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out authority is void. Morris v. United States,
clared by the act of Congress of March 2, 1889, did not operate by relation to revest in the United States title to timber which had been cut prior to the act of forfeiture, so as to give the United States a right of action against a trespasser who cut the timber. United States v. Loughrey,
12. The title to timber cut prior to forfeiture on land granted by the act of Con
3. A party cannot defend against a pat-gress of June 3, 1856, to the state of Michient for land, duly issued upon an entry made gan, to aid in the construction of railroads, in the local land office, on the ground that subject to a condition subsequent that unhe was in actual possession of the land at sold lands should revert to the United States the time of the issue of the patent.. John- if the roads were not completed within ten son v. Drew, years, is in the state, and not in the United States. Id.
2. Relief against a patent for land issued by inadvertence and mistake can be granted to one who, being duly qualified and entitled, offered to enter the land, and on the denial of his offer instituted a contest, which was pending when the patent issued. Duluth & Iron Range R. Co. v. Roy,
4. The failure of a pre-emption claimant to make proof and payment within the time required by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2267, forfeits his right without any cancelation on the records. Northern P. R. Co. v. De Lacey,
5. An honorably discharged soldier was not entitled to go into Oklahoma territory before the designated time, and make a valid entry of a homestead therein, notwithstanding the general restriction by virtue of the act of Congress of March 2, 1889, § 12, providing that the rights of honorably discharged Union soldiers and sailors shall not be abridged. Calhoun v. Violet,
6. The grant of land by the act of Congress of July 2, 1864, was not blotted out with respect to an intervening pre-emption claim by the resolution of Congress adopted May 31, 1870, making a further grant. Northern P. R. Co. v. De Lacey,
7. The fact that only 25 feet in width of its right of way has been occupied for railroad purposes, under a grant of 200 feet on each side of the track, does not prevent the railroad company from claiming the full width of the grant as against persons who had occupied the premises for the purpose of making a townsite location thereof, but had not acquired a right thereto as against the railroad company when the road was built. Northern P. R. Co. v. Smith,
See CARRIERS, 3-6; CONSPIRACY, 3-5;
See also INDIANS, 2.
8. The occupation and survey of lands with intent to locate a town site thereon, but without filing a plat or obtaining the adoption of the town site or a patent therefor until after a railroad is located thereon, does not prevent the land from being a part of the public domain for the purposes of a grant to the railroad company.
ed to a railroad company on condition of its 1. A provision that certain rights grantestablishing a terminus at a certain point
shall cease if the terminus is abandoned cre
9. The right to repayment of the excess of $1.25 per acre given by the act of Con-ates a resolutory condition. New Orleans v. gress of June 16, 1880, where the double Texas & P. R. Co. minimum price has been paid for land afterwards found not to be within the limits of a railroad land grant, does not extend to a case in which the lands were at the time of the payment within the limits of such a grant and ceased to be so only because the grant was forfeited. Medbury v. United States, 779 10. Valid entries can be made under the desert land act, of land within the place limits of a land grant to railroad corporations. United States v. Ingram,
1. The claim of an equity or lien on prop
11. The forfeiture of a land grant de-erty held by an officer of a corporation to se
2. An ordinance giving the right to ex tend railroad tracks from a depot at a designated terminus to certain points, in consideration of the obligation to establish its terminus at that place, creates a suspensive condition or a condition precedent.
See also APPEAL AND ERROR, 16, 24-27;
ure a debt to himself does not defeat the juisdiction of a court which has appointed a eceiver for the corporation in a suit to hich the officer is a party, after hearing on ue notice and appearance, to order him to urn over such property to the receiver. 91 insley v. Anderson,
2. A receiver in a Federal court who volntarily goes into a state court cannot quesion the right of that court to determine the ontroversy between himself and the other 430 party. Grant v. Buckner,
3. A counterclaim or set-off comes within the spirit of the act of Congress of August 13, 1888, allowing a receiver of a Federal court to be sued in a state court without leave of the court appointing him. Id.
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.
3. An appropriation act authorizing the attorney general to offer rewards relieves officers who earn such rewards from the pro visions of earlier statutes denying extra conId. pensation to officers.
See BOUNDARIES, 2, 3; COURTS, 17;
1. An agreement to pay one fourth the value of a vessel as salvage, although it gives very large compensation for the work which actually proves necessary to be done, will not be considered unconscionable or exorbitant, when it was made after the refusal by the master of an offer to do the work for such salvage as the court should award, and after receiving bids, and full advice from the owners of the vessel and their agent, who came to the vessel and saw her situation, and when
See APPEAL AND ERROR, IV.; INDIANS, the vessel was in fact never in imminent danger. The Elfrida,
See ARBITRATION, 2; CONTRACTS, 4.
See DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
2. A salvage contract for stipulated compensation, dependent upon success within a limited time, although the amount may be much larger than a mere quantum meruit, will not be set aside unless corruptly entered into, or made under fraudulent representations, a clear mistake, or suppression of important facts, in immediate danger to the
See ACTION OR SUIT, 5, 6; APPEAL AND ship, or under other circumstances amount-
RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
See COMMERCE, 8.
ing to compulsion, or unless its enforcement would be contrary to equity and good conscience.
See PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS, 10.
See CARRIERS, 6.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 71; JUDGMENT, 10.
1. The right to take fur seals under
See ACTION OR SUIT, 5, 6; CONFLICT OF tions for which a reduction of rentals is pro-
Congress of 1870, is not done away with by implication by the act of May 24, 1874, which removes the restrictions imposed by U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 1960, 1962, concerning the months during which seals may be taken and the number to be taken on or about each island respectively.
4. No reduction of the per capita amount to be paid for each sealskin taken and shipped by a lessee of the government can be made on account of the limitation by the Secretary of the Treasury of the number of seals that may be killed, although by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1962, a proportionate reduction of the rents reserved may be made where the lease provides for an annual rental of $60,000 and in addition thereto for a certain sum for each skin taken and shipped, as this is in the nature of a bonus or addition to the stated consideration.
3. An explosion of a case of detonators, making a hole in the ship's side below the water, while a ship is being unladen at the
dock, which happens purely by accident and without any fault or negligence on the part of anyone engaged in carrying or discharging the cargo, is the proximate cause of damage to cargo, which follows from the immediate inflow of sea water; and such damage is not occasioned by the perils of the sea, within exceptions in the bill of lading.
4. A ship sailing when the weather is fair is not unseaworthy because ports between decks, which are tightly closed with glass, are not also covered with inner covers or dummies of iron, when these have been provided for such purpose, and because the hatches are battened down, when these could be opened in two minutes by knocking out the wedges, and there is no cargo stowed against the ports, or anything else to prevent or embarrass access to them in case a change of weather should make it necessary proper to close the iron shutters. The Silvia,
5. A schooner was in fault for excessive speed in case of a collision with a steamer, when she was sailing at a speed of 7 miles per hour, through a fog, in waters where other vessels were frequently met, and her fog horn was heard by the steamer but once, or possibly twice, while, if the vessels had been proceeding at the speed required by law, their signals would have been exchanged so many times that the locality and course of each would have been made clearly known to the other, and there would have been sufficient time to take proper steps for avoiding the collision. The Chattahoochee, 801
See PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS, 7.
See CONTRACTS, 12.
See LIBEL AND SLANDER.
See DUTIES, 12, 13; INDICTMENT,
See PUBLIC LANDS, 5.
SOLDIERS' HOME. See FOOD.
See PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS, 7, 9.
SPECIAL LAWS. See STATUTES, 1.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 4.
See SHIPPING, 5. STAMPS.
See INDICTMENT, 2.
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 2, 4.
See also COUPONS; STATUTES, 4; WA-
A suit to restrain officers of a state from taking any steps, by means of judicial proceedings, in execution of a state statute to which they do not hold any special relation, is really a suit against the state within the prohibition of the 11th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Fitts v. McGhee, 535
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
2. An exclusive right of a street-railway company to use a street cannot be conferred by a city under the Michigan tram-railway act, providing that the corporations formed for such purposes shall have the exclusive right to use and operate any railways constructed, owned, or held by them, provided that they shall not construct a railway through the streets of any town or city with
See also ATTACHMENT, 3; COURTS, 5, 23; out the consent of the municipal authorities. REWARD, 3.
1. A statute creating a special tribunal for claims against a municipal corporation which have no legal, but only an equitable or moral, obligation, does not regulate practice in courts of justice, within the meaning of a provision restricting local or special laws. Guthrie Nat. Bank v. Guthrie,
796 2. In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect. Collins v. New Hampshire,
3. A statute taken from another state will be presumed to be taken with the meaning it had there. Henrietta Min. & M. Co. v. Gardner, 637
4. A statute authorizing state coupons to be received for all taxes is not altogether void because certain special taxes and dues are, by the existing state Constitution, required to be paid in cash. McCullough v. Virginia, 382 5. A rightful judgment against the state gives a vested right which cannot be taken away pending writ of error, by a repeal of the statute which authorized the state to be sued.
SUBMISSION OF CONTROVERSY.
See WRIT AND PROCESS.
See also APPEAL AND ERROR, 29; CONSTI-
1. The state may tax the average number of refrigerator cars used by railroads within the state but owned by a foreign corporation which has no office or place of business in the state, and employed as vehicles. of transportation in the interchange of interstate commerce. American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, On corporation.
6. A city charter authorizing a contract for a water supply, without providing for an 2. A franchise or business tax on the election to ratify it, although it does provide for such an election as a condition of the amount of capital stock employed by a corerection of waterworks by the city, super-poration within the state is not invalid besedes a general statute which requires such cause a portion of its business is the imporan election to ratify a contract for a water tation and sale of articles in original packsupply. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Wa- ages. New York, Parke, D. & Co., v. Rob323 ter Co. 341 erts, 3. A tax on a corporation or its property is not a legal equivalent of a tax on the stock in the names of the stockholders. Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 850
See JUDGMENT, 8.
4. A bridge over the Ohio river between See CORPORATIONS; DAMAGES, 1; TAX- Indiana and Kentucky is subject to taxation ES, 2, 3, 10.
STOCK AND PRODUCE EXCHANGE.
in a Kentucky city, so far as it is within the city boundaries, although they extend to lowwater mark on the Indiana side. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 823
5. The fact that a bridge over the Ohio river was erected under the authority or with the consent of Congress, and is used for
interstate commerce, does not exempt it from taxation by the state within whose limits it is permanently located. Id.
6. A city charter forbidding taxation of lands not divided into lots of 5 acres or less does not apply to a bridge erected over the Ohio river within the city limits. Id.
water stations, which is exempt from taxation within the territories of the United States under the act of Congress of July 27, 1866, does not mean the right of passage merely, but is real estate of corporeal quality, and the exemption includes all that is erected upon it. New Mexico v. United States Trust Co. 407 15. The exemption of the railroad right of
7. A stipulation in a grant to a bridge company by a city, that it shall not be construed as waiving the right of the city to col-way given by 2 of the act of Congress of lect taxes on the bridge itself and all appur- July 27, 1866, granting lands to the Atlantic tenances thereto, saves not only the right & Pacific Railroad Company, does not extend which the city then has to impose taxes, but to the right of way acquired under § 7, or any right that may subsequently be lawfully independently of that section from private conferred upon it. Id. owners. New Mexico v. United States Trust Co. 1079
On national banks.
8. A state tax nominally on the franchise of a national bank, but in reality upon all its intangible property, is in violation of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5219, which allows a tax only on
the shares of stock in the names of share-
9. A statute which requires the shares of national banks and of other incorporated banks to be assessed at their true value in money, without any deduction of debts, but allows a deduction of debts existing in the business of an unincorporated bank, does not make a discrimination against national banks, as its debts are in fact considered in reaching the true value of its shares. First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 669
17. Previous notice of a hearing before 850 officers who make an assessment for taxes is 1035 not necessary if there is notice of the decision, with a right to appeal to a court and 1037 be heard and offer evidence before the valua
tion of the property for taxation is finally fixed. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Board of Public Works,
10. The increase of the value of national bank shares by reason of the bank franchises does not make the taxation of those shares at their true value amount to a discrimination in favor of unincorporated banks, which
have no franchise.
11. Credits consisting of claims for labor or services do not constitute "moneyed capital" within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5219, respecting discrimination against national banks. Id.
12. Moneyed capital, within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5219, prohibiting the taxation of national banks at higher rates than other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals, does not include capital which does not come into competition with the business of national banks. Id.
13. Lands included in the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by the act of Congress of July 2, 1864, are subject to state taxation for their value as agricultural lands, although they have not been patented to the railroad company and their mineral or nonmineral character is under investigation under the provisions of the act of Congress of February 26, 1895, chap. 131. Northern P. R. Co. v. Myers, 564
16. The designation of some railroad improvements by name and giving some of them a separate valuation does not invalidate their assessment as realty.
14. The right of way for 100 feet each side of a railroad, including all necessary grounds for station buildings, workshops, machine shops, switches, side tracks, turntables, and
See COMMERCE, 18.
See also COMMERCE, 18.
A telephone company whose business is the electrical transmission of articulate speech between different points is not entitied to the benefit of the act of Congress of July 24, 1866 (U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 52635268), respecting the use of post roads. Richmond v. Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. 1162