[660] [661] refused the motion, and the Corporation ex-| had no more effect than a motion for a new It is assigned for error, that the Circuit Court trial, and, therefore, under our settled practice cannot be reviewed here, on this writ of error although there is a bill of exceptions in regard to it. It is contended that when the fi. fa. was is sued against the city, there was no law unde which a fi. fa. could issue against the city This point was not taken in the court below It does not appear in the motion in arrest o judgment, or in the bill of exceptions, or in th assignment of errors accompanying the writ o error. It was a point which should have bee raised and saved when the traverse to the an swer was tried before the jury. But this wa not done. Still, as the garnishment proceeding were based on the fi. fa., it is proper to say that the proceedings in the case were warrante by section 916 of the Revised Statutes, whic provides as follows: "The party recovering judgment in any common-law cause, in any Ci cuit or District Court, shall be entitled to simila remedies upon the same, by execution or othe wise, to reach the property of the judgment deb or, as are now provided in like causes by the lay of the State in which such court is held, or b any such laws hereafter enacted which may adopted by general rules of such Circuit or Di trict Court; and such courts may, from time time, by general rules, adopt such State laws may hereafter be in force in such State in rel tion to remedies upon judgments, as aforesai by execution or otherwise." That section of t statute was considered by this court, in Ex par Boyd, 105 U. S., 647 [Bk. 26, L. ed. 1200], a was held to apply to proceedings supplementa to execution, to examine the judgment debt in regard to his property, under a judgme rendered in a common-law cause. We are al of opinion that it covers the proceedings had this case to reach the property of the cit Those proceedings were authorized by laws the State of Louisiana in force when § 6 of t Act of June 1, 1872, chap. 255, 17 Stat. at I 197, now § 916 of the Revised Statutes, w enacted. It is urged that, by § 2 of the Act of t Legislature of Louisiana, passed March 17, 18 (Sess. Laws of 1870, Extra Session, Act No. p. 10), it was made unlawful to issue any w of execution or fieri facias, from any of t courts in Louisiana, against the City of Ne Orleans, to enforce the payment of any jud ment for money against that city. But we a of opinion that the provisions of that spec Act, in reference to judgments against t City of New Orleans, were adopted by secti 916. The meaning of that section is, that t remedies, by execution or otherwise, on a jud ment in a common-law cause, in a Circuit Cou shall be the same as were then provided by t laws of the State in respect to judgments suits of a like nature or class. "Like cause is the expression. By article 641 of the Code Practice of Louisiana, it was and is provid that, "When the judgment orders the payme of a sum of money, the party in whose favo The verdict of the jury on the trial of the is rendered may apply to the clerk and obta traverse to the answer was rendered April 5, from him a writ of fieri facias against the pr 1882. No bill of exceptions was taken at the erty of his debtor.' It is this provision, a trial. The motion to expunge the proposed the garnishee proceedings consequent upon judgment, and to arrest any judgment on the provided by the laws of Louisiana in respect verdict, was not filed till April 21, 1882, and | judgments generally, of a like nature or cl in the present case, which the Act arted as remedies for the judgAT, in a common-law cause, in the And such has been the uniform e Circuit Court at New Orleans. ***Av. Morris, 3 Woods, 115; Hart v. 12 Fed. Rep., 292; New Or1. Pa, decided by Mr. Justice 1999. unreported. The exception the State as to the City of New Orbe of force as to suits in the Courts but it is not an exception which Messrs. J. G. Shipman and Samuel Dickson, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Theo. Little, for defendants in error. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: This was a writ of error by the devisces of Mary V. Wurts to reverse a judgment confirming an assessment of Commissioners for the Drainage of Lands, under the Statute of New Jersey of March 8, 1871, the material provisions of which are as follows: ore in the Circuit Court. By section 1, "The Board of Managers of signments of error seek to raise the Geological Survey, on the application of at s. that the debt of the Corpora- least five owners of separate lots of land, inwas part of its public revenues, cluded in any tract of land in this State which to seizure or levy: that the city is subject to overflow from freshets, or which de a party to the garnishee proceed- is usually in a low, marshy, boggy or wet conplemental petition does not dition," are authorized to examine the tract, the debt to the city is not public prop- and, if they deem it for the interest of the pubthere was no issue raised to be tried lic and of the landowners to be affected therethat the character and origin of the by, then to make surveys, and decide upon and of the Coporation to the city were adopt a system of drainage, and report it to the o be such as would support the Supreme Court of the State; and thereupon the At the Corporation; and that the court, upon reasonable notice published in a d in the verdict was improperly newspaper circulating in the county where the Generusly computed. These ques- tract is, shall appoint three Commissioners to aving been raised on the trial before superintend and carry out the system of drainved by a bill of exceptions, can-age so adopted and reported; "provided, that cdered by this court on a writ of if, at the time fixed for such appointment of Commissioners, it shall appear to the court by the written remonstrance of the owners of a majority of the said low and wet lands, duly authenticated by affidavit, that they are opposed to the drainage thereof at the common expense, then the said court shall not appoint such com edings of record appear to have lar, and in accordance with and practice of Louisiana. wered. *OT. IN: fl. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. missioners." By section 2, the Commissioners shall cause the tract to be drained in accordance with the LES STUART WURTS ET AL., Piffs. after the completion of the work, report to the general plan of the board of managers, and, in Err., Supreme Court the expense thereof, together A BAGLAND ET AL., Commisione pense; notice of the report shall be published of Drainage, Etc. S 8. C., Reporter's ed., 606–615.) for four weeks, in order that any persons in- Punta ef New Jersey of March 8, 1871, pro-directing the Commissioners "to distribute and e of any tract of low or assess the amount of said expense, and interest, of the meaning of the Four [No. 193.] shall be deposited in some convenient place for and where the Commissioners will meet to hear [607] --- Kr 10, 18×5. Decided May 4, 1885. six weeks, designating a time and place when 3 the Supreme Court of the State objections to the assessment; and the Commisd farts of the case appear in objections as shall be made to them, shall pro by Mr. Justice GRAY. sioners, having heard and decided upon such ceed to complete their assessment and file it in adattovi "me" Inse process of law." weeks, after which, if no objections have been Tel, C. S., uk. 21,436, note. made to the assessment, it shall be confirmed by [608] [609.] the court; any objections filed within the four | benefit derived from said drainage by the sev By section 5, the Commissioners may from time to time borrow the necessary moneys to carry on the work of draining the lands, and give their bonds as such Commissioners therefor, and pledge for the repayment thereof the assessment to be made as aforesaid By proceedings had in accordance with this statute, the Board of Managers of the Geological Survey, upon the application of more than five owners of separate lots of land situated in the tract of land known as the Great Meadows on the Pequest River, examined and surveyed the entire tract, and reported a plan for draining it to the Supreme Court, and on November 15, 1872, three Commissioners were appointed to carry the plan into execution. Pending the proceedings, on March 19, 1874, a supplemental statute was passed, by section 2 of which, "if the said commissioners, after having commenced the drainage of such tract and proceeded therewith, shall, before the drainage of the same shall be completed, be compelled to suspend the completion thereof, from any inability at that time to raise the money required therefor, they shall proceed to ascertain the tracts of land benefited or intended to be benefited by said drainage, and the relative proportions in which the said respective tracts have been or will be benefited thereby, and also the expenses incurred in said drainage, and as near as may be the additional expenses required for the completion thereof," and make and report to the court an assessment of such expenses. In accordance with that provision of the Statute of 1874, the Commissioners, before completing the work, made and reported to the court an assessment based upon an estimate of contemplated benefits, which was, for that reason, upon objections filed by Mrs. Wurts, set aside by an order of the Supreme Court, affirmed by the Court of Errors. 10 Vroom, 433; 12 Id., 175. On May 17, 1879, after the completion of the work, the Commissioners made a report to the court, pursuant to the Statute of 1871, showing the expense to have been $107,916.07. No objections to that report having been filed, after four weeks' notice, the court on June 23, ordered the Commissioners to distribute that sum "upon the lands mentioned in their said report, in proportion, as nearly as they can judge, to the Wurts was $13,347.84, and, after notice to and hearing of all parties who desired to object to the assessment, reported it to the Supreme Court, which directed it to be modified as to certain lands of other parties lying outside the original survey, and in other respects confirmed the assessment, notwithstanding objections made to it by the devisees of Mrs. Wurts; and its judgment was affirmed in the Court of Errors. 13 Vroom, 553; 14 Id., 456. The judg ment of the Court of Errors was the final judgment in the case, and this writ of error was addressed to the Supreme Court because at the time of suing out the writ of error the record had been transmitted to that court and was in its possession. 105 U. S., 701 [Bk. 26, L. ed. 1109]. The error assigned was that "the Act of March 8, 1871, upon which the said judgment and proceedings are founded, violates the Constitution of the United States in this, that it deprives the plaintiffs in error of their property without due process of law, and denies to them the equal protection of the laws, and violates the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." General laws authorizing the drainage of tracts of swamp and low lands, by commissioners appointed upon proceedings instituted by some of the owners of the lands, and the assessment of the whole expense of the work upon all the lands within the tract in question, have long existed in the State of New Jersey, and have been sustained and acted on by her courts, under the Constitution of 1776, as well as under that of 1844. Stats. December 23, 1783, Wilson's Laws, 382; November 29, 1788, and November 24, 1792, Paterson's Laws, 84, 119; Jones v. Lore, 2 Pen., 1048; Doremus v. Smith, 1 South., 142; Westcott v. Garrison, 1 Halst., 132; State v. Frank & Guisbert Creek Co. 2 J. S. Green, 301; State v. Newark, 3 Dutch., 185, 194; Berdan v. Drainage Co., 3 C. E. Green, 69; Coster v. Tide Water Co., 3 Id., 54, 68, 518, 531; State v. Blake, 6 Vroom, 208, and 7 Id., 442; Hoagland v. Wurts, 12 Id., 175, 179. In State v. Newark, 3 Dutch., 185, 194, the Supreme Court said: "Laws for the drainage or embanking of low grounds, and to provide for the expense, for the mere benefit of the proprietors, without reference to the public good, are to be classed, not under the taxing, but the police power of the government." In Coster v. Tide Water Co., 3 C. E. Green, 54, 518, the same view was strongly asserted in the Court of Chancery and in the Court of Errors. The point there decided was that a stat ute providing for the drainage of a large tract of land overflowed by tidewater, by a corporation chartered for the purpose, none of the members of which owned any lands within the tract, if it could be maintained as an exercise of the right of eminent domain for a public use, yet could not authorize an assessment on the owners of such lands for anything beyond the benefits conferred upon thera. But the case was clearly and sharply distinguished from the case of the drainage of lands for the exclusive of the owners upon proceedings insti- | since treated by the courts of New Jersey as finally establishing the constitutionality of such statutes. **tze of them. In State v. Blake, 6 Vroom, 208, and 7 Id., 442, a statute authorizing a tract of swamps and marshlands to be drained by commissioners elected by the owners of the lands, and the entire expense assessed upon all the owners, was held to be constitutional, although no appeal was given from the assessment. In the Supreme Court it was said: "This branch of legislative power which regulates the construction of ditches and secures the drainage of meadows and marshy lands has been exercised so long, and is so fully recognized, that it is now too late to call it in question. It is clearly affirmed in the Tide Water Co. v. Coster, and cannot be opened to discussion.” 6 Vroom, 211. And the Court of Errors, in a unanimous judgment, approved this statement of the Supreme Court, as well as that of chief Justice Beasley, in Coster v. Tide Water Co., above quoted. 7 Vroom, 447, 448. Zabriskie said: "But there is anof legislative power that may be authorizing the taking of the red for the works to drain these It is the power of the government he pabic regulations for the better ecomical management of property Esse property adjoins, or which, reason, can be better managed - by some joint operation, such as of regulating the building of party and maintaining partition fences structing ditches and sewers of uplands and marshes, which advantageously be drained by a comditch. This is a well known leg** ** mer, recognized and treated of by all and writers upon law through the branch of legislative power exState before and since the Revoand before and since the adoption of the sation, and repeatedly recognized The Legislature has power to *******bjects, either by general law, Par laws for certain localities or defined tracts of land. When invested the legislative power in and General Assembly, it conferred make these public regulations as ⚫d part of that legislative power. praciple of them all is, to make nt common to all concerned, at expense of all. And to effect this Acts provide that the works to efage may be located on any part of ed, paying the owner of the land compensation for the damage by *So far private property is taken by her is not. In none of them is the vested of his fee, and in most there is in which it could be vested, and her purposes the title of the land rener. To effect such common wer was in some cases given to contrans through adjacent lands not ompensation. All this was an well known exercise of legislative ad may well be considered as included fislative power in the Consti3C. E. Green, 68-71. The constitutionality of the Statute of 1871, under which the proceedings in the case at bar were had, was upheld by the Supreme Court and the Court of Errors upon the ground of the previous decisions. Re Lower Chatham Drainage, 6 Vroom, 497, 501; Re Pequest Riv er Drainage, 10 Id., 433, 434; 12 Id., 175, 179; 13 Id., 553, 554, and 14 Id., 456. The further suggestion made by the Supreme Court in 6 Vroom, 501, 506, and 10 Id., 434, that this statute could be maintained as a taking of private property for a public use, was disapproved by the Court of Errors in 12 Id., 178. In Kean v. Drainage Co., 16 Vroom, 91, cited for the plaintiffs in error, the statute that was held unconstitutional created a private corporation with power to drain lands without the consent or application of any of the owners; and the Supreme Court observed that in the opinions of the Court of Errors in the present case and in Coster v. Tide Water Co., the distinction was clearly drawn between meadow drainage for the exclusive benefit of the owners to be done at their sole expense, and drainage undertaken by the public primarily as a matter of public concern, in which case the assessment upon landowners must be limited to benefits imparted. 16 Vroom, 94. Beasley, in delivering the judgCourt of Errors, enforced the same Baying: "This case, with regard to which it rests, is to be distinthat class of proceedings by s and other lands are drained on of the landowners themselves. instance, the State is the sole c necessity or convenience is on of her intervention. But as established by the legislative the owners of meadow-lands' ***** submit to an equal burden of trued in their improvement, are of the same character as proaring party walls and partition es, therefore, the princirate devision of the present case extended" 3C. E. Green, 531. and explicit statements have been, [S13] This review of the cases clearly shows that general laws for the drainage of large tracts of swamps and lowlands, upon proceedings instituted by some of the proprietors of the lands to compel all to contribute to the expense of their drainage, have been maintained by the courts of New Jersey (without reference to the power of taking private property for the public use under the right of eminent domain, or to the power of suppressing a nuisance dangerous to the public health) as a just and constitutional exercise of the power of the Legislature to establish regulations by which adjoining lands, held by various owners in severalty, and in the improvement of which all have a common interest, but which, by reason of the peculiar natural condition of the whole tract, cannot be improved or enjoyed by any of them without the concurrence of all, may be reclaimed and made useful to all at their joint expense. The case comes within the principle upon which [614] [15] this court upheld the validity of general mill It is also well settled by the decisions of the v. Plainfield, Id., 145. The statute of 1971 is applicable to any tract of land within the State which is subject to overdow from freshets, or which is usually in low, marshy, boggy or wet condition. It is only on the application of at least five owners of warate lots of land included in the tract that a plan of drainage can be adopted. All persons interested have opportunity by public notice to object to the appointment of commis The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Messrs. H. O. Platt and H. T. Fenton, for appellant. Messrs. J. M. Wilson, Geo. S. Prindle and Charles R. Ingersoll for appellees. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: junction and damages for the infringement of This is an appeal form a decree for an ina patent issued to Robert R. Miller, on February 22, 1870, and reissued to his assigns on May 6, 1879, for an improvement in dies for forming the clip-arms of kingbolts for wagons. 8 Fed. Rep. 608. According to the description in the specification, such bolts are made by taking an iron rod inches at one end, and turning the forks or of suitable length, splitting it for about two the body in a hole in a block or die grooved to arms outwards; then heating the rod, placing receive the arms, and striking it with a planeand make them take the shape of the grooves: upper die, so as to force the arms into and afterwards placing it between two other dies, which give the arms the proper bend, to fit them to the axletree of a wagon. With the the bolt, this patent has nothing to do. subsequent shaping of the collar and stem of faced moners to execute that plan, and no commis- Judgment affirmed. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. kingbolts for wagons, said dies being construct The second claim of the reissue, like the single claim of the original patent, for the use in succession, or, in the patentee's phrase, “the series," of the two pairs of old dies, the one pair to shape the arms of the bolt, and the other to give those arms the requisite curve, does not show any patentable invention. The two pairs of dies were not combined in one machine, and did not co-operate to one result. Each pair was used by itself, and might be so used at any dis tance of time or place from the other; and if the two were used at the same place and in im mediate succession of time, the result of the ac tion of each was separate and distinct, and was in no way influenced or affected by the action of the other. This was no combination that would sustain a patent Hailes v. Van Wor mer, 20 Wall., 853 187 U. S., bk. 22, L. ed. 241]: Pickering v. McCumescà, 104 U. S., 310 [Bk. 26. L. ed. 749); Stephenson v. R. R. Co. 114 C. S., 149 [amič, 58 Decree reversed, and case remanded with direc tions to dismiss the bill. True copy. Test James H. McKenney, Cerk, Sup. Court, U. S |