of compulsion is brought to bear upon unwilling members to effect the design of the combination. With respect to laborers not members and willing to work, other and not less effective means of intimidation must be and are employed in prevention of labor. The history of strikes declares that this intimidation has always taken the shape of threats and personal violence. Constructive violence has failed in large measure to prevent the continuance of operation of business by the master. rally, therefore, we find resort to actual violence, the destruction of property, the disabling of railway trains, and the like. Natu Of the ideal strike, in the definition proposed at the argument, the only criticism to be indulged is that it is ideal, and never existed in fact. Undoubtedly, in the absence of restrictive contract, workmen have a right by concerted action to cease work, to procure better terms of service, no compulsion being used except that incident to the cessation, subject, however, to the qualification, at least with respect to those employments that directly concern the public welfare, that reasonable notice of the quitting should be given; but such is not the strike of history. The definition suggested is misleading and pretentious. To my thinking, a much more exact definition of a strike is this: A combined effort among workingmen to compel the master to the concession of a certain demand by preventing the conduct of his business until compliance with the demand. The concerted cessation of work is but one of, and the least effective, of the means to the end, the intimidation of others from engaging in the service, the interference with and the disabling and destruction of property, and resort to actual force and violence when requisite to the accomplishment of the end being the other and more effective means employed. It is idle to talk of a peaceable strike. None such ever occurred. The suggestion is impeachment of intelligence. From first to last, from the earliest recorded strike to that in the State of West Virginia, which proceeded simultaneously with the argument of this motion, to that at Connellsville, Pa., occurring as I write, force and turbulence, violence and outrage, arson and murder have been associated with the strike as its natural and inevitable concomitants. No strike can be effective without compulsion and force. That compulsion can only come through intimidation. A strike without violence would equal the representation of the tragedy of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet omitted. The moment that violence becomes an essential part of a scheme or a necessary means of effecting the purpose of a combination, that moment the combination, otherwise lawful, becomes illegal. All combinations to interfere with perfect freedom in the proper management and control of one's lawful business, to dictate the terms upon which such business shall be conducted, by means of threats or by interference with property or traffic or with the lawful employment of others, are within the condemnation of the law. It has well been said that the wit of man could not devise a legal strike, because compulsion is the leading idea of it. A strike is essentially a conspiracy to extort by violence, the means employed to effect the end being not only the cessation of labor by the conspirators, but the necessary prevention of labor by those who are willing to assume their places, and, as a last resort, and in many instances an essential element of success, the disabling and destruction of the property of the master, and so, by intimidation and by the compulsion of force, to accomplish the end designed. I know of no peaceable strike. I think no strike was ever heard of that was or could be successful unaccompanied by intimidation and violence. Counsel at the argument could recall but one which he was willing to indorse as peaceable. That was the strike upon the Lehigh Valley Railroad during the year 1893. The history of that occurrence does not carry out the declaration of counsel. There, as I understand, the running of trains was constantly interfered with-engines and cars disabled and wrecks caused by the violence of the strikers. The president of the company reported to his board of directors that the loss to freight and equipment by reason of the strike-which continued for less than three weeks--was $77,000, of which amount $46,000 was for damage done to locomotives alone. And that strike was not successful, the violence being insufficient. The history and legality of strikes has been well told by Mr. Justice Brewer, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in an admirable address before the New York Bar Association in January, 1893, in language that should be taken to heart by everyone who has regard to the safety and peace of society and the protection of our institutions. "The common rule," says Mr. Justice Brewer, "as to strikes is this: Not merely do the employees quit the employment, and thus handicap the employer in the use of his property, and perhaps in the discharge of duties which he owes to the public, but they also forcibly prevent others from taking their places. It is useless to say that they only advise; no man is misled. When a thousand laborers gather around a railroad track and say to those who seek employment that they had better not, and when that advice is supplemented every little while by a terrible assault on one who disregards it, everyone knows that something more than advice is intended. It is coercion-force; it is the effort of the many, by the mere weight of numbers, to compel the one to do their bidding. It is a proceeding outside of the law, in defiance of the law, and in spirit and effect an attempt to strip from one that has that which of right belongs to him-the full and undisturbed use and enjoyment of his own. It is not to be wondered at that deeds of violence and cruelty attend such demonstrations as these, nor will it do to pretend that the wrongdoers are not the striking laborers, but lawless strangers who gather to look on. Were they strangers who made the history of the Homestead strike one of awful horror? Were they women from afar who so maltreated the surrendered guards, or were they the very ones who sought to compel the owners of the property to do their bidding? "Even if it be true that at such places the lawless will gather, who is responsible for their gathering? Weihe, the head of a reputable labor organization, may open the door to lawlessness, but Beekman, the anarchist and assassin, will be the first to pass through; and thus it will be always and everywhere. * * This is the struggle of irresponsible persons and organizations to control labor. It is not in the interests of liberty; it is not in the interest of individual or personal rights. It is an attempt to give to the many a control over the few-a step toward despotism. Let the movement succeed, let it once be known that the individual is not free to contract for his personal services, that labor is to be farmed out by organizations, as to-day by the Chinese companies, and the next step will be a direct effort on the part of the many to seize the property of the few." * No word of mine could give added strength to the thought suggested. The strike has become a serious evil, destructive to property, destructive to individual right, injurious to the conspirators themselves, and subversive of republican institutions. Certainly no court should give encouragement to any combination thus destructive of the very fabric of our Government, tending to the disruption of society, and the obliteration of legal and natural rights. Whatever other doctrine may be asserted by reckless agitators, it must ever remain the duty of the courts, in the protection of society, and in the execution of the laws of the land, to condemn, prevent, and punish all such unlawful conspiracies and combinations. Of this duty it was forcibly said by Judge Baker, of the district of Indiana, under like circumstances, in the Lake Erie & Western cases: "It may do for men that are reckless of the welfare of human society, who care nothing for its peace and good order, to imperil life, property, and liberty, and the perpetuity of our institutions by teaching such doctrines; but the judge who tolerates it ought to be stripped of his gown and be driven from the sacred temple of justice." The wrongs of labor are not to be righted by war upon society, by turbulence and disorder, by oppression and force. Such action alienates sympathy and provokes resentment. In this land, only by peaceable means in the courts and through the lawmaking power can wrongs be redressed and justice be established. Let combined labor deal with combined capital, but only in ways sanctioned by the law. When this lesson is learned, and becomes the rule of conduct, labor will acquire in a decade greater privileges and surer protection from wrong than could be extorted by a century of violence. By the act of Congress of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. L., chap. 647), every combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States is declared to be illegal. Under this act it was held by Judge Speer, in Waterhouse v. Comer (55 Fed. Rep., 149; 19 L. R. A., 403), that a strike, if it ever was effective, can be so no longer; and this view seems to have been held by Judge Billings in the case of United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans (54 Fed. Rep., 994). On the other hand, Judge Putman, in United States v. Patterson (55 Fed. Rep., 605), is inclined to the view that the statute has no relation to labor organizations. I do not find it needful to enter into this field of discussion, or to express an opinion upon the subject, being content to rest my conclusion upon the grounds discussed. One clause of the supplemental injunction has been characterized as wholly unwarranted. That clause is: "And from ordering, recommending, approving, or advising others to quit the service of the receivers of the Northern Pacific Railroad on January 1, 1894, or at any other time." In fairness, this clause must be read in the light of the statements of the petition. It was therein asserted to the court that the men would not strike unless ordered so to do by the executive heads of the national labor organizations, and that the men would obey such orders instead of following the direction of the court. This clause is specially directed to the chiefs of the several labor organizations. The use of the words, "order, recommend, approve, or advise," was to meet the various forms of expression under which by the constitution or by-laws of these organizations the command was cloaked-as, for instance, in the one organization the chief head "advises" a strike, in another he "approves” a strike, in another he "recommends" the quitting of employment. Whatever terms may be employed the effect is the same. It is a command which may not be disregarded, under penalty of expulsion from the order and of social ostracism. This language was employed to fortify the restraints of the other portions of the writ, and to meet the various disguises under which the command is cloaked. It was so inserted out of abundant caution that the meaning of the court might be clear, that there should be no unwarrantable interference with this property, no intimidation, no violence, no strike. It was perhaps unnecessary, being comprehended within the clause restraining the heads of these organizations from ordering, recommending, or advising a strike, or joinder in a strike. It is said, however, that the clause restrains an individual from friendly advice to the employees as a body or individually, as to their or his best interest in respect of remaining in the service of the receivers. Read in the light of the petitions upon which the injunction was founded, I do not think that such construction can be indulged by any fair and impartial mind. It might be used as a text for a declamatory address to excite the passions and prejudices of men, but could not, I think, be susceptible of such strained construction by a judicial mind. The language of a writ of injunction should, however, be clear and explicit, and, if possible, above criticism as to its meaning. Since, therefore, the language of this particular phrase may be misconceived, and the restraint intended is, in my judgment, comprehended within the other provisions of the writ, the motion in that respect will be granted, and the clause stricken from the writ. In all other respects the motion will be denied. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, ss: At a stated term of the circuit court of the United States, within and for the eastern division of the northen district of Ohio, begun and held at the city of Cleveland, in said district, on the first Tuesday in April, being the 3d day of said month, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighteenth, to wit, on Monday, the 11th day of June, A. D. 1894. Present: The Hon. Augustus J. Ricks, United States district judge. THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, A CORPORATION, LOCAL UNION NUMBER Whereas in the above cause, a motion for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction has been duly filed, the hearing thereof being fixed for the twenty-eighth day of June, 1894, at the United States circuit court rooms, at Cleveland, Ohio, and it having been made to appear that there is danger of irreparable injury being caused to complainant and others before the hearing of said application for a writ of injunction, unless the said respondents are restrained as herein set forth, therefore complainant's application for such restraining order is granted. Now, therefore, take notice that you, the said local union number, United Mine Workers of America, the officers of said local union number, the members of said local union number the miners of subdistrict number 6 of Ohio, and others whose names are unknown to the complainant, and each of you, as well as all other persons, are hereby especially restrained and enjoined from in any manner, directly or indirectly, delaying, hindering, or obstructing the receipt or movement of any coal by said The Cleveland, Lorain and Wheeling Railway Company, or its delivery to said company by said The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and from in any manner interfering, directly or indirectly, with said The Cleveland, Lorain & Wheeling Railway Company's use or right to use its railroads, tracks, switches, side tracks, turntables, cars, engines, tools, station houses, water tanks, bridges, right of way, or other property necessary to be used or employed by said company in the receipt, handling, or carriage of said coal, and from in any manner, by threats, violence, intimidations, or otherwise, obstructing, interfering with, hindering, or delaying any of the employes of said railway company engaged in the transportation of said coal, or any part thereof, until the hearing of said application for a writ of injunction and the further order of this court in the premises. And further, take notice that you, the Cleveland, Lorain and Wheeling Railway Company, your servants, agents, and employes are restrained and enjoined, until the hearing upon said application for a writ of injunction and the further order of the court in the premises, from failing or refusing to receive from the said The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and to forward any and all coal received from it or tendered to you by The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, coming from points on the line of the said Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company and destined to Cleveland, Ohio, or other points on the line of road of said The Cleveland, Lorain and Wheeling Railway Company. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 88: I, Irvin Belford, clerk of the circuit court of the United States, within and for the northern district of the State of Ohio, do hereby certify that I have compared the within and foregoing transcript with the original order entered upon the journal of the proceedings of said court in the therein entitled cause, at the term and on the day therein named; and do further certify that the same is a true, full, and complete transcript and copy thereof. Witness my official signature and the seal of said court, at Cleveland, in said district, this 21st day of April, A. D. 1900, and in the 124th year of the Independence of the United States of America. [SEAL.] THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, 88: IRVIN BELFORD, Clerk, By B. C. MILLER, Deputy Clerk. At a stated term of the circuit court of the United States, within and for the eastern division of the northern district of Ohio, begun and held at the city of Cleveland, in said district, on the first Tuesday in April, being the 3d day of said month, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighteenth, to wit, on Monday, the 11th day of June, A. D. 1894. Present: The honorable Augustus J. Ricks, United States district judge. THE CLEVELAND, CANTON AND SOUTHERN This day came the petitioners, John W. Wardwell and Frederick Swift, receivers of the court, who were, on the 15th day of September, 1893, duly appointed to take custody and control of all the property rights, credits, choses in action, rolling stock, tracks, side tracks, bridges, trestles, and all and singular the property of the Cleveland, Canton & Southern Railway Company, and file in this case their petition, in which they state that in the discharge of their duties as such receivers in operating said road, they are transporting large quantities of coal consigned from points in West Virginia to parties residing in Canton, Cleveland, and other points along the line of said road in the State of Ohio; that in shipping said coal, the cars containing the same pass over the line of the railroad in portions of Stark County, in this judicial district. Said petitioners further represent that a large body of miners and other persons along the line of said road, among whom are James Finney, Mike Hadley, sr., John Hadley, Charles Brain, Thomas Adley, William Hay, Harmon Slusser, Joe Fish, Andy Winkheart, H. Shearsmiths, John Bailis, John Fetheringham, Charles Winkheart, Jerry Gibler, William Hodson, Joe Greaten, Andrew Hay, Joe Simler, Albert Simler, Rheinhart Longontre, Joe Martindale, Peter Maulbaugh, John Finney, Nick Finney, Peter Adams, George Ray, Peter Merts, sr., Peter Merts, jr., Thos. McNeal, Rheinhart Botch, Joe Stanz, Eron Roderick, John Johnson, Win. Grabrel, Charles Hoovic, John Smith, Joe Palmbo, Wm. Brindle, Paul Roden, Edward Greaten, Albert Berger, John Griffith, Peter Reed, Frank Ashman, Harmon Felt, John Unkersheit, Henry Bokel, Anthony Parks, George Freditsy, and a large number of associates and confederates, whose names are unknown, have entered into a combination and conspiracy to prevent petitioners from operating said road, and from moving its cars of coal and other freight; that said persons and their confederates have combined to prevent said receivers from moving their coal cars through Stark County, and that sundry persons have threatened to blow up, and have actually attempted to burn the bridges of said railroad, and have threatened to cut the telegraph wires, and destroy the coal and other property being shipped over said road, and to injure and destroy the cars, engines, and property of said road now in possession and custody of the petitioners as receivers. Said petitioners further represent that they have reason to believe, and do believe, that said persons will carry their said threats into execution and destroy said property if petitioners attempt to move any of the cars in their possession loaded with coal over said road, and that they have no means for protecting said coal, or the property in their possession, other than by the process of this court. Now, upon the facts alleged in said petition, and it appearing to the court that the apprehensions of said receivers, in part at least, are well founded, it is now hereby ordered that the marshal of this district summon such number of men as, in his judgment, may be necessary to protect the property so as aforesaid in the custody of the court, and to protect the employés of the receivers in the operation of the same and in the handling of interstate freight; and that he proceed as soon as possible to the points along the line of said road where said coal is being stored or handled, and where the property of the receivers is threatened, and protect the receivers, their agents, and employees in the lawful possession and use of the same. marshal is further directed to warn, by proclamation and otherwise, all persons not to interfere with or molest any of the cars, engines, tracks, sidetracks, bridges, trestles, or freight or any other property belonging to said road or in the custody of said receivers for transportation, advising them that the same is in the custody of this court for public use, and must and will be protected by the power and authority of the Government of the United States. Said Said marshal is further directed and ordered to restrain and prevent all persons from unlawfully interfering with the officers and agents of said receivers, or their employés, in any manner, by actual violence, or by intimidation, threats or otherwise, in the full and complete possession and management of said railroad and all the property thereunto pertaining, and from interfering with any and all property in the custody of the receivers, whether belonging to the receivers or to shippers or other owners, and from interfering with, intimidating, or otherwise injuring, inconveniencing or delaying passengers or freight being transported or about to be transported over the railway of said receivers, or from interfering in any manner by actual violence, threat or otherwise preventing or endeavoring to prevent shipment of coal or other freight, or the transportation of the mails of the United States, over the road operated by said receivers. And the marshal is directed to carry out these orders by giving direct notice and warning, as far as possible, and by making public proclamation to the persons specially named in this order and to all other persons restraining and prohibiting them from doing any of the unlawful acts forbidden in this order. All persons, whether named in this order or not, who in any way interfere with the property in the receiver's custody or control, with or without special notice, will be dealt with as violators of the law. The property being in the custody of this court, for public use, all persons are charged with notice of that custody and use, and if they in any way interfere with it, will be dealt with accordingly. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 88: I, Irvin Belford, clerk of the circuit court of the United States within and for the northern district of the State of Ohio, do hereby certify that I have compared the within and foregoing transcript with the original order entered upon the journal of the proceedings of said court in the therein entitled cause, at the term and on the day therein named; and do further certify that the same is a true, full, and complete transcript and copy thereof. Witness my official signature and the seal of said court, at Cleveland, in said district, this 21st day of April, A. D. 1900, and in the 124th year of the independence of the United States of America. [SEAL.] THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, ss: IRVIN BELFORD, Clerk, By B. C. MILLER, Deputy Clerk. At a stated term of the circuit court of the United States, within and for the eastern division of the northern district of Ohio, begun and held at the city of Cleveland, in said district, on the first Tuesday in October, being the fourth day of said month, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and twentythird, to wit, on Tuesday, the 18th day of October, A. D. 1898. Present: The honorable Eli S. Hammond, district judge. |