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Lynch v. Clarke.

Treaty of Peace. Judge Story, in his opinion, rested upon the grounds that she was not incapacitated by coverture from determining her allegiance on the Revolution in the government, and her removal and the Treaty, effected a dissolution of the allegiance to the state of South Carolina. Mr. Justice Johnson dissented, on the ground that the common law disallowed of expatriation, and it was in that respect the law of South Carolina.

These cases growing out of the anomalous state of allegiance produced by the Revolution, cannot with propriety, be deemed authorities against well established principles, as applicable to the ordinary questions of alienage and allegiance. In the one, the new principle applied to an unprecedented case, happens to be analagous to principles which the civil law applied to all the children of foreigners. It does not, therefore, follow that the Supreme Court of the United States thought the civil law to be right, and the common law wrong, in respect to the citizenship of such children. In the other case, the common law rule as to expatriation was departed from, because the separation of the countries by a revolution, and the construction of the treaty, were supposed to require it. It does not follow that the rule of the common law was therefore abandoned in all cases of expatriation, much less in its application to citizenship by the place of nativity.

In conclusion, I entertain no doubt but that Julia Lynch was a citizen of the United States when Thomas Lynch died. She therefore inherited the property in controversy, if Thomas Lynch had any estate therein, to the entire exclusion of the complainant, who was then an alien, and incapable of taking by descent.

It is unnecessary, in this view of the case, to examine the right of Thomas Lynch to the premises in question. The complainant's bill must be dismissed. The question which I have discussed and decided, was new in our courts. For this reason, and others that arise upon the merits of the case, I will give no costs to the defendants.

INDEX.

A.

ABSOLUTE CONVEYANCE.

See MORTGAGE, 12 to 15, 24 to 26.

ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP, SUSPENSION

OF.

See TRUST, 3, 14, 17, 19.
WILL, 21, 23.

ABUSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE COURT.

See FRAUD, 1.

ACCOUNT.

See GUARDIAN, 4.

ACCUMULATION.

See TRUSTS, 17, 18.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

See POWERS, 2, 4.

ADEMPTION.

See LEGACY, 2

ADMISSIONS.

See EVIDENCE, 2, 3, 5.

AGENT.

The agent of L. A. one of the assignees, and
a preferred creditor in an assignment, was
active in getting up a sale of certain lease-
holds which were assigned, and became
the purchaser of the same at a very inade-
quate price. Held, that if he were igno-
rant of the fraud in the assignment, he
was, nevertheless, not a bona fide pur-
chaser; because, as the agent of L. A. a
creditor, and in a measure the agent of
the assignees, he had a duty to perform in
regard to the property sold, which was in-
consistent with his becoming a purchaser.
And his purchase was set aside, together
with the assignment, as fraudulent against
the creditors of the assignor. Cram v.
Mitchell,
251

AGREEMENT.

1. Executed covenants and agreements,
founded upon a good or meritorious con-
sideration, are upheld and enforced spe-
cifically in a court of equity. Hayes v.
Kershow,
258

2. Collateral consanguinity is not a meritori-
ous consideration.
id.

3. Where a parol contract is made for the
sale of two parcels of land for a gross price,
and the vendor, at the time for completion,
conveys one parcel only, and agrees to
convey the other presently, and the ven-
dee pays the whole price and enters into
possession of both parcels, on receiving the
deed for the one; the contract is not
merged in such deed, nor is it varied by
the vendee's assent to the delay, as to the
other parcel. And the vendor's agree-
ment to give the deed for the latter, is not

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