certain forms of derangement. But lunacy, though absurd in itself, and in its proper acceptation referring to but a single phase of insanity, has yet gained a more conspicuous place in legal practice than any other term. Statutes, both English and American, have expressly declared that lunatic shall apply to all persons of unsound mind, and to those who are incapable of managing their affairs; and in England the name includes idiots also. Lunacy may then be fitly employed as a title under which to present the legal relations of insanity. Its medical and scientific aspects are treated under other heads. (See INSANITY, and MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE.) Here we concern ourselves only with the settled rules of law, which determine the legal status of insane persons.In England the custody of lunatics and idiots is vested in the court of chancery, not in its character of a court of equity, but as the delegate of the crown, the representative of the parens patria; for it is the duty of the sovereign to take care of those of his subjects who cannot take care of themselves. In the United States the people have succeeded to the rights and prerogatives of the crown, and therefore it is that here the legislature exercises a protective authority over idiots and lunatics. The statutes of the different states provide that such persons may be put under guardianship; and if a competent judicature have found the fact of lunacy in the prescribed mode, and have appointed a guardian, the fact of lunacy is held to be conclusively proved. Until the contrary be shown, either upon an inquisition of lunacy, or upon special testimony in a given case, every man is presumed to be of sane mind. But if it be proved or admitted that lunacy existed at a particular period, and that the derangement was of a habitual and not of a merely temporary or accidental nature, then it is presumed to continue, unless its continuance be disproved. Thus, in the case of a will, the burden of proving a testator's insanity rests ordinarily on him who impeaches the instrument for this cause. Yet, on the other hand, proof of general and usual insanity may be rebutted by evidence that the act was done during a lucid interval, and the burden of proving this rests on the party who asserts the exception. Moral insanity alone, that is, mere derangement of the moral faculties, does not invalidate a will. The evidence must show a delusion in matters of fact. A higher degree of insanity must be shown, in order to absolve from criminal guilt, than to discharge from civil obligation. In all cases the jury must be instructed that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the commission of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality

of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. These were the rules laid down by the judges in McNaghten's case before the house of lords. In Rogers's case in Massachusetts, Chief Justice Shaw instructed the jury that in case of partial insanity the party must have sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which others stand to him; and to know that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right, injurious to others, and a violation of duty. But, on the contrary, if he still understands the nature of his act and its con-cquences, if he has a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment, the partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from responsibility for criminal acts. If it be found that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be whether the disease existed to so high a degree that for the time being it overwhelmed all reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the person in committing the crime acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse. If so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body without the concurrence of a mind directing it. In respect to the proof of insanity, the weight of authority is, that such a defence must be substantially proved as an independent fact, and the burden of proof is of course on the defendant. In Massachusetts the defence is made out if the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the prisoner's insanity. Evidence of acts, declarations, and conduct, both before and after the time when the alleged crime was committed, is admissible as tending to show insanity at the moment of the act. Evidence of hereditary insanity is also admissible, both in civil and criminal cases.— Whatever be the nature or degree of mental disease, if the mind be so much impaired as to be incapable of intelligent disposal in the ordinary affairs of life, it is in civil jurisprudence irresponsible for its acts. He whose mind is so far overshadowed possesses no longer a disposing and consenting will. He is therefore incapable of making contracts, for a contract requires a concurrence of wills. When then one of the parties to a contract of marriage lacks the capacity of consent, there is no mutually binding promise, and the marriage is void. Whether, in a given case, such a disability existed as to render contract impossible, is generally declared, and the nullity of the marriage pronounced by competent judicial authority. But though the contracts of an insane man are necessarily void, he has not always been permitted to repudiate them. Until the time of Edward III. no objection seems to have been made to such a proceeding. Afterward the absurd maxim grew into a rule, recognized by the most eminent legal authorities, that no man

should be permitted to stultify himself. The strictness of the rule was gradually relaxed; not at first on the ground that lunacy was a defence in itself, but that it was competent evidence to show that undue advantage had been taken of a party, or that actual fraud had been practised upon him, by reason of his imbecility. This rule is now abandoned, and if one enters into a contract while he is deprived of reason he may avoid it when he recovers his sanity. Yet the exception is admitted that one may not plead his lunacy to annul his contract for necessaries made with him in good faith by the other party; nor if, in fact, no advantage were taken of the lunatic, can a purchase made in good faith be rescinded, if injustice would thus be wrought to the other party, and both cannot be placed in statu quo.-A testament discloses the will of the testator; but when a disposing will fails, a testament is impossible, and the writing which purports to be one is a nullity. It is naturally very difficult to prove the existence of a lucid interval, far more difficult than to prove the existence of general insanity. It is sufficient for the purposes of the law that the mind appears to have been rational when the will was made. Indeed, the will itself may furnish strong, perhaps the best evidence of the lucid interval. If testimony can be adduced to show that the act was done without any assistance, and the writing itself discloses no marks of delusion or folly, no further proof can generally at least be required. -It has been already stated that the same degree of incapacity which invalidates civil acts, does not exempt from criminal responsibility. When insanity is pleaded to a charge of crime, the real question which the law entertains is: Was there a criminal intent; was the accused capable of that criminal will which is the essence of the offence? From the nature of the case the law has found it difficult to answer these questions; and perhaps it has not always answered them well. The doctrine of Sir Matthew Hale has exerted a large influence on the course of English decisions. He was disposed to determine the criminal responsibility of a mind affected with insanity by its strength and capacity; and said: "Such a person as, while laboring under melancholy distempers, hath yet ordinarily as great understanding as usually a child of 14 years old hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason or felony." But such a rude test could not be permitted when juster views of mental disease had come to prevail among scientific men; and accordingly we find the nicety of the test a little advanced when the inquiry became whether the accused had so far lost the use of his understanding as not to know right from wrong. With the single qualification that this test should be applied to the particular act committed, this criterion has been long in use, with only slight and immaterial variations, in the English criminal law. It was laid down in Bellingham's case, by Sir James Mansfield, in 1812. In that case the

court went to what is now considered an ex treme length, and instructed the jury that if a person affected by that species of insanity in which the patient fancies the existence of injury and seeks an opportunity of gratifying his revenge by some hostile act, be yet capable in other respects of distinguishing right from wrong, this would be no excuse for any act of violence which he might commit under this species of derangement. So Baron Rolfe, in the case of the queen against Stokes in 1848 (and he was quoted and followed by Baron Parke in Barton's case in the same year), said the subject had been lately carefully considered by the judges, and the law was now clear; every man is responsible for his acts by the law of his country if he can discern right from wrong. In the trial of Pate (1850) for an assault upon the queen, in which an uncontrollable impulse was urged in defence, Baron Alderson said in summing up: "It is not because a man is insane that he is unpunishable; and I must say that upon this point there exists a very grievous delusion in the minds of medical men. The only species of insanity which excuses a man for his acts is that species of delusion which induced to, and drove him to the commission of the act alleged against him. The jury ought to have clear proof of a formed disease of the mind; a disease existing before the act was done, and which made the accused incapable of knowing at the time that it was a wrong act which he was about to commit. The law does not acknowledge the doctrine of an uncontrollable impulse, if the person was aware that the act which he contemplated was wrong. The question you have to decide is: Was the accused at the time suffering from a disease of the mind which rendered him incapable of judging whether the act he committed was a right or a wrong act?" In one class of cases the test of responsibility is therefore to be, whether the prisoner knew that the act which he committed was wrong, and right and wrong in these cases are probably to be understood as Lord Brougham explained them in McNaghten's case, viz.: right must be understood of right according to the law, and wrong of an act condemned and punishable by law. Another class of cases is that in which responsibility is modified by the existence of delusion. This form of insanity was first brought before and recognized by the courts in the celebrated case of Hatfield in 1800. In that case the prisoner was put upon his trial for firing at the king. Mr. Erskine defended him successfully, and procured the acquiescence of the court in his views of the irresponsibility of the accused. Hatfield labored under the delusion that it was his duty to sacrifice himself for his fellow men, and he conceived that the best mode to draw upon himself the punishment of death was to make an attempt upon the life of his sovereign. It was not denied that Hatfield knew right from wrong, and that the act which he contemplated was punishablo

Society," and wrote an appeal on the subject of slavery. Soon after a journal entitled "The Philanthropist" was commenced at Mt. Pleasant, to which Lundy contributed. He then visited St. Louis, where he remained nearly two years engaged in a newspaper exposition of the slavery question. During this time he lost the few thousand dollars his previous industry had accumulated. Returning to Mt. Pleasant, he commenced, in Jan. 1812, the publication of the "Genius of Universal Emancipation," the office of which was soon removed to Jonesborough, Tenn., and thence to Baltimore in 1824. In 1825 he visited Hayti to make arrangements for the settlement of emancipated slaves. In 1828 he visited the eastern states, where he formed the acquaintance of a number of prominent abolitionists, one of whom, William Lloyd Garrison, afterward became associated with him in editing his journal. In 1828-9 he was assaulted for an alleged libel, indirectly censured by the court, and soon afterward removed to Washington. In 1830 -31 he travelled in Canada and Texas to obtain subscribers to his paper, and to continue his observations on the condition of the blacks. He made a second trip to Texas in 1833, returned the following year, and immediately afterward undertook another journey to Texas and Mexico. He continued his literary connection with the "Genius of Universal Emancipation" as long as it was published, and was the first to establish anti-slavery periodicals and the delivery of anti-slavery lectures, and probably the first to induce the formation of societies for the encouragement of the produce of free labor. "The Life, Travels, and Opinions of Benjamin Lundy," by Thomas Earl, was published in Philadelphia in 1847.

LUNDY'S LANE, BATTLE OF, called also that of Bridgewater or Niagara, a severe engagement fought in Canada, near the falls of Niagara, between the British and American forces, July 25, 1814. Two days after the defeat of the British under Gen. Řiall at Chippewa by Brig. Gen. Scott, July 5, 1814, the American forces under Gen. Brown, numbering about 3,000 men, crossed the Chippewa river and took post at Queenstown; Riall, after throwing a portion of his force into Fort George, retreating to a strong position near the head of Lake Ontario. Occasional skirmishes took place between the outposts of both armies; but Brown, finding_that he had no battering cannon to besiege Fort George, and being unwilling to leave that fortress in his rear, fell back after a few days to the Chippewa. Here on the 25th he received intelligence that Gen. Drummond, who had reached Fort George with British reenforcements, had crossed the Niagara river at Queenstown to attack Fort Schlosser, where the American supplies were deposited. Scott was at once detached with 1,200 men to make a demonstration on Queenstown, and about sunset unexpectedly came up with Riall and his whole

force advantageously posted on an eminence at the head of Lundy's lane, and in the immediate vicinity of Niagara falls. Although greatly outnumbered, the American general determined to hold his ground if possible until the main body of the army under Brown could arrive upon the field, and at once commenced the offensive by sending Major Jessup with a battalion to turn the enemy's left. His small force in the mean time was compelled to sustain the full fire of the British infantry and of a battery of 7 pieces, consisting of 24-pounders and howitzers, which crowned the heights, and at every discharge made deep chasms in the American ranks. Animated by the courageous bearing and buoyant spirits of their commander, the regiments maintained their ground unflinchingly, and were presently cheered by the intelligence that Jessup had been completely successful in his manoeuvre, and had captured Gen. Riall and his whole staff, who were immediately sent to the rear. Soon but one American regiment, the 9th, remained in front, and this made feeble resistance against the British battery, now augmented, by the arrival of reënforcements under Drummond, to 9 pieces. The enemy, though numbering upward of 4,000 men, nevertheless refrained from charging Scott's exhausted battalions, which they might by the mere force of numbers have easily overpowered. At this critical moment the main body of the American army, which Brown, alarmed at the heavy and continued cannonade, had hurried forward without waiting for a message from Scott, arrived upon the field on a run, and Gen. Ripley's brigade at once went to the front, while the remnant of Scott's soldiers were formed in a single battalion in the rear. The evening was now far advanced, and notwithstanding the moon was shining in an unclouded sky, an almost complete darkness enveloped the field, broken only by the flashes from the British guns, and from the irregular discharges of musketry on either side. A pause presently ensued as cach army prepared for a decisive blow, and Brown, gaining a partial view of the heights occupied by the British guns, as the clouds of smoke rolled away from the field, determined as the only chance of winning the battle to make an attempt to carry the battery. Turning to Col. Miller, he asked him if he could take it." "I'll try, sir," replied Miller, and, placing himself at the head of the 21st regiment, supported by the 23d under Major McFarland, he commenced the ascent of the hill. Guided by Scott, the column pressed swiftly and silently forward in close order, and had nearly reached the summit when their muffled tread announced their approach. At this moment a sheet of flame burst from the battery, and a fearful discharge of grape caused the 23d to recoil, while a second discharge drove them in disorder down the hill. But the 21st never faltered. Closing up their ranks after every volley, they held their course unswervingly until within musket shot of the battery, when, pouring in a volley,

they charged with a shout, bayoneted the artillerymen at their guns, and after a fierce struggle drove the enemy in confusion down the hill. The 23d, which had rallied under McFarland, arrived at this juncture, followed by the remainder of Ripley's brigade, and the Americans prepared to maintain the hill so heroically won. Soon the British column was heard ascending the slope, and after a volley from both sides a desperate hand-to-hand fight was maintained for 20 minutes around the captured guns, resulting in the complete discomfiture of the British, who fled precipitately under cover of the darkness. After the lapse of half an hour they returned, but were again driven down the hill, Scott with his battalion charging them effectually in the flank. Scarcely an officer now remained unwounded in the American ranks, and the men, faint with their exertions and tormented by thirst, were ready to sink with exhaustion. Unwilling, however, to relinquish the field, they replenished their ammunition from the cartridge boxes of their fallen comrades and foes, who covered the ground around the battery, and then calmly awaited the return of the British. After an hour's pause the latter, reënforced by fresh troops from Fort George, advanced under Gen. Drummond to the third and last assault. The conflict which ensued was more deadly than ever; for half an hour the hill seemed one blaze of fire, and friend and foe were mingled in almost inextricable confusion. At length the enemy, broken and foiled at all points, retired for the third time, and "a profound silence ensued, interrupted only by the groans of the wounded and dying, and the monotonous roar of the great waterfall, moaning, as it were, over this fatal scene of fraternal strife and military glory." Brown and Scott being now disabled by wounds, the command devolved upon Ripley, who, finding the enemy indisposed to renew the attack, drew off his troops to the camp. The captured guns, owing to the want of horses and the exhausted state of the men, could not be removed from the field, and when a detachment was sent back to secure them it was found that the hill had been reoccupied by the British. In this battle, the most obstinately contested perhaps ever fought upon the American continent, the British force, beside greatly outnumbering their opponents, had the advantages of position and preparation. Against these odds the troops of Brown fought with a valor and obstinacy unparalleled in the war, and which did much to disabuse the country of the idea, then prevalent, that American troops could not cope with the trained veterans of Europe. According to the official accounts, the Americans lost in killed and wounded 743 men, and the British 878. Ripley, finding his forces reduced to less than 2,000 effective men, retired to the neighborhood of Fort Erie, having first destroyed the bridge over the Chippewa and a portion of his stores. LÜNEBURG, a province of Hanover, bound

ed N. by the Elbe (which separates it from Hamburg, Holstein, Lauenburg, and partly from Mecklenburg), E. by the Prussian provinces of Brandenburg and Saxony, S. by Brunswick and Hildesheim, and W. by the province of Calenberg; area, 4,300 sq. m.; pop. in 1858, 358,701. The highest land between the two principal rivers, the Elbe and the Aller, is the Lüneburg heath, a very desolate spot. The other parts of the province are also mostly covered with heath, turf, moors, and forests, chiefly of fir. Along the river banks there is some fertile marsh land, but the corn raised is not sufficient for consumption. Flax and turnips are largely cultivated, and also to some extent hops, potatoes, and vegetables, but very little fruit. The breeding of cattle yields better returns than the tillage of the soil; sheep abound, and the breed of horses is much improving. Timber for building and fuel abounds in the forests. Gypsum is found in many places, in the vicinity of saline springs. The chief means of subsistence of the inhabitants are afforded by the forests, and by bilberries, juniper berries, and cranberries, of which large quantities are exported. The heath is so well adapted to the breeding of bees, that thousands of beehives are sent to Lüneburg from other parts of the country. The manufactures are confined to yarn, linen, hosiery, and wooden carvings. Lüneburg was in ancient times an allodium of the house of Brunswick. In 1235 it became a duchy, together with Brunswick. Afterward it formed a distinct principality, and eventually was allotted to Hanover.-LÜNEBURG, the capital, is situated on the Ilmenau, 82 m. by railway N. N. E. from Hanover, and 244 m. S. E. from Harburg; pop. 13,000. It retains the aspect of antiquity, and contains a town hall (RathHaus), noted for its fine relics and works of art. There are manufactories of sugar, salt, tobacco, &c. Nearly 70,000 horses are annually brought to the market.

LUNENBURG, a S. E. co. of Va., bounded N. by the Nottoway and S. by the Meherrin river; area, 410 sq. m.; pop. in 1850, 11,692, of whom 7,187 were slaves. The surface is generally level and the soil moderately fertile. The productions in 1850 were 49,960 bushels of wheat, 240,065 of Indian corn, 2,284,668 lbs. of tobacco, and 15,689 of wool. There were 7 grist mills, 6 saw mills, 3 tanneries, 20 churches, and 450 pupils attending public schools. Capital, Lewistown.

LUNEVILLE, a city of France, capital of an arrondissement of the same name, in the department of Meurthe (Lorraine), situated on the right bank of the Meurthe, near its junction with the Vezouse, 240 m. by railway E. from Paris, 73 m. W. from Strasbourg, and 20 m. S. E. from Nancy; pop. in 1856, 11,969; of the commune, 15,301; and of the arrondissement, 83,614. Lunéville contains the largest cavalry barracks (accommodating over 6,000 horses) and the finest riding school in France. Vast bodies of cavalry are frequently collected there in