EQUITY.

See ACTIONS, 1;
COURTS, 4;

JURISDICTION, D 8, E.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

See ESTOPPEL, 2. ·

ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.

See JURISDICTION, C.

ESTOPPEL.

1. In pais; application of principles to municipal corporations.

The principles of right and justice upon which the doctrine of estoppel in
pais rests, are applicable to municipal corporations. Beadles v. Smyser,
393.

2. In pais; effect of contract by municipality to pay judgments.
Where public property of a municipality cannot be seized on execution
and the municipality enters into a valid agreement with judgment
creditors to apply the judgment fund to judgments in order of entry and
complies therewith, it cannot, after the expiration of the statutory
period when a judgment becomes dormant for failure to issue execution,
plead the statute of limitations as a bar to those judgments not yet
reached for payment under the agreement. The municipality is estopped
both on the contract and on the ground of equitable estoppel, and so
held as to judgments against a city in Oklahoma. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.

EVIDENCE.

Burden of proving state rate statute invalid.

A state rate statute is to be regarded as prima facie valid, and the onus rests

FEDERAL QUESTION.

1. Method of proving existence of law of State.

A ruling by the highest court of the State sustaining the method of proving
the existence of a law of that State presents no Federal question. Stick-
ney v. Kelsey, 419.

2. Frivolous question; question involving application of state statute to inter-
state commerce not frivolous.

Whether the state railroad rate statute involved in this case, although on its
face relating only to intrastate rates, was an interference with interstate
commerce held to raise a Federal question which could not be considered
frivolous. Ex parte Young, 123.

Who are.

See JURISDICTION, A 4; B 2, 4;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 4, 9.

FELLOW-SERVANTS.

One employed as a fireman on an engine of a construction train held, under
the circumstances of this case, not to be the fellow-servant of the fore-
man of the gang constructing the bridge which fell and caused the
accident. McCabe & Steen Co. v. Wilson, 275.

FOREIGN COMMERCE.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3.

FOREIGNERS.

See TREATIES.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 12;
STATES, 4.

FREIGHT RATES.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 7:

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.

See STATUTES, A 2.

GOVERNMENTAL POWERS.

See COURTS, 1.

GRAND JURY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9, 10.

GRANTS.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 1.

HABEAS CORPUS.

Power of Circuit Judge to discharge one convicted in state court for act done in
conformity with conditions prescribed by Federal court.

Where the Circuit Court of the United States has, in an action within its
jurisdiction, issued an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement
of a state railroad rate statute, and in such order directed the conditions
under which tickets shall be sold at rates higher than those prescribed
under the state statute, a ticket agent who sells tickets in conformity
with such conditions, and who is proceeded against, convicted, and
sentenced therefor by the state authorities, is in custody for an act
done pursuant to an order, process or decree of a court or judge of the
United States within the meaning of § 753, Rev. Stat., and may apply
for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States Circuit Judge who has
the power and right under such section to discharge him. Hunter v.
Wood, 205.

See CONTEMPT OF COURT, 2.

HUDSON RIVER.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.

ILLITERACY.

See WILLS, 1.

IMMIGRATION.

1. Deportation of Chinese; right of one, ordered by commissioner to be deported,
to trial before district judge.

Under the provisions of § 13 of the act of September 13, 1888, c. 1015,
25 Stat. 476 and § 3 of the act of May 15, 1890, c. 60, 27 Stat. 25, the
appeal given to a Chinaman from an order of deportation made by a
commissioner is a trial de novo before the district judge to which he is
entitled before he can be ordered to be deported, and the order cannot be
made on a transcript of proceedings before the commissioner. Liu Hop
Fong v. United States, 453.

2. Same; authority of commissioner.

After a commissioner has made and filed a certified transcript in the case of

a Chinaman ordered by him to be deported his authority over the matter
ends. There is no statutory right to make up and file additional find-
ings. Ib.

3. Effect of certificate made in conformity with treaty on rights of Chinaman
sought to be deported.

While a certificate issued as provided by § 3 of the Treaty of December,
1894 between the United States and China to entitle Chinese subjects
to enter the United States may be overcome by proper evidence, and
may not have the effect of a judicial determination, when a Chinaman
has been admitted to the United States on a certificate made in con-
formity with the treaty, he cannot be deported for having fraudulently

entered the United States unless there is competent evidence to over-
come the legal effect of the certificate. Ib.

INDICTMENTS.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 5.

INFANTS.

See JURISDICTION, D 5.

INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT.
See COPYRIGHT;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2.

INJUNCTION.

1. Bond; measure of protection given by.
The measure of protection to be given by the undertaking required on
issuing a restraining order under § 718, Rev. Stat., is to make good the
injuries inflicted upon a party observing the order until it is dissolved,
and such undertaking inures to the benefit of a defendant suffering
injuries irrespective of the exact time when that party has knowledge
of the pendency of the action or appears therein; nor is this protection
denied because the only defendant sustaining injuries is a woman and
the undertaking is to make good " to the defendant all damages by him
suffered." Hutchins v. Munn, 246.

2. Bond; right of recovery for damages sustained through restraining order
preventing completion of dwelling.

The owner of a house in Washington, D. C.,.who was prevented by a restrain-
ing order from completing alterations during the winter months, the
house meanwhile being only partially habitable, was held, in this case,
to have lost the entire use of the house and to be entitled to recover on
the undertaking the reasonable rental value of the house for the season.
Ib.

Where several instructions are asked and refused, exceptions must be taken
separately and not as an entirety. McCabe & Steen Co. v. Wilson, 275.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.

INSURANCE.

Reinsurance compact construed.
Reinsurance has a well known meaning, and, as the usual compact of re-
insurance has been understood in the commercial world for many years,
the liability of the reinsurer is not affected by the insolvency of the re-
insured company or by the inability of the latter to fulfill its own con-
tracts with the original insured; and in this case the compact, notwith-
standing it refers to losses paid, will be construed to cover losses payable
by the reinsured company; and, in a suit by the receiver of that company
on the compact, the fact of its insolvency and non-payment of the risk
reinsured does not constitute a defense. Allemannia Insurance Co. v.
Firemen's Insurance Co., 326.

INTEREST.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 12.

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Adoption of act by governmental powers affecting its character as a tort.
The courts will not declare an act to be a tort in violation of the law of nations
or of a treaty of the United States when the Executive, Congress and
the treaty-making power have all adopted it. O'Reilly de Camara v.
Brooke, 45.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

1. Discrimination in rates; term "device" defined.

A device to obtain rebates to be within the prohibition of the Interstate
Commerce Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 857, and the Elkins Act of
February 19, 1903, 32 Stat. 847, need not necessarily be fraudulent.
The term "device" as used in those statutes includes any plan or con-
trivance whereby merchandise is transported for less than the published
rate, or any other advantage is given to, or discrimination practiced in
favor of, the shipper. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 56.

2. Discrimination in rates; construction of Elkins Act.

In construing the Elkins Act it will be read not only in the light of the pre-
vious legislation on the same subject, but also of the purpose which
Congress had in mind in enacting it-to require all shippers to be treated
alike and to pay one rate as established, published and posted. (New
Haven Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361,
391.) Ib.

3. Scope of Interstate Commerce Act; transportation embraced by.
The Interstate Commerce Act embraces the whole field of interstate com-
merce; it does not exempt such foreign commerce as is carried on a
through bill of lading, but in terms applies to the transportation of
property shipped from any place in the United States to a foreign
country and carried from such place to a port of transhipment. Ib.

4. Contracts for carriage at published rates subject to change in rates.
There is no provision in the Elkins Act exempting special contracts from its