Principles of Contract at Law and in Equity

petent parties? (Ch. II.) Does it satisfy the requirements of the law as to form (if any there be for the particular kind of contract) (Ch. III.) and consideration? (Ch. IV.) Who may now, or hereafter, sue or be sued upon it? (Ch. V.) So far as to what may be called the first elements. We have further to ask if there is nothing in the matter of the agreement to interfere with its validity: whether it be unlawful (Ch. VI.) or impossible (Ch. VII.) Again, the question may arise whether there is nothing to prevent the expressed consent of the parties from having its full effect. By reason of mistake (Ch. VIII.) the consent may be only apparent, or a true consent may be wrongly expressed; or by reason of misrepresentation (Ch. IX.), fraud (Ch. X.), coercion or undue influence (Ch. XI.), the consent of one of the parties may not be binding upon him. Finally there may be a question whether we have to deal with one of those curious and more or less anomalous cases where there is an agreement neither void nor voidable, for some purposes recognized and having legal consequences, yet not directly enforceable (Ch. XII.) Questions arising on the performance or discharge of contracts are not considered except incidentally.

Some digressions have been deliberately admitted, partly for reasons of practical convenience, partly on account of the subjects having a special interest on historical or other grounds. In one or two instances I have sacrificed scientific arrangement for the sake of keeping things in the place where I thought a reader would expect to find them: thus the rules as to the rescission of voidable contracts in Ch. X. should strictly have formed a separate chapter.

The Indian Contract Act has been almost constantly kept in view. Most of the sections relevant to the topics here considered will be found cited in full either in the text or in the notes. Possibly this may be not without practical use to some of my readers: but apart from this, the Contract Act deserves, as it appears to me, more

attention from English lawyers than to my knowledge it has yet received. It is a most instructive example of what can be done to consolidate and simplify English case-law, and shows better than any discussion can do what are the real advantages of codification, the real difficulties to be overcome, and the most likely means of overcoming them.

I have not attempted to collect American authorities : the ever growing bulk of English reports alone is already formidable enough to deal with. But some account has been given of a certain number of decisions of the Supreme Court, selected as being recent or otherwise of marked importance.

Considering the amount of coincidence (if not more than coincidence) between English and Roman law in the main principles of Contract, I have felt justified in making a pretty free use of the Roman law for purposes of illustration and analogy. I have also referred at times to modern Continental Codes, especially where it seemed that light might be thrown on a topic of special legislation, or of what is called "the policy of the law," by extending the range of observation. However no systematic comparison has been undertaken. On points of Roman law (and to a considerable extent, indeed, on the principles it has in common with our own), I have consulted and generally followed Savigny's great work.

My obligations to foregoing English writers are acknowledged to the best of my power in their proper places in the text. Here I must express my thanks to my friend Mr. W. R. Kennedy, of Lincoln's Inn, for valuable suggestions and contributions, especially on the subject of Ch. VII.; and in like manner to my friend Mr. G. H. Blakesley, of Lincoln's Inn, especially as to Ch. X. F. P.

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