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V. PRACTICE.

20. If no witnesses be sent in with the prize, or produced for examination upon the standing interrogatories, the vessel and cargo will be delivered to the claimants on giving security in the appraised value. (The Ariadne, Fish. Pr. Cas., 32.)

21. The master or agent may make claim; but it must be made in behalf of the proper party. (The Lilla, 2 Cliff., 169; S. C. 2 Spr., 177.)

22. Claims presented after the proofs have been opened and examined, and after hearing the reasons assigned for condemnation, are never favored. (Ibid.)

23. If a neutral claimant attempt to impose upon the court, by knowingly or fraudulently claiming property as his own, which belongs in part to an enemy, he will not be entitled to restitution of that portion which he may ultimately establish as his own. (Ibid.)

VI. DISTRIBUTION OF PRIZE MONEY.

24. It is not enough, to entitle a vessel to share in the distribution of a prize, that she was within signal distance, and formed part of the force commanded by the officer who made the capture, if her situation were such that she could not have rendered any assistance in the actual conflict. (The Selma, 1 Low. Dec., 30.)

25. Where the alleged joint captors were more than 5 miles off, they were held not to have been within signal distance. (The R. E. Lee, 1 Low. Dec. 36.)

NOTE. During the late war certain quantities of broken cotton bales were picked up in the sea by United States blockading vessels, which had evidently been thrown overboard from some English blockade runner escaping from a southern port, and which were uniformly sent into port to be sold for the benefit of the salvors. At first it was the practice for the United States marshal to libel this cotton, and upon the presentation of affidavits of officers as to the time, place, and circumstances attending the finding of the derelict, by the United States district attorney, the court (in the absence of counsel for the salvors as to their rights) signed decrees, declaring that the "derelict broken cotton bales" were of "inferior force to the captors" (a prerequisite under the law to such a decree), and decreed it therefore to be "prize of war," and directed that one moiety of the proceeds of the sale of such cotton should be paid into the United States Treasury.

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Subsequently the officers, being advised of the rulings of the court, employed counsel to protect their interests, and after full argument the court afterwards decided in other cases, on the same facts and circumstances, that such cotton was not prize of war, but was simply 'derelict," and that the salvors were entitled to the whole proceeds of the cotton sold, reference being made to the decision of Justice Betts, United States district court for the southern district of New York, in the cases of the United States v. Forty Bales of Cotton, United States v. Thirty-four and cne-half Bales of Cotten, United States v. One hundred and fifty Sacks and Fifteen Bundles Picked Out by the Gunboats Gettysburg, Quaker City, and Niphon.

In consequence of these decisions the accounting officer of the Treasury distributed the whole proceeds to the salvors, as directed by the court, whereas prior thereto, only one half was paid to them and the other half covered into the Treasury.

DECISION OF SECOND COMPTROLLER.

The Second Comptroller of the Treasury Department decided as follows:

"Where seventy-eight bales of cotton were picked up at sea by the United States steamer Vicksburg, and the court (in Boston) decreed that one half of the proceeds of the cotton should go to the salvors and the other half be paid into the United States Treasury, and subsequently one of the salvors applied for his proportion of the moiety paid into the Treasury, on the ground that the cotton was 'derelict' and belonged wholly to the salvors: Held, that under section 11 of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. L., 310), relative to the distribution of ransom money, salvage, etc., it was competent for the Secretary of the Navy to correct the mistake of the court, and to direct payment to the salvors of the moiety erroneously paid into the Treasury, provided it was carried to the credit of the appropriation subject to draft; but that if the money was covered in as miscellaneous receipts,' an act of Congress would be requisite to authorize the payment to the salvors." (April 29, 1870, vol. 33, p. 108, Comptroller's Decisions.)

NOTE.-Laws relating to prizes and bounty for destroying enemy's vessels repealed March 3, 1899. (Vol. 30, Stat. L., p. 1007.)

PARDON AND AMNESTY.

PARDON AND AMNESTY, SCOPE, CONDITIONAL, EFFECT OF, POWER TO GRANT, COMMENTED ON AND EXPLAINED BY THE COURTS.

A conditional pardon is not complete without delivery; and if not complete may be revoked by the successor of the President by whom it was granted. (Ex parte De Puy, 3 Ben., 307.)

A transmission of the pardon to the marshal, and its receipt by him, is not a delivery to the prisoner. (Ibid.)

Where a conditional pardon is granted, the condition must be strictly complied with to make it available. (Haym v. United States, 7 N. & H., 443; Hamilton v. United States, Ibid., 444; Waring v. United States, Ibid., 501.)

Where a conditional pardon is granted, the fact that the party is in prison under sentence does not constitute such duress as will make his acceptance of the condition of no effect. (Ex parte Greathouse, 2 Ab. C. C., 382.)

One who accepts and complies with the conditions of a pardon granted by the President, for acts done in aid of the rebellion, may plead the same in bar of proceedings for the confiscation of his property. (Brown v. United States, McCahon, 229; S. C., 1 Wool., 198; Armstrong v. United States, 13 Wall., 154; Witkowski v. United States, 7 N. & H., 393; Backer v. United States, Ibid., 551.)

Such pardon restores to the grantee all his rights of property not already vested in others by judicial proceedings. (Ibid.)

No such vested right has accrued until an order of distribution is made, or the money is actually paid to the informer, or into the Treasury. (Ibid.)

The President had power, by the amnesty proclamation of 1868, to pardon all of a particular class of political offenders. (United States v. Crozier, Dist. Court, Tennessee, February 1, 1869; Trigg, J., MS.) The amnesty proclamation of 1868 did not embrace a crime not amounting to treason, or the giving of aid to the public enemy during the Civil War; a conspiracy to abduct the President was not thereby pardoned. (United States v. Surratt, Crim. Court, D. C., September 23, 1868; Wylie, J., MS.)

Nor was crime of being accessory to the murder of the President. (Ex parte Mudd, Dist. Court, S. Florida, September, 1868; Boynton, J., MS.)

The amnesty proclamation of 1868 extended to persons previously convicted and sentenced. (Ex parte Greathouse, 2 Ab. C. Cls. R., 382.)

It included not only those who joined the rebellion in arms, but also those who were in any way implicated therein. (Ibid.)

The amnesty proclamation of 1868 relieved those who were within its purview from all the consequences of participation in the rebellion; consequently they might sue in the Court of Claims for the proceeds of captured cotton. (Pargoud v. United States, 13 Wall., 156; reversing 4 N. and H., 337; Waring v. United States, 7 N. and H., 501.)

But it did not restore property forfeited under the nonintercourse law, though the proceeds were still in court and the proceedings not concluded. (Gay's Gold, 13 Wall., 358.)

The amnesty proclamation of 1868, extended to one who stood indicted for treason, for participation in the rebellion; and the prisoner, having complied with its requirements, could not be excluded from its benefit by a subsequent explanatory proclamation. (United States v. Hughes, 1 Bond, 574.)

The amnesty proclamation had no effect upon one who died before it was issued; it did not enable his administratrix to sue in the Court of Claims. (Meldrim v. United States, 7 N. and H., 595.)

Where a defendant is sentenced to an imprisonment and payment of a fine and costs, a remission of the fine by the President does not affect the residue of the sentence. (United States v. Lukins, cited 1 Chitty Cr. L., 770 n.)

The effect of a pardon duly granted by the President can not be restricted by subsequent legislation. (United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., Witkowski v. United States, 7 N. and H., 393.)

PAYMENTS.

[14 Stat. L., p. 571.]

JOINT RESOLUTION Prohibiting payment by any officer of the Government to any person not known to have been opposed to the rebellion and in favor of its suppression.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That until otherwise ordered it shall be unlawful Payment by for any officer of the United States Government to pay officer to any perany account, claim, or demand against said Government, have been op

any Government

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posed to the rebel- which accrued or existed prior to the thirteenth day of April, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-one, in favor of any person who promoted, encouraged, or in any manner sustained the late rebellion; or in favor of any person who, during said rebellion, was not known to be opposed thereto, and distinctly in favor of its suppression; and no pardon heretofore granted, or hereafter to be granted, shall authorize the payment of such account, claim, or demand, until this resolution is modified or repealed: Provided, That this resolution shall not be construed to prohibit the payment of claims founded upon contracts made by any of the departments, where such claims were assigned or contracted to be assigned prior to April first, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, to creditors of said contractors, loyal citizens of loyal States, in payment of debts incurred prior to March first, eighteen hundred and sixty-one.

Proviso.

Approved, March 2, 1867.

NOTE. The above act received a judicial construction by the Court of Claims in the case of The Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company v. The United States (20 C. Cls., p. 49), in which they held that the act of March 2, 1867, expressly prohibits the executive officers from paying claims which existed prior to the war in favor of persons who promoted or encouraged the late rebellion and, by implication, prohibits them from paying claims which originated after the war began.

PAYMENT BAR.

Receipt of a smaller sum in payment of a larger, as defined by the Supreme Court:

Acceptance from the Government of a smaller sum than one. claimed, in full of such one (the acceptance being without force or intimidation, and with a full knowledge of all the circumstances), does not leave the Government open to further claim on the ground of duress because the sum was so large that the claimants were induced by their want of the money to accept the less sum in full. (12 Wallace, United States v. Child & Co., p. 232.)

The bar in this case rested upon the voluntary acceptance by the claimant of a smaller sum than their claim as a full satisfaction of the whole, and acknowledging this in a receipt for the amount paid; the demand having been disputed for a long time by the Government, and the smaller sum accepted without objection or protest. (Ibid.)

Receiving payment of a sum of money for a disputed claim against the Government and giving a receipt in full therefor, will, in the absence of proof of any mistake, be deemed a satisfaction of the claim. (13 Wallace, United States v. Clyde, p. 35.)

If a statute declares a payment to be conclusive, a protest on the part of the party will not save his rights in any portion of the claim. (Savage v. The United States, 98 U. S.; Perry, 25 C. Cls., p. 274.)

The powers of the Claims Commission were not judicial, its decisions were not final, its findings were in effect like the report of a

committee advisory to Congress in the investigation and adjustment of a claim. When Congress made an appropriation which was accepted by the claimant it operated in law as a discharge of the claim. (21 C. Cls., Dodd v. The United States, p. 117.)

Where a judgment has been rendered against a petitioner by the Court of Claims because his cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations (Rev. Stat., sec. 1069), a congressional suit on the same cause of action is doubly barred by the Revised Statutes (secs. 1069, 1092, 1093), and by the Bowman Act, section 3. If the accounting officers have jurisdiction to adjust a claim and do so, and the petitioner accepts the amount in settlement, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition under the Bowman Act. (23 C. Cls., S. Sprigg Belt v. The United States, p. 317.)

The powers of the Southern Claims Commission were not judicial, its decisions were not final, its findings were in effect like the report of a committee advisory to Congress in the investigation and adjustment of a claim. When Congress made an appropriation which was accepted by the claimant it operated in law as a discharge of the claim. (21 C. Cls., Orien L. Dodd v. The United States, p. 117.)

Claims against the United States which are disputed by the officers authorized to adjust such accounts may be compromised, and if the claimant voluntarily enters into such a compromise and accepts a smaller sum than the claim and executes a discharge in full for the whole claim, he is bound by the adjustment and can not sue for what he has voluntarily relinquished. (Sweeney v. The U. S., 17 Wallace, p. 75; Mason v. The U. S., ibid., 67. See United States v. Clyde, 13 Wallace, p. 35.)

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT, ORGANIZATION

OF.

[13 Stat. L., p. 394.]

AN ACT To provide for the better Organization of the Quartermaster's
Department.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there shall be established in the office of the quartermaster-general of the army, to exist during the present rebellion and one year thereafter, the following divisions, each of which shall be placed in the charge of a competent officer of the quartermaster's department, to be assigned to such duty by the Secretary of War, who shall, under such rules as may be prescribed by the quartermaster-general, with the approval of the Secretary of War, transact the business of such division as hereinafter provided, to wit:

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The first division shall have charge of the purchase, 1st division. procurement, and disposition of horses and mules for cavalry, artillery, wagon and ambulance trains, and all other purposes for which horses or mules may be procured for the armies of the United States.

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