not free? Who can conceive of a being, possessing the power of voluntary action, that is not a free agent? Such a conception as to the possibility of it, we put on the same footing with that of a ball that is not round, or a cube that is not square.

The attempt has often been made to embarrass this subject with questions respecting the free agency of the Deity. And in replying to such questions, the friends of truth have for the most part satisfied themselves with acting merely on the defensive-with showing that the alleged difficulties might be obviated, without abandoning their peculiar sentiments. But, as it seems to us, the cause of truth demands something more than this. It demands that the scene of the war be changed, and be carried home into the enemies' camp. The Arminian says, that a liberty of indifference is essential to free agency-that, if there is a preponderating bias one way or the other, there can be no freedom. But has God this liberty of indifference? Is he equally inclined to evil as to good, and just as likely to turn to the one, as to the other? Or do not all his inclinations prompt him, with an infinite strength of holy purpose, to do perpetually and eternally what is right?

The Arminian insists that a liberty of contingency is essential to free agency, and that if there is any moral necessity, or previous certainty, as to the actions of any being, he cannot be free. But is there no previous certainty as to the actions of the Divine Being? Is it altogether a matter of contingency and uncertainty, whether, at any future time, he may do right or wrong? Or have not all his creatures the highest assurance, and may they not repose in him the utmost confidence, that he will do for ever what is right?

The Arminian insists farther, that there must be a selfdetermining power-that the will must originate its own volitions, independently of any external cause or there can be no freedom. But does God will, only because he wills to will, without any exciting reason or motive? If so, his actions are the result of mere arbitrary caprice, without motive, reason, end, or aim, and his moral character loses all its glory.

If we were wholly in the dark as to the manner in which the Divine Being acts, and could give no account of it, whatever, it is believed we might safely determine how he does not act. We might conclude that his actions are not,

and cannot be, the result of what is commonly called a selfdetermining power. But perhaps we are not more in the dark relative to this subject, than we are in respect to many others pertaining to the Divine Being, or than short-sighted creatures might expect to be, when contemplating the character and actions of the great Jehovah. Without doubt, the will of the Deity is subject to the great law of motives, equally with our wills; and that, in respect to himself, this law was established, not by his own pleasure, but by the same mysterious necessity from which he exists. All possible motives are before him, and were so from eternity; and it is a law of his moral nature, for which there is the same reason as for his existence, that his will shall always be in accordance with those motives which are intrinsically wisest and best. And to be subject to such a law is no disparagement to the Divine Being, but rather his glory. Without it, he would not be entitled, as he now is, to unlimited confidence. Without it, in short, he would not be God.

It has been often regretted, in regard to the work of Edwards on the Will, that he did not better guard his conclusions against the use which has been made of them by Materialists and Fatalists; and perhaps this is to be regretted. We have no doubt he would have expressed himself more cautiously on some points, and more fully on others, if he could have foreseen all that has been said and written on the subject, within the last seventy years; and yet, it is no more than just to him to say, that he has laid down distinctions, and made them clear, which, if carried fully and consistently out, effectually guard his conclusions against all the perversions which have been attempted to be put upon them. Abolish the distinctions marked out by Edwards, between natural and moral necessity, and natural and moral inability, and what follows? Not that his conclusions are unfounded, and that contingency and the self-determining power must be admitted. These cannot be admitted on any ground. But it follows, if the above distinctions are abolished, that we must all be Fatalists; there is no help for it. It is our happiness, however, to feel assured that these distinctions are not abolished, and never can be. They are plain, obvious distinctions, and will stand unshaken to the end of time. Is there not a manifest distinction, we ask, between a physical necessity, that a thing must be, whether we will or no, and a

previous certainty that it will be, with the free and full consent of our hearts? Yet this is the precise distinction between what is called natural and moral necessity. And is there not an equally plain distinction between being physically able to do a thing, and being willing to do it; or between being physically unable to do a thing, and being unwilling? Yet this is the distinction, (and surely it is distinction enough,) between natural and moral ability and inability. We need not fear to rest any conclusion on the validity of distinctions such as these. We need have no fear that such distinctions will ever be confounded. And yet they are confounded, and must be, by all who would confound the Necessarianism of Edwards, with the Necessarianism of Materialists and philosophical unbelievers. Edwards held that, though it is previously certain, in every case, how man will act, yet they will act freely and voluntarily, and with perfect natural powers to act differently; and consequently that they are responsible for their actions, as really and as justly, as though there was no previous certainty respecting them. While the Fatalist holds, that there is a natural necessity for men to act, in every case, just as they do; that they have no power of any kind to act otherwise; that they are controlled by an invincible fate; and consequently, that a sense of ill-desert, is but a vulgar prejudice; and the distinction between right and wrong is a distinction only in name. And now who does not see that these two systems are as wide asunder as truth and falsehood, or as light and darkness; and that to confound them together, or to substitute the one for the other, is to confound the plainest and most important distinctions.

But perhaps we have said enough respecting the work of Edwards. It certainly is a noble work-a monument, not only of his acuteness as a philosopher, but of his faithfulness as a Christian. It has stood the test of opposition and perversion; has won for him the respect both of friends and enemies, and is sure to go down, with the name of the distinguished author, to future generations.

We turn now to the other publication, the title of which stands at the head of this article.

ART. II. THE LOVE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS.

By Rev. JOSEPH TRACY, Editor of the Boston Recorder.

THE Scriptures inform us that God "loveth righteousness." Is it possible for man to do the same? We contend that it is. By this we mean, not merely that righteousness may be valued and desired as a means of obtaining some other good; but that it may be regarded as desirable in itself, and may be desired as good, irrespective of its consequen

ces.

It may be well to illustrate our meaning by an example. A man owes another a sum of money. There is no legal proof of the debt. It never was known to any human being, but the parties. The creditor has forgotten it, but the debtor remembers it. He knows he can neglect to pay it, without any loss of reputation. He has no fear-he sees that he has no cause for fear-of any temporal evil, if he neglects payment. We say, it is possible for a man in this situation to love honesty so well, that he will pay the debt, for the sake of being an honest man. True, God knows the whole truth, and would call him to account for dishonesty in another world; but it is not necessary that he should think of this, before he can find a motive to do that which is right. True also, his conscience will reproach him with dishonesty, if he withholds from his neighbour his due; but he may so love honesty, that he will pay without being goaded by this fear. In short, the man may so love honesty, that he will not need to think of any thing, except the fact that he ought to pay that debt, in order to find a sufficient motive for paying it. In other words, the man who, knowing that a debt is honestly due, will stop and consider whether it can be collected by law, or whether he shall lose credit, or comfort, or heaven, by neglecting to pay it, or who needs to stop and consider any thing but the single fact that it is due, before he can feel any inducement to pay it, is not so thoroughly honest as a man can be. We maintain that there may be a love, not only for the consequences of honesty, as manifested in external advantages or internal peace, in this world or the world to come, but for honesty itself. We maintain that the hope of enjoyment is not the only consideration, which man is capable of feeling as an inducement

to act; that a man may so love righteousness, that it also may be felt as an inducement. We maintain, too, that this is not merely another form of the desire of enjoyment, but that a man may feel a desire to do right, without taking into consideration any of the advantages which are to result from it.

It is maintained by some, that man is incapable of being induced to act, by any thing but the desire of enjoyment that enjoyment is the only thing which man is capable of regarding as good in itself, and of desiring for its own sake; that he is, from his very constitution, if not from the nature of intelligent being, incapable of acting at all, except as led by the hope of enjoyment, or driven by the fear of suffering. We mean to deny this doctrine, and to assert that man is capable of acting from motives of a different kind. We admit that he cannot act, except in view of something which he, at the time, regards as good; and we admit that enjoyment is good, and may be a motive to action; but we maintain that enjoyment is not the only good which man is capable of appreciating and pursuing. We grant, too, that righteousness and enjoyment are intimately connected; that, indeed, ordinarily, the same act of the mind is at once duty and enjoyment; but we contend that man is under no indispensible necessity to think of this, in order that he may feel inducement to do that which is right.

We mean to deny the doctrine of Paley, that "we can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be a violent motive to us." We mean to deny that "self-love, or the desire of happiness, is the primary cause or reason of all acts of preference or choice, which fix supremely on any object." We maintain that the love of righteousness, the desire to be righteous, may sustain the same relation to acts of choice, which the writers just quoted ascribe to self-love, or the desire of happiness.

Our proof of this doctrine must rest, for the most part, on the reader's own consciousness; and we beg leave, for the sake of brevity, to state what we believe that consciousness will recognize as true, in the form of positive assertion.

That this doctrine is true, is proved from the nature of the Christian duty of self-denial. What is self-denial? Is it merely exerting ourselves to avoid pain, or secure enjoyment? Is any act, performed because we can promote our