C. OF DISTRICT COURTS.

Jurisdiction of District Court for Porto Rico of action to set aside agreement of
liquidation of community.

By art. 62, par. 5, of the Porto Rican Code, power to administer estates is
exclusively vested in the judge of the last place of residence of the de-
ceased, and this includes all actions incidental to the liquidation of a
community existing between husband and wife, and the District Court of
the United States for Porto Rico has not jurisdiction of an action to set
aside an agreement of liquidation of a community where the estates
are still open in, and subject to the power and authority of, the local
court. Garzot v. de Rubio, 283.

D. OF THE FEDERAL COURTS GENERALLY.

1. Exclusive jurisdiction to decide constitutionality of state statute.
When the question of the validity of a state statute with reference to the
Federal Constitution has been first raised in a Federal court that court
has the right to decide it to the exclusion of all other courts. Ex parte
Young, 123.

2. Interference with criminal case pending in state court.
While a Federal court cannot interfere in a criminal case already pending
in a state court, and while, as a general rule, a court of equity cannot
enjoin criminal proceedings, those rules do not apply when such proceed-
ings are brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional state statute,
after the unconstitutionality thereof has become the subject of inquiry
in a suit pending in a Federal court which has first obtained jurisdiction
thereover; and under such circumstances the Federal court has the
right in both civil and criminal cases to hold and maintain such juris-
diction to the exclusion of all other courts. Ib.

3. Of offenses committed in post offices.

Under § § 711 and 5339, Rev. Stat., the United States courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all offenses enumerated in § 5339, committed in a
post office owned by the United States over which the State has ceded
jurisdiction. Battle v. United States, 36.

4. Of offenses committed in post offices.

The language of the Constitution, being wide enough to authorize the pur-
chase of land for post offices and the acceptance of a grant of jurisdiction,
the language of the statute based thereon will not be taken in any nar-
rower sense as excluding post offices. Ib.

5. Right of next friend of infant to elect to accept.

A next friend may select one of several tribunals in which the infant's case
shall be tried, and may elect to accept the jurisdiction of the Federal
court to which the case may be removed. In re Moore, 490.

6. Restraint of instrumentalities of State.

Under such conditions as are involved in this case the Federal court may

enjoin an individual or a state officer from enforcing a state statute on
account of its unconstitutionality, but it may not restrain the state court
from acting in any case brought before it either of a civil or criminal
nature, or prevent any investigation or action by a grand jury. Ex
parte Young, 123.

7. Restraint of instrumentalities of State.

An injunction by a Federal court against a state court would violate the
whole scheme of this Government, and it does not follow that because
an individual may be enjoined from doing certain things a court may be
similarly enjoined. Ib.

8. Injunction against enforcement of state rate statute.
While injunctions against the enforcement of a state rate statute should
not be granted by a Federal court except in a case reasonably free from
doubt, the equity jurisdiction of the Federal court has been constantly
exercised for such purpose. Ib.

9. Waiver of objection to.

While consent cannot confer on a Federal court jurisdiction of a case of
which no Federal court would have jurisdiction, either party may
waive the objections that the case was not brought in, or removed to,
the particular Federal court provided by the statute. In re Moore, 490.

10. Same.

Nothing in Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, changes the rule that a party
may waive the objection to the jurisdiction in respect to a particular
court where diversity of citizenship actually exists. Ib.

See STATES, 8.

E. EQUITY.

Adequate remedy at law to prevent jurisdiction.

No adequate remedy at law, sufficient to prevent a court of equity from act-
ing, exists in a case where the enforcement of an unconstitutional state
rate statute would require the complainant to carry merchandise at con-
fiscatory rates if it complied with the statute and subject it to excessive
penalties in case it did not comply therewith and its validity was finally
sustained. Ex parte Young, 123.

See COURTS, 4;

JURISDICTION, D8;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 6.

LAND GRANTS.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 1.

LEASE.

See RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

LIENS.

See PARTNERSHIP.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 2.

LIQUIDATION OF COMMUNITY.

See ACTIONS, 4;

JURISDICTION, C.

LOCALITY OF CRIME.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.

LOCAL LAW.

Kansas. Laws of 1905, c. 495, § 27. Cattle inspection (see Interstate
Commerce, 13). Asbell v. Kansas, 251.

Kentucky. Taxation of spirits in bond (see Constitutional Law, 5). Thomp-
son v. Kentucky, 340.

Michigan. Water boundaries (see Public Lands, 1). United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Co., 447. Tax sales (see Constitutional Law, 7).
Longyear v. Toolan, 414.

New Jersey. Laws of 1905, c. 238, relative to diversion of waters (see Con-
stitutional Law, 8). Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 349. Right of
challenge to grand jurors (see Constitutional Law, 10). Lang v. New
Jersey, 46.

Oklahoma. Case within stat. 146, art. 8, c. 66, Wilson's Ann. Stat., relating to
harmless defects in pleadings, etc. Where the cause of action is against
the members of a copartnership who afterwards incorporate their
business, themselves taking practically all the stock and continuing
without changing their relations with employés, the fact that the suit
is commenced against the corporation was held under the circumstances
of this case, and in view of the fact that no testimony was offered, to
be within the provisions of the Oklahoma statute, 146, art. 8, c. 66,
Wilson's Ann. Stat., requiring the court to disregard, and not reverse
for, defects of pleading or proceedings not affecting the substantial
rights of the parties. McCabe & Steen Co. v. Wilson, 275.

Porto Rico. Code, art. 62, par. 5, administration of estates of decedents
(see Jurisdiction, C). Garzot v. de Rubio, 283. Probate jurisdiction of
courts (see Courts, 5). Garzot v. de Rubio, 283.

Tennessee. Statute of 1873 relative to suits against States (see Actions, 3).
General Oil Co. v. Crain, 211. Act of 1899 providing for inspection of
oil (see Interstate Commerce, 8). General Oil Co. v. Crain, 211.

MAIL MATTER.

See COURTS, 2.

MANDAMUS.

1. To correct decision of Circuit Court as to parties to suit.
Mandamus will not lie to correct the decision of the Circuit Court that a
party to the record-in this case a State-is not an indispensable
party to the suit, and that a separable and removable controversy exists.
Such a decision is within the jurisdiction and judicial discretion of the
court and can be reviewed by appeal after final judgment in the case.
Ex parte Nebraska, 436.

2. To compel Circuit Court to remand cause where State a party to suit removed.
The Circuit Court having held that the State of Nebraska was not an actual

and necessary party plaintiff to a suit, brought in its name by the At-
torney General against a non-resident railroad company to enjoin it
from charging more than the rates fixed in a statute of the State and
from disobeying orders of the State Railway Commission, refused to
remand the case; as such decision may clearly have been correct, was
within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and involved no abuse
of judicial discretion, this court will not review the decision on petition
for mandamus. Ib.

Drity of master to provide safe place of employment.

It is the duty of the employer to provide a suitable and safe place for the
employés to work and they are not charged with any responsibility in
regard thereto, and while the employer is relieved if he does everything
that prudence requires in that respect, it is largely, a question of fact
and this court will not, in the absence of convincing testimony, set
aside the verdict of a jury approved as was the verdict in this case by
the trial and Supreme courts of the Territory, especially where the acci-
dent was the result of recurring conditions. McCabe & Steen Co. v.
Wilson, 275.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1.

MICHIGAN.

See STATES, 11.

MONOPOLY.

See RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

See ESTOPPEL.

MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS.

See COPYRIGHT, 3, 4.

NATIONALITY.

See TREATIES 1.

NEGLIGENCE.

Contributory; effect of failure of one injured to avail himself of permission to
occupy a safer place than that where injured.

A fireman, who, under the circumstances of this case, remains at his regular
post where his ordinary duty calls him, is not guilty of contributory
negligence because he does not avail himself of permission to occupy a
different and, perhaps, safer place. McCabe & Steen Co. v. Wilson, 275.

NEXT FRIEND.
See JURISDICTION, D 5.

NOTICE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.

OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES.
See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2.

OFFICES.

Effect of extinction of sovereignty creating office on property rights therein.
The holder of a heritable office in Cuba which had been ab olished prior to
the extinction of Spanish sovereignty, but who, pending compensation
for its condemnation, was receiving the emoluments of one of the grants
of the office, held in this case to have no property rights that survived
the extinction of such sovereignty. O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 45.

PARTIES.

1. Attorney Generál of State a proper party defendant to suit to prevent enforce-
ment of state statute.

The Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, under his common law
power and the state statutes, has the general authority imposed upon
him of enforcing constitutional statutes of the State and is a proper
party defendant to a suit brought to prevent the enforcement of a state
statute on the ground of its unconstitutionality. Ex parte Young, 123.

2. State officer as party defendant to suit to prevent enforcement of state statute.
It is not necessary that the duty of a state officer to enforce a statute be
declared in that statute itself in order to permit his being joined as a
party defendant from enforcing it; if by virtue of his office he has
some connection with the enforcement of the act it is immaterial whether
it arises by common general law or by statute. Ib.

See ACTIONS, 4;
JURISDICTION, B 1, 5;

LOCAL LAW (Oklahoma); ·
MANDAMUS, 1, 2.