Argument for Respondent. 209 U.S. That the injunctional order, for violation of which the petitioner was adjudged in contempt, was not void for want of jurisdiction, and could not be ignored or disobeyed with impunity, as an absolute nullity, and is not subject to collateral attack in any form of proceeding, see Illinois Central v. Adams, 180 U. S. 28. As to what matters are open for review upon a writ of habeas corpus is likewise a question of procedure; and the principles invoked in the Adams case are equally applicable to either question. The case involves a Federal question sufficient to sustain jurisdiction upon that ground alone. The penalty provisions of the law attacked are violative of the Fourteenth Amendment; as to this see Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Company, 183 U. S. 79, 99-102; Consolidated Gas Company v. Mayer, 146 Fed. Rep. 150; Ex parte Wood, 155 Fed. Rep. 190. The rates fixed are confiscatory and the legislation is therefore unconstitutional and void under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hastings v. Ames, 68 Fed. Rep. 726. Neither the suit itself, nor the injunction against petitioner is within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment. The doctrine of Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, if held applicable to the facts of the present case, is not supported by any other decision of this court, is inconsistent with the uniform current of authority, and has been overruled by later decisions of this court: Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 218; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 241. Fitts v. McGhee is also inconsistent with the subse→ quent case of Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, and other still more recent cases. The case of In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, is not in point and does not support the doctrine of Fitts v. McGhee in any direct sense. The distinction between the case of In re Ayers and cases like the case at bar has been clearly drawn by this court itself in the case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 9, 10. 209 U. S. Argument for Respondent. See also Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362; Tindall v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204; Starr v. C., R. I. & P. Ry., 110 Fed. Rep. 3. The same principle of distinction is applied, in varying language and with greater or less explicitness, in a number of other cases decided since the Ayers case, among which are:. In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Dey (Brewer, J.), 35 Fed. Rep. 866. The following cases deal with a state of facts like that in the case at bar and are squarely in conflict with Fitts v. McGhee, supra; in the view of that case which makes it applicable to the present situation. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U. S. 273, 284; Miss. R. R. Comm. v. Illinois Central, 203 U. S. 335, 340. If Fitts v. McGhee can be held applicable to the present case, then that decision is unsound in principle and ought to be overruled upon the ground that the Eleventh Amendment should not be given & construction which would tend to impair the full efficacy of the protecting clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has become the aim of some legislatures to frame their enactments with such cunning adroitness, and to hedge them about with such savage and drastic penalties, as to make it impossible to test the validity of such statutes in the courts save at a risk no prudent man would dare to assume. An apt comment upon this tendency, and upon the character of such legislation,. appears in the opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Company, 183 U. S: 79, 99-102. There is but one effective protection against such legislation-the power that may be exercised by courts of equity, and especially by the Circuit Courts of the United States. If it shall be held that a state statute may be so adroitly framed that the Eleventh Amendment will bar-any suit in the Federal courts of equity jurisdiction, then no corporation nor individual will dare assume the risk of the savage punishments which may be inflicted under such acts, and legislation which flagrantly violates the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment will be made operative for all practical purposes. By leave of court, Mr. Walker D. Hines filed a brief herein in behalf of the Southern Railway Company, in support of the contentions of the respondent. MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. We recognize and appreciate to the fullest extent the very great importance of this case, not only to the parties now before the court, but also to the great mass of the citizens of this country, all of whom are interested in the practical working of the courts of justice throughout the land, both Federal and state, and in the proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, as limited and controlled by the Federal Constitution and the laws of Congress. That there has been room for difference of opinion with regard to such limitations the reported cases in this court bear conclusive testimony. It cannot be stated that the case before us is entirely free from any possible doubt nor that intelligent men may not differ as to the correct answer to the question we are cailed upon to decide. The question of jurisdiction, whether of the Circuit Court or of this court, is frequently a delicate matter to deal with, and it is especially so in this case, where the material and most important objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is the assertion that the suit is in effect against one of the States of the Union. It is a question, however, which we are called upon, and which it is our duty, to decide. Under these circumstances, the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, is most apposite. In that case he said: "It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisIdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously perform our duty." Coming to a consideration of the case, we find that the complainants in the suit commenced in the Circuit Court were stockholders in the Northern Pacific Railway Company, and the reason for commencing it and making the railroad company one of the parties defendant is sufficiently set forth in the bill. Davis &c. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 220; Equity Rule 94, Supreme Court. It is primarily asserted on the part of the petitioner that jurisdiction did not exist in the Circuit Court because there was not the requisite diversity of citizenship, and there was no question arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States to otherwise give jurisdiction to that court. There is no claim made here of jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship, and the claim, if made, would be unfounded in fact. If no other ground exists, then the order of the Circuit Court, assuming to punish petitioner for contempt, was an unlawful order, made by a court without jurisdiction. In such case this court, upon proper application, will discharge the person from imprisonment. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 485. But an examination of the record before us shows that there are Federal questions in this case. It is insisted by the petitioner that there is no Federal ques tion presented under the Fourteenth Amendment, because there is no dispute as to the meaning of the Constitution, where it provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, and whatever dispute there may be in this case is one of fact simply, whether the freight or passenger rates as fixed by the legislature or by the railroad commission are so low as to be confiscatory, and that is not a Federal question. Jurisdiction is given to the Circuit Court in suits involving the requisite amount, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States (1 U. S. Comp. Stat. p. 508), and the question really to be determined under this objection is whether the acts of the legislature and the orders of the railroad commission, if enforced, would take property without due process of law, and although that question might incidentally involve a question of fact. its solution nevertheless is one which raises a Federal question. See Hastings v. Ames (C. C. A. 8th Circuit), 68 Fed. Rep. 726. The sufficiency of rates with reference to the Federal Constitution is a judicial question, and one over which Federal courts have jurisdiction by reason of its Federal nature. Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Reagan v. Farmers' &c. Co., 154 U. S. 369, 399; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649; Covington &c. Turnpike Road Company v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 522; Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 172. Another Federal question is the alleged unconstitutionality of these acts because of the enormous penalties denounced for their violation, which prevent the railway company, as alleged, or any of its servants or employés, from resorting to the courts for the purpose of determining the validity of such acts. The contention is urged by the complainants in the suit that the company is denied the equal protection of the laws and its property is liable to be taken without due process of law, because it is only allowed a hearing upon the claim of |