principles of true Christianity, I would send all the missionaries, not to the Congo, but to school first, where they could learn the ABC of religion. There nave always been, and still are, amongst us, men who would make good schoolmasters, and who could form good moral civilisers, but the present specimens and the unseemly squabbles between Catholics and Protestants are as distressing as they are ridiculous. See how well we are getting on in Egypt, where we simply teach the natives to be decent shop-keepers, that is, as decent as we are ourselves. They are too strong for us, and they find they can go through the process of being civilised as easily with the Koran in hand as they would with the Bible; and so, there, as in India, we leave well alone,' and are successful. Above all, I would wish the pressure of public opinion, and the voice of the public conscience to be so great and so loud that our representatives must be honest and moral. It is not by abstaining-if abstinence were possible in the case of Africa-that we shall further the cause of progress; it is by acting, ever with less selfishness and with more uprightness."

DOES FRANCE DESIRE WAR WITH GERMANY?

A PAMPHLET has appeared at Brussels with the above title, and it contains a valuable preface by that distinguished writer on economic and political science, M. le Comte Goblet d'Alviella, member of the Belgian Senate. The pamphlet contains a careful examination of the question whether France has shown a disposition to accept any settlement of the Alsace-Lorraine dispute, other than that of war. The Count observes that all Europe is interested in this question, inasmuch as another war between France and Germany might easily become a general war, and involve even the neutral states, like Belgium. He further points out that the situation has become far more menacing since an understanding has been entered into between France and Russia, for that puts an end to all the security for the preservation of the status quo, provided by the Triple Alliance. He then reviews the several proposals which have been made with the object of bringing about an arrangement which would satisfy both France and Germany, and states that he himself has always considered the neutralisation of the two provinces to be the most efficacious of the remedies proposed. He gives reasons, however, for thinking that it would not be accepted, and suggests a solution which would be more practicable-viz., “the military neutralisation of the territory in dispute."

"The essential object to be attained, even from the French point of view, is the re-entry of Alsace-Lorraine into political unity with the fatherland, not the preservation of fortresses or the quartering of battalions." As to the view which Germany would take of the proposal, M. Goblet d'Alviella reminds us that they have always alleged strategic reasons as their justification for the occupation. He adds, that if

France were to adopt a conciliatory attitude in the matter, Germany, threatened as she is by increasing difficulties, would clearly perceive that "to hold an armed camp in an enemy's country is not always the best means of obtaining security against possible aggression."

We are indebted for this information to the Etats Unis d'Europe, which has published the preface in question at full length, and we therefore presume that its editor, M. Emile Arnaud, President of The League of Peace and Liberty, as a Frenchman, looks favourably on the suggestion. We should be glad to learn how it will be regarded by German Liberals.

A proposal like this, thus approved by a man of statesmanlike abilities, must make everyone exclaim, "Oh! that this might be true." What a weight would be taken from all Europe, from peoples and rulers alike, if the secret were at last found of delivering the nations from the awful peril which has so long threatened them. PHIL.

AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.

A NEW PROPOSAL, BY SIR EDMUND HORNBY.

WE desire to call the special attention of our readers to the following masterly essay which Sir Edmund Hornby has forwarded to the Peace Society, and which, together with the covering letter, we reprint from the Herald of Peace. We trust that our readers will give it their most careful attention, and we shall be glad to receive comments and criticisms on the scheme. We hope in a future number to discuss the plan in detail. We only add now that the following account of Sir Edmund Hornby's official career shows that he is eminently qualified to prepare a scheme for a tribunal, and that any opinions of his on the subject are entitled to great respect.

Having been previously called to the Bar, Sir E. Hornby was appointed, by H.M. Government, one of the Commissioners in the mixed British and American Commission, under the Convention of 1853, for the settlement of various outstanding claims between the United States and Great Britain. In 1855 he was constituted a Commissioner, on behalf of England, to control the expenditure of the Turkish Loan. He also became Judicial Assessor at the Consulate General at Constantinople. During the period of the Crimean War he was the sole Arbitrator in all the claims and disputes arising between the British Government and the contractors for supplies to the Army in the East. From 1857 to 1864 he was Judge of the Supreme Consular Court of the Levant, at Constantinople. In 1862 he received the honour of knighthood,

and in 1865 he became Judge of the Supreme Court of China and Japan. After this distinguished official career he retired on a pension in 1876.

THE LETTER.

"TO THE SECRETARY OF THE PEACE SOCIETY.

"Lensdon House, Ashburton. "DEAR SIR, I send you a paper which I have written, with a desire that the subject of it should be broached and ventilated.

"When I was in Germany last year, I mentioned the matter to several influential men, and they thought it at least worthy of attention, and were especially struck with the idea of founding an international college for the creation of a modern system of international law. To my mind such a system will best grow out of an international tribunal. The best part of our law, and indeed of all law, is judge-made faw. Its merit being its adaptibility to the ever-varying conditions of society, and in its reference to and enunciation of principles."

"Make whatever use of it you like.

"The subject is to me a most interesting one. Throughout my career I have had a great deal to do with international questions, arbitrations, &c., and am convinced that governments would, far more readily than is imagined, refer matters, often in their inception easy of settlement, to a tribunal, if one existed, so constituted as to ensure impartial judgments based on recognised principles. It must, however, be beyond the reach of suspicion and of the highest rank and influence.

"The smaller States would welcome it as a protectorate. The larger ones, if England, Germany, and Italy would fall in with the idea, would soon come round. I have reason to hope that the Emperor of Germany would welcome it. In talking the matter over with two distinguished ministers, one a Frenchman and the other a Russian, whose names I am not at liberty to mention, they both said they 'dreaded reference, for arbitration, to Sovereigns and commissions, because it was impossible to calculate or foresee the influence of 'interests' political, diplomatic, or private; but that if a tribunal could be constituted, of international weight, above all suspicion, and that would act on 'principle,' their objections would disappear.

"Details could be settled easily. What I want is to invite discussion and attention.

"Yours sincerely, "EDMUND HORNBY."

THE ESSAY.

The wise determination of the Governments of England and the United States of America to submit the long pending dispute relative to the Seal Fisheries in the Behring Seas to arbitration suggests the possibility of determining all international questions, of sufficient importance, to some impartial tribunal of a similar character. Of course it will be said that nations will not, except perhaps in very exceptional cases, give up their right to determine for themselves, and by force of arms, if necessary, the question of their rights and wrongs-that human nature must change before such an ideal state of perfection can be hoped for, in which people, sovereigns, and governments will submit to the dictation of any human tribunal, however perfect its constitution, or whatever guarantees it might offer for an impartial decision-and that, if even they could be persuaded to forego the arbitrament of war, or the luxury of testing by brute strength their infallibility, there would be, and could be, no power behind the

tribunal to enforce its decrees. In answer to this latter argument it may be said there is absolutely no power behind the arbitration tribunal, constituted only the other day by the good sense of the English and United States Governments, to enforce upon either party to the convention submission to its decrees. Yet no one in the whole civilised world would be bold enough to doubt that the decree will be accepted and obeyed, or to hint even that the agreement has not been entered into in perfect good faith, and will be fully carried out. The question submitted also is one which so nearly touches the patriotic sensibilities of both nations, and is itself so difficult of decision, that if anything can justify an appeal to arms it would, since it involves a point of jurisdiction never yet raised, still less determined; a point which from the United States point of view, touches its sovereignty almost as much as an infringement of its territory, to say nothing of alleged acquiescence and long user; and from the point of view of England, an interference with its right, hitherto unquestioned, of free user for all legitimate purposes, of the high seas.

If the real and primary causes of the chief wars that have from time to time devastated Europe and thrown back civilisation and development are investigated, it will be found that, apart from those of purely dynastic interest, they have, with but few unimportant exceptions, originated in the vanity and greed of rulers-the desire for extension of territory-jealousy of influence exercised by powerful States over minor States-personal pique on the part of diplomatic agents-fancied insults or more or less unfounded suspicions-the irritating comments of irresponsible writers in the public press-abuse of the right of asylum by political refugees, or from the necessity which sovereigns, absolute as well as constitutional, have felt, to divert by war the attention of their subjects from matters of internal reform. Few, if any, have arisen from differYet these ences on tariff, or commercial questions. often involve matters of the gravest import to the most vital interest of nations. No doubt in the past many causes would have rendered the settlement of such differences by any form of arbitration difficult, if not impossible. Now, however, education and a better knowledge by the people of the position in which rulers and governments stand towards those they rule or govern, has to a great extent prevented, and will in the future, to a still greater extent, prevent these arbitrary and ill-conditioned causes culminating in

war.

The sacrifices and sufferings endured by the people, the vast expense incurred by each belligerent, crippling their respective countries for generations, has, particularly of late years, been brought home to the people in a way foreign to all past experience. Sovereigns and ministers have been made to feel in their own persons the full weight of the popular displeasure, and the knowledge thus acquired, and the experience thus gained by both peoples and rulers, must tend to diminish the most frequent and unjustifiable causes of

war.

There is, however, another and perhaps more potent reason why wars should not be rashly undertaken, and therefore will not be so undertaken. No belligerent can now ever forecast the issue of a war. Victory no longer rests as a certainty with the stronger. The weaker has now positive chances in its favour. It may, it is true, lose at the outset a battle, or see a portion of its territory in the occupation of its enemy; but then steps in a combination-not necessarily an armed force -but one ready to arm and with crushing power to overthrow and to humiliate.

Curiously enough, this combination is seldom a force moved by pity or inspired by jealousy or righteous indignation, but one moved simply by a determination

for which it would be puzzled to offer any reason but an untrue or a sentimental one-that the struggle

shall stop, that the shedding of blood shall cease, and territory acquired be evacuated. The farce of a congress may be gone through, but each belligerent knows the moment hostilities are thus forcibly suspended that the last thing to be taken into consideration will probably be the cause of the quarrel or the rights of the parties. Thus arbitrament by war is not long likely to be a favoured method, even with the masters of legions, of solving a difficulty, vindicating a right, or avenging a wrong. There is always the unseen possible combination in the background, possessed of an irresistible capacity for frustrating the best laid plan, and of changing certainty into uncertainty, and this at the cost of a few sheets of dispatch paper.

This possibility, or probability, would in itself, then, seem to be a sufficient deterrent to the undertaking of costly wars; but unfortunately it is not, and precisely because it is only a possibility, or a probability. It is chance, and chance is a prime factor which nations and rulers, as well as individuals, love to discount.

This "chance" justifies also in the sight of rulers the maintenance of huge standing armies, which necessitate ever-increasing taxation, and drains the life-blood of nations by withdrawing from industry-the only true source of wealth and culture-the youth and vigour of a country. To maintain the discipline of an armed force it is necessary to employ its energy somehow, or, at least, to keep prominently before it, the chance of its employment becoming necessary. Hence the imminency of war becomes a necessity-disturbing every social, intellectual, and industrial occupation, which, reacting on "capital," causes it to shrink from assisting any species of enterprise, from which it cannot withdraw itself at a moment's notice.

Moreover, there are dangers in large standing armies, and especially in those maintained by "conscription," which sovereigns, rulers, and governments must take note of. In these times they are a standing menace to all government-a nation of citizens accustomed to discipline, the use of arms, and alive to the advantages of concerted and combined action-constitute a force in times of popular excitement, especially on questions affecting the masses, such as Socialism or labour troubles, which even popular governments would do well to take into consideration. A small highly disciplined and well-paid force is always a loyal force, and can always be reckoned on to support authority, often only too devotedly. Opposed to a discordant undisciplined mob-no matter how fanatic-it is irresistible; but it is powerless to resist such a force when trained to arms, with leaders (and some are sure to come to the front on the emergency arising) accustomed to command and enforce obedience. Such mobs are more dangerous than a disbanded army, because they fight for a principle, however absurd a one, and not for mere loot or lust of blood, and have, moreover, a nation at their back instead of opposed to them.

Owing, perhaps, to its quasi-insular position, but more largely to the good sense and confident patriotism of its people, the United States has never kept up a large standing army or navy, yet no people on the face of the earth have convinced other nations of their power at such little cost. No other nation has shown itself more ready to avenge an insult or to maintain a right, yet a large standing army has not been found necessary to maintain the unity or integrity of its national life.

The Arbitration Convention then, to which reference has been made, furnishes a precedent on which to establish an "International Court of Arbitration," to which all questions that are likely, or may be likely, from the mode in which they may be discussed, to culminate in war, should stand automatically referred. It will only be necessary to adopt the main principles which underlie that convention to establish a basis on which a permanent tribunal shall stand, as on a rock.

That convention, however, has not the mere settlement of an isolated dispute in view. It seeks, by the appointment of the eminent jurists-selected jurists, be it remarked, brought up under different systems of law -for the enunciation of some principle of "international law," which shall rule in the future, all decisions involving similar points. Notwithstanding the many learned works which eminent jurists have written on the interesting subject of the "Law of Nations," they have failed in producing a system of "international law" which recommends itself to the sense of modern nations, or which is either suited to the marked development that has taken place in juridical science, or to the vast change that has crept over the popular mind in regard to the principles which should regulate not only the rights but the intercourse of nations. It is in vain to search the pages of Ayala or Grotius, of Puffendorf, or of Ulpian or Gaius, for some guiding principle to which reasonable exception cannot be taken, to decide such points of jurisdiction, &c., as are submitted to the arbitrators under the Behring Sea Convention, and mainly because the conditions of things have altered. Who, for instance, in the time of these learned publicists would have dreamed of a necessity arising for the protection of the denizens of the sea? Who could have foreseen that a demand for a mere article of fashion could threaten the extinction of a whole race of amphibia, or that the appliances for such wholesale destruction would, in the face of dangers and natural obstructions, be so brought to perfection, or be so wantonly applied, as to ensure the annual slaughter of millions upon millions of fur-coated seals? Yet the same necessity may, and probably will, arise in the near future in the determination of the right of those seagirt nations whose outlying islands, estuaries, bays, and rivers are the spawning and feeding grounds of whole races and families of fishes and animals which; when in the open sea, are claimed as the common property of all mankind to use or abuse as it may seem fit.

On this subject the judgment of the arbitrators will, without doubt, lay down principles of law and reason which will be accepted as binding, not only by the United States and England, but by the whole civilised world. In other words, it will, on the points submitted, create, or, if one exists, enunciate with authority, a branch of "international law." What, then, the Behring Seas Convention seeks to and will accomplish by means of a limited international arbitration, a general "international court" may, and certainly will if established, accomplish as regards the creation or enunciation of a whole system of international law, in a way and under conditions of success never hitherto attempted or perhaps seriously thought of.

The constitution of the Court of Arbitration established by the Convention, as well as the procedure to be observed, furnishes an admirable ground work on which to raise the superstructure of an international court. It provides, on a small scale, exactly those conditions of success which will ensure success when applied to a larger sphere of action. The arbitrators are men of varied nationalities-of the highest reputation-jurists, and not mere lawyers or advocatesstatesmen, not in the sense of either theoretical doctrinaires or practical politicians, but in the sense of men who have lived in the world, who have taken an active part in all questions which affect the prosperity of countries and peoples, who are familiar with, because they have shared, the wants, difficulties, necessities, and aspirations alike of those who rule and those who submit to rule from a sense of the necessity of rule-men on whom responsibility lies heavily, who have a keen appreciation, not only of the importance, but of the difficulties attending the

adequate performance of the honourable task they have undertaken-men, doubtless, imbued with strong patriotic feelings, but to whom the whole world is kith and kin, and not mere sections of the world—and whose honour and reputation is not alone their own, but the property of the world. They are not mere citizens of the country in which they were born, or whose sympathies are confined to a narrow circle of a nation's boundaries, but men who are citizens of the world. That such men have been found is an earnest that the world is not wanting in them, although it may be necessary in a permanent Court of Arbitration to find still further guarantees for impartiality-to place the members beyond the possibility of temptation to which the wisest and best men have yielded-and to make it worth their while to withdraw, at the height of their power, from the legitimate pursuit of honourable ambition within the limits of country and friends. What is wanted is for them to build up a system of international law, whilst deciding without favour or affection upon a series of single issues which may in their character of international exponents of the laws of nations be submitted to them-to form, in short, at once a college and a court.

Entitled as the arbitrators on the Behring Sea Commission are to the confidence and trust reposed in them, they are, nevertheless, in a false position. a false position. Appointed ad hoc, they are the "representatives," the nominees, of the government of their respective countries. They are all more or less in and on service. It is impossible to calculate to what extent the wishes, feelings, desires, or interests of their governments may be enlisted, or what complications those governments may foresee, or what bearing or effect they may think the decision, one way or the other, may have on those interests. International politics and relations may exert influences which ought to be wholly absent. With every desire, every determination to be impartial, to decide and judge without fear, favour, or affection, it is almost hopeless to expect that these interests and relations will not, unwittingly to the arbitrators themselves, produce results. At any rate, if there should be any want of unanimity, if the judgment should be that of a majority only, public opinion will certainly attribute it to this pressure, invisible as it may be, of such influences, and it will be without weight as an exposition of the principles of public law. Hence the importance the paramount importance of a "tribunal" being, by its very constitution, beyond the reach alike of such suspicions and such influences.

The procedure prescribed may also be followed with advantage. Outside the arbitrators, and wholly independent of them, the agents of the respective countries will each prepare the case and arguments to be submitted to the tribunal, which is located in a neutral capital, and a time is fixed within which the case is to be presented, and argued, and judgment thereon passed. It is simplicity itself.

The "scheme" of an "international tribunal," however, requires a little more elaboration. Nations must be invited to divide themselves-as indeed they are now diplomatically divided-into three ranks, not because their sovereignty as nations is incomplete, or their equality as independent nations unrecognised, but simply because their position, size, material strength, and therefore influence, as also their mercantile and productive interests, are small in comparison with those of others, and therefore not so likely to involve them in disputes; and because also it would be unfair that they should contribute anything like the same proportion of the expense attending the foundation or maintenance of an institution, either in its character of an "international tribunal" or of a "college" they may seldom be called on to invoke. Before the tribunal, however, they would rank, on a footing of perfect equality. Each nation would then be invited to nomi

nate, for a period of at least ten years, a member, not necessarily of its own nationality, and certainly not in the character of a representative, but in that of a personality in which it places confidence, founded on a recognition of those qualities which are the distinguishing characteristics of the arbitrators appointed under the Behring Seas Convention, it being left open to the nations of the second and third ranks to nominate a member or to decline to do so, whilst giving in their adherence as consenting parties to the general scheme.

The locality of the Tribunal should be permanent and on quasi-neutral ground. No better place could be selected than one of the Swiss Cantons-central as a place of residence and blessed with a good climatethe Confederate Government of Switzerland being appointed guardians of this tribunal or college, and likewise the depositaries and administrators of the subscribed funds for the payment of salaries and the disbursement of all expenses. The site of the tribunal or college and its grounds (by whatever name the institution be called) should be declared extraterritorial, and the persons of its members and staff inviolate, and invested with the privileges usually accorded to ambassadors. The title of the members might be the old and honoured one of "senators," or of jurisconsults-their rank, when they appeared in public, being nominally fixed as equal to the highest, except that of a sovereign ruler. They should be solemnly absolved from allegiance to any earthly Power, be unable to accept, not only during office but during life, any title, rank, decoration, or place from anyone. They should be required to be in residence nine months in the year in the canton selected, or in the college itself, or within one hundred miles of it, provided that the country selected was not that of their birth. Their salaries should not be less than £10,000 a year, paid, not by the Government nominating them, but out of the common subscribed fund-a retiring pension, if not re-nominated at the expiration of ten years, being granted to them of £3,000 a year from the same fund.

The amount to be raised must necessarily depend on the cost of the building and its surroundings, and on the number of senators and staff. To defray the first item of cost would probably require a contribution of £100,000 or £150,000 from each first-class Power, half those amounts from a second-class Power, and onethird from a third-class Power. Assuming that twentyone Powers of all ranks gave in their adherence, two millions would thus be raised, and for the annual maintenance of the institution, pensions, &c., £200,000 a year would be required, which eight contributions of £20,000 a year each, six ditto of £5,000, and seven ditto of £2,500 a year would more than supply, although, in view of eventualities, it would be wiser to raise a capital sum from which an income by way of an annuity of at least £200,000 a year could be obtained. But whatever the amount necessary, it would be insignificant in comparison to the cost of even a single petty war.

The court or college would thus be created at the cost of the subscribing Powers in proportion to their rank, and be worthy in point of extent, accommodation and architectural beauty of the object it is founded to attain. It should be laid out in the form of a vast college or club, at some distance from the busy haunts of men, capable of accommodating at least 150 persons, including staff and servants, with guest rooms for advocates, and surrounded by hundreds of acres of ample grounds dedicated to exercise and health.

The chief secretary, whose appointment should be vested in the senators, should have no rank outside the precincts of the institution, but be entitled to the privileges of the senators, and during office be subject to their disabilities. The appointment should be for life, subject only to recision on a two-third vote

of the senators, the salary, £5,000 a year, with a retiring pension of £2,500. Under this officer should be placed the general staff of the institution, and he alone should be the medium of communication with the adhering governments, it being contrary to the first principle under which such an institution is founded that any senator should, under any circumstances, hold communication with any sovereign or a government. The staff should be adequately paid, and inability to take any public employment anywhere the penalty for every species of infidelity to

the senate.

To this tribunal so constituted would then be submitted any and every question between the adhering powers on every failure by ordinary diplomatic effort to effect a settlement. Relations should not be suspended pending the reference, or any preparation for war be undertaken; but when necessary a committee of the senators, not including the nominees of the Powers interested, should determine on a modus vivendi during the investigation and until decision.

It should be competent for the Powers interested to formulate their respective cases, either in writing, without oral argument or by written arguments supported by oral advacacy-the tribunal having full powers to order the production of any evidence it deemed necessary, in any form or by any means, and to adjourn final decision until such be furnished.

The president should be chosen annually by secret ballot, but be eligible for re-election by a two-third majority.

As conferences and discussions must necessarily take place amongst the arbitrators themselves, and as all men, learned and unlearned, differ constitutionally in nerve power, as well as in mental and physical power, care must be taken to prevent the possibility of masterful "will," crushing timidity, lack of selfconfidence, or sensitiveness of disposition. The freest scope must be secured for the exercise of individual thought and conviction, and its freest expression. Most men are sensitive to the world's opinion, and whether they value it not, often shrink from defying or running counter to it. On some men, and more frequently than not on men of studious habits, of sabtle brains and vast learning, the bare idea of selfassertion cripples their powers. They doubt their right to oppose their conviction to those expressed by a majority, however convinced they may be that the majority is wrong. Hence it is necessary to shield such minds, not from the coercion of stronger intellects, for the sensitive intellect may be, and often is, infinitely the stronger of the two, but from influences which act on wholly different organs, and may be brought to bear with overwhelming force on weaknesses and feelings that have nothing in common with intellectual forces. The dread of criticism, and especially such criticism as ignorance or venality offers, and publicity, paralyses the finest minds to an extent which induces many to defer the publication of their grandest mental efforts until death places them beyond the reach of the torture which both inflict upon the living. It is not difficult to devise such a shield. Each draft judgment, signed with some distinguishing mark known only to its author, must be printed so that each senator may be provided with a copy of the draft or unsettled judgment of every other senator after each has written his own, and placed it in a specially provided receptacle, like the Lion's Mouth at Venice, whence all are handed to the printer, under such restrictions as are necessary to secure secrecy, the object being to enable each senator to study the productions of every one of his colleagues without knowing whose opinion he is reading, and to profit by such study either in the way of modifying his own views, or in his final judgment, correcting errors or fallacies apparent in the draft judgments of the others without, of

course, special reference to them. When this has been done within a fixed time, then each senator will settle his own final judgment, and place it in the same receptacle for printing; and when printed the chief secretary will count the judgments in favour of, or against, the interested parties to the arbitration, the majority becoming the judgment of the tribunal, without however any disclosure of the name of the members forming such majority. The publication of the whole of the judgments still unsigned being postponed until the award has been complied with, or until such later time as the senators in their wisdom shall decree the chief secretary being the sole depository of the secret of authorship, until it be deemed advisable to record the judgments signed, in the reports of the court. In the event of the separate judgments of the majority being difficult to reduce in the form of a collective judgment, a committee of the authors of them, not however exceeding half their number, must be chosen by the chief secretary to summarise them so as to form a condensed précis of all the reasons and conclusions arrived at.

Thus, in the course of a few years, will a body of judge-made international law grow up, embodying the collective results of the learning and industry of the ablest jurists of the period.

There then remains the enforcement of the decrees of the tribunal. This must, as in the case of the Convention which has suggested the idea, be left to the good faith of the parties and to the influence of public opinion. But the adhering Powers might well determine to withdraw from or suspend diplomatic regulations, as distinguished from consular or commercial relations, with any recalcitrant, or might, as an extreme measure, combine to compel compliance by force, or by the infliction of some pecuniary or other penalty.

If each of the adhering nations should elect, as is improbable, a member of the court or college, and the number be considered excessive for the decision of comparatively insignificant disputes, or it be considered advisable to form a court of revision to which the judgment of a first court should stand referred, then cases should in the first instance be brought before a court composed of seven members (two of which should be of the nationality of the disputants), chosen otherwise by lot or from a rota, and the judgment (always that of the majority) be subject to revision by the rest of the senators, having all the judgments delivered before them, the rules as to secrecy being observed. This would tend perhaps to give additional weight to the final judgment, and secure a more exhaustive consideration of each case, particularly of those which from their nature involved intricate and complex points of international law.

Such, then, is a broad outline of an international court, or college, for the determination of disputes between nations, and for the gradual development of a system of international law. Before it all nations, however powerful or insignificant, would stand on a level of perfect equality. Its members would have nothing to gain or lose from the fears or affections of monarchs or of peoples. Absolved from mere national allegiance, on a rank with the highest, free from all temptation and even cares, and knowing that in the future their reputation for honour, learning, and impartiality would depend on their devotion to their duties, every incitement which operates on human nature and stimulates human ambition is offered them.

Details as to the nature of the duties of the chief secretary and the staff, and as to how the difficulties of language are to be overcome, can be easily supplied.

Insignificant, comparatively, as the location, and even the building, its library, its grounds and internal arrangements, and economy at first sight may appear to be, to the two great objects in view, they are never