* The trial court, among other things, made the following findings, to wit: "And the court further finds that the evidence introduced on behalf of plaintiff shows that the death of plaintiff's husband and decedent was caused by his own negligence." ily say in every case what conduct shall | F. Anthony was caused solely by his own be considered reasonable and prudent, and negligence in this, that he carelessly and what shall constitute ordinary care, under negligently failed to exercise ordinary or any and all circumstances. The terms 'or- reasonable care for his own safety and prodinary care,' 'reasonable prudence,' and such tection. This presented an issue, like terms, as applied to the conduct and which, with the facts in this case, under affairs of men, have a relative significance, section 6, article 23, of our Constitution, and cannot be arbitrarily defined. What should have been submitted to the jury. may be deemed ordinary care in one case may, under different surroundings and circumstances, be gross negligence. The policy of the law has relegated the determination of such questions to the jury, under proper instructions from the court. It is their province to note the special circumstances and surroundings of each particular case, and then say whether the conduct of the parties in that case was such as would be expected of reasonable, prudent men, under a similar state of affairs. When a given state of facts in such that reasonable men may fairly differ upon the question as to whether there was negligence or not, the determination of the matter is for the jury. It is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them that the question of negligence is ever considered as one of law for the court." Also the doctrine that no one, although it may be his own property, and be operated on his own premises, will be permitted to maintain a perilous menace to others or operate a dangerous agency, in disregard of the lives and safety of others in the lawful exercise of their rights, is well settled in this state in Enid City Ry. Co. v. Webber, supra, C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stone, 34 Okl. 364, 125 Pac. 1120, and Connally v. Woods, 134 Pac. 869, not yet officially reported. In the case at bar we will not say that the evidence does not show negligence for failure to give proper warning when the elevator started, nor do we deny that it might tend to show a lack of proper regard for the lives and safety of employés by the operation of the elevator at all, while this work was being done on the very line of the elevator path. We believe reasonable men might have honestly differed as to the probative force of these facts, that reasonable men might have honestly differed as to whether a failure to give any warning when the elevator started was a failure to discharge a duty owed by defendants to the workmen, or as to whether the operation of the elevator at all, while the work was being done in the very path of this dangerous agency, was a negligent disregard for the lives and safety of the workmen, and therefore believe the court erred in taking the case from the jury. And entertaining this view it follows that the court erred in finding that the deceased met his death by his own negligence. The defendants alleged in their answer "that the accident occurring to the said Jas. Section 6, article 23, of the Constitution (section 355, Williams' Annotated Constitution) provides: "The defense of contribu tory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury." At the time this cause was tried, the foregoing section of the Constitution had not been construed by this court. Since then, however, in C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Baroni, 32 Okl. 540, 122 Pac. 926, C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Beatty, 34 Okl. 321, 126 Pac. 736, C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 129 Pac. 13, Frederick Cotton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Traver, 129 Pac. 747, Phoenix Printing Co. v. Dur ham, 32 Okl. 575, 122 Pac. 708, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1191, Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. Blunt, 132 Pac. 659, and in C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Duran, 134 Pac. 876, a recent case not yet officially reported, in a very exhaus tive and well-considered opinion by Justice Williams, the question is settled that, in an action for negligence, at least where there is any competent testimony tending to show primary negligence, and where the defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk is interposed, the issue becomes a question of fact, which shall in all cases be left to the jury for determination. Therefore the foregoing finding of the trial court was error. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole. (39 Okl. 344) ZEIMANN v. BENNETT et al. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. June 11, 1913. Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 1913.) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 425*)-PARTIES-CI TATION-DISMISSAL OF APPEAL. Prior to the passage of Act Feb. 14, 1911 (Sess. Laws 1910-11, c. 18), every necessary party to an appeal must either make a general appearance within the year following the rendition of the judgment or the entering of the final order appealed from, or summons must issue within such time, and service thereof be For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes had upon the defendant in error, and, when not so done, the appeal will be dismissed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2155-2161; Dec. Dig. 425.*] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 327*)-PARTIES. All persons who are parties to the proceedings in the trial court, and whose interest will be adversely affected by a reversal of the judgment, must be brought into the appellate proceedings. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1795, 1814-1820, 18221835; Dec. Dig. § 327.*] 3. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 336*) — PARTIESDISMISSAL OF APPEAL. If the interests of those who are brought into the appellate proceedings as parties will be injuriously affected by a reversal or modification of the judgment complained of, without a reopening of the case as to the other parties, as to whose interest the judgment has become final by the failure to appeal, the appeal will be dismissed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1868-1876; Dec. Dig. § 336.*] court, can the present appeal be sustained? [2, 3] The rules for determining this question are settled by this court, and are as follows: (1) All persons who are parties to the proceedings in the trial court, and whose interests will be affected adversely by a reversal of the judgment, must be brought into the appellate proceedings. (2) If the interests of those who are brought into the appellate proceedings as parties will be injuriously affected by a reversal or modification of the judgment complained of, without a reopening of the case as to the other parties, as to whose interests the judgment has become final by a failure to appeal, the appeal will be dismissed. Board of Commissioners v. Harvey, 5 Okl. 468, 49 Pac. 1006; Humphrey v. Hunt, 9 Okl. 196, 59 Pac. 971; Wedd v. Gates et al., 15 Okl. 602, 82 Pac. 808; Strange et al. v. Crismon, 22 Okl. 841, 98 Pac. 937; Board of Commissioners v. Lemley, 23 Okl. 306, 101 Pac. 109; Weisbender et al. v. School District No. 6, 24 Okl. 173, 103 Pac. 639; Con Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1.tinental Gin Co. v. Huff et al., 25 Okl. 798, Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; John J. Carney, Judge. 108 Pac. 369; Seibert v. First Nat. Bank, 25 Okl. 778, 108 Pac. 628; Vaught v. Miners' Bank, 27 Okl. 100, 111 Pac. 214. [1] Every necessary party to an appeal must either make a general appearance within the year following the rendition of the judgment or the entering of the final order appealed from, or summons must issue within such time, and service thereof be had upon the defendants in error, and, when not so done, the appeal will be dismissed. The court is without authority to make any order as to those defendants not made parties to the appeal. The judgment as to them is final. We cannot, therefore, reverse the case, without injuriously affecting the rights of those who are parties to the proceedings on appeal, for we cannot reopen the case as to the remaining defendants. For the reasons given, the petition in error should be dismissed. PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole. (39 Okl. 31) CURTIS & GARTSIDE CO. v. PIGG. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. April 4, 1913. On Rehearing, July 22, 1913.) (Syllabus by the Court.) SHARP, C. Plaintiff sought to recover damages in the sum of $15,138.50 of the defendants, arising out of his expulsion from Subordinate Erie No. 124, Fraternal Order of Eagles. It is difficult, indeed, from the record before us to understand what was done in the trial court; but from the transcript, supplemented by the nunc pro tunc judgment of the trial court, and from the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error, we infer that the order made by the trial court was treated as a final judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. An elaborate motion for a new trial, embracing 73 grounds, was filed and overruled. The petition in error is entitled "Charles Zeimann, M. D., v. D. A. Bennett et al." Nowhere in the petition in error are any of the defendants, other than D. A. Bennett, named or 1. PLEADING (§ 345*)-JUDGMENT ON PLEADdesignated. The petition in error was filed July 15, 1911, on which day a summons in error issued to the defendants D. A. Bennett, J. F. Kuhn, and H. D. Grout. There was no waiver of the issuance of summons in error, nor has there been any entry of appearance by the remaining defendants. The only defendants, therefore, that are before the court are those last above named. It will be necessary on that account for us to consider, and that briefly, but one question. Regardless of the alleged errors committed by the trial For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes INGS. Under section 5933, Comp. Laws 1909, a the pleadings, even after verdict has been renparty to an action may be given judgment on dered against such party; but in such case the right to such verdict should clearly appear plaintiff has stated a cause of action, and isfrom the status of the pleadings, and where sues are formed by answer and reply, and where the pleadings thereby present material issues. of fact, which cannot be determined without evidence aliunde, it is not error to overrule the motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 1055-1059; Dec. Dig. § 345.*] The trial court, among other things, made the following findings, to wit: "And the court further finds that the evidence introduced on behalf of plaintiff shows that the death of plaintiff's husband and decedent was caused by his own negligence." ily say in every case what conduct shall | F. Anthony was caused solely by his own be considered reasonable and prudent, and negligence in this, that he carelessly and what shall constitute ordinary care, under negligently failed to exercise ordinary or any and all circumstances. The terms 'or- reasonable care for his own safety and prodinary care,' 'reasonable prudence,' and such tection. This presented an issue, like terms, as applied to the conduct and which, with the facts in this case, under affairs of men, have a relative significance, section 6, article 23, of our Constitution, and cannot be arbitrarily defined. What should have been submitted to the jury. may be deemed ordinary care in one case may, under different surroundings and circumstances, be gross negligence. The policy of the law has relegated the determination of such questions to the jury, under proper instructions from the court. It is their province to note the special circumstances and surroundings of each particular case, and then say whether the conduct of the parties in that case was such as would be expected of reasonable, prudent men, under a similar state of affairs. When a given state of facts in such that reasonable men may fairly differ upon the question as to whether there was negligence or not, the determination of the matter is for the jury. It is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them that the question of negligence is ever considered as one of law for the court." Section 6, article 23, of the Constitution (section 355, Williams' Annotated Constitution) provides: "The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury." At the time this cause was tried, the foregoing section of the Constitution had not been construed by this court. Since then, however, in C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Baroni, 32 Okl. 540, 122 Pac. 926, C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Beatty, 34 Okl. 321, 126 Pac. 736, C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 129 Pac. 13, Frederick Cotton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Traver, 129 Pac. 747, Phoenix Printing Co. v. Durham, 32 Okl. 575, 122 Pac. 708, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1191, Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. Blunt, 132 Pac. 659, and in C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Duran, 134 Pac. 876, a recent case not yet officially reported, in a very exhaustive and well-considered opinion by Justice Williams, the question is settled that, in an action for negligence, at least where there is any competent testimony tending to show primary negligence, and where the defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk is interposed, the issue becomes a question of fact, which shall in all cases be left Therefore to the jury for determination. the foregoing finding of the trial court was error. Also the doctrine that no one, although it may be his own property, and be operated on his own premises, will be permitted to maintain a perilous menace to others or operate a dangerous agency, in disregard of the lives and safety of others in the lawful exercise of their rights, is well settled in this state in Enid City Ry. Co. v. Webber, supra, C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stone, 34 Okl. 364, 125 Pac. 1120, and Connally v. Woods, 134 Pac. 869, not yet officially reported. In the case at bar we will not say that the evidence does not show negligence for failure to give proper warning when the elevator started, nor do we deny that it might tend to show a lack of proper regard for the lives and safety of employés by the operation of the elevator at all, while this work was being done on the very line of the elevator path. We believe reasonable men might have honestly differed as to the probative force of these facts, that reasonable men might have honestly differed as to whether a failure to give any warning when the elevator started was a failure to discharge a duty owed by defendants to the workmen, or as to whether the operation of the elevator at all, while the work was being done in the very path of this dangerous agency, was a negligent disregard for the lives and safety of the workmen, and therefore believe the court erred in taking 1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 425*)-PARTIES—CI the case from the jury. And entertaining this view it follows that the court erred in finding that the deceased met his death by his own negligence. The defendants alleged in their answer "that the accident occurring to the said Jas. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole. (39 Okl. 344) ZEIMANN v. BENNETT et al. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. June 11, 1913. Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 1913.) (Syllabus by the Court.) TATION-DISMISSAL OF APPEAL. Prior to the passage of Act Feb. 14, 1911 (Sess. Laws 1910-11, c. 18), every necessary party to an appeal must either make a general appearance within the year following the rendition of the judgment or the entering of the final order appealed from, or summons must issue within such time, and service thereof be For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes had upon the defendant in error, and, when not so done, the appeal will be dismissed. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. 88 2155-2161; Dec. Dig. & 425.*] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 327*)-PARTIES. All persons who are parties to the proceedings in the trial court, and whose interest will be adversely affected by a reversal of the judgment, must be brought into the appellate proceedings. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1795, 1814-1820, 18221835; Dec. Dig. § 327.*] 3. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 336*) — PARTIESDISMISSAL OF APPEAL. If the interests of those who are brought into the appellate proceedings as parties will be injuriously affected by a reversal or modification of the judgment complained of, without a reopening of the case as to the other parties, as to whose interest the judgment has become final by the failure to appeal, the appeal will be dismissed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1868-1876; Dec. Dig. § 336.*] Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1. Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; John J. Carney, Judge. Action by Charles Zeimann against D. A. Bennett, worthy president, and others. Judg. ment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Dismissed. L. J. Marks, of Muskogee, and R. H. Towne, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error. Giddings & Giddings, of Oklahoma City, for de fendants in error. court, can the present appeal be sustained? [2, 3] The rules for determining this question are settled by this court, and are as follows: (1) All persons who are parties to the proceedings in the trial court, and whose interests will be affected adversely by a reversal of the judgment, must be brought into the appellate proceedings. (2) If the interests of those who are brought into the appellaté proceedings as parties will be injuriously affected by a reversal or modification of the judgment complained of, without a reopening of the case as to the other parties, as to whose interests the judgment has become final by a failure to appeal, the appeal will be dismissed. Board of Commissioners v. Harvey, 5 Okl. 468, 49 Pac. 1006; Humphrey v. Hunt, 9 Okl. 196, 59 Pac. 971; Wedd v. Gates et al., 15 Okl. 602, 82 Pac. 808; Strange et al. v. Crismon, 22 Okl. 841, 98 Pac. 937; Board of Commissioners v. Lemley, 23 Okl. 306, 101 Pac. 109; Weisbender et al. v. School District No. 6, 24 Okl. 173, 103 Pac. 639; Continental Gin Co. v. Huff et al., 25 Okl. 798, 108 Pac. 369; Seibert v. First Nat. Bank, 25 Okl. 778, 108 Pac. 628; Vaught v. Miners' Bank, 27 Okl. 100, 111 Pac. 214. [1] Every necessary party to an appeal must either make a general appearance within the year following the rendition of the judgment or the entering of the final order appealed from, or summons must issue within such time, and service thereof be had upon the defendants in error, and, when not so done, the appeal will be dismissed. The court is without authority to make any order as to those defendants not made parties to the appeal. The judgment as to them is final. We cannot, therefore, reverse the case, without injuriously affecting the rights of those who are parties to the proceedings on appeal, for we cannot reopen the case as to the remaining defendants. For the reasons given, the petition in error should be dismissed. PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole. (39 Okl. 31) SHARP, C. Plaintiff sought to recover damages in the sum of $15,138.50 of the defendants, arising out of his expulsion from Subordinate Erie No. 124, Fraternal Order of Eagles. It is difficult, indeed, from the record before us to understand what was done in the trial court; but from the transcript, supplemented by the nunc pro tunc judgment of the trial court, and from the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error, we infer that the order made by the trial court was treated as a final judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. An elaborate motion for a new trial, embracing 73 grounds, was filed and overruled. The petition in error is entitled "Charles Zeimann, M. D., v. D. A. Bennett et al." Nowhere in the petition in error are any of the defendants, other than D. A. Bennett, named or 1. PLEADING (§ 345*)-JUDGMENT ON PLEADdesignated. The petition in error was filed July 15, 1911, on which day a summons in error issued to the defendants D. A. Bennett, J. F. Kuhn, and H. D. Grout. There was no waiver of the issuance of summons in error, nor has there been any entry of appearance by the remaining defendants. The only defendants, therefore, that are before the court are those last above named. It will be necessary on that account for us to consider, and that briefly, but one question. Regardless of the alleged errors committed by the trial CURTIS & GARTSIDE CO. v. PIGG. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. April 4, 1913. On Rehearing, July 22, 1913.) (Syllabus by the Court.) INGS. Under section 5933, Comp. Laws 1909, a the pleadings, even after verdict has been renparty to an action may be given judgment on dered against such party; but in such case the right to such verdict should clearly appear. plaintiff has stated a cause of action, and isfrom the status of the pleadings, and where sues are formed by answer and reply, and where the pleadings thereby present material issues of fact, which cannot be determined without evidence aliunde, it is not error to overrule the motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 1055-1059; Dec. Dig. § 345.*] For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 2. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 95*)-CHILD LA- | without giving the foreman any instructions in BOR LAW. Under section 629, Comp. Laws 1909 (section 1, Child Labor Law), no child under the age of 14 years shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work in any factory, workshop, or at any occupation especially injurious to health or morals or hazardous to life or limb. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. 88 141, 160; Dec. Dig. § 95.*] 3. Master and Servant (§ 95*)—CHILD LA BOR LAW. Under section 630 (section 2, Child Labor Law), children over 14 and under 16 years of age may be lawfully employed to do such work as is not dangerous or hazardous, in a room or building where dangerous machinery is being operated; but they shall not be employed nor permitted nor suffered to operate nor assist in operating any dangerous machinery, nor to oil nor assist in oiling any circular bandsaws while in motion. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 141, 160; Dec. Dig. § 95.*] 4. MASTER AND SERVANT (95)-CHILD LA- - The purpose of the child labor law is to positively prohibit children under the ages designated from being employed, permitted, or suffered to engage in occupations that are injurious to health or morals or hazardous to life or limb, and, in the general plan of prohibition, the terms "employed," "permitted," and "suffered," are each given a distinct office, with the full meaning and significance given such terms in common usage, and mean that children shall neither be employed by contract, nor permitted by acquiescence, nor suffered by a failure to hinder. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 141-160; Dec. Dig. 8 95.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2377-2380; vol. 8, p. 7649; vol. 6, pp. 5315-5318; vol. 8, p. 7752; vol. 7, pp. 6757-6759; vol. 8, p. 7809.] 5. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 95*)-INJURY TO SERVANT-ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. reference to the boy, but leaves the matter of instructions altogether to the foreman. The foreman orders the boy to assist a man who is operating a system of bandsaws, and instructs him to do whatever the operator tells him to do. The operator tells him to oil the saws while in motion. In so doing his hand is cut off by a saw. In such case the master is liable for failure to exercise the degree of care required by statute. Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 314-317; Dec. Dig. § [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and 153.*] 7. TRIAL (§§ 295, 296*)-INSTRUCTIONS-Cure OF ERROR. (a) Although a single paragraph of a charge, standing alone, may not fully state the law, if in the entire charge, construed as a whole, the law is fairly and fully stated, the judgment will not be reversed. (b) Where the material issues involved are stated in preceding paragraphs of the charge with such clearness as to enable the jury, without reference to the petition, to know what the material issues are and what issues are to be determined, a judgment will not be reversed merely because in a succeeding paragraph the court uses the language, "provided you find that plaintiff has established all the other material allegations of this petition." Dig. 88 703-718; Dec. Dig. §§ 295, 296.*] On Rehearing. 8. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 95*)—INJURY TO MINOR EMPLOYÉ-PROHIBITED WORK. Where a manufacturer assigns a boy under 16 years of age to the work of assisting in the operation of a machine, the principal factors of which are circular saws, such act constitutes a violation of the prohibitions of the child labor laws, and if the boy is injured at such work the manufacturer is liable. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 141, 160; Dec. Dig. § 95.*] 9. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1178*)— REMAND— REASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES. Where liability is so clearly shown by the evidence of the defendant that the trial court would have been justified in instructing the jury to find the defendant liable, and this court has held, as a matter of law, that defendant is liable under its own evidence, and there is no error in the record save as to the amount of the damages recovered, this court has the power, in the interest of a speedy and economical adminoil-istration of the law, to fix and establish plainthe trial court for a reassessment of the damtiff's right to recover and remand the case to ages, and for that purpose only. Where a minor over 14 and under 16 years of age is employed to do such work as the law authorizes his being employed to do, in a room where circular bandsaws and dangerous machinery are being operated it is negligence for which the master is liable for the injuries resulting, for a vice principal to direct or negligently per mit or suffer such minor to oil or assist in ing such machinery while in motion, although the contract of employment may be lawful. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. 88 141-160; Dec. Dig. 8 95.*] 6. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 153*)—INJURY TO SERVANT-LIABILITY OF MASTER. Error, Cent. Dig. 8 4604-4620; Dec. Dig. i 1178.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) 10. TRIAL (§ 3211⁄2*)—VERDICT. Under Williams' Ann. Const. § 27, providing that "three-fourths of the whole number of verdict," it is with the jury to say whether they jurors concurring shall have power to render a will render a three-fourths verdict, and not for the court to peremptorily demand it. Under a contract between his father and the vice principal of a sash and door factory, a boy 14 years of age is employed to sweep out and do such other things as the law permits his being employed to do in a factory where dangerous machinery is being operated. The boy knows nothing of the terms of the contract, nor what he is supposed to do or to be forbidden to do. He is placed by his father under the care and supervision of the vice principal. The vice principal gives him no instruction as to what he shall do or not do, gives him no warning as to the dangers of the machinery, and fails to admonish him not to assist in oiling or operat- Where, in a personal injury case, the ining same, but turns him over to a foreman,structions stated an improper measure of dam•For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 742; Dec. Dig. § 3212.*] 11. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1064*)-HARMLESS ERROR-INSTRUCTIONS-MEASURE OF DAM AGES. |