See ACTIONS, 1;
COURTS, 4;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2.
When cause removable to Circuit Court.
A cause is removable to the Circuit Court if it is one of which the court is
given jurisdiction. Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 24.
See JURISDICTION, D 8, 9, 10;
MANDAMUS, 1, 2.
RESTRAINING ORDERS.
See INJUNCTION, 1.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
1. Invalidity of lease as in furtherance of monopoly.
In this case, the Supreme Court of the Territory having found that a lease,
being made to further an unlawful enterprise, was void as an unreason-
able restraint of trade and as against public policy, this court sustains
the judgment, there being proof supporting the conclusions to the
effect that the lessor company agreed to go out of the field of competition,
not to enter that field again, and to render every assistance to prevent
others from entering it-other acts in aid of a scheme of monopoly also
being proved. Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 423.
It is not necessary to determine whether the Supreme Court of the Territory
based its judgment declaring such a lease void on the common law,
the Sherman law, or the statutes of the Territory; the restraint placed
upon the lessor was greater than the protection of the lessee required.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8;
PROPERTY RIghts, 2;
PUBLIC LANDS, 1.
SANITY OF ACCUSED.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
SAULT STE. MARIE..
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1;
STATES, 11.
SIXTH AMENDMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3.
Effect of decisions of lower Federal courts as to construction of Federal statute.
While this court is not bound under the doctrine of stare decisis by the de-
cisions of lower Federal courts which have not been reviewed by this
court, as to the construction of a Federal statute, or by the decisions
of the highest courts of foreign countries construing similar statutes of
those countries, where all of such decisions express the same views on the
subject involved, the omission of Congress, when subsequently amend-
ing the statute, to specifically legislate concerning that subject may be
regarded by this court as an acquiescence by Congress in the judicial
construction so given to the statute. White-Smith Company v. Apollo
Company, 1.
1. Power to conserve natural wealth.
The State, as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the
public, has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere, the water and
the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of
the private owners immediately concerned. (Kansas v. Colorado, 185
U. S. 125; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230.) Hudson
Water Co. v. McCarter, 349.
2. Power to conserve natural advantages; prevention of diversion of waters.
A State has a constitutional power to insist that its natural advantages re-
main unimpaired by its citizens and is not dependent upon any reason
for its will so to do. In the exercise of this power it may prohibit the
diversion of the waters of its important streams to points outside of its
boundaries. Ib.
3. Power to provide for cattle inspection not affected by Federal legislation.
Congress has not enacted any legislation destroying the right of a State to
provide for the inspection of cattle and prohibiting the bringing within
its borders of diseased cattle not inspected and passed as healthy either
by the proper state or national officials. Asbell v. Kansas, 251.
4. Power to prohibit suits in state courts against state officers to prevent their
enforcing unconstitutional statutes.
Provisions of the Federal Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot be nullified by the State prohibiting suits in its own courts
against state officers to prevent their enforcing unconstitutional statutes
and contending that the National tribunals are also precluded from
entertaining such suits under the Eleventh Amendment. General Oil
Co. v. Crain, 211.
5. Power to tax spirits in bonded warehouse.
It is within the power of the State to tax spirits in bonded warehouses and
require the warehouseman to pay the same with interest after the taxes
due to the United States Government have been paid; and if the ware-
houseman is given a lien on the spirits for the taxes and interest paid by
him he is not deprived of his property without due process of law.
Thompson v. Kentucky, 340.
6. Personal liability of officers in enforcing unconstitutional statute.
The attempt of a state officer to enforce an unconstitutional statute is a pro-
ceeding without authority of, and does not affect, the State in its sover-
eign or governmental capacity, and is an illegal act and the officer is
stripped of his official character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to
impart to its officer immunity from responsibility to the supreme au-
thority of the United States. Ex parte Young, 123.
7. Suit against within meaning of Eleventh Amendment.
A suit by a citizen of another State to restrain a state officer from improperly
enforcing a state statute, where no criminal prosecution has been com-
menced, held, in this case, not to be an action against the State within
the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. Scully v. Bird, 481.
8. Suit against State within meaning of Eleventh Amendment; enjoining state
officer from enforcing unconstitutional state statute.
While making a state officer who has no connection with the enforcement
of an act alleged to be unconstitutional a party defendant is merely
making him a party as a representative of the State, and thereby
amounts to making the State a party within the prohibition of the Elev-
enth Amendment, individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed
with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State,
and who threaten and are about to commence an action, either civil or
criminal, to enforce an unconstitutional state statute may be enjoined
from so doing by a Federal court. Ex parte Young, 123.
9. Suit between; reference to master.
Order referring cause to master and directing conditions under which testi-
mony shall be taken and master shall report to this court. Virginia v.
West Virginia, 514.
Defendant's demurrer having been overruled, 206 U. S. 290, 322, and de-
fendant having answered, both complainant and defendant submitted
and sustained by argument forms of decree referring the cause to a
master. Ib.
11. Title of Michigan to bed of Sault Ste. Marie and islands therein.
On the admission of Michigan to the Union the bed of the Sault Ste. Marie,
whether strait or river, passed to the State, and small unsurveyed
islands therein became subject to the law of the State. United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Co., 447.
STATUTES.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF.
1. Presumption against retrospective effect.
There is always a strong presumption that a statute was not meant to act
retrospectively, and it should never receive such a construction if sus-
ceptible of any other, nor unless the words are so clear, strong and
imperative as to have no other meaning. U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Struthers
Wells Co., 306.
2. Prospective effect of act of February 24, 1905, c. 778.
The act of February 24, 1905, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811, amending the act of Au-
gust 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278, is prospective and does not relate to
or affect actions based on rights of material-men which had accrued
prior to its passage, and such actions are properly brought under the act
of 1894. Ib.
3. Act of February 24, 1905, construed to be not retrospective.
The absolute taking away of a present right to sue and suspending it until
after certain events have happened, and the giving of preferences be-
tween creditors, are not mere matters of procedure, but affect substan-
tial rights, and as the act of February 24, 1905 consists of but a single
section and deals with such subjects and only incidentally applies to
procedure, the entire statute must be construed under the general rule
that it is not retrospective in any respect. Ib.
4. Weight of departmental construction.
When the meaning of a statute is doubtful the construction given by the
department charged with its execution should be given great weight.
(Robertson v. Downing, 127 U. S. 607; United States v. Healy, 160 U. S.
136.) United States v. Hermanos y Compañia, 337.
5. Departmental construction; adoption by Congress.
The reenactment by Congress, without change, of a statute which had
previously received long continued executive construction, is an adop-
tion by Congress of such construction. (United States v. Falk, 204 U. S.
143.) Ib.
6. Departmental construction followed.
Par. 296 of the Tariff Act of July 11, 1897, construed in accordance with
Treasury decisions. Ib.
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