Lien of partner for advances to firm.
A partner has a lien on the firm's assets for the repayment of his advances
to the firm, and in this case held, that the articles of copartnership, con-
strued as a whole, provided that the partner in a land venture advanc-
ing the amount needed for the venture should have a lien on the land
regarded as assets. Smith v. Rainey, 53.
PATENTS FOR LAND.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1, 2.
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11;
JURISDICTION, B 3.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
See TREATIES, 1.
See LOCAL LAW (Oklahoma).
PLEDGE.
See BANKRUPTCY;
BROKERS.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13;
PORTO RICO.
See COURTS, 5;
JURISDICTION, A 6, C;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.
POST OFFICES.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF;
JURISDICTION, D3, 4.
PRACTICE OF LAW.
See TREATIES.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
1. Force of findings of fact by two lower courts.
Findings of fact in a suit in equity made by both the Circuit Court and the
Circuit Court of Appeals will not be reversed by this court unless shown
to be clearly erroneous. Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Association, 20.
2. Findings of fact by lower courts concurred in and injunction against in-
fringement of copyright refused.
Where the lower courts have both found that the proportion of copyrighted
matter issued in a later publication, in this case a trade rating journal,
is insignificant compared with the volume of independently acquired in-
formation, an injunction should be refused and the owner of the copy-
right remitted to a court of law to recover the damages actually sus-
tained. Ib.
3. As to setting aside findings of auditors.
Findings of an auditor assessing damages on an undertaking should not be
set aside by the court unless there has been an error of law or a con-
clusion of fact unwarranted by the evidence. Hutchins v. Munn, 246.
4. Ambiguities in decision sought to be reviewed, as to existence of Federal
question, resolved against plaintiff in error.
Where the language of the appellate court is ambiguous, if it may be taken
as a declination to pass upon a question not necessary to the decision,
this court will not, in order to aid a technical and non-meritorious de-
fense, spell out a Federal question; but it will resolve the ambiguity
against the plaintiff in error who is bound, in order to give this court
jurisdiction, to clearly show that a Federal right has been impaired.
Stickney v. Kelsey, 419.
5. As to assumption of inconsistency between opinion and certificate of Circuit
Court.
This court will not assume an inconsistency to exist between the opinion of
the Circuit Court and its certificate. Scully v. Bird, 481.
6. As to scope of determination on certificate from Circuit Court.
On certificate that the bill was dismissed solely because the suit was against
the State within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore
not within the jurisdiction of the Federal court as such, this court cannot
determine whether the bill should have been dismissed because not pre-
senting a case for equitable relief. Scully v. Bird, 481.
7. Scope of review where question of jurisdiction certified under § 5 of act of
1891.
Where the question of jurisdiction is certified to this court under § 5 of the
judiciary act of 1891, nothing but that question can be considered here.
In this case the question is considered both as to parties and subject-
matter. Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 24.
8. In construing compacts between States.
This court in construing a compact between States will hesitate to reach a
conclusion different from that reached by the highest courts of both
States. Central R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 473.
9. Time for raising Federal question.
It is too late to raise the Federal question for the first time in the petition
for writ of error from this court or in the assignment of errors here.
Thomas v. Iowa, 258.
10. Effect of introduction of testimony by defendant after demurrer to plaintiff's
evidence overruled.
Defendant who introduces testimony after the demurrer to plaintiff's evi-
dence has been overruled waives any error to the ruling. McCabe &
Steen Co. v. Wilson, 275.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
1. Ratification of tort by principal exonerating agent.
A tort can be ratified so as to make an act done in the course of the princi-
pal's business and purporting to be done in his name, his tort; and the
rule of exonerating the servant when the master assumes liability is still
applicable to a greater or less extent when the master is the sovereign.
(The Paquette Habana, 189 U. S. 453, 469.) O'Reilly de Camara v.
Brooke, 45.
2. Ratification by United States of acts of officers committed during military
occupation of Cuba.
By virtue of an order of the Secretary of War and also by the Platt amend-
ment of the act of March 2, 1901, c. 803, 31 Stat. 897, and the treaty
with Cuba of May 22, 1903, 33 Stat. 2249, the acts of the officers of the
United States, during the military occupation of Cuba, complained of
in this action, were ratified by the United States, and those officers re-
lieved of liability therefor. Ib.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8, 14.
PROBATE LAW.
See COURTS, 5;
JURISDICTION, C.
PROOF OF CLAIM.
See BANKRUPTCY, 5.
1. Determination of boundary line between private rights of property.
The boundary line between private rights of property which can only be
limited on compensation by the exercise of eminent domain, and the
police power of the State which can limit such rights for the public
interest, cannot be determined by any formula in advance, but points
in that line helping to establish it have been fixed by decisions of the
court that concrete cases fall on the nearer or farther side thereof. Hud-
son Water Co. v. McCarter, 349.
2. Subserviency of rights of riparian owners to public interest.
The public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows
more pressing as population grows, and is paramount to private prop-
erty of riparian proprietors whose rights of appropriation are subject
not only to rights of lower owners but also to the limitations that great
foundations of public health and welfare shall not be diminished. Ib.
3. Acquisition; effect of use in interstate commerce.
One cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in commerce
among the States. Ib.
See OFFICES;
STATES, 1;
TREATIES, 3.
PUBLIC HEALTH.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 12.
1. Boundary of patent to land bordering on Sault Ste. Marie; right of patentee
to islands therein.
By the law of Michigan a grant of land bounded by a stream whether nav-
igable in fact or not, carries with it the bed of the stream to the center
of the thread thereof, and under this rule the patentee of government
land bordering on the Sault Ste. Marie, takes to the center line, including
small unsurveyed islands between the main land and the center line;
nor are the rights of riparian owners to the center affected by the fact
that the stream is a boundary. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.,
447.
2. Limitation of action to vacate and annul patent; application to void patent.
Statutes of limitations with regard to land affect the right even if in terms
only directed against the remedy. The act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, § 8,
26 Stat. 1099, providing that suits to vacate and annul patents thereto-
fore issued shall only be brought within five years after the passage of
the act, applies to a void patent, and where suit has not been brought
within the prescribed period a patent of public lands, whether reserved
or not, must be held good and to have the same effect as though valid
in the first place. Ib.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
JURISDICTION, B 2, 3.
RATIFICATION.
See INTERNATIONAL LAW;
PRINCIPAL AND Agent, 2.
REBATES.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 5;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1.
REFERENCE TO MASTER.
See STATES, 9, 10.
REINSURANCE
See INSURANCE.
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