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tions of law.

(288 IIl. 448, 123 N. E. 543.) law and denies to him the equal pro- People v. William Henning Co. 260 tection of the laws. It is contended Ill. 554, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1206, 103 that the statute is an arbitrary and N. E. 530; People v. Elerding, 254 unreasonable exercise of the police Ill. 579, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 893, 98 N. power of the state.

E. 982. At the close of all the evidence It is contended by plaintiff in error plaintiff in error submitted eight that one might be guilty under this propositions of law, which he asked act by having a car in his possession the court to hold to be the law as from which the numbers had been applicable to the case. The court removed without his knowledge. The marked each of the propositions, Constitution does

Criminal law"Refused.” It will be unnecessary not require that scienterto discuss this action of the court, scienter be a neces

necessity. for the reason that we have held sary element of any law where an of. that the submission of propositions fense is malum prohibitum. One

of law to the court may violate the law without any inCriminal lawtrial-submis- is inapplicable to a tent on his part to do so. People v. sion of proposi.

criminal case, where Nylin, 236 Ill. 19, 86 N. E. 156;

the same is tried by People v. Spoor, 235 Ill. 230, 126 the court without a jury. People v. Am. St. Rep. 197, 85 N. E. 207, 14 Taylor, 279 Ill. 481, 117 N. E. 62; Ann. Cas. 638. Various statutes of Jacobs v. People, 218 Ill. 500, 75 N. this state, punishing the doing of E. 1034; Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. acts without requiring allegation or v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 73 N. E. 770. proof of criminal intent upon the

Motions for a new trial and in ar- part of the doer, have been upheld on rest of judgment were made and the ground that they were a valid overruled.

exercise of the police power. MaThe police power of a state is an guire v. People, 219 Ill. 16, 76 N. E. attribute of sovereignty, and exists 67; American Car & Foundry Co. v.

without any reserConstitutional

Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509, 73 N. E. law-police vation in the Consti- 766; Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322; power.

tution, being found- Mapes v. People, 69 Ill. 523; Eells ed on the duty of the state to protect v. People, 5 Ill. 498. In other jurisits citizens and provide for the dictions laws enacted by the legislasafety and good order of society. tures punishing the doing of acts The mere fact that a law restrains

without intent or guilty knowledge the liberty of cit-restraining

on the part of the doer have been izens of a state does liberty.

held to be valid enactments. People not render it uncon

v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333, 140 N. stitutional. In Hawthorn v. People,

W. 648; Com. v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 109 Ill. 302,50 Am. Rep. 610, we dis

141, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 467, 93 N. E. cussed at length the powers of the 249, 20 Ann. Cas. 1152. legislature, and an elaborate repeti- Laws cannot be held invalid meretion of that discussion would serve ly because some innocent person may no good purpose here. We have held possibly suffer. The in a long line of decisions, where the principle of police of innocent

-punishment authorities have been collected and regulation is "the persone con:

stitutionality. discussed, that it is greatest good to the Courtsauthority over for the legislature greatest number.” The essence of exercise of

to determine when the offense contemplated by $ 15b of police power.

the conditions exist the Motor Vehicle Law consists in calling for the exercise of police pow- the "purpose of concealing or deer to meet existing evils, and when stroying the identity" of the vehicle. the legislature has acted the pre- If it could be shown that the possumption is that the act is a valid session

automobile with exercise of such power. People v. mutilated numbers was not for the Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 118 N. E. 87; "purpose of concealing or destroy

of an

4 A.L.R-97.

of vehicle with

removed.

ing the identity" of such auto- will show that there is no mei'it in mobile, we apprehend that a pros- this contention. Burdick v. People. ecution, not to say a conviction, 149 Ill. 600, 24 L.R.A. 152, 41 Am. would be unlikely. We feel that .

St. Rep. 329, 36 N. E. 948, 952; there is no merit in the conten- Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80. We are

tion that the enact- unable to see how plaintiff in error -possession ment of this statute

was deprived of any “liberty or manufacturer's was not a valid exer

a

property without due process of numbers

cise of the police law.The act does not deprive him power of the state.

of the use of the cars. He is merely People v. Fernow, 286 Ill. 627, 122

prohibited from changing the numN. E. 155.

bers for the purpose of destroying As to the objection to the validity

the means of identification. What of the statute, to the effect that it

loss this will cause him is not redeprives the defendant of his liberty

vealed. The value of the act for the and property without due process of law and denies him the equal protec

protection of the property rights of

the citizens in general is too patent tion of the laws, it is sufficient to

to need discussion. say that we have had occasion to discuss these constitutional limitations

We think that the act is a valid at length on prior

exercise of legislative power, and due process and equal occasions, and

a

therefore affirm the judgment of the protection.

reference to those municipal court. decisions, without discussing them, Judgment affirmed.

ANNOTATION.

Constitutionality of statute making possession of automobile from which

identifying marks have been removed a crime.

It will be seen that in the reported case (PEOPLE V. JOHNSON, ante, 1535) it is held that a statute punishing any person having possession of any motor vehicle from which the manufacturer's number or identificaton mark has been removed, defaced, covered, or destroyed, for the purpose of concealing or destroying the identity of the vehicle, is a valid exercise of the police power, and that it does not deprive such possessor of his liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny him the equal protection of the iaws. The court brushed aside as immaterial the suggestion that a person might be guilty under this act by having a car in his possession from which the numbers had been removed without his knowledge; that is, one is guilty who commits the prohibited act although he does not know he is committing it. The views of the court in this particular are more fully set forth in People v. Fernow (1919) 286 Ill. 627, 122 N. E. 155, arising under the same statute, which was there sus

tained as a valid exercise of the police power, as not an illegal deprivation of liberty or property, or a denial of equal protection of the laws, or illegal class legislation, and as not having more than one object clearly indi. cated in its title. The court there said: "In the exercise of the police power for the protection of the public, the performance of a specific act may constitute the crime regardless of either knowledge or intent, both of which are immaterial on the question of guilt. For the effective protection of the public the burden is placed upon the individual of ascertaining at his peril whether his act is prohibited by criminal statute. The law in that regard has most frequently arisen in police regulations of the liquor traffic, but it has been applied in precisely the same way in other cases coming within the same rule and reason, such as a sale of imitation butter, a sale of milk below a prescribed quality, the obstruction of a public highway by a railroad corporation for longer than a specified time, the admission of a minor to a guilty though he believed the manupool room, driving an unregistered au- facturar's packages he sold contained tomobile, killing for sale an animal 5 gallons); People v. Hatinger (1913) under a designated age, carriage by an 174 Mich. 333, 140 N. W. 648 (one sellexpress company for transportation ing intoxicating liquor is guilty albeyond the st line

ish or game,

though he supposed it contained and in prosecutions for bigamy. Mc- no alcohol); Eells v. People (1843) Cutcheon v. People (1873) 69 Ill. 601; 5 Ill. 498 (an indictment for harborFarmer v. People (1875) 77 Ill. 322; ing and secreting a slave, the propPeople v. Nylin (1908) 236 Ill. 19, 86 erty of another, need not allege N. E. 156; People v. Spoor (1908) 235 that the defendant knew that the Ill. 230, 126 Am. St. Rep. 197, 85 N. person harbored was a slave, the propE. 207, 14 Ann. Cas. 638; Barnes v. erty of another); Maguire v. PeoState (1849) 19 Conn. 398; State v. ple (1905) 219 Ill. 16, 76 N. E. 67 (one Smith (1872) 10 R. I. 258; Com, v. Zelt permitting a female under eighteen (1891) 138 Pa. 615, 11 L.R.A. 602, 21 years of age to room in the defendant's Atl. 7; Humpeler v. People (1879) 92 house of prostitution is guilty, though Ill. 400; State v. Hartfiel (1869) 24 without knowledge of the female's Wis. 60; Com. v. New York C. & H. R. age); American Car & Foundry Co. R. Co. (1909) 202 Mass. 394, 23 L.R.A. V. Armentraut (1905) 214 Ill. 509, 73 (N.S.) 350, 132 Am. St. Rep. 507, 88 N. N. E. 766 (one employing a child unE. 764, 16 Ann. Cas. 587; Com. v. Mix- der fourteen years of age in his facer (1910) 207 Mass. 141, 31 L.R.A. tory, against the law, cannot resist an (N.S.) 467, 93 N. E, 249, 20 Ann. Cas. action for negligence because the 1152; Wells F. & Co. Express v. State child assured him he was sixteen years (1906) 79 Ark. 349, 96 S. W. 189, 8 R. old); People v. Spoor (1908) 235 Ill. C. L. 62. The section does not infringe 230, 126 Am. St. Rep. 197, 85 N. E. upon the Bill of Rights or the 14th 207, 14 Ann. Cas. 638 (one marrying a Amendment to the Constitution of the second time is guilty of bigamy alUnited States."

though he believed his first wife had The cases cited in these two Illinois obtained a divorce); Com. v. Mixer opinions on the subject of scienter are (1910) 207 Mass. 141, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) all cases where the defendant was ac

467, 93 N. E. 249, 20 Ann. Cas. 1152 cused of an affirmative act in disobedi

(the driver of a common carrier who ence of a statute. Thus, McCutcheon

transports unmarked intoxicating liqv. People (1873) 69 Ill. 601, 1 Am.

uor into dry terrritory is guilty though Crim. Rep. 471; Farmer V. People

he did not know that the barrel he (1875) 77 III. 322; State v. Hartfiel

carried contained intoxicating liq(1869) 24 Wis. 60 (one selling intoxi

uor); Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. cating liquor to a minor is guilty al

State (1906) 79 Ark. 349, 96 S. W. 189 though he did not know the buyer was

(a carrier is guilty of transporting a minor); Mapes v. People (1873) 69

game although it did not know the packIll. 523 (one selling intoxicating liquor

ages contained game); Com. v. New

York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1909) 202 to a person in the habit of getting intoxicated is guilty though he did not

Mass. 394, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 350, 132 know that the buyer had this habit);

Am. St. Rep. 507, 88 N. E. 764, 16 Ann. Com. v. Zelt (1891) 138 Pa. 615, 11

Cas. 587 (a railroad company is guilty L.R.A. 602, 21 Atl. 7 (one furnishing

of blocking a crossing more than five liquors to a person of known intem

consecutive minutes, though third perperate habits is guilty although not

sons unlawfully opened the air cocks knowing the habits) ; Barnes v. State

on the cars so that they could not be (1849) 19 Conn. 398 (so one selling

moved in time); State v. Smith (1817) liquor to a common drunkard though 10 R. I. 258 (one having in possession not knowing him to be such); People with intent to sell and exchange, and V. Nylin (1908) 236 Ill. 19, 86 N. E. offering for sale and exchange, adul156 (one selling intoxicating liquors terated milk, is guilty though he did in less quantities than 5 gallons is not know of the adulteration).

Nev.

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As heretofore stated it will be seen of another, for which he is not responthat these cases are all cases of af- sible, is startling to old-fashioned firmative acts. While it is not intend- ideas. Under the Illinois statute in ed to cite cases on the general sub- question, what is the innocent owner ject of intent, it may be said that there of an automobile to do who finds in are in Massachusetts three cases which the morning that the manufacturer's are probably to be classed as cases number of his car has been mutilated of affirmative acts, which seem to go in the night? Is he to give himself further than the cases cited in the up to the police as a criminal? Is he two Illinois opinions supra. In Com. at once to destroy his car? Is there v. Smith (1896) 166 Mass. 370, 44 N. any way in which he can escape? It E. 503, and in Com. v. Yee Moy (1896) seems that he may even be apprehend166 Mass. 376, note, 44 N. E. 1120, the ed before he knows of the mutilation. court sustained convictions of the of- In Park v. State (1919) fense of being found present in a place 3 A.L.R. 75, 178 Pac. 389, it was held which had been complained of as a that a statute making possession of common gaming house, if any ma- the hides of cattle from which the terials of any form of gaming are cars have been removed or the brand found therein, holding that it was im- defaced, a felony, deprives the owner material whether the defendants knew of his property without due process of of the presence of the implements or law. the character of the place; similarly, It may be noted that in Daugherty in Com. v. Kane (1899) 173 Mass. 477, v. Thomas (1913) 174 Mich. 371, 45 53 N. E. 919, a conviction was upheld L.R.A.(N.S.) 699, 140 N. W. 615, Ann. for being present where implements Cas. 1915A, 1163, it was held that, unfor smoking opium were found, al- der the due process and equal protecthough it was not alleged that the de- tion clauses of the Constitutions, a stat. fendants were knowingly, wilfully, ute could not be sustained which made and wantonly there.

the owner of an automobile liable for The elimination of criminal intent, injury to strangers through the use of while reasonable enough in some persons who took it without his knowlcases, is full of danger to the accused, edge or permission, though their acts even in cases where the statute pun- did not constitute larceny; and that a ishes affirmative acts, and ought to be later statute, providing that the owner strictly limited by the courts in a day should not be liable unless the car was when the doctrine of the presumption being driven by his express or implied of innocence has become unpopular. consent or knowledge, was upheld in What would be thought of a statute Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co. making the utterance of forged paper (1917) 198 Mich. 170, L.R.A.1918A, a forgery whether the utterer knew of 916, 164 N. W. 520. the forgery or not?

For constitutionality of statute for But a statute under which an inno- prevention of larceny of live stock, see cent person, who does nothing, may the annotation to Park v. State, 3 be turned into a criminal by the act A.L.R. 81.

B. B. B.

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JESSE D. KASH, Guardian of Octavia Smith, et al.

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(180 Ky. 815, 203 S. W. 731.) Constitutional law — lease extending beyond minority of ward.

1. Permitting a guardian to grant leases for mining coal from his ward's land, to extend beyond the minority of his ward, violates the con

(180 Ky. 815, 203 8. W. 731.) stitutional rights of the latter to acquire and protect property and pursue happiness.

[See note on this question beginning on page 1552.] Equity power to sell infant's real provisions, and those provisions must estate.

be strictly complied with. 2. Courts of equity have no inherent [See 14 R. C. L. 269, 580.] power to sell for any purpose, the real Statute when invalid. estate of infants or persons of unsound 3. A legislative act will not be demind, and when it is sought to sell clared invalid unless the legislation their real estate, express authority for was prohibited by the Constitution. the sale must be found in statutory [See 6 R. C. L. 75, 79.]

(Thomas, J., dissents.)

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APPEAL by the coal company from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Pike County in favor of petitioner, and overruling formal exceptions to the report of sale, in a proceeding to lease property for coal mining purposes. Modified.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Auxier, Harman, & Francis ucts taken from other land, and for appellant.

the right to dump upon said land Messrs. P. B. Stratton, Jesse D.

refuse or other products taken Kash, J. R. Johnson, Jr., E. C. O'Rear,

therefrom and from other land; and J. T. Metcalf, B. R. Jouett, and Pendleton & Bush for appellees.

to erect upon said land miners' Messrs. John G. Winn and Robert H. houses, commissaries and hotels and Winn for Oil Men's Association et al.

other houses and equipment reason

ably necessary to enable the lessee Carroll, J., delivered the opinion to carry on the business in the most of the court:

economical way. Such lease may be This case presents the important for such length of time as the question whether a circuit court, guardian, curator or committee may pursuant to legislative authority so

approve, without being limited to to do, has the power to lease the

the time at which the disability of mineral land of infants for a term

such infant or person of unsound of years beyond their minority, and

mind may be removed.” brings before us the validity of the legislative act attempting to confer

In § 2 it was provided that no

such lease shall be made until the upon the circuit court the power exercised in this case.

guardian, curator, or committee

shall have filed, in the office of the The question comes up in this

circuit clerk, a petition against the way: In 1916, the legislature enacted a statute (Laws 1916, chap.

infants or person of unsound mind,

setting forth a description of the 99) providing in $ 1: "That the guardian of an infant curator or

land, and showing the propriety of the committee of a person of un

making a lease thereto. In $ 3 it sound mind may lease the real es

was provided that a guardian ad

litem should be appointed to protect tate, or any interest therein, of such

the interest of the infants or the infant or person of unsound mind

person of unsound mind, and in $ for the purpose of mining and re

4 that the court should hear and moving all or part of the coal, oil, dispose of the case upon the evigas and any or all other mineral or

dence taken, and if it was made to mineral substances and products appear by the evidence of at least therein; together with the usual and

two creditable witnesses that the inreasonable necessary privileges to teres of the infants or person of mine, bore for, store, pump and re- unsound mind would be promoted move the same, and similar prod- by the lease, the court should order

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