« 이전계속 »
the rule that knowledge of the attor- attorney received such knowledge in ney is imputed to the client when the the performance of his duties under conveyance by the mortgagor, imputa- able with the knowledge of their atble to the client.
torney of a prior attachment. Hulbert v. Douglas (1886) 94 N. C. Holmes v. Long (1918) Tex. Civ. 122, sustaining a finding of the jury App. -, 207 S. W. 201, holding a purthat the client did not take bona fide chaser of notes chargeable with the and without notice, where there was knowledge of his attorney, who was some evidence that the attorney repre- also attorney for the payee, of desenting the client in the particular fenses to the notes. transaction had notice.
Sheldon v. Cox (1764) 2 Ambl. 624, PYEATT V. ESTUS (reported here- 27 Eng. Reprint, 404, holding mortwith) ante, 1570, charging a purchaser gagees chargeable with the knowledge of land with the knowledge of the at- of their counsel of a prior, unrecorded torney for a loan company which was mortgage. making a loan on the land, where such LeNeve v. LeNeve (1748) 3 Atk. purchaser elected to rely upon the in
647, 26 Eng. Reprint, 1172, holding a vestigation and the opinion of such at
second wife chargeable with knowltorney, who examined the title for the edge of an unrecorded marriage setpurpose of making the loan to the pur- tlement, made by her husband upon chaser, although the attorney was paid his first wife, where her attorney had no fee by the purchaser.
knowledge thereof. Patterson's Estate (1912) 234 Pa.
Rickards v. Gledstanes (1861) 3 128, 82 Atl. 1130, holding purchasers
Giff. 298, 66 Eng. Reprint, 423, 8 Jur. of a mortgage chargeable with notice
N. S. 455, holding notice of the assignto their attorney, employed to exam
ment of a reversionary interest to the ine the title of the mortgagor, of a
solicitor of a trustee, notice to the partition proceeding affecting the
trustee. mortgaged land. It does not seem
Harrison v. Wiltshire (1835) 4 L. J. necessary, however, to have relied Ch. N. S. (Eng.) 260, holding a client
affected with the knowledge of his upon charging the client with the knowledge of his attorney in this case,
solicitor of facts relating to the exas the partition proceedings were a
ecution of a bond by another client, . matter of record.
who is told that he is indebted to the Mutual Bldg. & L. Asso.'s Case
solicitor and thereby induced to ex(1893) 19 Pa. Co. Ct. 504, holding a
ecute the bond to the first client, to
whom the solicitor is indebted. mortgagee chargeable with the knowledge of its attorney who was also the
Dixon v. Winch  1 Ch. 736, 82 mortgagor, that the deed of the prop
L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 437, 69 L. J. Ch. N. erty had not been delivered to him.
S. 465, 48 Week. Rep. 612, 16 Times
L. R. 276, imputing to a mortgagor the Scottish-American Mortg. Co. v.
knowledge of his solicitor, who was Clowney (1904) 70 S. C. 229, 49 S. E. 569, 3 Ann. Cas. 437, charging a mort
the mortgagee, of an assignment of
the mortgage. gage company with the knowledge of
In Fuller v. Bennett (1823) 2 Hare, an attorney who acted for its invest
402, 67 Eng. Reprint, 165, purchasers ing agents in making a loan, that the mortgagor was the wife of a trustee,
were held chargeable with notice of
the claim of third persons given to from whom she had received a convey
their solicitor while perfecting negoance of the property.
tiations for the purchase of the propGivens V. Taylor (1851) 6 Tex.
erty, where the negotiations had been 315, holding plaintiffs in attachment
discontinued and renewed with the chargeable with knowledge of their at- heirs of the former owner about five torney of the existence of a deed of
years after the discontinuance of the trust upon the property.
first negotiation, the same solicitor Van Hook v. Walton (1866) 28 Tex. being employed. A mortgagee of the 59, holding execution creditors charge- purchaser, who employed the same able with knowledge of an assignment solicitor, was likewise held affected by by the debtors, possessed by their at- notice. The court states: “If, theretorney.
fore, in order to decide the cause now Riordan v. Britton (1887) 69 Tex. before me, it was strictly necessary 198, 5 Am. St. Rep. 37, 7 S. W. 50, hold- that I should decide, as an abstract ing plaintiffs in attachment charge- question, that a purchaser who for the
his employment.11 Again the rule is attorney in the course of the agency stated that knowledge acquired by the or employment is the knowledge of the first time employs a solicitor (not be- in the title of the property on which ing also the solicitor of the vendor) the loan was taken, possessed by a locan be affected with constructive no- cal attorney who represented the comtice of anything known to the solicitor, pany in his locality, and through whom save that of which the solicitor ac- loans were consummated, and to whom quires notice after his retainer, and papers were sent by the company for during his employment by the pur
such action as was necessary for the chaser, I should certainly feel great completion of the loan. difficulty in coming to the conclusion." Price v. Carney (1883) 75 Ala. 546;
Spaight v. Cowne (1863) 1 Hem. & Silvey v. Cook (1914) 191 Ala. 228, 68 M. 359, 71 Eng. Reprint, 156, holding
So. 37, holding knowledge of an attora mortgagee who had intrusted a con- ney for the plaintiff in an action, acsiderable sum of money to a solicitor
quired while the action was pending, to invest, chargeable with knowledge
from a petition in bankruptcy filed by of the solicitor with reference to an
defendant, of a vendor's lien on the investment made by him.
defendant's real estate, imputable to Tunstall v. Trappes (1830) 3 Sim.
the client so as to prevent him acquir286, 57 Eng. Reprint, 1005; Gosling's
ing a lien superior to the vendor's lien. Case (1830) 3 Sim. 301, 57 Eng. Re
Allison v. Falconer (1905) 75 Ark. print, 1011, holding a client charge
343, 87 S. W. 639, holding notice to an able with the knowledge of his solic.
attorney employed to have a deed ex
ecuted and acknowledged, of a mortitor of a lien upon property mortgaged.
a Real Estate Invest. Co. v. Metropol
gage on the property, which by mis
take described the wrong property and itan Bldg. Soc. (1883) 3 Ont. Rep. 476,
therefore did not appear on the record holding the knowledge of the solicitor
of title of this property, notice to the for the purchaser of a number of
client, when acquired in the course of mortgages, of an alteration in the de
the duty he had been employed to perscription of one of the mortgages in
form. a list previously furnished the pur
Singfield v. Vogler (1917) 127 Ark. chaser, imputable to the purchaser.
618, 192 S. W. 906, holding notice to an In Brewin v. Briscoe (1859) 2 El.
attorney acting for a purchaser of & El. 117, 121 Eng. Reprint, 45, 28 L.
property, of an unrecorded deed of J. Q. B. N. S. 329, 5 Jur. N. S. 1206,
the property to a third person, notice 7 Week. Rep. 584, the knowledge of
to the purchaser. a solicitor who had been employed by Watson v. Sutro (1890) 86 Cal. 500, the regular solicitor of a judgment 25 Pac. 64, 24 Pac. 172, holding notice creditor, that the debtor had commit
to an attorney employed by a purted an act of bankruptcy, was held to chaser of land to examine the title, of be the knowledge of the judgment an equity in a third person, notice to creditor. The decision in this case the client. was made to depend upon the fact Mabb v. Stewart (1905) 147 Cal. that the solicitor had been vested by 413, 81 Pac. 1073. the regular solicitor of the execution Sweeney v. Pratt (1898) 70 Conn. creditor with a discretion as to how 274, 66 Am. St. Rep. 101, 39 Atl. 182, to act in carrying out instructions in holding that notice to an attorney repregard to the execution; that the in- resenting a client in a compromise structions did not give him a mere agreement in which provision was authority to execute process at all made in a general way for the applicahazards.
tion of certain insurance money, of See Lampkin v. First Nat. Bank the way in which the other party ac(1895) 96 Ga. 487, 23 S. E. 390, infra, tually applied the money, is notice to note 83.
the client. 11 May v. Le Claire (1870) 11 Wall Jones v. Bamford (1866) 21 Iowa, (U. S.) 217, 20 L. ed. 217; Smith v. 217, holding knowledge of a mortgage Ayer (1880) 101 U. S. 320, 25 L. ed. which by mistake described the wrong 955.
land, acquired by an attorney in inArmstrong v. Ashley (1907) 204 vestigating the title for a prospective U. S. 272, 51 L. ed. 482, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. purchaser, notice to the purchaser. 270, holding a nonresident loan com- Allen v. McCalla (1868) 25 Iowa, pany bound by knowledge of a defect 464, 96 Am. Dec. 56, holding knowl
principal.12 Another form of the in the course of the business of the statement is that knowledge received agency, or under such circumstances edge acquired by attorneys for attach- judgment, of the claim of a third pering creditors during their employment, son to the property through an unof an unrecorded mortgage on the recorded deed, is notice to the client. goods attached, imputable to the cli- Bierce v. Red Bluff Hotel Co. (1866) ent.
31 Cal. 160; see note 16 for facts. Bank of Commerce v. Hoeber (1885) Bunnell y. Holmes (1918) Colo. 88 Mo. 37, 57 Am. Rep. 359, imputing - 171 Pac. 365, imputing to one who to an insolvent debtor knowledge of employed an attorney to ascertain an attorney employed by him to effect whether there was any suit pending, a composition with the creditors, that affecting certain lands, knowledge of one of the creditors had been, by the such a suit, acquired by the attorney attorney, paid a sum over and above in making the investigation. that paid the creditors generally, to Webber v. Clark (1891) 136 Ill. 256, induce them to sign the agreement. 26 N. E. 360, 32 N. E. 748, holding the
Wells v. McMahon (1888) 3 Wash. client chargeable "with notice of such Terr. 532, 18 Pac. 73, charging a mort
came to the knowledge of gagee with knowledge of her attorney Grant (the
(the attorney) during the that the mortgage was given to hinder course of his employment or agency." and delay creditors.
Lambert v. Smith (1916) 53 Okla. Hyman v. Barmon (1893) 6 Wash. 606, – A.L.R. -, 157 Pac. 909, imput516, 33 Pac. 1076, holding creditors in ing to the assignee of a note the whose favor a failing debtor had con- knowledge of the attorney who repfessed judgment, chargeable with resented him in the assignment, as to knowledge of their attorney that the the consideration for the note. debtor intended to make an assign- American Freehold Land Mortg. Co. ment.
v. Felder (1895) 44 S. C. 478, 22 S. E. Deering v. Holcomb (1901) 26 Wash. 598, holding notice to the local attor588, 67 Pac. 240, 561.
ney of the state representative of a Boursot v. Savage (1866) L. R.2 Eq. nonresident mortgage company, whose (Eng.) 134, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 627, 14 duty it was to prepare abstracts of L. T. N. S. 299, 14 Week. Rep. 565, title and superintend the execution of holding that one who takes an assign- all papers relating to the loan by the ment of a leasehold estate from one mortgage company in his county, that of three persons, who acts for himself money borrowed and secured by a and his co-owners, who are in fact mortgage on the property of a martrustees, is chargeable with knowledge ried woman was in fact borrowed for of the existence of the trust, where the benefit of her husband, imputable the trustee who made the conveyance to the mortgage company. The court was a solicitor, and employed by the states that it was the duty of the assignee in the transaction of the pur- local attorney to pass upon the validchase.
ity of the security, “and it is manifest It has been held that, where the that information received by him, knowledge was acquired previously to showing that the mortgage would be the creation of the relation of attor- invalid, would be within the scope of ney and client, and none was obtained such agency, and, therefore, binding in doing business for the client to upon his principal.” whom it is sought to be imputed, it Bexar Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Lockwood will not be so imputed. Warner v. (1899) — Tex. Civ. App. 54 S. W. Hall (1894) 53 Mich. 371, 19 N. W. 253, holding a building and loan as40.
sociation to which the payee of a note See Vermont Min. & Quarrying Co. secured by a vendor's lien indorsed the v. Windham County Bank (1872) 44 same, chargeable with the knowledge Vt. 489, 3 Mor. Min. Rep. 312, infra, of its attorney, upon whom devolved note 23.
the duty of passing upon securities ofAnd see V., infra.
fered, that the sale in which the ven12 Hunter v. Watson (1859) 12 Cal. dor's lien note was given was a mere 363, 73 Am. Dec. 543, holding that no- sham, to enable a loan to be secured tice to an attorney while acting for on the property, which was a homea judgment creditor who afterwards ad. became a purchaser at an execution Fordtran v. Cunningham (1911) sale of the debtor's property, under his Tex. Civ. App. — 141 S. W. 562, hold
as to induce the satisfactory belief General knowledge of an attorney that it was received while transacting for the collection of a claim against such business, is notice to the client.13
merchants in the town of his resi. In another case, it is stated that con
dence, of the insolvency of the merstructive notice to a client through an attorney “can only extend to informa
chants, is imputable to his clients.15 tion received by
Knowledge acquired by an attorney ney]in the course of the transaction in the course of litigation is imputable in which” the attorney is employed.14 to his client. 16 This rule applies in ing a purchaser of property charge- amount of a loan made by his client able with the knowledge of a lien secured by mortgage on the same thereon, possessed by an attorney, and premises, and who, instead of doing acquired by him in the course of his so, appropriated the money to his own employment and within the scope of use, that he subsequently secured the his authority. Upon a second appeal money to pay the mortgage by a forged of this case in (1915) Tex. Civ. check on a bank, will not be imputed App. -177 S. W. 212, the court, in to his client. holding the client not chargeable with Barnes v. M'Clinton (1831) 3 Penr. the knowledge of the attorney, states & W. (Pa.) 67, 23 Am. Dec. 62. that even if the attorney had knowl
And see Pennsylvania cases cited in edge of the lien there was evidence
notes 38, 39, 68, 69, all of which recog. that he agreed with the defendant not
nize the rule as thus limited. to reveal the fact to the plaintiff, and
Ives v. Culton (1917) Tex. Civ. that under such circumstances the de
App. -, 197 S. W. 619. fendant could not claim that such acts
Warrick v. Warrick (1745) 3 Atk. of the agent were binding upon the
291, 26 Eng. Reprint, 970, holding the person defrauded, because the agent became the agent of the person he col
assignee of a mortgage not chargeable
with knowledge that the mortgagor lusively served. Newton v. Easterwood (1913)
had only a life estate in the property,
where such knowledge was acquired Tex. Civ. App. -, 154 S. W. 646, knowl
prior to his employment by the asedge of an attorney employed to clear up title to lands, of the minority of a
signee. party interested therein, is imputable
15 Wiley v. Knight (1855) 27 Ala. to his client.
336. Mitchell v. Morgan (1914) Tex.
16 Bierce v. Red Bluff Hotel Co. Civ. App. -165 S. W. 883, holding
(1866) 31 Cal. 160, holding that notice one who took a deed to property, which
to an attorney who began an action was in effect a mortgage, chargeable
in which a garnishment was obtained, with the knowledge of the attorney
that the garnishee had previously givwho represented him in the transac
en his obligation to the defendant in tion that the property was a home
full settlement of his claim, and that stead.
the obligation had been assigned to a 18 Williams v. Tatnall (1862) 29 Ill. third person, is notice to the client, 553, holding knowledge of an attorney
with which the client is charged in a for the plaintiff, of a mortgage on the
subsequent compromise of the suit. defendant's lands, imputable to the
Rauer v. Hertweck (1917) 175 Cal. plaintiff.
278, 165 Pac. 946 (knowledge of an atSmith v. Wilson & B. Sav. Bank
torney representing a party to an ac(1892) 1 Tex. Civ. App. 115, 20 S. W.
tion, of a judgment entered in the ac1119, holding one who employed an
tion, is knowledge of his client). attorney to assert offsets against cer
People v. Duncan (1908) 8 Cal. App. tain judgments, chargeable with 186, 96 Pac. 414 (knowledge of the knowledge of the assignment of such attorney for the defendant in a crimijudgments, possessed by any member nal prosecution, of facts with referof the firm to which the attorney be- ence to the substitution of a juror, is longed.
the knowledge of his client). 14 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Baker (1900) Brown v. Qattis (1875) 55 Ga. 416 60 N. J. Eq. 170, 47 Atl. 6, holding that (knowledge of one of several attorknowledge of an attorney who was neys acting for a party in litigation, employed to pay and secure the release of the incompetency of a juror, is of a previous mortgage out of the knowledge of the party, so as to pre
vent this from being ground for a new to a third person, where the third pertrial).
son notified the attorney for the crediJones v. Lamon (1892) 92 Ga. 529, tor after the action was begun, and 18 S. E. 423, holding, in an action for before judgment was entered. wrongful attachment, that knowledge Riley v. Pearson (1913) 120 Minn. of an attorney for the plaintiff in the 210, L.R.A.1916D, 7, 139 N. W. 361, attachment suit that the property at- imputing to a party to a land registratached belonged to the plaintiff in the tion under the Torrens Law, knowlsuit for wrongful attachment, is im- edge of her attorney as to the duration putable to his client.
of easements. De Louis v. Meek (1849) 2 G. Greene Allen v. Poole (1877) 54 Miss, 323, (Iowa) 55, 50 Am. Dec. 491 (knowl- knowledge of an attorney for the edge of attorneys who represent one plaintiff, acquired in a suit to foreclose party in an action, and claim to repre- a mortgage and before a confirmation sent another also, that they do not in of the sale of the mortgaged premises, fact represent the latter, is imputable of a claim upon the property, is imto the former).
putable to the plaintiff. Walker v. Schreiber (1877) 47 Iowa, Edwards v. Hillier (1893) 70 Miss. 529, holding knowledge of an attorney 803, 13 So. 692, imputing to a purfor a plaintiff in an action to foreclose chaser of land under a bond for title, a mortgage, of the claim of a person who had filed a bill for specific pernot made a party to the proceedings, formance, the knowledge of his attorof an interest by reason of an assign- ney that the land was then claimed by ment of one of several notes secured another. by a second mortgage, acquired by the Priddy v. Mackenzie (1907) 205 Mo. attorney before final judgment in the 181, 103 S. W. 968, imputing to a litiforeclosure suit in a second action be- gant knowledge of his attorney of gun by such person, in which the at- prejudice of a judge. torney represented the owner of the Hunter v. Wabash R. Co. (1910) 149 premises, imputable to the first client. Mo. App. 243, 130 S. W. 103, imputing
Cochburn v. Hawkeye Commercial to a defendant against whom a judgMen's Asso. (1913) 163 Iowa, 28, 143 ment had been rendered, knowledge of N. W. 1006, knowledge or notice of his attorney of duress in obtaining facts acquired by one who is general from the plaintiff a “satisfaction attorney for an insurance company, piece" of such judgment. and also attorney for it in an action Dickerson v. Bowers (1886) 42 N. J. against it, in relation to an assign- Eq. 295, 11 Atl. 142, imputing to a ment of the claim involved in the ac- judgment debtor the knowledge of his tion, is notice to the company.
attorney, acquired while attempting to Sermonin v. Duerson (1891) 13 Ky. collect the claim, of the ownership by L. Rep. 169, holding knowledge of an another of certain property standing attorney employed in litigation, of in the name of the debtor. facts acquired therein relating to the Taft v. Wright (1873) 47 How. Pr. subject of litigation, imputable to the (N. Y.) 1, affirmed in (1875) 59 N. Y. client.
656, imputing to a judgment creditor Presstman v. Mason (1887) 68 Md. knowledge obtained by his attorney of 78, 11 Atl. 764, Shartzer v. Mountain a fraudulent conveyance by the debtor. Lake Park Asso. (1897) 86 Md. 335, Greenlee v. McDowell (1847) 39 N. 37 Atl. 786, imputing an attorney's ac- C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 481, imputing to a tual or constructive knowledge of ir- litigant facts known by his attorney. regularities in a proceeding conducted Bigsby v. Eppstein (1913) 39 Okla. by the attorney, to his client.
466, 135 Pac. 934, holding a client Baltimore v. Whittington (1893) 78 chargeable with the attorney's knowlMd. 231, 27 Atl. 984, imputing to a city edge of the assignment of a cause for tax collector the knowledge of the ex- trial, and of a judgment rendered. istence of a leasehold estate, acquired Peeples v. Warren (1897) 51 S. C. by his attorney in a foreclosure pro- 560, 29 S. E. 659, imputing to the plainceeding, in which the tax collector tiff in an action to recover property sought to enforce a lien for taxes. claimed by him, knowledge of his at
Bates v. A. E. Johnson Co. (1900) torney that the property was claimed 79 Minn. 354, 82 N. W. 649, imputing by another, who was not made a part to a judgment creditor notice of the to the action. fact that land standing in the name of Presidio County v. Shock (1900) 24 the judgment debtor in fact belonged Tex. Civ. App. 622, 60 S. W. 287, hold