOTICE IS GIVEN TO THE NON COMPOs, proceedings of orphans'
court in the nature of an inquisition are void, and the record of such pro-
ceedings is not admissible in evidence for any purpose. McCurry v.
Hooper, 280.

2 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS on the second, third, and fourth days of
April next, between the hours of eight A. M. and six P. M. of each or any
of said days, at the court-house in the city of New Orleans, in the state
of Louisiana, is not sufficiently definite, either as to time or place, when
it appears that several courts are held in the same building. Harris v.
Hill, 295.

3. PURCHASER OF SUBJECT-MATTER of a Suit PENDENTE LITE acquires no in-
terest as against the title, whether legal or equitable, of the plaintiff in
that suit. Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 108.

4. LIS PENDENS IS CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.

Id.

Bee BONA FIDE PURCHASERS; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; MORTGAGES, 16,
17; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS; SURETYSHIP, 2.

NOVATION.

See CONTRACTS.

NUISANCE.

See GRANTS.

OFFICERS DE FACTO.
See CORPORATIONS, 20.

ORDINANCES.

See STREETS; WATERCOURSES, 5.

ORPHANS' COURT.

See NOTICE, 1.

OUSTER.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 6, 7.

PARENT AND CHILD.

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 2; WITNESSES, 4.

PAROL EVIDENCE.

See ASSIGNMENTS OF CONTRACTS, 2; EVIDENCE, 25, 29, 30; Mortgages, 2.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. DORMANT PARTNER IS ALLOWABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL PARTY to an as-
tion. Desha v. Holland, 261.

2 IN EQUITY, PARTNERSHIP DEBTS WILL FIRST BE PAID out of partnership
assets, and the individual debts of each partner out of his individual
assets; but the equity of partnership creditors is dependent on the equity
of the partners. Ladd v. Griswold, 443.

3. IF A PARTNER SELLS HIS INTEREST IN THE FIRM to his copartner, the lat-
ter takes the property free of the lien of the former; the property ceases
to be partnership assets and becomes individual property, and the credit-
ors of the partnership are no longer entitled to have it applied to the pay-
ment of their debts in preference to the individual debts of its owner,
nor are such individual debts, there being no solvent partner to resort to,
entitled to any preference over the partnership debts. Id.

4. PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS ARE TREATED AS JOINT AND SEVERAL in equity.
In the event of the death of one partner, the firm creditors may proceed
at law against the survivors, and in equity against the estate of the de-
cedent. Id.

5. RETIRING PARTNER HAS NO LIEN on the partnership property when he sells
his interest in the firm assets to his copartners, and takes their covenant
to indemnify and save him harmless from the liabilities of the firm. He
can not maintain any proceeding in equity to subject such assets to the
satisfaction of such debt, especially after they have gone into the hands
of a subvendee. Smith v. Edwards, 71.

6. NON-JOINDER-BILL IN EQUITY BY ONE PARTNER against one of his co-
partners for an account, alleging that the other partners are not within the
jurisdiction of the court, that they have received their full share of the
partnership effects, that the defendant has received more than his share,
and the complainant less, is not demurrable for a non-joinder of the other
partners. Towle v. Pierce, 679.

7. BILL IN EQUITY NEED NOT STATE WITH AS MUCH CERTAINTY AND PAR-
TICULARITY the facts of the case, where it alleges that the complainant
and defendant are copartners; that the defendant has all the partnership
books in his possession and under his control, and refuses to permit the
complainant to examine them, and prays for an account, as would be
necessary if the complainant had access to the books. Id.

See SET-OFF; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 9.

PAYMENT.

1. WHERE PARTY IS COMPELLED BY OPERATION OF LAW TO PAY A DEBT,
which in equity and good faith another party should have kept him from
paying, the party so paying may recover from such other party the amount
paid. Ticonic Bank v. Smiley, 593.