unless a regular meeting of the bar association of his state was to be held before the next annual meeting of this Association, he procure to be called, if possible, a special mecting to take action upon the subject of judicial recall, and also, where practicable, to have county and city associations do the same; that at such meeting the fullest opportunity for discussion of the question be given; that definite action be taken, in a report or declaration of principles, and that the widest publicity be given to this action, in order that there might be stimulated general public interest and full and intelligent discussion. In this manner it was deemed that the interest of the individual members of this Association and of state, county and city bar associations would be aroused and the people would receive the benefit of this discussion. Your committee believes that the results have justified this conclusion. It has been the object of your committee to invite and procure the greatest degree of public discussion of this important question both by members of the Bar and the people generally, because we believe that the more intelligent investigation is given to the subject the less danger there is of the application of the recall to the judiciary. Under this plan of action we are pleased to report that the bar associations of many states have taken action and that such action has been universally opposed to the principle of judicial recall. In nearly every case the majority against the judicial recall was very large.

In a number of the states, meetings of the bar associations, where action will undoubtedly be taken, have not yet been held. In a few states, after very careful investigation by the member of the local committee, it was found that there was no general sentiment in favor of the judicial recall, and it was deemed unnecessary to bring up the subject.

Very few legislatures have been in session since your committec commenced this work, and we cannot therefore report action by these bodies. In Ohio the Constitutional Convention, which was in session until about June 1, 1912, after very full discussion of the subject, declined to apply the principle of the recall to the judges, but it provided by Section 38 of Article II of the proposed constitution, that laws should be passed providing for the prompt

removal from office, upon complaint and hearing, of all officers, including state officers, judges and members of the General Assembly, for any misconduct involving moral turpitude or for other cause provided by law. It was further provided that this method of removal should be in addition to impeachment or other method authorized by the constitution. This is substantially the system in existence in Massachusetts, New York, and several other states, where judges may be removed from office by joint action of the two chambers of the legislature. It will be noticed that under the proposed constitution of Ohio a judge can only be removed for cause after complaint and hearing. This is entirely different in principle from the judicial recall by the vote of the electorate of the district in which the judge presides.

Your committee understands that in addition to California and Oregon, where the judicial recall exists, the only states which have taken action looking to its adoption, so far as we have been informed, are the states of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and North Dakota, where constitutional amendments are now pending.

Special efforts have been made by Mr. Ellinwood in Arizona to diffuse general information among the electors of that state, and under his direction your committee is carrying on a campaign by sending to the entire electorate speeches of various senators, representatives and other public men, on this subject. Over 25,000 copies of these have already been sent out, and we hope that by this means and the public discussion of this question, favorable action may be had by the electorate of that state.

In North Dakota the annual meeting of the bar association is to take place on September 3 and 4, when we believe that strong action will be taken against the recall. The member of your committee, Mr. Bronson, of that state, is carrying on a campaign, by correspondence and personal interviews with the members of the Bar, which has resulted in much favorable discussion upon the subject.

There has been a remarkable demand for literature upon this subject, evidencing great public interest, and a very large number of addresses have been delivered by prominent men, or articles and pamphlets written, and by distribution and through

the press these speeches and pamphlets have been given a wide publicity. Many of these addresses have been sent to the members of your committee, to the members of the American Bar Association, to the members of the legislatures in certain states, to public men, and to a considerable extent to the general public where applications have been made and where your committee has had the means of distributing them. Among the more prominent documents thus used, were the addresses of President Taft and Senator Root before the New York State Bar Association, January 19, 1912; "The Recall of Judges and Judicial Decisions," by Augustus P. Gardner, of Massachusetts, delivered in the United States House of Representatives April 4, 1912; "The Constitution and its Makers," by Henry Cabot Lodge, delivered before the Literary and Historical Association of North Carolina, November 28, 1911; the speech of George Sutherland in the United States Senate on the admission of Arizona, in 1911; the 1911 Report of the Minnesota State Bar Association, and a part of the 1912 Report of the Illinois State Bar Association, containing discussions on both sides of the subject; "The New Despotism," by Justice W. P. Stafford of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, before the New York County Lawyers' Association, February 17, 1912; "Current Politics and Civic Duty," by Hugh H. Brown, of Tonopah, at the University of Nevada, May 15, 1912; Rome G. Brown's latest paper on the subject, "The Judicial Recall-A Fallacy Repugnant to Constitutional Government," reprint from The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September, 1912; and "Constitutional Morality," by Wm. D. Guthrie, of the New York Bar, before the Pennsylvania State Bar Association, June 25,

1912.

We deem it important that the members of the American Bar Association should have for reference in the annual report a list of the publications on this important subject. Therefore, appended to this report is a bibliography prepared for the most part by Mr. Rome G. Brown, of Minneapolis.

Your committee recommends that this work be continued by the American Bar Association. It recognizes to the fullest extent that our government is a representative democracy, and that the

people have the right ultimately to adopt, and will adopt, any form of government they desire. It should be the object of the Bar of the country, with unselfish devotion to duty, to foster and encourage the best thought upon this subject and to inculcate those principles of government best calculated to preserve the liberties and insure the prosperity and happiness of the people.

We recognize that there are defects in the administration of justice, as there are in all branches of the government, which are of necessity subject to the limitations of human infirmity. Those defects which have called for reforms and which are now attracting the attention of the Bar and of the country, consist principally of the delays and expense incident to trials in the federal and many of the state courts. These defects it is the duty of all lawyers to use their influence to remedy, and we believe that the Bar is now taking an active part in these reforms. The judges of the Supreme Court of the United States have taken steps to reform the rules of practice in the federal courts, and have called upon the Bar of the country for suggestions. Without exception the committees of the Bar throughout the country have recommended the simplification of practice so as to expedite business and save expense to litigants. In many of the states the statutes providing the forms of procedure and practice are cumbersome and lead to delays and great expense to the people, but this is principally the fault of the law and not of the judges. The lawyers should, and we believe do, recognize these evils, which are no more incident to the courts than other evils are incident to other branches of the government. We should attempt to simplify the practice, to make the remedies more speedy and less expensive, and to obviate the reversal of judgments on technicalities not affecting the merits of causes, so as to keep the procedure and generally the administration of justice abreast with the progression of the times and to meet the changing conditions of our rapidly developing civilization. We believe that when this is done much of the agitation for judicial recall will disappear; that this agitation is an incident of a general reform movement (towards a higher standard of business, commercial integrity, and of political and civic administration, and is not caused by any inherent defect in our judicial system.

It is not the intention of this committee to make an extended argument—this has been so effectively done by many statesmen and publicists within the last year that we could not hope to add anything upon the subject-but to state briefly the principle upon which we believe such opposition should be made.

We maintain that the recall applied to judges will tend to deprive the public of judges of ability, character, high sense of duty, and a due regard to enlightened public sentiment; that such a judiciary is absolutely necessary to the existence of a constitutional democracy-we mean one having a written constitution placing limitations and restraints upon the executive and legislative power. Absolute democracy means the right of the changing majority of the people to rule, without any limitations. or restraints whatever upon their power. It is demonstrable that to maintain a constitutional democracy it is necessary to vest in some department of government the power to decide whether the executive or legislative branches of the government have exceeded their authority or not. This power, under Vour government, was wisely vested in the judiciary. To make the judges subservient to the will of the majority at any time expressed, or to submit to a vote of the majority of the people the question of whether the executive or legislative branches have or have not exceeded their authority, of necessity does away with the restrictions of constitutional government. In other words, the majority of the people who at any particular time adopt a law under such a system of government, would decide whether the law contravenes the constitution or not. It must be evident to every student of government that this means absolute democracy or the rule of the majority without regard to constitutional restraint. The statesmen who framed this government sought to build upon firmer foundations than all the governments which had come and gone in the course of centuries. They were familiar with the abuses of governmental power. They had before them the examples and failures of unlimited democracies and monarchies, and what is commonly known as the constitutional monarchy of England. They chose a middle ground, recognizing to the fullest extent the right and ability of the people for selfgovernment, and, guarding against abuses of power, they framed