the equity claimed by the plaintiff, or embarrassing the plaintiff by dealing with the property during the pendency of the action, or obstructing the performance of some act incidental to the execution of the contract. "The court will in many cases interfere and preserve property in statu quo during the pendency of a suit, in which the rights to it are to be decided, and that without expressing, and often without having the means of forming, any opinion as to such rights." () § 1123. In the class of cases now to be considered the injunction is therefore granted, upon interlocutory application and until the trial, on the plaintiff showing a primá facie case for specific performance. (k) It is not necessary that it should be clear that the plaintiff will succeed at the trial it is sufficient if there is ground for supposing that relief may be given. (7) For on this application the court will not decide delicate points, (m) such as delay, which can only be decided at the trial. (n) § 1124. Accordingly, where an intended lessor was sued by an intended lessee for the specific performance of a contract to grant a lease, he was restrained from bringing an ejectment during the suit.(o) In another case the plaintiff (purchaser) obtained an injunction to restrain the vendor from conveying away the legal estate, which might compel the plaintiff to make some other person a party to the suit. (p) In other cases injunctions to restrain sale and surrender of estates as to which specific performance was sought, were granted on certificate of bill filed and affidavit. (2) And in another case, an injunction was granted to restrain a purchaser, who had got into possession, from cutting timber on the estate. (r)1 (j) Per Lord Cottenham in Great Western Railway Co. v. Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway Co. 2 Ph., 602; Cf. Order LII. rr. 1-3. (k) Powell v. Lloyd, 1 Y. & J., 427. () Hudson v. Bartram, 3 Mad., 440, 447; Attwood v. Barham, 2 Russ., 186. (m) Price v. Assheton, 1 Y. & C. Ex., 82. (n) Levy v. Lindo, 3 Mer., 81. (0) Boardman v. Mostyn, 6 Ves., 467; Buck land v. Hall, 8 Ves., 92; Attwood v. Barham, 2 Russ, 186. Distinguish Fox v. Purssell, 3 Sm. & G., 242. (p) Echliff v. Baldwin, 16 Ves., 267. (q) Curtis v. Marquis of Buckingham, 3 V. & B., 168: Spiller v. Spiller, 3 Sw., 556. (r) Crockford v. Alexander, 15 Ves, 138. Distinguish Marshall v. Watson, 25 Beav., 501, 504. 1 Injunction granted.] The vendee paid the entire consideration for personal property, and, before its delivery, the vendor was about to dispose of it in fraud of vendee's rights. The vendee was insolvent, and great difficulty would have been experienced in replevying the property. Held, that the vendee was entitled to an injunction in the nature of specific performance. Parker v. Garrison, 61 Ill., 250; see, however, City, etc., Ins. Co. v. Olmstead, 33 Conn., 476. § 1125. On the same principle, where the contract was for the sale of a leasehold public house at a fixed price, and of the furniture, fixtures, and other effects on the premises, at a valuation to be made by a valuer named in the contract, and the vendor refused to allow the valuer to enter upon the premises for the purpose of making an inventory of the articles to be valued, Jessel, M. R., upon the interlocutory application of the purchaser in a suit instituted by him for the specific performance of the contract, made an order compelling the vendor to allow the valuer to enter. (s) "I have no hesitation," said his lordship, "in saying that there is no limit to the practice of the court with regard to interlocutory applications so far as they are necessary and reasonable applications ancillary to the due performance of its functions, namely, the administration of justice at the hearing of the cause." (t) § 1126. In one case, where the validity of the contract was disputed, Lord Langdale, M. R., refused a motion for an injunction to restrain the vendor from letting or selling the estate pending the hearing, on the ground that a lessee or purchaser pendente lite would take subject to the plaintiff's rights. (u) And in another case, where, on the plaintiff (purchaser) making his interlocutory application, it was not clear that he would be able at the hearing to establish his right to specific performance, the court of appeals refused, on the ground of comparative convenience, to restrain the vendor by injunction until the hearing from selling the property in dispute, it appearing that the grant of the injunction would, if the plaintiff ultimately failed, do more injury to the defendant than its refusal would occasion to the plaintiff should he ultimately be successful. (v) Turner, L. J., however, in his judgment in the last cited case, distinctly affirmed the general principle that, if there is a clear valid contract for sale, the court will not permit the vendor afterwards to transfer the legal estate in a third person, although such third person would be affected by lis pendens.(w) (8) Smith v. Peters, L. R. 20 Eq., 511. Cf. 4 De G. J. & S., 462; Munro v. Wivenhoe and infra, § 1564 Brightlingsea Rai way Co., 4 De G. J. & S., (t) L. R. 20 Eq., 513. (u) Turner v. Wright, 4 Beav., 40. (v) Hadley v. The London Bank of Scotland, Limited, 3 De G. J. & S.. 63. Cf. Garrett v. Banstead and Epsom Downs Railway Co., 723 (w) 3 De G. J. & S, 70, where the Lord Justice also suggests a probable explanation of a (seemingly) contrary dictum of Lord Eldon in Spiller v. Spiller, 3 Sw., 557. § 1127. It is hardly necessary to remark that the court will not restrain a person who is under contract to buy an estate from buying another, merely on the ground that the completion of the second purchase may incapacitate him to complete the first. (x)1 § 1128. The court will, in some cases, restrain even third persons, whose rights are independent of the contract, from acting in a manner which would prejudice the plaintiff in respect of the property. For instance, where after a contract for the sale of an advowson the incumbent died, and a bill was filed against the vendor and the bishop, the court restrained the vendor from presenting, and the bishop from instituting, or, in case of a lapse taking place pending the suit, from collating to the living any clerk not nominated by the plaintiff.(y) § 1129. Other cases in which the court has restrained by injunction acts inconsistent with the due performance of the contract have been discussed in a previous chapter.(z) § 1130. The Court of Chancery used to grant injunctions to restrain actions at law for the deposit upon its being paid into court;(a) and to restrain actions at law for damages for delay in completion ;(b) or in which the defense was a contract between the parties which the court of law could not specifically enforce ;(c) and it had jurisdiction to restrain parties from applying for probate or the grant of letters of administration, and would so restrain them if it were necessary for the purpose of enforcing a contract which they had entered into. (d) But whether, in a suit for the specific performance of a contract for a separation deed between husband and wife, it would have been within the province of the Court of Chancery to interfere by injunction to restrain a suit in the court of probate for the restitution of conjugal rights, as incident to the main object of the suit in equity, can hardly be said to have been determined, though it was twice discussed by the House of Lords in the case of Wilson v. Wilson, (e) opposite opinions having been (x) Syers v. Brighton Brewery Co. (Limited), 13 W. R., 220. (y) Nicholson v. Knapp, 9 Sim, 326. (b) Duke of Beaufort v. Glynn, 3 Sm. & G., 213, 226. See too Viney v. Chaplin, 2 De G. (e) 1 H. L. C., 538; S. C. 5 H. L. C., 40. expressed on the point by the learned lords by whom that case was decided. § 1131. Under the present practice (judicature act, 1873, s. 24, subs. 5), no cause or proceeding pending before the high court or the court of appeal can be restrained by injunction, but every matter of equity on which an injunction against the prosecution of any such cause or proceeding might, if the judicature act, 1873, had not been passed, have been obtained, either unconditionally or on any terms or conditions, may be relied on by way of defense thereof. It is by the same sub-section enacted that nothing in that act contained shall disable either of the said courts [the high court and the court of appeal], from directing a stay of proceedings in any cause or matter pending before it if it shall think fit; and that any person, whether a party or not to any such cause or matter, who would have been entitled, if that act had not been passed, to apply to any court to restrain the prosecution thereof, shall be at liberty to apply to the said courts respectively by motion in a summary way for a stay of proceedings in such cause or matter either generally, or so far as may be necessary for the purpose of justice; and that the court shall thereupon make such order as shall be just. § 1132. In other words, the defendant to an action who desires to avail himself of some matter which would formerly have been a ground for asking the Court of Chancery to restrain proceedings in another court, has now two courses only open to him:-he may plead the matter as a defense to the action, or he may make it the ground of an application to the court in which the action is pending to stay the proceedings in an action.(ƒ) 3. Enforcement of right resulting from non-performance. § 1133. The court will, in a proper case, grant an injunction for the purpose of enforcing a right resulting to the applicant from the non-performance of the contract. § 1134. Thus, where a decree had been made declaring that a contract between a railway company and the rector (ƒ) Garbutt v. Fawcus, 1 Ch. D., 155; Re People's Garden Co., 1 Ch. D., 44. of W. for the purchase by the company of certain glebe lands of which the company had taken possession before the institution of the suit ought to be specifically performed, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a vendor's lien, and directing the company to pay the purchase-money by a day named, with liberty for the plaintiff, in case of default, to apply for the purpose of enforcing his lien; and, default having been made by the company, an order had been made for the sale of the lands, but two attempts to sell had proved unsuccessful: Lord Selborne finally ordered that, in default of the company paying the purchase-money with interest and costs into court within a month after service of the order, an injunction should be awarded to restrain them. from continuing in possession of the lands.(g) § 1135. With regard to the extent of the court's jurisdiction in injunction, it is to be observed that the judicature act, 1873, enacts (s. 25, subs. 8) that an injunction may be granted by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient that such order should be made, but does not in terms extend this wide power to the grant of injunctions at the trial. It seems, however, that the effect of the above enactment, read in connection with the 76th section of the same act and the common law procedure act, 1884 (sections 79, 81, 82), is to give the court an unlimited power of granting an injunction at any stage of any case where it would, according to sufficient legal reasons or on settled legal principles, be right or just to do so. (h)' () Williams v. Aylesbury & Buckingham Railway Co., 21 W. R., 819, Seton, 1331; Infra, $1149 Disinguish Pell v. Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co., L. R. 2 Ch, 100; Latimer v. Aylesbury and Buckingham Railway Co., 9 Ch. D., 385; and consider Lord Nelson v. Salisbury and Dorset Junction Railway Co., 16 W. R., 1074. (h) Beddow v. Beddow, 9 Ch. D., 89, 93; Cf. Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D., 873; and per Bacon V. C. in Dicks v. Brooks, 15 Ch. D., 25. 1 Execution.] Unless the complainant has a good defense at law, and was prevented from availing himself of the same by mistake, suprise or fraud, without negligence on his part, an injunction will not be granted to restrain the execution of a judgment. Hill v. Reifsnider, 46 Md., 555. Where the judgment entered is contrary to an express agreement between the parties, an injunction will be granted. Kent v. Ricards, 3 Md. Ch., 392. A clear agreement was violated. Held, that an injunction would be granted. Reily v. Miami Ex. Co., 5 Ohio, 333. Balance of equities.] In a case where either party may suffer by the granting or withholding of an injunction, the equitable rule appears to be that the court must balance the inconveniences likely to be sustained, and to grant or withhold |